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Bogue v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Case No. 12291-09 (U.S. Tax Ct., Jul. 11, 2011)

Respondent determined income tax deficiencies of $5,900.85 and $6,738.11, and accuracy-related penalties pursuant to section 6662(a)1 of $1,180.17 and $1,347.62 for petitioner’s 2005 and 2006 tax years (the years in issue), respectively. After concessions, the issues we must decide are: (1) Whether petitioner is entitled to deduct certain transportation expenses for travel between his residence and worksites during the years in issue; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to certain depreciation deductions; (3) whether petitioner is entitled to certain deductions on his Schedule C; and (4) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related penalties for the years in issue.


Some of the facts and certain exhibits have been stipulated. The parties’ stipulations of fact are incorporated in this opinion by reference and are found accordingly. At the time he filed his petition, petitioner was a resident of New Jersey.

Petitioner is an independent contractor based in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. During the years in issue, petitioner lived in a house owned by his fiancé, Janis Pannepacker (Ms. Pannepacker) (we sometimes also refer to Ms. Pannepacker’s house as petitioner’s residence). During the years in issue, petitioner was building an addition to Ms. Pannepacker’s house in his spare time.

During the years in issue, petitioner worked with Raymond J. Mancino (Mr. Mancino) to renovate residential properties. During his 2005 tax year, petitioner worked on properties at the following locations: East Upsal Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wissahickon Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Seminole Avenue, Melrose Park, Pennsylvania. During his 2006 tax year, petitioner worked on properties at the following locations: Seminole Avenue, Melrose Park, Pennsylvania; Albright Avenue, Elkins Parks, Pennsylvania; and Coles Mills Road, Haddonfield, New Jersey. Those five work locations (hereinafter sometimes referred to as worksites) were 20.1, 15.7, 15.0, 14.7, and 4.0 miles, respectively, from petitioner’s residence. He worked at each of the worksites for a number of months and then, when the project at that worksite was finished, he moved to another worksite. Petitioner also received some income from his work as a track team coach.


Judge(s): Thomas Wells
Jurisdiction: U.S. Tax Court
Related Categories: Taxation
Circuit Court Judge(s)
Thomas Wells

Petitioner Lawyer(s) Petitioner Law Firm(s)
Glenn Bogue Pro Se

Respondent Lawyer(s) Respondent Law Firm(s)
Carrie Kleinjan Internal Revenue Service



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mobile, a factor irrelevant to the maintenance and internal revenue code of 1986, as amended, and rule references the same trade or business, regardless of the distance." rev. - 11 - it was not until 2006 that he firmly decided that he would write court rejected a similar argument made by the taxpayer in fausner pursuant to section 162(a) in a suit that "arises in connection required by "the exigencies of business." * * * accounting department at builder's prime had made an error and 46016 (nov. 6, 1985). b. depreciation expenses under rule 155. in reaching the foregoing holdings, we have considered all computer or peripheral equipment, and any cellular phone or other states, supra at 48. nonetheless, we will treat the regular work deductible expense of $1,250. c.b. 28; rev. rul. 190, 1953-2 c.b. 303. pannepacker to the law firm he retained to represent him. he expense. accordingly, we conclude that petitioner is not during the years in issue, petitioner had a storage shed at 8 see kasun v. united states, supra at 1061. the taxpayer's choice petitioner contends that because he lived in cherry hill, building houses and to keep track of his billing. he also used small business jobs act of 2010, pub. l. 111-240, sec. 2043(a), books he intended to write in the future. indeed, it is unclear transportation between his principal or regular place of established that he "[worked] or [performed] services on a not incurred in the pursuit of the business of the commissioner, 63 t.c. 129, 134 (1974). see taproot admin. servs., inc. v. commissioner, 133 t.c. 202, between a taxpayer's residence and a place of business are listed property * * * unless the taxpayer substantiates each commissioner, supra at 114, we made it clear that our holding in taxpayer could allocate expenses between the necessary costs for are part of the philadelphia-camden-wilmington metropolitan consequently, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to deduct petitioner's residence in cherry hill, new jersey, is a taxpayer who pays or incurs daily transportation amount, we generally may estimate the amount of the deductible expense has been paid but is unable to substantiate the precise commissioner, t.c. memo. 2008-287; olsen v. commissioner, t.c. quote on similar tools. he obtained the price quote from home residence (regular work location exception). petitioner contends pannepacker, who has never bought anything from builder's prime. from the record whether petitioner had even conceived of the idea residence to contact building supply stores, and used his desktop (msas) defined by the omb are often quite large, such as the for trips between the taxpayer's residence and temporary also satisfied that, although the canceled checks provided by of a purchase dispute with builder's prime window. on his 2006 dec. 31, 2009. place of business during the tax year. see also leach v. with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or admit it into evidence. petitioner argues, in a separate motion, concession. consequently, we conclude that petitioner is not of the insurance expenses he reported on his schedules c, locations is like the taxpayer described in rev. rul. 190 those issues, the burden of proof remains with petitioner. with walker was limited to the "regular place of business" standard introduced no evidence regarding when he purchased those tools. commissioner, 76 t.c. 839, 849 (1981); curphey v. commissioner, activities of any trade or business of the taxpayer if there expenses. although deductions are allowed for separate "expenditure" means expenses and items (including items such 280a(c)(1), we reject petitioner's argument that his computer month for internet service. ms. pannepacker also accesses the t.c. 28, 32 (1970). within the "work area" of the city that was the taxpayer's tax was carrying his tools in his pickup truck. however, the supreme purchase records for his 1991 ford explorer and for his tools. whether petitioner's office in his residence qualifies as his rul. 99-7, supra, except that a "regular work location" may not see vanicek v. commissioner, 85 t.c. the years in issues were worksites where he performed that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct travel and lodging - 15 - expenses, tolls, auto insurance, and car rental expenses, are not between the taxpayer and the persons being entertained. sec. the landline telephone in the office to contact building supply deduct his expenses for short errands to pick up materials at petitioner for that amount. taxpayer normally has worksites in one msa and only occasionally opinion work sites outside the metropolitan area that is considered written by ms. pannepacker, they were written on a bank account principal place of business: (1) the relative importance of the 2001-132. strict substantiation therefore does not apply, and rul. 99-7, 1999-1 c.b. at 361, which states: "a taxpayer * * * added the flush language following section 280a(c)(1)(c) to is attributable to the tax treatment of an item (1) that was taxpayer to deduct expenses traveling between a "regular place of we do not estimate under the cohan doctrine expenses that are - 32 - "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during commissioner, supra at 446-447. deduct personal expenses. sec. 262(a). type made in this case when the taxpayer's employment is 744 (1973). an automobile is listed property under section is no other fixed location of such trade or business where nucleus and adjacent communities that have a high degree of work. however, petitioner produced no evidence to substantiate commissioner, 117 t.c. 294, 305 (2001). petitioner offered no settlement agreement also refers to the bills from another to reflect the foregoing, respect to his rental activities) to his rental properties after fausner, the irs published rev. rul. 75-380, 1975-2 for 2005 and 2006, respectively. petitioner also deducted $650 petitioner's credit was affected by his bankruptcy, and as part of petitioner's claimed "other expenses" on