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Ramirez v Balboa Thrift and Loan

Case No. D060057 (CA Dist. 4 Ct. App., Div. 1, Apr. 22, 2013)

Patricia Ramirez appeals from an order denying her motion to certify a class on her unfair competition claim (UCL) against Balboa Thrift and Loan (Balboa). Ramirez's UCL claim is based on Balboa's alleged violation of the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (Rees-Levering Act or Act). (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.)

Ramirez contends the court erred in denying her class certification motion because the court based its denial on an erroneous legal analysis of the Rees-Levering Act. We conclude this contention has merit and reverse the order. We remand to permit the court to consider the propriety of the class certification motion without the improper legal analysis.


In December 2006, Ramirez purchased an automobile from a Honda dealer under a conditional sale contract obligating her to make monthly payments. As part of the purchase, Ramirez filled out a credit application. Shortly after the purchase, the dealer assigned the contract to Balboa. During the next three years, Ramirez often missed required payments. In about May 2009, Ramirez stopped making payments and voluntarily surrendered her vehicle to Balboa.


Judge(s): Judith L. Haller
Jurisdiction: California Court of Appeals, Fourth District
Related Categories: Civil Procedure , Finance / Banking
Trial Court Judge(s)
Richard Strauss

Court of Appeals Judge(s)
Judith Haller
Judith McConnell
Alex McDonald

Appellant Lawyer(s) Appellant Law Firm(s)
Michael Lindsey
Mark Anderson Anderson Ogilvie & Brewer

Appellee Lawyer(s) Appellee Law Firm(s)
Michael Dawson Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
Greg Hafif Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
Herbert Hafif Law Offices of Herbert Hafif



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negative report on her credit report. this case, balboa did not allege, or seek to assert, a common law fraud claim against the contract. (juarez, supra, 152 cal.app.4th at pp. 899-912.) we held the noi must failed to comply with the act and therefore balboa "lost the right to assert a deficiency of america, inc. (2010) 183 cal.app.4th 986, 998 (salenga), disapproved on other after considering the parties' arguments and submissions, the court issued a order.' [citation.]" (caro v. procter & gamble co. (1993) 18 cal.app.4th 644, 655.) a. section 2983.3 possibility does not raise a likelihood that individual issues would predominate over the contract and seeking a deficiency judgment of $13,313.90. 9 versions of the noi during the class period. balboa's counsel also argued that ramirez voluntarily surrendered her vehicle to balboa. d060057 residents whose vehicles were repossessed by or voluntarily surrendered to [balboa] or relevance here, section 2983.2 states: "except as provided in section 2983.8 [pertaining or threatened to commit acts of destruction or failed to take care of the vehicle in a buyer—without need for further inquiry—as to exactly what the buyer must do to cure v. she sought to certify a class of individuals whose vehicles were repossessed by or noi stated that ramirez had the right to redeem the vehicle by paying the total 2983.2(a)(2) that the noi must identify all " 'conditions precedent' " to reinstatement of court erroneously held that an unfair trade practice class action required proof of each collection and repossession costs and fees incurred, including attorney's fees and legal iii. the rees-levering act maintenance of the class action only where substantial benefits accrue both to litigants stated at the hearing that it did not view resolution of ramirez's class certification motion anderson, ogilvie & brewer, mark f. anderson; and michael e. lindsey for the notice period, as well as any late fees or other fees and the amount of those fees. civ. proc., § 382.) the proponent must show the "class action is superior to individual claimed injuries were sufficient to show standing for purposes of a ucl claim. after the surrender, on july 6, 2009, balboa sent ramirez a "notice of intention to 14 (super. ct. no. 37-2009-00099225- also noted it had identified many other individual issues and discussed the fact that court "fail[s] to follow the correct legal analysis when deciding whether to certify a class fraud) against buyers, these rights exist only during the applicable limitations period. in successfully defend the ucl claim based on a retroactive denial of her reinstatement certification, and ignore any other grounds that might support denial." (bartold, supra, over 99.5 % of [the] deficiencies. . . ." balboa's vice-president explained in a declaration lawsuits or alternative procedures for resolving the controversy." (bufil v. dollar become due." (id. at pp. 904-905.) in so holding, we acknowledged "there may be 1 all further statutory references are to the civil code unless otherwise specified. on the issue whether common issues predominate in the litigation, a court must order reversed. the matter remanded for the court to reconsider ramirez's class 20 parties' papers and factual submissions, the court did not rule on the legal argument, but is given within 60 days of repossession or surrender and does all of the following: individuals in the proposed class. ramirez then filed a class certification motion, seeking to certify the proposed voluntarily surrendered to a creditor must be given the opportunity to reinstate the customer's right to reinstatement. . . . discovery to each class member's credit balboa's counsel countered that the court's reliance on section 2983.3(b)(1) to ramirez (or any of the class members), and instead merely sought to rely on a statutory lallana (1998) 19 cal.4th 203, 215 [" ' "[t]he rule and requirement are simple. if the show the existence of individual factual issues was proper because balboa had the ability (1981) 29 cal.3d 462, 469; seastrom v. neways, inc. (2007) 149 cal.app.4th 1496, ucl. (id. at pp. 898-899.) this court reversed, holding the noi did not "provide a level iv. analysis many individual issues in this. i'm going to confirm the tentative ruling." and supported by substantial evidence. with respect to the first (predominance) issue, balboa argued primarily that there violated the act because the noi sent to her did not specifically include the "conditions p. 443; soderstedt v. cbiz southern california, llc (2011) 197 cal.app.4th 133, 151- the act provides detailed rules governing motor vehicle conditional sale contracts exception could be asserted after the statutory time period had expired, balboa did not mcconnell, p. j. supra, 183 cal.app.4th at pp. 998-1002.) the california supreme court has additionally who failed to give timely notice of a statutory exception to the mandatory reinstatement this legal demand as requested, we may be obligated to institute litigation to liquidate this 8 acts. (bus. & prof. code, § 17200.) it embraces anything that can properly be called a creditor who sells a defaulting debtor's repossessed car may obtain a deficiency the exception was not identified in the noi sent to the buyer. identify any other reasons on the record. moreover, it is unclear on the record before us raised in opposition to the class certification motion. in its final order, the court cited summarize the relevant provisions of the rees-levering act. we then examine whether against balboa, alleging that balboa engaged in an unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent individual borrower's lack of knowledge]; mcadams v. monier, inc. (2010) 182 misrepresentation on a credit application) allows a creditor to obtain a deficiency even if during oral argument, ramirez's counsel argued that the court's conclusion was cal.app.4th 174, 187 [reversing court order denying class certification where "trial court the court's conclusion that the noi satisfied statutory requirements and thus the creditor i. class action certification principles act's requirements. (juarez, supra, 152 cal.app.4th at pp. 896-898.) after the court (super. ct. no. 37-2009-00099225- an injunction prohibiting balboa from attempting to collect or recover on invalid 908-909.) but we said "the creditor must provide the buyer with all of the relevant an extension) and "you must also pay any payment, fees, or charges that comes due certification question court must examine the plaintiff's theory of recovery and "assess for the unsophisticated motor vehicle consumer." (salenga v. mitsubishi motors credit moreover, to the extent creditors retain rights to bring affirmative claims (such as state of california claims and defenses, but should not rule on the merits unless necessary to resolve the 22 (§ 2983.2(a).) under section 2983.2(a)(2), this notice must include information about the plaintiff and appellant, surrendered to balboa. based on balboa's interrogatory response as to how many buyer wishes to do so, the buyer must reimburse the seller for all costs, including the preferable to redemption, because reinstatement allows the buyer to recover the car amount(s) of these additional payments or fees, and when the additional sums will extensive information on numerous subjects (set forth in nine separate paragraphs). certification in this case, and it is tempting to consider them in reviewing the court's balboa then moved for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on the noi stated that ramirez must pay $1,567.03 within 15 days of the notice date (or request under this code section, if the seller/holder does not "reasonably and in good sufficient to uphold the order.' " (linder, supra, 23 cal.4th at p. 436; see kaldenbach, patricia ramirez, faith determines that any of the following has occurred . . . ." the statute then sets forth identified several other individual issues that would make the class action unmanageable. mcconnell, p. j. financial group, inc. (2008) 162 cal.app.4th 1193, 1204; accord city of san jose v. within the reinstatement period." (italics added.) the notice also stated that "to learn 2 presentations. not an easy case. i still don't think i can certify this as a class. there's too v. superior court (2004) 34 cal.4th 319, 326; accord brinker, supra, 53 cal.4th at p. "examine the plaintiff's theory of recovery" and "assess the nature of the legal and factual [class claim under the act and the ucl "on behalf of all persons who had received should be provided the right to "investigate" each class member to determine whether it the rees-levering act to require that, as a precondition to seeking a deficiency, a creditor the exact amount you must pay, call us at the telephone number stated above." life & health ins. co. (2008) 160 cal.app.4th 528, 534 [denial of motion to certify class to expiration of the right to reinstate, unless the seller or holder reasonably and in good 10 (§ 2983.2(a).) under the statutory provisions, the noi must conform to specific mailing deficiency claims. analysis. whether there were grounds to deny reinstatement as to each individual class member balboa thrift and loan, secured creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey the law. if he does not obey whether the court would have reached a similar conclusion on the class certification according to the evidence, the total amount collected on deficiencies from all the noi's that "after we send the notice of deficiency and a couple of months go by, except in the further, many of the other grounds for opposing the class certification motion require a relevant factors and in ruling on a class certification motion. (sav-on drug stores, inc. constitutional due process rights. in particular, balboa argues that "it would be denied certification motion and balboa's opposition to the motion in a manner consistent with rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion]; fletcher v. security 13 result, not its rationale.' [citation.] erroneous legal assumptions or improper criteria v. consider ramirez's class certification motion on a proper legal analysis. when a trial expenses expended in retaking and holding the vehicle." (§ 2983.3(d)(1), (5).) although specifically and timely notifies the buyer of the conditions precedent to loan would be both desirable and feasible. 'as a general rule if the defendant's liability can be disputes likely to be presented." (brinker restaurant corp. v. superior court (2012) 53 bank v. superior court, supra, 40 cal.4th at pp. 1091-1092; linder, supra, 23 cal.4th at commission intentionally provided false or misleading information of material court of appeal, fourth appellate district cal.app.4th at pp. 904-912.) ramirez also argued that the requested injunctive and balboa alternatively argues that many other grounds exist for affirming the court's sent during the class period was $170,341.57. the default." (id. at pp. 904, 912.) we thus remanded for the trial court to consider the 15 those third parties in order to reinstate the subject vehicle." she alleged that she has been as an "easy case" and stated it was unnecessary to address certain issues balboa had 3 although a court should avoid addressing the merits of an issue in the context of a for readability, we omit the word subdivision when referring to the act's subdivisions. determination regarding a buyer's reinstatement right, section 2983.2 sets forth strict persons whose conditional sales contract obligations have been discharged in [balboa] also failed to tell [ramirez] the names and addresses of the third parties that had seastrom, supra, 149 cal.app.4th at p. 1500.) cal.app.4th at pp. 998-999, 1000 ["[w]hen a secured creditor pursues a deficiency we have since reaffirmed that a buyer may potentially recover under the ucl for did not engage in an unlawful, unfair or deceptive practice within the meaning of the because balboa had a legal basis under section 2983.3(b)(1) to have denied her voluntary surrender of the vehicle, and that a deficiency of $3,344 was "written off."2 different legal and factual issues regarding whether the noi complied with the rees- of particular relevance here, balboa argued that many class members received noi's that reinstatement exception to conclude individual issues would predominate. although the must issue an noi specifically identifying all conditions precedent to reinstatement, and ramirez's ucl claim is based on her allegation that balboa violated the rees- in juarez, as here, a car buyer whose vehicle was repossessed brought a class deducting the sale proceeds and related charges, there was a balance of $5,574.65. the conditions precedent thereto or that there is no right of reinstatement and provides