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Ramos v Brenntag Specialties, Inc.

Case No. B248038 (CA Dist. 2 Ct. App., Mar. 21, 2014)

In the underlying action, appellants Flavio Ramos and his wife asserted claims against respondents for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and loss of consortium, alleging that Ramos’s exposure to their products during his employment at a metal foundry caused his pulmonary fibrosis. Respondents demurrered to the claims on the ground that they failed under the component parts doctrine, as applied in Maxton v. Western States Metals (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 81 (Maxton). Relying on Maxton, the trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend and thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal.

With the exception of appellants’ claim for negligence per se, we conclude that the complaint states viable claims, and we respectfully disagree with the holding in Maxton. As we explain, the component parts doctrine does not shield a product supplier from liability when a party alleges that he suffered direct injury from using the supplier’s product as the supplier specifically intended. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to the trial court to enter a new order overruling respondents’ demurrers to appellants’ claims, with the exception of the claim for negligence per se.


On November 19, 2010, appellants initiated the underlying action. Their second amended complaint (SAC) contained claims against respondents for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability based on a failure to warn and design defects, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranties, and loss of consortium.


Judge(s): Nora Margaret Manella
Jurisdiction: California Court of Appeals, Second District
Related Categories: Product Liability
Trial Court Judge(s)
Amy Hogue

Court of Appeals Judge(s)
Lee Edmon
Norman Epstein
Nora Manella

Appellant Lawyer(s) Appellant Law Firm(s)
Kenneth Holdren Metzger Law Group
Raphael Metzger Metzger Law Group
Brian Barrow Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett

Appellee Lawyer(s) Appellee Law Firm(s)
Kevin Place
Eric Blumhardt Archer Norris
Tiffany Gates Archer Norris
Christopher Robyn Bates Winter & Cameron
David Winter Bates Winter & Cameron
Tiffany Birkett Chuck Birkett Tsoong
Stephen Chuck Chuck Birkett Tsoong
Victoria Tsoong Chuck Birkett Tsoong
Roger Mansukhani Gordon & Rees
Matthew Nugent Gordon & Rees
Brandon Saxon Gordon & Rees
Gerhardt Zacher Gordon & Rees
Melinda Cantrall Hurrell Cantrall
Thomas Hurrell Hurrell Cantrall
Michele Barnes K & L Gates
Susan Caldwell Koletsky Mancini Feldman & Morrow
Rosemary Do Lynberg & Watkins
Ruth Segal Lynberg & Watkins
Diane Flannery McGuire Woods
Yaron Dunkel Schaffer Lax McNaughton & Chen
Jill Franklin Schaffer Lax McNaughton & Chen
Trenton Diehl Snider Diehl & Rasmussen
Stephen Snider Snider Diehl & Rasmussen



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on any ground raised in the demurrer, regardless of whether the trial court relied we concur: affirmative defense; and (2) that the fac successfully “‘plead[ed] around’” the specific america, n.a. (2010) 186 cal.app.4th 727, 737-740.) manufacturing process. (id. at p. 86.) the complaint further alleged that the “[c]omponent and raw material suppliers are not liable to ultimate consumers of the product’s hazards. (pfeifer v. john crane, inc. (2013 ) 220 cal.app.4th that is dangerous to foundry workers.” (gray, supra, 676 n.w.2d at p. 281.) certified for publication. component seller to scrutinize another’s product which the component seller has a component part supplier is subject to liability for harm caused by the end product it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground that the w. eric blumhardt, tiffany j. gates and archer norris; kevin l. place for according to the fac, although state and federal regulations identified the defendant and respondent tst, inc. the plaintiff’s injuries. (id. at p. 106.) used as respondents intended in the course of supreme’s manufacturing process. determine whether the fac adequately pleaded around the doctrine, as set forth in goods or material in bulk to a sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially n.w.2d at p. 281.) “sophisticated buyer” rules -- focus on whether the product, before causing injury, perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect.” (soule v. general cal.app.4th at p. 840.) that type of inquiry, however, is inappropriate when a 81 (maxton). relying on maxton, the trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer chuck birkett tsoong, stephen s. chuck, tiffany m. birkett and victoria j. chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and [¶] (c) fails to exercise fac alleges that respondents did not design their products in accordance with supreme’s from using the supplier’s product as the supplier specifically intended. we 3 the sac alleges that those respondents provided the following materials: united that hazards from silica sand to workers engaged in sandblasting were “‘common measures].) not only does the fac contain no admission of such knowledge, it asserts respondent porter warner industries. 21 subd. (a)(1)(2)(3).) allegations were not, in fact, harmful to appellants’ claims, and there is an we further conclude that the fac’s remaining claims for fraudulent which it is supplied, and [¶] (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the stage of a construction or manufacturing process (crane v. sears, roebuck & co. our inquiry is thus focused primarily on a question of law, namely, whether the adequate explanation for the amendments (deveny v. entropin, inc. (2006) 139 allegations inconsistent with the harmful allegations. (state of california ex rel. 1. liability for product defects suffered injuries when exposed to dust from their products while transporting the ramos suffered injuries not from a defective “integrated product” that negligence claim (elsner v. uveges (2004) 34 cal.4th 915, 935-936), the suffer from design defects, and that their suppliers ordinarily are not required to submit a proposed amended complaint or, on appeal, enumerate the facts and for the purpose of grinding metals, and that toxic dust was created when the tools product, appellants argue the component parts doctrine does not shield relieves a supplier of component parts from liability for injuries arising from an warnings of hazards to foundry]; phillips v. a.p. green refractories company they supplied to supreme were necessarily defect-free because they constituted sand products that it supplied. we disagree. the fac provides a list, “by named biosources, inc. (2007) 156 cal.app.4th 1338, 1353, fn. 2.) under the doctrine, supplier. as explained above (see pt. b.1 & b.3, ante), in suitable circumstances, 6 as explained in arena, “[t]o the extent that the term ‘design’ merely means a becomes “defective” simply by the absence of a warning.’” (finn v. g. d. searle the product in a different way is irrelevant . . . . [citation.]” (arena, supra, 63 purpose is to inform consumers about a product’s hazards and faults of which they below, neither the component parts doctrine nor its underlying rationale supports doctrine. (id. at p. 581.) in reversing, the appellate court noted that the complaint doctrine shielded the defendant from liability, reasoning that the defendant built the tank an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for product is put to the use intended or specified by the supplier.16 second doctrine is ordinarily invoked when the supplier provides the product to a 169 cal.app.3d 375, 381-387 [supplier of “ordinary, off-the-shelf” electric motors not the supplier. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at p. 841.) following a survey of c. analysis respondents knew, or should have known, of hazards arising from their products worked as a mold maker, machine operator, and laborer for supreme casting & the second artiglio factor, namely, whether the supplier sold in bulk to a application has ordinarily been restricted to situations in which the injuries were 148 cal.app.3d at pp. 446-448 [manufacturer’s data sheet adequately warned that 943, 947.) in reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we will affirm the order use involves the product’s transformation or its combination with products from 13 the fac alleges that federal and state regulations describe metal ingots intended for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” (evid. code, (los angeles county suppliers are not liable to ultimate consumers when the goods or material they courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn.” (rest.3d torts, because the trial court, in applying maxton, advised them that their claims would specified in artiglio -- presupposes that the product was potentially a component because the foundry was a sophisticated purchaser of sand, the minnesota artiglio v. general electric. co. (1998) 61 cal.app.4th 830, 838-839 (artiglio). (fn. continued on next page.) possibility of an alternative safer “design” for a product, raw asbestos has been appellate court concluded that the defendant was not liable for the injuries because it has been incorporated. (o’neil v. crane co. (2012) 53 cal.4th 335, 355; taylor v. manganese, molybdenum, and titanium). the fac further asserts that those metals can liability litigation (8th cir. 1996) 97 f.3d 1050 is misplaced. there, the plaintiffs torts, products liability, § 5, com. c., p. 134.)18 in several of the cases, the pertinent injuries arose from a finished product sold to with the exception of the claim for negligence per se. be combined with abrasive disks was obliged to warn users that grinding process alleged that the tools were specifically designed to be used with the abrasive discs in tellez-cordova, the plaintiff asserted strict liability claims based on some other element of the system, rather than to the supplier’s component part. supplier may sell a specialized product intended for a particular manufacturing process “suppliers of versatile materials like chains, valves, sand, gravel, etc., cannot be expected into whether the supplier’s product was “inherently dangerous” -- the first factor 275-280.) regarding these doctrines, the court noted that the supplier had warning and design defects against manufacturers of grinding tools the plaintiff the suppliers filed demurrers and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, p. 479; powell v. standard brands paint co. (1985) 166 cal.app.3d 357, 363- 28 negligence per se, the fac stated causes of action not subject to demurrer.21 manufacturing process and the supplier has a limited role in developing and products liability, § 5, com. a, p. 131, italics added.) here, the fac alleges that ruled in the suppliers’ favor without affording the plaintiff leave to amend his solvent could cause skin and respiratory irritation insulated them from liability for had no role in machine’s design and manufacture]; wiler v. firestone tire & rubber co. defendant and respondent j.r. simplot company. breaker, which was rendered ineffective by employer’s error in designing system]; fail because the fac contains no allegation that ramos was exposed to any limestone or amend the complaint to state a cause of action. [citation.]” (id. at p. 879, fn. 9.) medical devices; that the implant manufacturers were “highly sophisticated in section 5 of the restatement third of torts, products liability, which states that the fac alleges those facts, which are also sufficient to establish a claim for (wright, supra, 54 cal.app.4th at p. 1222.) when the plaintiff, a public 7 section 388 of the restatement second of torts states: “one who supplies directly to apprise the plaintiff of the injuries he actually suffered. (schwoerer, supra, 14 contentions. firefighter, used the water cannon, it broke loose from its mount, threw him to the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no control. suffered injuries from medical jaw implants, and asserted products liability claims against 16 we granted a request from the council for education and research on toxics and that ramos’s employer was unaware of the hazards of respondents’ products. application of “bulk sales” and “sophisticated purchaser” doctrines. (see id. at pp. consortium. comment c addresses sand, gravel and other materials when they take the 364.) design of the end-product. the same considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims product -- is also ordinarily pertinent only to injuries arising from an end product no such facts are alleged in the fac.17 against the manufacturer and intermediary suppliers, who secured summary the california supreme court, numerous appellate courts, and the the employer integrated it into the manufacturing system without suitable safety strong mounting system; in addition, the court determined there were triable issues 18 necessarily a sophisticated purchaser. (maxton, supra, 203 cal.app.4th at pp. 93, davis (tex.app. 2007) 254 s.w.3d 471, 475-485 [worker injured when bale fell from show what facts he or she could plead to cure the existing defects in the complaint. 110-114.)10 law. even if it were, however, this factor omits a consideration crucial to the century kentucky, inc. in our view, comment c is inapplicable to the claims asserted in the fac, as amy d. hogue, judge. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with businesses that supplied materials to the implant manufacturer. (id. at pp. 1052-1053.) in type alleged in the fac, we respectfully disagree. knowledge of dangers of cobalt dust]; beale v. hardy (4th cir. 1985) 769 f.2d 213, 214- 19 for similar reasons, respondents’ reliance on in re tmj implants products b248038 intended” by the plaster suppliers “for the purpose of making plaster molds of the type suppliers failed to disclose the hazards of their products to the plaintiff, who suffered from a design defect because it was incompatible with a sufficiently 5 . . . .” the fac contains similar allegations regarding the products from the mold created from plaster, sand, limestone and marble supplied by the remaining the “sham pleading” doctrine is inapplicable because the original 857, 879, fn. deleted (cantu).) “second, if a trial court sustains a demurrer and development of the end product is irrelevant to the rationale underlying the employer’s manufacturing system. (zaza v. marquess and nell, inc. (1996) 144 n.j. 34, material suppliers, namely, the plaster, sand, limestone and marble used to create the (fn. continued on next page.) in sustaining respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend, the trial court component part supplier “for harm to persons . . . caused by a product into which “although sand is a raw material and is not inherently dangerous, it is nevertheless their own parts or materials were nondefective, and they did not exercise control holding in maxton. as we explain, the component parts doctrine does not shield a 669, 672 [supplier of acid not liable for injuries from drain cleanser containing acid as in contrast, artiglio addressed claims against a supplier of a material for accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm caused by defective cause interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. the fac also contains materially similar limiting a supplier’s liability only for injuries arising from an end product into component of the finished product not provided by the defendant. in each case, the defendant and respondent southwire company. applying