his 2005 consistent with the holdings of similar cases, the irs has testified that she did not use the office at all during regular building supply stores were for his own residence or for his respectively. after concessions, the issues we must decide are: entitled to deduct the cost of his landline telephone. in fact last) for 1 year or less". id. neither rev. rul. 99-7, only 5 miles to and from worksites. however, if that taxpayer - 13 - claim a deduction for the business use of his office. distinguished from a micropolitan statistical area by having a must strictly substantiate the percentage of business use, and we - 30 - from the account at the direction of petitioner, both she and not in subsequent years), affd. 283 f.2d 487 (9th cir. 1960); see - 31 - but that was a concession in favor of the taxpayer. going between the residence and another work location". - 4 - 16 claimed deductions for car and truck expenses of $9,232 and business" standard employed by the commissioner in rev. rul. 90- 142(a)(2). the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the understatement" of income tax, meaning that the amount of the given that four out of five of petitioner's worksites during the as we explain below, petitioner has failed to present cover instances when people commute long distances to their first circuit explained the reasoning underlying the temporary his car, the bank, and various building supply stores should be renting a car after the 1991 ford explorer became inoperable. with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to they were purchased some time before then. petitioner failed to mistaken about how the omb defines "metropolitan area". the omb 10 work location exception is found in rev. rul. 99-7, 1999-1 c.b. vehicle * * * manufactured primarily for use on public streets, 6 i. whether the burden of proof has shifted under section 7491 such expenses. moreover, petitioner was also performing three exceptions to the general rule that commuting expenses expenses, and section 262(b) provides that the first telephone expand the scope of the home office deduction. that flush 2 113 t.c. 106, 113-114 (1999); wis. psychiatric servs. v. does not apply, and we therefore cannot estimate the amounts of 4. other travel expense deductions and calculating the distances from his worksites to those return. see a. finkenberg's sons, inc. v. commissioner, 17 t.c. that amendment is effective only for tax years beginning after taxpayer's residence and in part at another location, the supreme residence exclusively for his business. although ms. pannepacker - 28 - prove that he is entitled to deduct expenses related to trips purposes. accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has not shown attributable to transporting his tools to and from his worksites. regarding her use of it during evenings or weekends. petitioner documentation that ms. pannepacker spends $33 per month on will not estimate the appropriate allocation using the cohan as we concluded above, most of petitioner's claimed business return or $5,000. the exact amount of petitioner's business" standard as a concession that effectively expanded the 303, which stated that when an employee "is employed for a or acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to may deduct daily transportation expenses incurred in going 274(d). listed property includes passenger automobiles, any type commissioner v. flowers, 326 u.s. 465 (1946); feistman v. distance, because those costs were incurred for personal reasons residence"); frederick v. united states, 603 f.2d 1292, 1295 (8th daily transportation expenses paid or incurred in going respondent is not estopped from asserting a different position in to any underpayment attributable to, inter alia, a "substantial with builder's prime regarding the dispute, a canceled check respect to an automobile, a taxpayer must establish that the "indeterminate." * * * trade or business of the taxpayer, petitioner contends that he is entitled to deduct $2,200 on petitioner has failed to show that he had substantial authority claimed a deduction for $1,970 in legal expenses related to a the taxpayer's residence qualifies under section 280a(c)(1) as - 8 - renovation and constructing an addition on his own residence commissioner, supra; sec. 1.274-5t(c)(2)(i), temporary income tax between a taxpayer's residence and temporary work locations, as noted above, for tax years beginning after dec. 31, business location and another are deductible should not be for a business purpose, i.e., to carry out management duties substantiation requirements of section 274(d) must be disallowed a deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden normally works." the revenue ruling defines a temporary work unsigned portion of his 2004 tax return for the purpose of should refer to the office of management and budget (omb) for a 1. the home office exception regs. such expenses must be reasonable in amount and bear a temporary work location and the situation where the taxpayer has management activities of such trade or business. - 27 - for depreciation of his tools. however, he did not explain how location exception was originally articulated by the commissioner pannepacker's name, including an invoice for internet and cable rationale for the temporary distant worksite exception. however, commissioner, supra at 777. consequently, although petitioner (b) as a place of business which is used by taxpayer's choices about where to live and where to "normally definitions and guidance on their uses (2005). the amount of any additional deductible commuting expenses 73 t.c. 766, 777-778 (1980). in the seminal case on the home the area where the taxpayer lives and normally works. see dahood that settlement expense from mr. mancino, and he also submitted a years in issue. to substantiate his claimed expenses, petitioner opinion by reference and are found accordingly. at the time he the result that it is not likely to be used more than a de to admit petitioner's price quote, we would still disallow miles, respectively, from petitioner's residence. he worked at 3. the regular work location exception taxpayer has met the requirements of section 7491(a). rolfs v. section 262(a) generally disallows deductions for personal his worksites and his residence were nondeductible commuting court has held that there are two primary considerations in - 12 - where a taxpayer's business is conducted in part at the principal place of business. expenses relating to the disallowed mileage for each year with builder's prime window (builder's prime). at some point, including the amounts petitioner claimed for car and truck decision in soliman unfairly denies a home office deduction petitioner is entitled.14 - 10 - to his tax returns for 2005 and 2006, respectively. in addition 775, 782 (1959) (a cash basis taxpayer's legal fees could be are not deductible in later years though incidental to earnings as we read the revenue ruling, on the basis of the caselaw cited sufficient evidence for us to link those trips to particular transportation expenses on trips between the taxpayer's hill, new jersey. during the years in issue, petitioner lived in 2) 1457, 1934. requirements of section 274(d). accordingly, we hold that he is we are not bound by revenue rulings, and we evaluate them deduct his commuting expenses, he should still be entitled to his 2006 tax return for books he purchased between 2001 and 2005. to depreciation expenses on listed property. sec. 1.274-5t(a), used by the taxpayer for the administrative or management between the taxpayer's residence and temporary work c.b. 59, stating that a taxpayer was entitled to deduct the cost submitted a receipt from ms. pannepacker stating that petitioner all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during between the taxpayer's residence and a temporary work location the facts demonstrate clearly that the expenses were location", the two are mutually exclusive. we treated the commissioner's use of the "regular place of residence did not qualify as his "principal place of business" not within his "metropolitan area". because "metropolitan area" philadelphia-camden-wilmington msa. a taxpayer who lives and and both rev. rul. 94-47, 1994-2 c.b. 18, and rev. rul. 99-7, that led to his arrest. those disputes arose in connection with reimbursed for that payment. accordingly, we conclude that it is toolshed. see id. television that shows that ms. pannepacker paid only $33 per locations outside of the metropolitan area where the taxpayer during the years in issue to travel about 15 miles from his petitioner's claim for depreciation of his tools because he years because he did not begin writing seriously until 2006. the because petitioner has failed to qualify under any of the petitioner had removed all of his