a had standing because she suffered monetary injury in the form of her $25 payment and a determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the argument is without merit. the legislature did not preclude a creditor from outstanding amount due ($19,420.55) or she had the right to reinstate the installment used improper criteria and made erroneous legal assumptions"]; knapp v. at&t wireless letter stated: "you are required to pay the remaining balance and demand is hereby made even if substantial evidence supported the order"]; ticconi v. blue shield of california law offices of herbert hafif, herbert hafif, greg k. hafif and michael g. certified the class, the court granted summary judgment in the creditor's favor based on balboa answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint alleging a single at trial." the attorneys of record are: in juarez, we interpreted the statutory requirement contained in section issues of fact predominate over common questions of fact. specifically, it is unclear the deficiency amount identified in balboa's letter. reinstatement right based on false statements she made on her credit application in 2006. by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal d060057 12 by the trial court for its ruling. (kaldenbach v. mutual of omaha life ins. co. (2009) 178 conclude this contention has merit and reverse the order. we remand to permit the court time period had lapsed for asserting the statutory exception. incorrect legal analysis, a reviewing court must reverse and remand, unless the trial court reasonable manner; (4) committed, threatened to commit, or attempted to commit ramirez did not make any efforts to redeem the vehicle or reinstate the contract. assumptions. [citations.]" (fireside bank v. superior court (2007) 40 cal.4th 1069, corp. (2003) 29 cal.4th 1134, 1143.) the ucl " 'borrows' violations from other laws by payments that come due and [these amounts] are not stated in those nois. . . ." ramirez's required payments. in about may 2009, ramirez stopped making payments and surrendered to balboa and against whom balboa asserted a deficiency claim. she her credit application"; (2) concealed the motor vehicle from the creditor; (3) committed two code sections of this statutory scheme are of particular relevance in balboa additionally proffered evidence indicating that although balboa's total counsel also clarified that the "persons who were denied reinstatement [in the noi] are form, ramirez's counsel asserted that the different versions would not require an in her supporting papers, ramirez addressed each of the elements of a class claim"; (2) restitution to class members "based on the amount of money each class (see in re tobacco ii cases (2009) 46 cal.4th 298, 311 [when a trial court's decision 3 determine within a 60-day period after repossession whether a buyer is entitled to a representative; (3) ramirez did not incur an "injury" within the meaning of the ucl's restitutionary relief requires the resolution of common factual and legal questions. application would be required to determine if they also lied on the credit application. it any foundational basis showing that such evidence could or would be discovered, this to raise this statutory misrepresentation defense "as a matter of due process." counsel postrepossession notices . . . in which the listed redemption amount [improperly] failed to 1022.) "a certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported appeal from an order of the superior court of san diego county, richard e. l. these costs to reinstate may be substantial, "the option of reinstating a contract is often reinstatement, and then notify the buyer of this decision. given the legislature's manifest provides a statement of reasons for this conclusion. reading together sections 2983.2 court of appeal, fourth appellate district without having to pay the full balance due on the contract . . . ." (juarez, supra, 152 in identical ways and thus common issues would predominate. she also alleged that she some class members; (3) whether ramirez's claims were typical of the class; (4) the instances in which the creditor does not possess information about the amount a buyer business practice based on its violation of the rees-levering act. she alleged balboa certified for publication a conditional sale contract obligating her to make monthly payments. as part of the analysis of each noi to determine the class member's recovery right. balboa also action, 'an appellate court is required to reverse an order denying class certification . . . , factual issues they present are such that their resolution in a single class proceeding 1096, 1106; linder, supra, 23 cal.4th at pp. 439-440.) "the 'ultimate question' . . . is disposition juarez, supra, 152 cal.app.4th at p. 899.) the code section requires a creditor to courts are required to ' "carefully weigh respective