those factors to the evidence before it, the appellate court under three distinct but potentially overlapping doctrines, courts have limited a respondents’ plaster, sand, limestone and marble were “inherently dangerous,” as asserted in the fac, we disagree with its rationale. for the reasons explained contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law [citation], and we may purchaser -- either an intermediary or an end user -- who knows (or should know) sustaining respondents’ demurrers to the fac without leave to amend, and to passed to, or through, a party who knew (or should have known) of the product’s to state a cause of action under any legal theory, [citation], or in other words, to k & l gates and michele barnes for defendant and respondent alcoa inc. cutting an underground tunnel. (schwoerer, supra, 14 cal.app.4th at p. 109.) facts as alleged in the fac necessarily invoke the application of the component that under the facts alleged in the fac, the component parts doctrine is inapplicable to the suppliers from liability to the plaintiff arising from the use of their metal matter of law, as a sophisticated purchaser. no role in developing. this would require the component seller to develop enter a new order overruling the demurrers to the claims in the fac, with the such application to the facts alleged here. of the hazards, regardless of any warning to the purchaser. (see ibid.) although pp. 833-834.) the plaintiffs contended the supplier knew or should have known dust]; smith v. walter c. best, inc. (w.d. pa. 1990) 756 f.supp. 878, 886-889 [same]; court placed special emphasis on the discussion of the component parts doctrine in sustained. as explained below, with the exception of the claim for negligence per cannon’s water pressure and the strength of its mount. (id. at pp. 1230-1236.) in liable for injuries from meat grinding machine lacking emergency brake because supplier mounted on a fire engine owned and operated by a public fire department. products. the comment states that such basic raw materials generally do not inconsistent allegations, noting that it describes their products as “specialized metal alloys we reach the same conclusion regarding the strict liability claim predicated 29 the court also rejected application of the component parts doctrine, stating: combination with that product, and the appellate court determined that the defendant determined that the manufacturer’s silicone was not inherently dangerous because component parts doctrine underscores its circumscribed application: assn. v. shell oil co. (1996) 51 cal.app.4th 762, 772.) the doctrine is reflected al., claims.20 that transformed them. the mold material suppliers maintain that those supplier, an employee may allege that the supplier, in providing the product to the stang manufacturing co. (1997) 54 cal.app.4th 1218, 1222 (wright), tellez- lacked material control over the finished product. (lee v. electric motor division (1985) in wright, the defendant manufactured a water cannon that had been 1235-1236.) while employed as a laborer, “‘worked with and around’” those metal products, otherwise alleges that ramos suffered injury from exposure to those hazards, the safer “design” for the products, we see no fatal defect in the claim. private right of action for violation of a statute. [citation.]” (johnson v. supra, 203 cal.app.4th at p. 90; arena, supra, 63 cal.app.4th at p. 1191.) only when the component itself has a defect that results in injury, or the supplier alleges injuries from products supplied to his or her employer for use by the relying on the “sham pleading” doctrine, respondents contend that certain doctrine does not target claims by a party alleging that he suffered a direct injury cal.app.4th at p. 106, fn. 2.) integrated, or apparatus built to the employer’s specifications.15 products or their constituents as hazardous, respondents provided no warnings to 3. other claims alleges a direct injury from the intended use of respondents’ products -- not from (pa.super.ct. 1993) 630 a.2d 874, 883 [foundry had full knowledge of dangers of silica defects cause injury. (rest.3d torts, products liability, § 5.)9 component into the design of the product; and [¶] (2) the integration of the component in connection with the negligence per se claim, the fac alleges that the molds, for purposes of the component parts doctrine. we disagree. the fac alleges were properly pleaded. [citation.] however, we will not assume the truth of the first artiglio factor. because we conclude that the component parts doctrine is understandably concluded that the claims in the fac failed under maxton. claims. the allegations establish a duty to warn, as they assert (1) that certified for publication court to enter a new order overruling respondents’ demurrers to appellants’ claims, specifically intended in supreme’s manufacturing process.12 the fac further mold material suppliers note, appellants’ initial complaints alleged that ramos about the hazards inherent in their products. [citation.] the requirement’s manufacturing system that incorporated the defendant’s product, or from an item used in the types of claims asserted in the fac, and thus does not shield respondents from claims by workers alleging that they suffered injury from products used in their required that use of detergent could caused dermatitis]), or its deployment at some not inherently dangerous, as they became potentially unsafe only when used in respondents violated labor code section 6390.5 and its attendant regulations. super. ct. no. bc449958) respondents violated labor code section 6390.5, which requires manufacturers fac alleges that ramos’s injuries resulted from the direct and intended use of supreme court reversed, concluding that there were triable issues regarding the loss of consortium, alleging that ramos’s exposure to their products during his 12 are unaware, so that they can refrain from using the product altogether or evade company. against a supplier of injurious products to their employer. (see johnson v. inc., supra, 179 cal.app.4th at p. 556.) those regulations oblige manufacturers & co. (1984) 35 cal.3d 691, 699.) from a finished product into which respondents’ materials were incorporated, but from similarly, in all but one of the cases, a worker alleged injuries from the employer’s involves the trial court’s discretion, an appellate court employs two separate sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially changed during the regarding the sac with leave to amend, and advised appellants that to state causes (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at pp. 833-834.) artiglio’s statement of the notice may be taken. [citation.]” (ellenberger v. espinosa (1994) 30 cal.app.4th fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranties against several connection with the former, the fac alleges primarily that respondents demurrers to the negligence per se claim were properly sustained. (das v. bank of employer, who had bought many types of metal over a lengthy period, was product. two of these doctrines -- often called the “bulk supplier” and married, the fac is sufficient to support his wife’s claim for loss of consortium. products, mixing them together to form molds, and breaking the molds to remove dangerous when used in a foundry process. [the supplier] specifically develops used in casting operations,” and the other materials were “sold and supplied by [their we begin by discussing the principles governing tort claims involving elements of the defense, as stated in artiglio. generally, a demurrer predicated on an developed interstitial pulmonary fibrosis due to his exposure to metallic fumes and plaintiff asserted claims for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, designed and intended by [the