possessions, including some of rule. see sowards v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2003-180; vaksman not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or under section 280a(c)(1). we held that the "regular place of internet service, and he testified that he uses the internet to petitioner also argues that his use of the storage shed tax year is irrelevant to our decision in the instant case. the court may estimate a taxpayer's deductible expenses, provided business. accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has failed to referred to as worksites) were 20.1, 15.7, 15.0, 14.7, and 4.0 at 362, which states: "if a taxpayer has one or more regular that computers used at a regular business establishment are not functions or activities performed at each location; and (2) the supra; sec. 1.274-5t(c)(3), temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. the depreciation of his 1991 ford explorer, which became during 2001. in any case, because petitioner paid for the books v. commissioner, 113 t.c. at 114 ("since petitioner's residence business (home office exception). the second exception is that residence must qualify as the taxpayer's "principal place of project that petitioner explained were the source of the dispute. his residence. consequently, it was petitioner's normal practice taxpayer will move to a distant location for a temporary job. on his 2006 tax return, petitioner claimed depreciation of in order to be entitled to a deduction for depreciation with general rule [that commuting expenses are nondeductible] to accordingly, he has not satisfied the strict substantiation findings of fact present-law bias in favor of taxpayers who manage their in question were incurred in traveling to a worksite unusually deciding whether the home office qualifies as the taxpayer's as much as 100 miles each way yet not be able to deduct such section 7491(a). generally, the commissioner's determination of from his or her residence. without such a requirement, the was building an addition to ms. pannepacker's house in his spare ii. whether petitioner is entitled to the claimed deductions - 41 - petitioner deducted auto insurance expenses of $2,028 and $1,866 sec. 280f(d)(4) has since been amended by the creating statement from mr. mancino, included among the stipulated another worksite. accordingly, petitioner has failed to show c. legal expenses - 21 - based on the "power to persuade" standard articulated by the of "transporting the work implements by the mode of "principal place of business" requirement under section 280a. the years in issue even if he accepted petitioner's treatment of "regular work location" is contrasted with "temporary work the years in issue. on april 23, 2009, respondent issued and definition of "metropolitan", which petitioner contends is an supreme court explained: exclusive-use requirement in section 280a(c)(1) is an "all-or- determine from his debit card transactions whether purchases at metropolitan area in which he is regularly employed, he may his worksites are deductible under the home office exception even understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax his residence and those worksites. see aldea v. commissioner, her commuting expenses). consequently, we conclude that on a construction project situated at a distance from the he eventually used those books as part of his research for a book - 20 - or van, unless the truck or van has been specially modified with tools and that he should be entitled to deduct them using petitioner to substantiate the majority of those expenses were travel expenses between a taxpayer's residence and a temporary insufficient substantiation to support it. see sec. 1.274-5t(a), establish each element of an expenditure or use. larson v. commissioner v. tellier, 383 u.s. 687 (1966). the deductibility in rev. rul. 90-23, supra. the current version of the regular is unclear as to whether, at the time petitioner made the - 43 - relevant facts were "adequately disclosed in the return or in a $9,657.50 on schedules c, profit or loss from business, attached deductible is that the taxpayer makes a personal choice about petitioner contends that his travel between his residence such an approach is consistent with the approach historically requirements of section 274(d) and the regulations thereunder. with respect to any penalty, including the accuracy-related (1993), we treated as a concession another portion of rev. rul. value of his tools, petitioner attempted to introduce a price to this rule, however, the tax court has engrafted an 14 - 44 - nothing" standard. hamacher v. commissioner, 94 t.c. 348, 357 appropriate response to the computer and information u.s. 111, 115 (1933). section 7491(a)(1) provides an exception book" value when it became inoperable. t.c. memo. 2011-164 "temporary" as contrasted with "indefinite" or we are persuaded by petitioner's evidence that the $1,000 his 2005 tax year, petitioner worked on properties at the transportation used in excess of the cost of commuting by the rule, expenses for traveling between one's home and one's place information, and meetings. sec. 7491(a)(2); see also rule generally, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct unreimbursed windows that petitioner and ms. pannepacker testified she never business as were his personal and living costs in jackson. distant from the area where petitioner lives and normally works. regarding the origin and character of those expenses. we are although he did not claim it on his return, petitioner regs., 50 fed. reg. 46017 (nov. 6, 1985). as we have stated, a are nondeductible have evolved since the supreme court decided accordingly, we will not allow petitioner any deduction for the the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business". as a deduction. he therefore deducted both of those expenses on area that is considered the taxpayer's regular place of expenses lacking the necessary direct relation to the petitioner's expenses. although ms. pannepacker wrote checks the commissioner's position over time." taproot admin. servs., requirement that the temporary worksite had to be distant from maintained a home office in his residence that qualified as his each of the worksites for a number of months and then, when the work concededly would be non-deductible living and personal did testify that he used a separate storage shed exclusively for one worksite for several months at a time before moving on to indefinite duration. in peurifoy v. commissioner, 358 u.s. 59, the taxpayer decided to continue to maintain a home in jackson brief, he contends that $3,200 is a reasonable value for his personal expenses contrast with trade or business expenses, which business" is set forth in section 280a(c)(1)(a) and the flush his ford explorer and toyota tundra, but we note that such exclusive use of his storage shed does not make his residence his year. transportation of his tools to his worksites. taken by a number of other courts. see ellwein v. united states, his principal place of business, a prerequisite for qualification as the supreme court explained in commissioner v. flowers, between the taxpayer's residence and temporary work transportation expenses because the worksite is still within the - 37 - because we have found that no portion of petitioner's taxpayer's employer, the railroad. jackson was his regular - 35 - and worksites qualify under all three exceptions; we will same mode of transportation without the work implements." elkins parks, pennsylvania; and coles mills road, haddonfield, purpose of depreciating them. population core of at least 50,000. however, petitioner's requirement that the taxpayer commute to a worksite distant the cost of tools with useful lives greater than a year is regulations specifically state that the substantiation deductible, the deduction may still be denied if there is building supply stores. respondent acknowledges that such travel residence and temporary work sites within the metropolitan petitioner claimed $1,200 for office expenses on his tax therefore were not listed property under sec. 280f(d)(4). sec. at trial, petitioner attempted to introduce an incomplete, deductible, ordinary and necessary expenses must be "directly - 26 - workplaces for business, rather than personal, reasons. purchased the tools. since he testified that the records section 6662(a) and (b)(2) imposes a 20-percent accuracy-related of $1,180.17 and $1,347.62 for however, over the years, a number of courts added an additional rigid definition would disallow the deduction of travel expenses (1) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct certain pannepacker opened an account in her name that was used only for his business, and ms. pannepacker confirmed petitioner's new jersey, and most of his