benefits and burdens and to allow contract, absent proof of certain statutory circumstances, including that the buyer (1) supra, at p. 1021.) in conducting this analysis, a "court must examine the allegations of motion absent its reliance on the section 2983.3(b)(1) exception. the court specifically vehicle, any person liable on the contract shall have a right to reinstate the contract and "intentionally provided false or misleading information of material importance on his or any amounts the buyer must pay to the creditor and/or to third parties and provide the whether 'the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring discussion the 'names and addresses of those who are to be paid.' " (see juarez, supra, 152 (§ 2983.3(b)(1)-(5).) "exercise of the right to reinstate the contract shall be limited to applicability of any statutory exception within 60 days of repossession if it wants a member paid on [balboa's] invalid deficiency claims during the relevant period"; and (3) certification if the trial court used improper criteria or made erroneous legal assumptions, dawson for defendant and respondent. must pay to a third party to satisfy a condition precedent to reinstatement." (id. at pp. vehicle repossession or surrender, there is no room for reading additional exceptions into on this record, the appropriate disposition is to reverse and remand for the court to in denying ramirez's class certification motion, the court stated: "[i]ndividual ramirez sought various remedies, including: (1) a determination that the noi could find any facts showing the applicability of any of the statutory exceptions. without the seller or holder shall not accelerate the maturity of any part or all of the contract prior 152.) defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent cal.app.4th 889 (juarez).) specifically, ramirez alleged that balboa "failed to inform retroactive denial is for affirmative or defensive purposes. any other conclusion would buyer with the names and addresses of those who are to be paid. the creditor must also she fell within an exception identified in section 2983.3(b). precisely what the buyer must do to reinstate his or her contract." (id. at p. 909.) "in other words, we review only the reasons given by the trial court for denial of class based on a faulty legal premise—that the section 2983.3(b)(1) exception (pertaining to faith" determine one of the exceptions applies, the buyer has a right to reinstate and if the in response to defense counsel's reliance on the different versions of balboa's noi cu-bt-ctl) the nature of the legal and factual disputes likely to be presented," italics added].) [¶] . . . [¶] (2) states either that there is a conditional right to reinstate the contract until raising a fraud defense; it merely required a creditor to raise and discover the claimants with a method of obtaining redress.' " (richmond v. dart industries, inc. 21 instead argues that a denial of its right to a deficiency judgment would violate its dispose of motor vehicle" (noi), notifying her that it intended to sell the vehicle. the pursuant to civil code section 2983.3(b)(1)." superior under the totality of the circumstances. to be paid in order to reinstate the subject vehicle, and the amounts that must be paid to right to assert an affirmative defense as to each class member concerning whether he or whether there were grounds to deny reinstatement as to each individual class member mcdonald, j. division one breach of contract cause of action, claiming ramirez failed to pay the amounts owed on do to cure the default. thus, the statute requires that a creditor inform the consumer of 23 to the date of class certification. this class excludes all [balboa] employees . . . and all ramirez contends the court erred in denying her class certification motion because her unfair competition claim (ucl) against balboa thrift and loan (balboa). ramirez's in her complaint, ramirez alleged a single cause of action under the ucl. the haller, j. levering] act"].) six specific exceptions to the reinstatement right, including the one contained in section and 2983.3, a seller/holder who wishes to preserve its rights to claim a deficiency must may require reversal 'even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court's complaint, asserting that as a matter of law ramirez could not prevail on her ucl claim balance, and you may be assessed all costs and fees." proffer any facts showing that any such exception would apply to any of the other class permitting group action' " and therefore are " 'afforded great discretion' " in evaluating the criminal acts of violence against the seller/holder or its agent; or (5) the buyer knowingly the complaint and supporting declarations [citation], and consider whether the legal and factual analysis of the record, a task best performed by the trial judge in the first instance. judgment, it must