metal suppliers] in furnaces during foundry operations on a defective design. that claim invokes the “consumer expectations” test for inapplicable to the claims alleged in the fac, it is unnecessary to examine their toxins known to cause interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. the fac also alleges that judgment on the plaintiff’s products liability claims on the theory that the cannon’s “‘negligence per se’” has occasionally been applied when a statute establishes a respondents’ products, and not from injuries resulting from the use of any end used in making casting molds in the foundry. (gray, supra, 676 n.w.2d. at pp. 4 after alcoa inc. filed the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on maxton, foundry, and that there was no evidence the supplier had reason to believe the 1270, 1298-1299 (pfeifer).) that showing may be made in numerous ways, demurrered to the claims on the ground that they failed under the component parts providing it to injured party]; walker v. stauffer chemical corp. (1971) 19 cal.app.3d sand for foundry use and has conceded that it understands the manner in which him to dip machine parts into the solvent, he frequently worked “up to his elbows” we are doubtful that the allegation of lengthy use, standing alone, is interstitial pulmonary fibrosis as the result of his exposure to, inter alia, fumes the component parts doctrine. they assert that the doctrine, when applicable, ante), a product supplier may be required to provide adequate warnings to a work. applications of the principles we have discussed are found in wright v. that doctrine, suppliers of component parts or raw materials integrated into an and respondent laguna clay company. (1979) 95 cal.app.3d 621, 627-629 [supplier of tires lacking valves not liable for injuries small unsophisticated company with a relatively small number of employees,” the supplier’s breach of duties regarding those products and the causation of the worker’s the component itself is not defective . . . . if the component is not itself defective, appellants filed their fourth amended complaint (fac), respondents again 3. injuries from product’s use by worker motors corp. (1994) 8 cal.4th 548, 562.) because that test does not require the provided only inadequate warnings regarding the hazards of its sand to the the judgment of dismissal is affirmed solely with respect to the claim for 24 none of whom were aware of the hazards of working with respondents’ products. corp. (1998) 63 cal.app.4th 1178, 1185-1186 (arena).)6 applicable, “raw materials” doctrine. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at p. 839; suppliers’ products as hazardous (including aluminum, chromium, copper, iron, under the first standard of review, “we examine the complaint’s factual here, appellants neither offer nor suggest factual amendments to the fac. 9 section 5 of the restatement third of torts, products liability, states in pertinent whether the defendant had failed to warn about a potential mismatch between the 16 failed to warn the manufacturer. (id. at p. 835.) the plaintiff. (id. at p. 109.) because the plaintiff’s job responsibilities required suppliers] for the specialized purpose of being used to create molds for the casting of a supplier must warn workers of hazards they will encounter when the supplier’s injuries caused by the finished product into which the material was integrated. relevant procedural background specialties, inc. (limestone), and resource building materials (limestone and marble). supreme had operated a foundry for a lengthy period, it must be regarded, as a and distributors to specify hazards related to the products on the labels or in liability for ramos’s injuries. accordingly, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the theory, a plaintiff must prove that the defect in the product was due to the substantially changed during the manufacturing process,” is reasonably viewed as (groll).)7 duty to the ultimate consumers far exceeds any additional protection provided to sand), laguna clay company, (limestone), scott sales co. (limestone), brenntag place special emphasis on comment c to section 5 of the restatement third of 2 the sac also alleged that from 1979 to 1980, ramos performed similar duties products. “generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers several of the other respondents joined in the motion. contained in products with which he worked, the complaint must allege facts establishing not shield the supplier from liability as a matter of law; the supplier must also were “not designed to [supreme’s] exact specifications.” we see no inconsistency, as a respondents also raise other contentions related to maxton and the trial when the goods or material they supply are not inherently dangerous, they sell 271-272.) after an appellate court determined that the worker’s claims failed specific hazards arising from the cannon’s installation for its intended use were purchaser’s use. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at p. 830.) in maxton, the noted above (see pt. b.1., ante), that claim is predicated on allegations that and respondents, united states gypsum co. and westside building material designing the end product. when these factors exist, the social cost of imposing a above, that remark is inapplicable to the fac, which does not allege injuries resulting breach of implied warranties. (id. at pp. 1201-1202.) finally, because the fac 23 according to the employer’s specifications, and that the tank was defective only because gaskets and packing, rather than from defendant’s valves used with the gaskets and greenstone panatier bartlett and brian p. barrow for plaintiffs and appellants. to amend, and entered a joint judgment of dismissal in favor of respondents. this liability claims based on a failure to warn against a silica sand supplier, alleging that they had been injured by silicone breast implants made by a manufacturer who (pfeifer, supra, 220 cal.app.4th at pp. 1296-1297.) 12 the fac alleges that the metal suppliers’ products were “specialized metal alloys the “design defect” claim relies on the so-called “consumer expectation[s]” that the complaint states viable claims, and we respectfully disagree with the the fac also contains claims for negligence and negligence per se. in show that it had some reason to believe the worker knew, or should have known, injuries. “‘bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser doctrine[].’” (see artiglio, supra, 61 plaintiff suffered permanent liver damage, he asserted products liability claims that the mold material suppliers sold or provided their products for a specific use or there, the plaintiffs asserted negligence claims against a silicone supplier, alleging special duty of care beyond that underlying common law negligence. (connell v. persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if: [¶] (a) liability, addresses liability for harm “caused by a product into which the manufactured and sold . . . for specialized applications,” and were “melted as specifically them in other ways. supplier’s liability for injury arising from certain uses or applications of its however, that statute affords workers no private right of action for such violations materials. on the contrary, the fac alleges that the products were specialized 20 the mold material suppliers suggest that because appellants alleged that their doctrine constitutes an affirmative defense. for similar reasons, it is unnecessary to respondents sought judgment on the pleadings regarding the sac, aside amendments that omit harmful allegations in the original complaint or add product itself has a specific intended use, the supplier ordinarily must provide reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it engaged in employment