worksites were across the state line 23, supra, was a less exacting standard than the "principal place t.c. 731, 743 (1985). including the burden of proving that the penalties are move to a distant location when a job is foreseeably of properly substantiates: (1) the amount of such expense; (2) the building supply stores. however, petitioner did not provide 503 u.s. 79, 84 (1992). section 162(a) permits "as a deduction was not his `principal place of business', it follows that the regularly and exclusively used for business purposes. the he subsequently estimated the values of those tools for the respondent contends that many of petitioner's expenses, paid on the way to worksites. he claimed deductions of $660 and at those properties. we see no reason why the rule that during 2006, "i know i'm going forward." personal propensities. * * * decision will be entered deductible if the residence is the taxpayer's principal place of 2. the temporary distant worksite exception "other expenses" on his schedules c amounts for tolls that he if (1) the office is used by the taxpayer to conduct the taxpayer worked during the year, all of which were distant 90-23, 1990-1 c.b. 28, that was inconsistent with our precedent 190, supra: deduction reflects petitioner's estimate of its "kelley blue memorialized the temporary distant worksite exception in rev. is not defined in any revenue ruling, petitioner argues that we telecommunications equipment from "listed property". however, reference to the definitions used by the omb does not support his worksites, but petitioner testified that he typically worked at and his worksites should not be considered commuting because he as the maps introduced by respondent at trial show, memo line, and a settlement agreement signed by petitioner, ms. to a growing number of taxpayers who manage their business taxpayer travels between the taxpayer's residence and a distant requirements of sec. 280a(c)(1). regardless of the distance, are deductible if the taxpayer also commuting time and expenses, and spend additional time with is $1,198. it is not clear from the record how he arrived at a limited duration." implicit in this exception is the in the case of meals and entertainment, the business relationship imposed will be reduced by the portion of the understatement that pays her the following amounts each month: $50 for internet proof is immaterial. see knudsen v. commissioner, 131 t.c. 185, we have held to be the principal place of business with (1990). expenses as utility expenses. verma v. commissioner, t.c. memo. v. commissioner, 413 u.s. at 839. in that case, the taxpayer was however, rev. rul. 90-23, 1990-1 c.b. at 28, defines "regular location as one that "is realistically expected to last (and does because the taxpayer's residence did not qualify as his principal that the burden of proof has shifted to respondent pursuant to on the schedule c attached to his 2005 tax return, understatement will depend upon the rule 155 computations, which 13 approximately 10 miles east of philadelphia. most of did not admit the price quote into evidence. petitioner now united states tax court taxpayers may substantiate their deductions by either home. had his post of duty been in that city the cost of portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was petitioner is an independent contractor based in cherry necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax year for the his residence. contends that he should also be allowed to depreciate the cost of between the taxpayer's residence and a temporary work location in we sustained respondent's objection to that exhibit and did not walker was rev. rul. 90-23, 1990-1 c.b. 28, which allowed a 2006. activities from their homes. thus, the statutory supra, nor any of its predecessors7 commissioner, t.c. memo. 1985-382. the court of appeals for the taxpayer's business are disallowed unless a taxpayer establishes the taxpayer's argument but left open the possibility that a the burden of proof to respondent with respect to those issues. home office qualifies as the "principal place of business" petitioner treated all of the funds in the account as stated: shed at his residence, used the telephone in his office in his and (4) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related of business by the taxpayer * * * we conclude that petitioner is entitled to deduct only the legal accepts work at a temporary worksite on the opposite end of the deductible if the residence is the taxpayer's principal place of 3 or performs services on a regular basis." we infer that the same travel expenses under this subsection only when they are petitioner claimed "other expenses" of $1,000 for the settlement see walker v. commissioner, 101 t.c. 537, 546 (1993); curphey v. instead, we will evaluate greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the to building supply stores by examining his debit card purchases 82,228 (dec. 27, 2000). a metropolitan statistical area is similar telecommunications equipment.4 778 f.2d 506, 511 (8th cir. 1985) (holding that it was necessary used to support a taxpayer's reconstruction of the expenditure minimis amount for personal purposes." sec. 1.274-5t(k)(7), for deciding when a taxpayer's temporary worksites take him sustain respondent's determination that petitioner is entitled to reasonable and proximate relationship to the production or generally will not estimate a deductible expense, however, unless transportation expenses for travel between his residence and business because a home office is located at the residence, is a consequently, are nondeductible personal expenses. see sec. normally works near the outskirts of one msa may normally drive the added costs in issue, moreover, were as unnecessary work location exception reaches a result similar to what the seminole avenue, melrose park, pennsylvania; albright avenue, 168, 175-177 (1993); strohmaier v. commissioner, supra at that petitioner has a substantial understatement of income tax, about the storage shed, and his direct examination of ms. (2001). to meet that burden, the commissioner must come forward credible evidence sufficient to substantiate most items. on section 280a is amended to specifically provide that a hundred miles to work, the nature of these expenditures the record before us would establish petitioner's office temporary distant worksite exception.8 id. at 473-474. by holding that commuting expenses are personal, filed his petition, petitioner was a resident of new jersey. h. rept. 105-148, at 407 (1997), 1997-4 c.b. (vol. 1) 319, 729; exception would be logical if it were limited to distant business, or subject to the requirements of section 274(d). sanford v. commissioner, 135 t.c. 471, 483 (2010). 142 (2007). under that standard, the weight we give revenue service; $30 for a landline telephone; $20 for computer and are deductible provided they satisfy the requirements of section during the years in issue, petitioner worked with raymond j. the first exception, that expenses incurred traveling the office is exclusively used on a regular basis as a place residence was still within the city limits of philadelphia. - 19 - residence and his worksites. year, petitioner worked on properties at the following locations: this exception permits taxpayers to deduct commuting 262(a); fausner v. commissioner, 413 u.s. 838 (1973); activities from their homes to claim a home office deduction even see strohmaier v. commissioner, his business as an independent building contractor. we are transportation, food and lodging. whether he maintained one business" and a "temporary work location". in walker, we following locations: east upsal street, philadelphia, testimony or other evidence regarding the date on which he sec. 167(a); henry schwartz corp. v. commissioner, 60 t.c. 728, time and place of the expense; (3) the business purpose; and (4) what is considered a "regular work location". in strohmaier v. acquiesced to our interpretation of "regular place of business", court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct the costs 1 considered regular work locations. petitioner has not upon which an estimate may be made. vanicek v. commissioner, 85 the books.3 deducted on his 2005 return. see burke v. commissioner, 32 t.c. liable for the section 6662(a) penalty insofar as the rule 155 deduction is allowed with respect to the taxpayer's residence. entitled to deduct travel expenses to and from his home); beale in prior years, he is not entitled to deduct them on his 2006 has worksites in the other msa, the taxpayer would be permitted of his business use of his cellular phone or computer. business and (2) there is no other fixed location of the north, we conclude that those areas are the areas where has one or more regular work locations away from the taxpayer's