follow the statutorily prescribed notice procedures of the [rees- not in the class. the class includes [only] those persons who received an noi that ramirez appeals. judgment, but only by complying with all of the act's provisions. (bank of america v. such as the one signed by ramirez. (§ 2981 et seq.; see juarez, supra, 152 cal.app.4th 16 178 cal.app.4th at pp. 843-844.) the class period; (2) the fact that balboa had settled with or obtained judgments against ramirez brought the action on behalf of the following class: "all california the expiration of 15 days from the date of giving or mailing the notice and all the thereto or that there is no right of reinstatement and provides a statement of reasons certification issues. (ibid.; lockheed martin corp. v. superior court (2003) 29 cal.4th cu-bt-ctl) levering act by failing to comply with the act's requirement that an noi contain the tentative ruling on may 5, 2011, individual issues of fact predominate over common in the noi.3 common legal and factual issues would predominate because the juarez court interpreted individual analysis because "each of the different iterations . . . are defective in the same reinstatement or timely notifies the buyer that there is no right of reinstatement and ii. the ucl order. however, based on our review of the court's statements and written order, it is 11 defense to the ucl claim alleged by class members who were given a reinstatement right specific "conditions precedent" to reinstatement of her vehicle loan. (§ 2983.2(a)(2).) patricia ramirez, [citation.] the community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) right—was unsupported by the rees-levering act, and, in any event, the facts showed to consider the propriety of the class certification motion without the improper legal the deficiency balance. soon after, ramirez's credit report reflected her loan default and several days later, on september 28, 2009, ramirez filed a class action lawsuit in december 2006, ramirez purchased an automobile from a honda dealer under require that we ignore the plain language of sections 2983.2(a)(2) and 2983.3(b). omitted.) individual analysis of each class member's entitlement to recover because balboa had the precedent" to contract reinstatement. (see juarez v. arcadia financial, ltd. (2007) 152 of specificity as to the conditions precedent to reinstatement sufficient to inform the before the end of the notice period, as well as of any late fees, or other fees, the 7 plaintiff and appellant, cal.4th 1004, 1025 (brinker), italics added.) the court may consider the elements of the under this subsection, a seller cannot recover a deficiency unless the noi issues of fact predominate over common questions of fact. specifically, it is unclear contract and obtain a return of the vehicle. with respect to the reinstatement right, the cal.app.4th 816, 829 (bartold).) "appeal of an order denying class certification reinstatement as to each individual class member pursuant to civil code section strauss, judge. reversed and remanded. 2983.3(b)(1)." that balboa would be entitled to assert this statutory exception as a valid affirmative used the vehicle in connection with the commission of a criminal offense. 4 filed 3/21/13; pub. order 4/12/13 (see end of opn.; order received from court 4/22/13) claimed violations of the rees-levering act's noi notice requirement. (see salenga, we concur: a deficiency claim during the period beginning four years before the filing of this action and the courts." ' " (linder v. thrifty oil co. (2000) 23 cal.4th 429, 435 (linder); class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small the determinations expressed in this opinion. appellant to recover her costs on appeal. letter to ramirez notifying her that her vehicle had been sold for $6,187.50, and after 17 under these principles, if a trial court bases its denial of class certification on an predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or ucl prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business order certifying opinion sales and finance act (rees-levering act or act). (civ. code, § 2981 et seq.)1 did not sustain sufficient injury to show standing under the ucl claim, but the court section 2983.3 governs a party's right to reinstate a loan upon the buyer's default were eight different versions of the noi during the class period, many of which raise these arguments raise important issues regarding the propriety of class once in any 12-month period and twice during the term of the contract." (§ 2983.3(c).) the court based its denial on an erroneous legal analysis of the rees-levering act. we a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the reversed where trial court erroneously concluded that the defense of unclean hands was in analyzing whether the court erred in denying certification of the class, we first for publication additional monthly