that incorporates or uses a supplier’s component part, its and respiratory irritation, but the employer did not pass those warnings along to references to ramos refer to flavio. worker alleges that he suffered injuries directly from the supplier’s product, but honeywell internat. inc., supra, 179 cal.app.4th at p. 556.) accordingly, which were cut, ground, sandblasted, welded, and brazed during his employer’s defendants who had supplied metal products to his employer. (maxton, supra, 203 with the exception of appellants’ claim for negligence per se, we conclude versatile raw materials that were safe when they left respondents’ control. they received shock from employer’s electrical system that incorporated defendant’s circuit causes the product to be defective . . . and (3) the defect in the product causes the harm.” allege that respondents’ products were sold to supreme in the form of “basic” raw 3 (ibid.) through intermediary suppliers, the employer received the manufacturer’s form of “basic raw material[s],” and sets forth limitations on their suppliers’ ordinarily invoked when a supplier, upon selling a product in bulk to an “end product” are ordinarily not liable for defects in the end product, provided that respondents, united states gypsum co., westside building material co., porter filed 3/21/14 respondents from liability. we agree.5 over the end product. (artiglio, supra, at pp. 839-840; bay summit community other suppliers. appellants’ initial allegations were thus not harmful to their kentucky, inc. and tst, inc. (metal suppliers) provided metal products, which discussion when used as intended in the metal casting process, and (2) that users such as product supplier from liability when a party alleges that he suffered direct injury test for defects. under that test, a product is defective in design if it “fail[s] to preconceived plan, even raw asbestos has a design, in that the miner’s subjective plan of applying the sophisticated purchaser doctrine, have found suppliers of sand and similar 15 respondents contend that a “myriad” of cases have applied the component parts corp. (1991) 53 cal.3d 987, 995; merrill v. navegar, inc., supra, 26 cal.4th at standards of review on appeal. [citation.] . . . appellate courts first review the the direct use of those materials as their manufacturers intended. discussing the application of the component parts doctrine, the eighth circuit remarked: sufficient notice of the solvent’s potential for causing liver damage, the court the metal casting. the fac omitted that broad factual allegation, and substituted against a product supplier, the employer’s status as a sophisticated purchaser does a. standards of review parts doctrine. which defendant’s “on-off” buttons had been incorporated].) appellate court reversed, concluding there were triable issues whether the cannon (schwoerer), and a decision of the minnesota supreme court, gray v. badger manufacturer of the integrated product utilizes the component in a manner that while employed by a different metal parts manufacturer. doctrine to claims resembling those in the fac. we conclude that none of those cases plays a material role in integrating the component into the end product whose use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials but rather to defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects, that is, regarding the claim for negligence per se, we observe that ordinarily, employer, intentionally withheld information regarding the product’s injurious b. governing principles based on maxton, which the court sustained with leave to amend. when into which the supplier’s product has been incorporated. when, as in the fac, a 14 a.d.3d 1346] [worker injured by accidental operation of employer’s aluminum extrusion already charged with responsibility for the integrated product.” (rest.3d torts, chemistry council (1st cir. 2009) 576 f.3d 16, 24-25.) the first doctrine is and respondents alcoa inc. and schorr metals, inc. concluded that summary judgment was proper. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at supra, 171 cal.app.4th at pp. 577-586 [worker’s injuries arose from asbestos-laden the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be and distributors to provide labels on their products in compliance with attendant sustained without leave to amend. appellants are awarded their costs on appeal. various uses, constitutes a design. . . . [w]hen that design violates minimum safety on warning and design defects.11 regarding the warning defect claims, the fac 2. doctrines limiting liability themselves when melted during the casting process, as they released metallic on a theory of strict liability or on a theory of negligence. (merrill v. navegar, packing]; gray v. r.l. best co. (n.y. app. div. 2010) 910 n.y.s.2d 307, 309 [78 require employers to educate their employees regarding those hazards. (ibid.) 17 intermediary who passes it on, warns the intermediary of the product’s hazards. defective products, giving special attention to their application when a worker “defective warning” claims are adequately pleaded. gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed. inappropriate decisions regarding the they released silica dust and other known causes of interstitial pulmonary fibrosis around” metals, plaster and minerals that respondents supplied to supreme. 2. negligence per se claim negligence per se in the fac, and reversed with respect to the other claims in the specifications, and that supreme was unaware of the products’ hazards. claims against respondents for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and not from his employer’s end product, the supplier’s lack of control over the design components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to flavio ramos et al., sufficient to establish supreme’s status as a sophisticated purchaser as a matter of or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom surfaces for painting was combustible]). court’s application of that decision. their principal contention is that the products 21 in a related contention, the metal suppliers suggest that the fac contains pattern, inc. (supreme), which manufactured metal parts through “a foundry and second appellate district defendants and respondents p-g industries, inc. and the pryor-giggey the application of the component parts doctrine was examined in artiglio. theory. [citation.] we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts which *judge of the los angeles superior court, assigned by the chief justice pursuant to article vi, 8 evidence code section 669 provides that a presumption of negligence is on november 19, 2010, appellants initiated the underlying action. their ruling. (b & p development corp. v. city of saratoga (1986) 185 cal.app.3d pleaded. generally, to state a fraudulent concealment claim against a product foundry would provide adequate warnings to its workers. (ibid.) industries, llc. (plaster and zircon sand), p-g industries, inc. (plaster and zircon sand), the appellate court concluded that the doctrine, as set forth in artiglio, shielded determined they did not: “[p]laintiff claims his liver was irreparably damaged, an ltd. (2008) 161 cal.app.4th 651, 658-662; arena v. owens corning fiberglas intended use involves the product’s transformation or destruction (groll, supra, from using a product as the supplier specifically intended. (gray, supra, 676 metals.” 25 94-95.) relying on maxton, respondents argue that because the fac alleges that defendant’s negligence. (ibid.) generally, recovery is permitted for three kinds of dusts during the course of [his] employment, and which caused [his] toxic injuries and __________________________________________ negligence.’ [citation.] [¶] the doctrine of negligence per se does not provide a 1 although both flavio ramos and his wife are appellants in this action, our so concluding, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that it was exempt 129 cal.app.4th at pp. 579-584 [manufacturer of grinding tools specifically designed to brenntag specialties, inc., et liability for design and warning defects when they are integrated into end adequately pleads ramos’s personal injury claims and alleges that appellants are 18 comment c states: “product components include raw materials. . . . regarding the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier [¶] (a) renders the integrated product defective. imposing liability would require the endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the without leave to amend and thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal. knew that excessive exposure to silica dust was hazardous]; cowart v. avondale metz v. ccc information services, inc. (2007) 149 cal.app.4th 402, 412.) as the 2 31 products when he scooped them out of bags, poured them into containers, and lacked material control regarding the particular hazard that caused the injuries. (taylor, manella, j. material safety data sheet warning that exposure to the solvent could cause skin from liability as a “component part manufacturer[],” reasoning, inter alia, that the the fourth artiglio factor -- whether the supplier has control over the end products liability, § 5, com. c., p. 134.) foreseeably dangerous in all those uses. thus, in artiglio, the appellate court cal.4th 56, 64.) a product that is otherwise flawless in its design and manufacture sophisticated purchaser, focuses attention on whether the purchaser knew, or amendments constitute “sham” allegations. we disagree. tsoong for defendant and respondent resource building materials. 215 [foundry had extensive knowledge of dangers from silica dust and appropriate safety cal.app.4th at p. 1186, fn. deleted.) brocken v. entergy gulf states, inc. (tex.app. 2006) 197 s.w.3d 429, 435-438 [worker substantially changed [the product].” in response to that advice, appellants made defects, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranties, and loss of employer’s truck onto conveyor belt owned by employer and provided by defendant]; (bates v. e.d. bullard co. (la.ct.app. 2011) 76 so.3d 111, 113, 114 [evidence showed conceptually distinct, the two rules are sometimes combined under the term, consumers.” (id. at p. 839.) in the court of appeal of the state of california restatement third of torts have recognized that the component parts doctrine apparent to the employer that it would be expected to protect its workers. (ibid.) warnings regarding hazards likely to be encountered in that use, even when the allegations to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal furthermore, application of the component parts doctrine, as set forth in 20 directions. alleges that respondents’ products were specialized materials used as respondents maxton determined that the component parts doctrine is applicable to claims of the negligently failed to warn ramos of the “scientifically known and knowable materials to employers not liable for injuries to employees engaged in making end supports application of the doctrine to the claims asserted in the fac. allegations in the fac must be disregarded. under that doctrine, a court may set koletsky, mancini, feldman & morrow and susan l. caldwell for ramos were unlikely to discover those hazards on their own. because the fac attributable to an item over which the supplier lacked material control, such as the incorporated respondents’ products, but from those products themselves, which he employer’s workers. manufacturing process; and that the supplier had no role in designing the implants. apart from falling outside the letter of the component parts doctrine, the in it, yet his employer provided no protective clothing. (id. at p. 109.) after the concealment, breach of implied warranties, and loss of consortium are adequately to become experts in the infinite number of finished products that might conceivably claim against the manufacturer, the appellate court determined that its conclusion was 30 which the supplier’s product has been integrated. in contrast, when a supplier’s developing and designing the end product.” (id. at p. 839, italics added.) casting molds. according to the fac, the plaster was “specifically designed and injuries alleged in the fac also fall outside the doctrine’s rationale. the this court recently explained, when a worker asserts defective warning claims part: “one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product added.) no such injury is alleged in the fac. furthermore, the fac does not inc. (2001) 26 cal.4th 465, 478.) under either theory, the plaintiff must prove that (taylor v. am. chemistry council, supra, 576 f.3d at pp. 25-26.) in contrast, the artiglio. (fn. continued on next page.) fail if ramos’s exposure to dust occurred “in the course of a process that mining corp. (minn. 2004) 676 n.w.2d 268 (gray). that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.” (casterson v. superior court (2002) suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons and that the products posed known hazards to ramos when used as intended. gamble co. v. superior court (1954) 124 cal.app.2d 157, 159, 162 [warning from a “quench tank” supplied by the defendant after the tank had been integrated into the appeal followed. application of the sophisticated purchaser doctrine to the facts alleged here. as seller’s exposure to liability for defective design, a basic raw material such as sand, the component parts doctrine does not shield a supplier from liability when the supplier harris (1913) 23 cal.app. 537, 541; see 4 witkin, cal. procedure (5th ed. 2008) are created by the use of product as intended by the supplier. (see tellez-cordova, supra, component of a finished product, and it is the sand -- not the finished product -- the component is defective in itself, . . . and the defect causes the harm; or [¶] (b)(1) the (see taylor, supra, 171 cal.app.4th at pp. 584-586.) here, in contrast, the fac products. however, in each case, evidence in the record established that the employer [364 n.e.2d 267, 270-274] [plaintiff injured by accidental operation of punch press into fac further asserts that supreme was not a sophisticated purchaser, as it was “a not ordinarily discover.” (groll v. shell oil co. (1983) 148 cal.app.3d 444, 448 toshiba intern. corp. v. henry (tex.app. 2004) 152 s.w.3d 774, 777-786 [worker following terms: “as a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when 5 appellants raise two other contentions: (1) that the component parts doctrine is an changed during the manufacturing process and the supplier has a limited role in which caused [him] to be exposed to toxic metallic and inorganic fumes, vapors, and schaffer, lax, mcnaughton & chen, jill a. franklin and yaron f. dunkel blasting it out of the ground, pounding and separating the fibers, and marketing them for incorporate their multi-use raw materials or components.” (id. at p. 1057.) as explained products were integrated into molds, the products must be viewed as component parts of the appellate court reversed, concluding that the warnings were insufficient 42 [675 a.2d 620, 624].) the appellate court concluded that the component parts disposition knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for for melting as dangerous materials, and identify certain metals contained in the metal authorities regarding the “‘bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser’” and component injured by accidental operation of aluminum “scrap winder” into which defendant’s part alleges that respondents’ metal products were “inherently dangerous” in (johnson v. honeywel internat., inc., supra, at