depreciate his ford explorer. accordingly, we will deem 153 (1928); o'malley v. commissioner, 91 t.c. 352, 361-362 we consider as a preliminary matter petitioner's contention - 22 - categories of expenses. sanford v. commissioner, 50 t.c. 823, some work he was doing as general contractor, but that the such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit deductible because he used his automobile to transport the bags cohan doctrine does not apply, and we therefore will not estimate "principal place of business" under section 280a(c)(1)(a). we who pays or incurs deductible daily transportation expenses residence. * * * d. office expenses petitioner contends that, even if he is not entitled to depreciation to which he is entitled. subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent business. such daily transportation expenses are 1990-1 c.b. 28. expenses. of those expenses will be sustained. the supreme court placed those expenses in the category of evidence that he used his home office exclusively for business indeed, we conclude that respondent's use of the term fees he has substantiated, i.e., $398 for 2005 and $1,423 for prosecution of the railroad's legal business. * * * the fact contention because, as defined by the omb, petitioner's residence normally works." adopting such a rigid definition would that the court has a reasonable basis for making an estimate. desire to maintain a home in jackson while working in nondeductible expenses now governed by section 262(a). such business". sec. 1.162-1(a), income tax regs. additionally, paid to builder's prime was a settlement payment that arose from and made repeated trips between jackson and mobile. the supreme - 3 - internet through her laptop at her home. petitioner contends that we may ascertain how many trips he made - 29 - of writing a book series when he began to purchase the books adequate records or sufficient evidence that corroborates the the place of employment, it is unreasonable to expect that a transport job-related tools and materials. id. at 839. petitioner's worksites during the years in issue were in requirements of sec. 274(d) "apply generally to any pickup truck section 280a(c)(1) provides several exceptions to that general purpose as follows: the toolshed that he used exclusively to store his tools for - 6 - the parties' arguments, and, to the extent not addressed herein, deduction or credit shall be allowed with respect to * * * section 280a(a) provides that, as a general rule, no finally, respondent also acknowledges that petitioner would equally applicable where the taxpayer's principal place of - 39 - from the taxpayer's residence. our decision in that case was msa. production, the burden of proof remains with the taxpayer, house. petitioner did not deduct those expenses as he paid them; "metropolitan area" is not helpful for answering the question of sec. 6662(d)(1)(a). however, petitioner did not provide any evidence that would allow taxpayer who has one or more regular places of business, of proving it incorrect. rule 142(a); welch v. helvering, 290 his important records. among the records he lost were the retainer agreement he signed with the law firm that represented structures used in connection with the taxpayer's business, expenses, he offered canceled checks totaling $1,423 from ms. section 6662(d)(1)(a) as an understatement that exceeds the not provide any testimony or other evidence regarding the extent to keep track of his billing. petitioner, however, offered no of business" requirement for the home office exception with the the first exception is also recognized under rev. rul. 99- place of business" includes a place of business which is worksite. petitioner also received some income from his work as abode or two, whether he traveled three blocks or three of traveling from jackson to mobile, despite the substantial the house report accompanying the amendment explained its year he claimed on his returns. other, regular work locations.10 personal expense. petitioner provided no evidence regarding any the taxpayer may deduct daily transportation expenses incurred in the taxpayer presents sufficient evidence to provide some basis travel expenses between a taxpayer's residence and temporary work integration with that nucleus." standards for defining entitled to deduct travel expenses incurred in driving between requirements under section 274(d), and respondent's disallowance caselaw. in schurer v. commissioner, 3 t.c. 544 (1944), we held the amount of business use of the property. kinney v. - 2 - the intent of the primary principle that commuting expenses are we reject petitioner's argument that the strict additionally, petitioner claimed a deduction of $4,600 for petitioner has not contended, and the record does not support a three exceptions, we hold that his expenses in traveling between v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2001-165, affd. 54 fed. appx. 592 189 (2008). we therefore need not decide whether petitioner has also romer v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2001-168 (holding that deductible because they are commuting expenses. as a general deductions claimed. sec. 6001; indopco, inc. v. commissioner, gross vehicle weight or less." in the case of a truck or van, petitioner's. gross vehicle weight is 6,000 pounds or less. the record does project at that worksite was finished, he moved to another him. petitioner was unable to find any other records to be entitled to deduct travel expenses between different temporary u.s. 39, 48 (1963); kornhauser v. united states, 276 u.s. 145, - 36 - petitioner declared bankruptcy during 1999, following a and not in the pursuit of the business of his employer. the cir. 1979) (commuting expenses to a temporary worksite "a new jersey. those five work locations (hereinafter sometimes id. at 777-778 (citations omitted). according to the terms of the temporary distant worksite exception is also rooted in a judicial exception has been carved out of this petitioner had stolen a deposit. in connection with that clients over the payment of a bill and was arrested in at 743. depreciation of the storage shed on his tax return for either builder's prime billed ms. pannepacker approximately $2,500 for purchased. petitioner testified that the bill was related to 60 (1958), the supreme court summarized the law as follows: as the principal place of business, the home office must be series that he recently published through a self-publishing payable to builder's prime with a note about settlement on the renovations. all of those worksites were temporary as defined in of his work in jackson, was occasioned solely by his automobile was used at least partially for business, and the for listed property that is used both personally and in the entitled to deduct his commuting expenses under the regular work satisfied by petitioner's and ms. pannepacker's testimony taxpayer's own statement. sec. 274(d). to satisfy the adequate were incurred during several contract disputes, including one ms. pannepacker's house where he kept all of his tools when he trips. even the worksite that was farthest from petitioner's issue; and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain other conditions, generally, a deduction is disallowed for an expense for travel, 46014 (nov. 6, 1985), provides: line of a taxpayer's residence will be treated as a personal wells, judge: respondent determined income tax deficiencies accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has failed to produce whether written or oral, containing specific information in - 7 - nondeductible commuting expenses. on the other hand, a computer in his office to research parts for building houses and that shifts the burden of proof to the commissioner as to any glenn patrick bogue, pro se. schedule c, he included a $1,000 expense related to a settlement similarly, in walker v. commissioner, 101 t.c. 537, 550 books purchased by petitioner consist almost entirely of popular traveling expense" under section 162 are subject to the strict see also h. conf. rept. 105-220, at 464 (1997), 1997-4 c.b. (vol. pannepacker, petitioner also provided copies of correspondence respondent determined that petitioner was liable for the as loss and depreciation). time spent at each location. commissioner v. soliman, 506 u.s. 4 years in issue were in either philadelphia or its suburbs to the character of the claim with respect to which an expense was taxpayer who has one or more regular places of business and where to live. in flowers, the taxpayer was a longtime resident to manage trade or business activities from a home office. any transportation expenses during the years in issue. residence qualified as his principal place of business under sec. distant worksite exception as follows: faith with respect to such portion. see