payments coming due after the date of the noi but before the end of ramirez challenges the court's reliance on section 2983.3(b)(1) to deny her class levering act, and therefore the court would be required to undertake an individual due process if [after the 60-day period] it was not allowed to investigate and litigate each separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class understanding ramirez's claim: section 2983.2 and section 2983.3. would violate defendant's due process right to deny this discovery and individual defense order, including (1) the fact that balboa issued at least eight different form noi's during the court: pacific nat. bank (1979) 23 cal.3d 442, 454 [reversal and remand warranted where trial right to later alter its position and retroactively deny reinstatement, regardless whether the specifically stated that it was not making "any determination" on that issue, stating "i saw "even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court's order." ' " (bartold, defaulted payments, applicable delinquency charges, and "all reasonable and necessary apparent that the court relied primarily if not exclusively on the section 2983.3(b)(1) balboa opposed the motion on numerous grounds, including: (1) individual legal denied them a reinstatement right, and, with respect to the class members who received deficiency judgment. this limitation as to a seller's remedies does not establish a 6 1089; see sav-on, supra, at pp. 326-327.) the buyer, the seller or holder repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender of the motor ucl claim is based on balboa's alleged violation of the rees-levering motor vehicle grounds in aryeh v. canon business solutions, inc. (2013) 55 cal.4th 1185, 1196-1197.) reinstating their loans," including "how much they must pay to reinstate their loans and certification motion. we agree this ground was not a proper basis for denying class way," including that "[t]hey [require payment of] storage charges and additional common issues in the litigation. (see brinker, supra, 53 cal.4th at p. 1025 [in deciding allowed them reinstatement." action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.' " (brinker, requirements, must be given within 60 days following repossession, and must provide cal.app.4th at p. 894.) upheld the certification of class claims based on a violation of the rees-levering act's plaintiff and appellant. independently relied on at least one other legally valid and factually supported ground. the statements made on ramirez's credit application were truthful. section 2983.2 governs a creditor's notice obligations after a repossession. (see and factual issues predominate among class members; (2) ramirez is an inadequate class 1500.) however, "because group action . . . has the potential to create injustice, trial state of california factual and procedural background constitutional violation. as recognized by the california supreme court, a secured defendant and respondent. action alleging the creditor violated the ucl by failing to comply with the rees-levering the opinion filed march 21, 2013, is ordered certified for publication. "the party seeking certification . . . must establish the existence of an about one week later, ramirez sent balboa $25, which she said was a payment on division one only the section 2983.3(b)(1) statutory exception as the "[s]pecific[]" reason for its order. "provide a level of specificity as to the conditions precedent to reinstatement sufficient to certification motion. with respect to the predominance issue, ramirez argued that under section 2983.3, a defaulting buyer whose car has been repossessed by or court's final order also refers to "the reasons stated on the record," the court did not [her] of all amounts that [she] must pay to [balboa] to cure the default, including outstanding deficiency balance is approximately $20 million, balboa does "not collect on the statutory scheme. the statutes cannot be reasonably interpreted to allow a creditor the members must individually prove their damages.' " (id. at pp. 1021-1022, fn. although there is no specific time limit contained in section 2983.3 for making the services, inc. (2011) 195 cal.app.4th 932, 939 ["[w]e will reverse an order denying class exception (that is not necessarily equivalent to a common law fraud claim) long after the after a repossession or voluntary surrender. under section 2983.3, "[i]f after default by that in the documents, but i don't think that's part of this analysis." its agents pursuant to a conditional sales contract and against whom [balboa] has asserted the court's stated reasons for denying the motion were based on a correct legal analysis 2983.3(b)(1): "the buyer or any other person liable on the contract by omission or 24 noi requirements. (see fireside bank v. superior court, supra, 40 cal.4th at p. 1076 inform the consumer regarding any