p. 558.)8 nonetheless, the term however, to the extent maxton can be read to conclude that the component parts without first obtaining specifications for the product’s design from one of its buyers. occupational diseases.” resource building materials is among those named defendants. dermal exposure against which the [material safety data sheet] warned.” (id. at pp. 22 27 metzger law group, raphael metzger and kenneth a. holdren; simon although appellants may rely on evidence of those violations to prove their artiglio, is ill-suited to the assessment of the fac’s claims. to begin, an inquiry demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action.” (ibid.) ramos.13 in addition, respondents failed to comply with their statutory duty to for defendant and respondent scott sales co. states gypsum co. (plaster), westside building material co. (plaster), porter warner employment at a metal foundry caused his pulmonary fibrosis.1 respondents component parts doctrine, and thus to the supplier’s liability. in sum, insofar as appellants filed their third amended complaint, respondents asserted demurrers supply are not inherently dangerous, they sell goods or material in bulk to a hazards. (jones v. conocophillips (2011) 198 cal.app.4th 1187, 1198-1201.) 101 cal.app.4th 177, 183.) as explained below (see pt. c.4 & c.5., post), we conclude the comment is intended to illuminate section 5, which concerns the liability of a therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to the trial ground and fell on him, causing injury. (ibid.) the defendant obtained summary affirmative defense is properly sustained only when “the face of the complaint discloses demurred on the basis of maxton. the court sustained the demurrers without leave 11 as explained in bockrath v. aldrich chemical co. (1999) 21 cal.4th 71, 78-84, hazards. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at pp. 838-839; see taylor v. am. in the underlying action, appellants flavio ramos and his wife asserted from the molten metal and dust from the plaster, sand, limestone and marble. pryor-giggey company, j.r. simplot company, laguna clay company, and scott material safety data sheets provided to employers; in addition, the regulations buyers”; that the silicone materials were substantially transformed during the materials that respondents sold for use in the metal casting manufacturing process, 10 asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims failed under the so-called “component parts purpose, namely, the creation and employment of molds during the metal casting process. fabrication process.”2 while employed by supreme, ramos worked “with and there was no “sham pleading.” in sum, with the exception of the claim for defects, alleging that respondents’ products “failed to perform as safely as an bates winter & cameron, david l. winter and christopher r. robyn for the sac alleged that from 1972 to 1978 and from 1981 to 2009, ramos claims under circumstances resembling those alleged in the sac.4 there, the the fac adequately pleads strict liability and negligence claims predicated appellants maintain the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the of multiple end products, and focuses on whether the supplier’s product was provide warnings regarding the end products, as that would oblige the suppliers gordon & rees, roger mansukhani and brandon d. saxon for defendant it had been safely incorporated into many nonmedical devices, and became [discussing cases].) section 5 of the restatement third of torts, products (1963) 218 cal.app.2d 855, 857-859 [warning required that fluid for preparing when a worker asserts that he suffered personal injuries due to exposure to toxins the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to 5. respondents’ other contentions over which supplier had no control].) applies to harm caused by “finished product[s]” into which the supplier’s product epstein, p. j. 15 “‘may nevertheless possess such risk to the user without a suitable warning that it also applicable to a “warning defect” negligence claim. (schwoerer, supra, 14 injury different in kind from and significantly greater than any consequence of potentially dangerous only when used in breast implants. (artiglio, supra, 61 corp. “‘[t]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates result of exposure to toxic dust released from abrasive discs powered by the tools. lantern and stove fuel should be kept away from source of sparks]; proctor & 10 although the plaintiff in schwoerer asserted only a “warning defect” strict liability mechanisms. (144 n.j. at pp. 47-65 [675 a.2d at pp. 626-636].) here, in contrast, the hurrell cantrall, thomas c. hurrell and melinda cantrall for defendants cal.app.4th at pp. 838-839.) that he contracted silicosis due to exposure to the supplier’s sand, which he had public entity; [¶] (2) [t]he violation proximately caused death or injury to person or sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of the business entity that is of action, they must “plead around . . . artiglio,” as interpreted in maxton. after were melted in furnaces to form metal castings. the casting process used molds dust from the products. (ibid.) industries, inc. (la.ct.app. 2001) 792 so.2d 73, 76-77 [sand supplier provided adequate doctrine, as set forth in artiglio, is ordinarily applicable to the type of claim hazards” of their products. generally, “a manufacturer or a supplier of a product a defect in the product caused injury. (ibid.) in addition, to establish a negligence the danger by careful use.” (johnson v. american standard, inc. (2008) 43 the public that contained the defendant’s product as a component, or from another any finished product, manufacturing system into which the products were in contrast, the fac states no independent claim for negligence per se. as defendant,” of sand and limestone products, . . . to which . . . ramos[] was exposed, or 9 that its silicone materials were not appropriate for use in medical devices, yet it pp. 840-841.) in so concluding, the court observed that the silicone materials were 17 pointing to johnson v. american standard, inc., supra, 43 cal.4th 56, respondents established when a defendant “(1) . . . violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a cal.app.4th at pp. 112-114.) focusing on whether the warnings given provided disregard any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial pleading, § 583, p. 710 [discussing cases].) arising from defective valve, as intermediate manufacturer attached valve to tire before 4. maxton reject the fac’s factual allegations, which we decline to do.19 fac. their principal contention is that the injuries alleged in the fac fall outside end product into which the supplier’s parts have been integrated. because the ramos of “scientifically known and knowable” hazards related to his use of their ordinary user would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable successfully demurred to the complaint on the basis of the component parts the third doctrine is known as the “component part[s]” or, where generally, a plaintiff may seek recovery in a “products liability” case either 14 on appeal, resource building materials contends that appellants’ claims against it manufactured and sold . . . for specialized applications,” and also states that the products likely to be dangerous.” edmon, j.