sec. 6664(c)(1). petitioner made his trips from his home office (which expenses would be deductible but contends that petitioner failed had paid a lawyer to represent him during 2003 but never claimed documentary evidence that in combination are sufficient to expenses to a job that is temporary, as opposed to 162. section 162(a) provides that a deduction is allowed for petitioner is not eligible to deduct his commuting expenses under worksite must be "distant from * * * [the taxpayer's] he contends that he did not deduct those expenses during prior under rev. rul. 90-23, supra. in strohmaier, we held that after - 16 - (1993), to argue that his travel expenses between his home and 2009, cellular phones are no longer "listed property" under sec. pennsylvania; wissahickon avenue, philadelphia, pennsylvania; and petitioner's residence). during the years in issue, petitioner (c) in the case of a separate structure which is home); dahood v. united states, 747 f.2d at 48 (for commuting other evidence that he used his home office exclusively for his element of the expenditure * * *. this limitation petitioner may have incurred by transporting his tools.11 1985)). may establish an element of an expenditure by "his own statement, rul. 99-7, supra, does not define "regular work location". administrative or management activities of the trade or including substantiation of any item and cooperation with the walker permits him to deduct transportation expenses between his dahood v. united states, supra at 48 (citations omitted). for taxable years beginning on or after january 1, 1986, no substantiate the full amount of his claimed legal expenses for business with respect to the activities involved is his that he traveled frequently between the two cities and cellular phones15 office exception, curphey v. commissioner, supra, the taxpayer recoverable by depreciation. secs. 167(a), 168(b); seawright v. expense deduction of, at most, $16.50 per month. however, in cherry hill, new jersey, and all of his temporary worksites petitioner did exception is not rooted in caselaw. rather, the regular work 446. however, once the commissioner has met the burden of books that most purchasers would read for pleasure. the record penalty. sec. 7491(c); higbee v. commissioner, 116 t.c. 438, 446 flowers. the first exception is that expenses incurred traveling statement attached to the return". sec. 6662(d)(2)(b). metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, 65 fed. reg. establishment" only if that portion of the dwelling satisfies the spend most of his time in mobile, alabama. for personal reasons, supreme court in skidmore v. swift & co., 323 u.s. 134 (1944). in the absence of adequate records, a taxpayer alternatively sec. 280f(d)(4). petitioner's motion to admit a portion of his 2007 tax return, that should be permitted. the metropolitan statistical areas exception which allows a deduction for expenditures of the schedule c for 2005, petitioner claimed a deduction for legal glenn patrick bogue, petitioner v. work" are personal and it is assumed the taxpayer will live near inappropriate because of substantial authority or reasonable their families. moreover, the statutory modification is an petitioner testified that he never received reimbursement for purchases, he intended to use the books as research material for who pays or incurs daily transportation expenses for trips cause under section 6664. see rule 142(a); higbee v. v. united states, 747 f.2d 46, 48 (1st cir. 1984); kasun v. - 18 - pursuant to section 280a(c)(1)(c), the use of such separate exception, yet he has failed to produce testimony or documentary petitioner relies on walker v. commissioner, 101 t.c. 537 and inappropriate to the development of the railroad's record. larson v. commissioner, supra (quoting section 1.274- as his principal place of business. the term "principal place of of $5,900.85 and $6,738.11, and accuracy-related penalties time. - 17 - contemporaneous log is not required, but corroborative evidence section 274(d) supersedes the cohan doctrine for certain temporary worksites were located, she was not entitled to deduct outside the metropolitan area where the taxpayer lives and section 6662(a) imposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20 if his home does not qualify as his "principal place of pursuant to section 280a(c)(1), we nonetheless must consider enabling more taxpayers to work efficiently at home, save the sum of petitioner's legal expenses from 2003 and 2005 the vehicle will be considered a passenger automobile if the rev. rul. 90-23, 1990-1 c.b. at 29, explains the rationale transportation between his residence and the worksites. he lives and normally works are deductible (temporary distant patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2008-187; sec. 1.274-5t(a), temporary we reject petitioner's contention that his storage shed, regular basis" at any of those locations. see rev. rul. 90-23, listed property. sec. 280f(d)(4)(b) provides that any portion of judicially created exception.5 generally, the commissioner bears the burden of production - 5 - moves that we reconsider that ruling. however, even if we were - 9 - 280f(d)(4) and is therefore subject to the strict substantiation deduction will be allowed only to the extent of business use. they were incurred solely as the result of the taxpayer's income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. 46014 (nov. 6, 1985). deductions on the schedule c attached to his 2006 return, petitioner commissioner, 12 t.c. 20 (1949). the irs acquiesced to our in pennsylvania, those worksites were temporary work locations testimony or other evidence that he used the office in his congress did not change the requirement that, in order to qualify petitioner stated with regard to his work on the books that 827-828 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 f.2d 201 (2d cir. 1969). of property generally used for entertainment or recreation, any the committee believes that the supreme court's since the supreme court's decision in soliman, congress has from his worksites to building supply stores. worksites. because expenses for listed property and "any seminole avenue, melrose park, pennsylvania. during his 2006 tax consider each exception in turn. residence is the taxpayer's principal place of business * * *, inevitably lead to some absurd results. in some situations, a because "any traveling expense" under section 162 is subject to preponderance of the evidence, the allocation of the burden of memo. 2002-42, affd. 54 fed. appx. 479 (9th cir. 2003); sec. petitioner used one of the rooms in ms. pannepacker's house definition should apply to "regular work location" under rev. include the taxpayer's residence. we also infer that, because 11 printer use; and $82 for petitioner's share of a joint cellular of legal expenses is determined by looking at the "origin and worksites that were 20.1, 15.7, 15.0, 14.7, and 4.0 miles from considerable distance" from the taxpayer's residence were unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the or more regular places of business is like the taxpayer - 40 - modification adopted by the committee will reduce the under the home office exception. petitioner stored tools in a expenses of $1,250. that amount also included $800 petitioner temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. 46035 (nov. 6, 1985). statement'" to the level of credibility of a contemporaneous 1.274-5t(b)(6)(i)(b), temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. deduct * * * his actual expenses incurred for daily - 42 - we decline to accept petitioner's argument that our holding in one or more regular work locations and travels between the percent of any underpayment that is attributable to causes evidence sufficient to substantiate his expenses. however, instead, he deducted all of them on his 2006 tax return because meals and entertainment, or listed property unless the taxpayer petitioner has the burden of proof on the home office that he made any such trips. however, commuted to a succession of temporary jobs, to deduct a. commuting expenses the court has characterized internet service provider we order below. to the extent that those computations establish exhibits, in which mr. mancino stated that he did not reimburse inoperable during 2005. the $4,600 he claimed as a depreciation - 25 - of business or employment constitute commuting expenses and, whether petitioner's travel expenses are deductible under the he needed for his job. id. at 838. the supreme court rejected his 2005 return.2 if they would not qualify under the soliman standard.6 - 14 - place of business under section 280a(c)(1)(a), he was not to any substantial understatement of income tax, defined in cohan v. commissioner, 39 f.2d 540, 543-544 (2d cir. 1930). we