additional monthly payments that will come due denied balboa's motion based on its finding that triable issues of fact exist as to whether pursuant to civil code section 2983.3(b)(1)." members. instead, it merely stated that individual issues would predominate because it standing requirement; (4) ramirez's claims were not typical; and (5) class treatment is not 19 business practice and that is forbidden by law. (korea supply co. v. lockheed martin b. section 2983.2 that she did not make any false statements on her credit application. after reviewing the provide the buyer with a notice of intention (noi) to dispose of the repossessed vehicle. at the conclusion of the arguments, the court stated: "i appreciate everybody's class claims under all three prongs of the ucl. (id. at p. 912 & fn. 13.) in asserting its position, balboa does not rely on the statutory language, but tentative ruling stating: "ramirez's motion to certify the class is denied. individual upon you to contact the undersigned by: october 4, 2009. [¶] if you do not respond to available in a ucl action based on the violation of certain insurance code sections].) 81 cal.app.4th at p. 829.) however, " '[a]ny valid pertinent reason stated will be importance on his or her credit application." the class." (richmond v. dart industries, inc., supra, 29 cal.3d at p. 470; see also code balboa thrift and loan, to mobilehome sales], those persons shall be liable for any deficiency after disposition of balboa's "nois uniformly failed to give consumers these conditions precedent to defendant and respondent. 'presents an exception to the general rule on review that we look only to the trial court's patricia ramirez appeals from an order denying her motion to certify a class on inform the buyer—without need for further inquiry—as to exactly what the buyer must intent to set forth the exclusive process for creditors to obtain a deficiency balance after a the repossessed or surrendered motor vehicle only if the notice prescribed by this section equally important for class certification purposes, even assuming the statutory more than 60 days after sending the noi, on september 17, 2009, balboa sent a on appeal from the denial of class certification, we review only the reasons given subtract the credit for unearned finance charges"].) existence of differing forms of injury among class members; and (5) whether ramirez's supra, 81 cal.app.4th at pp. 828.) superior court (1974) 12 cal.3d 447, 459.) at p. 894.) the act's purpose is "to provide more comprehensive protections in financing information it possesses and/or information it has the ability to discern, concerning the law, he may not have his deficiency judgment." ' "]; see salenga, supra, 183 balboa had repeatedly modified its standard noi form and had used eight different trial courts " 'are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of class certification motion, a court may consider the merits where, as here, a class purchase, ramirez filled out a credit application. shortly after the purchase, the dealer therefor." certification is denied pursuant to the reasons stated on the record and the court's deadlines and notice requirements if the seller intends to or does seek a deficiency. of cal.app.4th 830, 843-844; accord bartold v. glendale federal bank (2000) 81 2 there is no explanation in the record for the difference between this amount and to credit bureaus." statement of reasons therefor." (§ 2983.2(a)(2), italics added.) ramirez opposed the motion, asserting that balboa's legal argument—that it could bankruptcy." questions of fact. specifically, it is unclear whether there were grounds to deny class of california residents whose vehicles were repossessed by or voluntarily making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices." (ibid.) reinstatement right, including the timing of this right and "all the conditions precedent individuals fall within the class definition, ramirez asserted there were at least 2,400 certification issue is necessarily "intertwined" with the merits of the case. (see fireside 18 " 'class actions serve an important function in our judicial system. by establishing 5 injured based on the $25 payment and the fact that balboa reported the "deficiency claim assigned the contract to balboa. during the next three years, ramirez often missed the court thereafter entered its final order stating that "plaintiff's motion for class ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among the class members. certification. the court's conclusion was based on an improper legal assumption, i.e., claimed that with respect to this class of persons, balboa violated the rees-levering act rare occasion, balboa does not pursue the customer o[n] the deficiency balance. . . ." an noi providing a reinstatement right, the court would be required to engage in an

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