* (vanhooser v. superior court (2012) 206 cal.app.4th 921, 927-928.)14 seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the sufficiently obvious to the defendant to trigger a duty to warn. (id. at pp. 1234, (id. at pp. 840-841.) we next examine whether respondents’ demurrers to the fac were properly gordon & rees, p. gerhardt zacher and matthew p. nugent for defendants mount, rather than the cannon itself, was defective. (id. at pp. 1222-1223.) the on it; moreover, we will consider new theories offered on appeal to support the here, the fac contains strict liability claims for warning and design “the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty of care and standard of care.” exception of the claim for negligence per se, to which the demurrers were properly handled them in other ways, independent of any melting, cutting, or other activity elliot turbomachinery co., inc (2009) 171 cal.app.4th 564, 584 (taylor) torts, which is quoted in maxton and other cases upon which they rely. (maxton, employer’s manufacturing system itself (viewed as the “finished product”), or to had used. the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he had suffered injury as the component is integrated . . . .” as noted in gray, on its face, the component parts when ramos scooped them out of bags, poured them into containers, and handled judgment in their favor on the theory that their warnings to the employer that the respondents’ contention that their products were defect-free would require us to (tellez-cordova, supra, 129 cal.app.4th at pp. 579-580.) the defendants allegations regarding constituents of the plaster, sand, limestone and marble. appellate court found that some of the plaintiff’s claims failed solely because his springmeyer v. ford motor co. (1998) 60 cal.app.4th 1541, 1550-1554.) under press while replacing part supplied by defendant]; ranger conveying & supply co. v. develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and to investigate the suggest that an employer’s status as a sophisticated purchaser, by itself, shields a supplier had full knowledge of the hazards, or that the hazards were apparent to the employer. we turn to decisions predating maxton that addressed product liability knowledge’”]; bergfeld v. unimin corp. (8th cir. 2003) 319 f.3d 350, 354 [foundry assumptions, it is defective. [citation.] whether or not the defendant is able to design under the second standard of review, the burden falls upon the plaintiff to worker alleges that he suffered injury by using a product as intended by its cordova v. campbell-hausfeld/scott fetzger co. (2004) 129 cal.app.4th 577 the component is integrated . . . .” (rest.3d torts, products liability, § 5, italics 11 component, as acid was substantially changed during the process of making the cleanser, products in the manufacturing process. (maxton, supra, at pp. 88-95 & fn. 3.) doctrine.” (maxton, supra, 203 cal.app.4th at p. 88.) the trial court agreed, and regulations (see cal. code regs., tit. 8, § 5194). (johnson v. honeywell internat., in our view, the allegations are sufficient to state “defective warning” respondents alcoa inc., schorr metals, inc., southwire company, century in the instant action, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings 7 defects. the “defective warning” claim alleges that respondents failed to warn the pryor-giggey company (plaster and zircon sand), j.r. simplot company (silica has a significant comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. property; [¶] (3) [t]he death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the contending that appellants’ claims failed under maxton, which addressed similar from liability. as we explained in pfeifer, johnson supports the contrary position. while in the tunnel, he used a solvent his employer had purchased and provided. warner industries, llc., resource building materials, p-g industries, inc., the including the presentation of evidence that the specific dangers were so readily manner . . . .” because the test does not require plaintiffs to identify an alternative in schwoerer, the plaintiff worked as a mechanic on a boring machine in a related contention, respondents observe that several out-of-state courts, in the remaining case, a worker alleged that he suffered injuries from hot materials allegations that ramos’s injuries were due to his exposure to dust from the produced toxic dust].) (cantu, supra, 4 cal.app.4th at p. 890.) “to meet this burden, a plaintiff must doctrine, as applied in maxton v. western states metals (2012) 203 cal.app.4th worker using its products as the supplier specifically intended, even though that inadequate warnings or failures to warn. (anderson v. owens-corning fiberglas were used for the purpose intended by their manufacturers. (id. at pp. 582-583.) although the doctrine may be invoked when a worker suffers injury while should have known, that the supplier’s products were hazardous when put to the without leave to amend, appellate courts determine whether . . . the plaintiff could had obtained silicone from the supplier. (artiglio, supra, 61 cal.app.4th at silica is used in the foundry process. more importantly, the sand is not used as a mcguire woods and diane flannery for defendant and respondent matter of law. [citation.]” (cantu v. resolution trust corp. (1992) 4 cal.app.4th 13 several other parties to submit a brief as amici curiae addressing the proper application of snider, diehl & rasmussen, stephen c. snider and trenton m. diehl for 8 “to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end products.” (rest.3d the amendments described above. under the circumstances, we conclude that 4 the third artiglio factor, namely, whether the supplier’s product “is plaintiffs and appellants, defendants and respondents. 26 section 6 of the california constitution. the record further discloses that appellants amended those allegations only ryntz v. afrimet indussa, inc. (6th cir. 1989) 887 f.2d 1087 [employer had full particularly instructive is gray. there, a foundry worker asserted product determined to have a defective design under the test. (garza v. asbestos corp., 1. strict liability and negligence claims the fabricator that puts them to improper use. the manufacturer of the integrated product restatement third of torts, products liability, explains that rationale in the cal.app.4th 408, 426-427). for the reasons discussed above (see b.3 & c.4., provide appropriate material safety data sheets to his employer, supreme. the fac. the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the orders (tellez-cordova); schwoerer v. union oil co. (1993) 14 cal.app.4th 103 use, of which he knows, or should know, and which the user of the product would honeywell internat., inc. (2009) 179 cal.app.4th 549, 555, quoting millard v. is required to give warnings of any dangerous propensities in the product, or in its 6 determine whether . . . the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a cal.app.4th at pp. 85-86.) the operative complaint alleged that the plaintiff, 949, 959.) “because a demurrer both tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and complaint de novo to determine whether . . . the complaint alleges facts sufficient against sellers of raw materials. to impose a duty to warn would require the seller to appeal from a judgment of the superior court of los angeles county, complaint. (id. at p. 95.) in affirming the judgment of dismissal, the appellate second amended complaint (sac) contained claims against respondents for division four negligence, negligence per se, strict liability based on a failure to warn and design provides its product for a specific use in a manufacturing process, the hazards of which parts doctrines, the appellate court stated: “[c]omponent and raw material lynberg & watkins, ruth segal and rosemary do for defendant and v. sales co. (mold material suppliers).3 according to the sac, ramos developed had been incorporated]; temple v. wean united, inc. (1977) 50 ohio st.2d 317, 323-329 statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) [t]he person 19 se, we conclude the fac states tenable claims (see pts c.1, c.2 & c.3. post).

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