understated his income tax for both of the years in issue. established facts that would qualify him for respondent's exclusively for business entitles him to deduct his commuting expenses were nondeductible commuting expenses, they focused only "outside the metropolitan area where the taxpayer lives and 124 stat. 2560, which removed cellular phones and other similar local transportation expenses incurred in travel between one accordingly, we will deem petitioner's motion moot. sec. 1.274-5t(a), temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. based, in part, on the fact that the taxpayer had no principal petitioner's testimony established that his legal expenses with" the taxpayer's business. united states v. gilmore, 372 court of appeals for the first circuit labeled "absurd" when it 9 during 2005, petitioner had a dispute with one of his pennsylvania when the client reported to the police that supra, to include a taxpayer's residence even though his exhibit were admitted, petitioner would not be allowed to additionally, no penalty will be imposed with respect to any 7, 1999-1 c.b. 361, 362, which states: "if a taxpayer's yecheskel v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 1997-89, affd. without to deduct the expenses incurred in traveling to the worksites in a dwelling unit will qualify as a "regular business "`must have a high degree of probative value to elevate such the taxpayer's "principal place of business". id. accordingly, testimony on that point. it is clear from petitioner's arguments that we erred in refusing to admit that exhibit. even if that the amount of an understatement on which the penalty is nondeductible. impose the relevant penalty. higbee v. commissioner, supra at choice about the location of those worksites. although the government's requests for witnesses, documents, other sufficiently connected to the taxpayer's business. see records requirement, a taxpayer must maintain records and section 212 generally allows the deduction of ordinary and docket no. 12291-09. filed july 11, 2011. to car and truck expenses, petitioner deducted as part of his personal choice to live outside the area where most of her - 46 - * * * for purposes of subparagraph (a), the term "principal msa. accordingly, employing rigid definitions would frustrate consequently, he was unable to get a credit card or open a bank necessary because "it is not reasonable to expect people to inc. v. commissioner, supra at 209. commissioner, supra at 827; larson v. commissioner, supra. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2003-247. certain items during other years. see rose v. commissioner, 55 qualifies for the exception under 280f(d)(4)(b), which provides other use of his vehicle that would satisfy the substantiation also provided part of the complaint filed in that lawsuit and the because we decide those issues in petitioner's favor on the petitioner's 2005 and 2006 tax years (the years in issue), phone plan. petitioner submitted several invoices in ms. dictated by business needs more than personal preference. the facts and circumstances to decide whether the travel expenses our first consideration is whether petitioner's residence is we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit. business. did not claim a deduction for the business use of his residence interpreted "regular place of business" under rev. rul. 90-23, rev. rul. 99-7, supra, and petitioner has not shown that he had business", and we have consistently equated the "principal place a bank account in ms. pannepacker's name to conduct his business, filed his petition with this court. respect to a few factual issues, petitioner presented credible principal place of business under that statute. object to deductions he claimed for commuting expenses during indefinite, in duration. the exception has been deemed divorce. during 2003, the bank foreclosed on his house and sold the amount he spent on the toolshed, nor did he indicate when he specified in subsection (b). subsection (b) applies the penalty temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. 46014 (nov. 6, 1985).12 residence to a worksite. there was nothing unusual about those be distant from the taxpayer's residence. see dahood v. united v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2000-158 (same). supported by "substantial authority" or (2) for which the taxpayer's residence and a nearby temporary work location. the dispute, ms. pannepacker paid $398 to the clerk of court. on his 973, 982-983 (1951) ("expenses incurred and paid in prior years use of his automobile was actually for commuting, a nondeductible penalty under section 6662(a) because he substantially language following section 280a(c)(1)(c) that, by its terms, penalty on any portion of a tax underpayment that is attributable above, the revenue ruling recognizes that taxpayers whose work section 280f(d)(4) and are therefore subject to the heightened establish the amounts of the items reported on his federal income required to be shown on the return for the tax year or $5,000. tax return. sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), income tax regs. statistical area" as "an area containing a recognized population carrie l. kleinjan, for respondent. on the nature of the job: whether it was of temporary or msa, but still within the msa, the taxpayer could end up driving in substantiating the amount of the expense is of his own making. scope of the home office exception. id. at 550. the irs never in order to deduct depreciation on listed property, the taxpayer a taxpayer is entitled to deduct expenses for legal fees that his transportation expenses driving between his residence pannepacker on that subject, that he understood the importance of incurred". united states v. gilmore, supra at 49. pannepacker, and the president of builder's prime. the 15 on his 2006 tax return, petitioner claimed a $400 deduction the taxpayer's trade or business. to take a temporary job at a remote location is therefore pursuant to section 6662(a)1 language was intended to permit taxpayers who manage business only $600 for each year. petitioner now contends that he should us to decide what excess commuting expenses, if any, might be stores. business. as under present law, deductions will be allowed that normally traveled when working at worksites in the first in addition to petitioner's testimony and that of ms. defines the term account. to provide a bank account for petitioner's use, ms. - 23 - in other situations, such a rigid definition would allow rev. rul. 90-23, supra, was superseded by rev. rul. 94-47, supra, reasonable cause for such portion and the taxpayer acted in good consists of many temporary worksites might not always have a the bill from builder's prime was actually addressed to ms. the commissioner considers analogous the situation where a deduct only $600 per year for office expenses, not the $1,200 per may deduct daily transportation expenses incurred in going nonetheless, we decline to adopt any such rigid definition generally bear the burden of proving their entitlement to the business activities from outside their home, thereby t.c. memo. 2000-136 (holding that, because it was the taxpayer's detail as to such element" and by "other corroborative evidence the home office exception remained limited to instances in which roads and highways, and * * * rated at 6,000 pounds unloaded commuting expense deductions that should not be permitted. for remained the same. petitioner's motion moot. similarly, we will deem moot at trial, in order to provide a basis for estimating the respondent conceded to petitioner in the notice of deficiency a mailed to petitioner a notice of deficiency. petitioner timely is unaltered by the circumstance that the taxpayer's post of instance, a taxpayer may live on the border of two msas. if that factual issue relevant to a taxpayer's liability for tax if: (1) location exception. petitioner's cars were trucks, not passenger automobiles, and 7 locations are deductible business expenses under section which he contends should be admitted to show that the irs did not business". the revenue ruling in effect at the time we decided structures for business does not qualify the taxpayer's residence it. the individual who purchased it razed the house before - 24 - of jackson, mississippi, who accepted a job that required him to absurd result would obtain of permitting a taxpayer, who generally, deductions for expenses subject to the strict be entitled to deduct office expenses of $2,184 for each of the research parts and tools. however, ms. pannepacker also uses the respondent has met his burden of production. see prince v. showing that he put his ford explorer into service during 2003. that we should employ the cohan rule and estimate the amount of 12 during the years in issue, and it is impossible for us to "metropolitan area". the revenue ruling does not explain the in full unless the taxpayer satisfies every element of those he determined that he was entitled to such a deduction. on rulings "depends upon their persuasiveness and the consistency of commuting and additional costs that might be incurred to an airline pilot who argued that his commuting expenses were to consider whether the taxpayer's temporary worksites were not contain any evidence regarding the gross vehicle weight of deduction of $800 in legal fees paid during 2003 cannot be of business" standard adopted in our prior cases. id. at 548. to supply evidence documenting his alleged trips. in his brief, decision in schurer and later issued rev. rul. 190, 1953-2 c.b. (we sometimes also refer to ms. pannepacker's house as * * *. for purposes of this section * * * the term vanicek v. commissioner, supra at 743. petitioner provided supra at 473, the core reason commuting expenses are not supersedes the doctrine found in cohan v. commissioner purchased it. he merely guessed what it was worth. generally, a taxpayer must keep records sufficient to exclusive use. nonetheless, he failed to offer any testimony or 5 internet at home, presumably for recreation. 162(a) of the code regardless of the distance. regarding their purchase were destroyed in 2003, we infer that in the event that a taxpayer establishes that a deductible are unable to estimate the amount of depreciation to which 111-112. deductions for a variety of expenses related to his between a taxpayer's residence and a place of business are 208-209 (2009); psb holdings, inc. v. commissioner, 129 t.c. 131, from a criminal matter, as long as the criminal matter is 2007. whether the irs examined petitioner's return for his 2007 revolution, which has made it more practical for taxpayers 2006. worksites during the years in issue; (2) whether petitioner is deducted only in the years during which they were actually paid, 280f(d)(5) defines a "passenger automobile" as "any 4-wheeled in later years"). are to the tax court rules of practice and procedure. any portion of his underpayment. accordingly, we hold that he is constitutes commuting expenses that are not deductible."); see a deductible business expense for 2005. e. other expenses accordingly, petitioner has not commissioner of internal revenue, respondent also met the conditions of section 7491(a)(2) required to shift $400 for tools he purchased in a prior year. his tool purchase for a home office meeting the above two-part test only if defines a "metropolitan statistical area" or a "micropolitan mancino (mr. mancino) to renovate residential properties. during we do not follow the commissioner's reasoning. it is unclear why administrative or management activities of a trade or substantiation requirements of section 274(d).16 finding, that his pickup truck was so modified. strictly temporary (as distinguished from an indefinite) period tax return, petitioner claimed schedule c "other expenses" of the president, omb bull. no. 06-01, update of statistical area location exception as a concession by the commissioner.9 petitioner used the computer in the office to research parts for * * * * * * * sufficient to establish such element." larson v. commissioner, those regulations also require strict substantiation with respect - 38 - clarifies only section 280(c)(1)(a). accordingly, petitioner's - 45 - not entitled to deduct any depreciation on his automobile.13 and computers are listed items under which is exclusively used on a regular basis-- work locations away from the taxpayer's residence, the taxpayer records were lost when his house was destroyed during 2003, and some of the facts and certain exhibits have been stipulated. in the instant case, petitioner's only work locations during containing petitioner's funds. however, petitioner's claimed reg. 46020 (nov. 6, 1985). even if an expense would otherwise be unlike the first two exceptions, the regular work location urban area with more than 50,000 people. however, petitioner is rev. rul. 94-47, 1994-2 c.b. 18; rev. rul. 90-23, 1990-1 a track team coach. the taxpayer's regular place of business. thus, for a the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business". to be in car rental expenses for the period during 2005 when he was (1988). a taxpayer is even permitted to deduct legal expenses evidence that would allow him to claim depreciation on the (5th cir. 2002); bishop v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2001-82; requirements. sanford v. commissioner, supra at 827-828; larson iii. whether petitioner is liable for accuracy-related penalties petitioner is entitled to certain deductions on his schedule c; expense, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude 1999-1 c.b. 361, explicitly exclude a taxpayer's residence from maintaining his home there and of commuting or driving to united states, 671 f.2d 1059, 1061 (7th cir. 1982); epperson v. substantiation requirements of section 274(d), the cohan doctrine commuting expenses, no matter how close these jobs were to a house owned by his fiancÚ, janis pannepacker (ms. pannepacker) originally, when courts decided whether transportation 280f(d)(4). collection of taxable income. id. however, a taxpayer may not fully depreciated by 2005 and 2006. without more evidence, we this judicially created home office exception, the taxpayer's deduction of $50 per month for office expenses. accordingly, we the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to that vehicles are commonly used passenger automobiles. moreover, the on his returns for the years in issue, petitioner claimed rule: for the regular work location exception by analogy to rev. rul. deductible). depot during april 2008. we sustained respondent's objection and trade or business where the taxpayer conducts substantial petitioner's contracting business and that he was never in sum, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to deduct duty was in mobile, thereby increasing the costs of temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. 46014 (nov. 6, 1985). work location to be deductible, the temporary work location must returns for both of the years in issue, but respondent allowed published opinion 173 f.3d 427 (4th cir. 1999); whalley v. penalties for the years in issue. worksite exception). the third exception is that travel expenses substantiation requirements of sec. 274(d) do not apply because computations show a substantial understatement of income tax. held that there was an implicit requirement that, in order for the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d), the employment and such job". incurred extra living expenses in mobile, while doing much expenses to a temporary worksite to be deductible, that temporary offer any evidence that the cost of his tools were not already the temporary distant worksite exception. the second msa even if the distance traveled were no greater than 5t(c)(1), temporary income tax regs., 50 fed. reg. 46016 (nov. 6, - 33 - statistical area. see office of mgmt. & budget, exec. office of also dehoney v. commissioner, t.c. memo. 2006-108. accordingly, commissioner, t.c. memo. 1996-533. as his office (office) during the years in issue, but he did not his commuting expenses under the first exception. see strohmaier expenses stemming from a series of temporary worksites at which prosecution of the business. the character of such expenses place of business" as "any location at which the taxpayer works was not using them. however, he did not deduct any expense for $2,200 for books that he purchased during the preceding 5 years. - 34 - lawsuit stemming from a contract dispute. to substantiate those deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers that his residence was his principal place of business. temporary work locations. however, as it stands, the regular straight-line depreciation over 4 years. petitioner contends $400 for those tolls during 2005 and 2006, respectively. as part the taxpayer conducts substantial administrative or philadelphia or its suburbs to the north. petitioner had five memorandum findings of fact and opinion production or collection of income. sec. 1.212-1(d), income tax business hours, she did not include in her testimony anything petitioner timely filed his federal income tax returns for described in rev. rul. 190 who pays or incurs daily expenses on trips between the taxpayer's residence and one entitled to certain depreciation deductions; (3) whether petitioner normally worked. accordingly, we hold that he was not the parties' stipulations of fact are incorporated in this (a) as the principal place of business for any billed him for windows he did not order. because petitioner used

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