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Whistleblower Loses Claim for Share of Extra Recovery

United States ex rel. Bogart v. King Pharmaceuticals, 493 F. 3d 323 (C.A. 3, July 16, 2007)

Edward Bogart (Bogart) filed a False Claims Act qui tam whistleblower lawsuit on behalf of the U.S., the District of Columbia, and ten states against several pharmaceutical companies (King) for misrepresenting pricing information supplied to the federal and state governments. The pricing information was required for King’s participation in numerous Medicaid programs.

After the filing of the lawsuit, Bogart was permitted to notify the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU). Once NAMFCU received notice of the pending lawsuit it formed a committee to negotiate settlements between King and NAMFCU members (these members were states which did not have qui tam statutes and thus were not parties to the suit that Bogart filed).

King eventually settled with the jurisdictions for which Bogart had filed the qui tam lawsuit, and Bogart received counsel fees and expenses of $800,000 plus relator fees of over $9,000,000.

King also settled with the 40 non-qui tam states for over $30,000,000. Bogart argued that his actions produced those settlements, and that he was entitled to up to one-third of the $30,000,000. The District Court ruled that Bogart was not entitled to any of that money and Bogart appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not even have control over the non-qui tam states' settlement proceeds. The Court of Appeals also held that Bogart's litigation did not create a "common fund" that included the NAMFCU settlements funds.

The common fund doctrine “provides that a private plaintiff, or plaintiff’s attorney, whose efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim, is entitled to recover from the fun the costs of his litigation including attorney’s fees”. The Court reasoned that there was no common fund because each non-qui tam state separately negotiated its settlement agreement with King.

The Court further held that there was no inequity to remedy because Bogart’s legal fees and expenses were all paid for and it was King that subsidized the litigation. Finally the Court stated it was not going to overrule the District Court’s decision because Bogart’s request was a “thinly-veiled attempt to obtain a reward for providing information about King from States that have declined to enact qui tam laws”.

The Court stated that applying the common fund doctrine to the additional settlements would judicially impose a reward status for whistleblowers on states that have chosed not to enact such rewards. The decision of the District Court was affirmed.



Judge(s): Vanaskie
Plaintiff Lawyer(s) Plaintiff Law Firm(s)
Joel M. Androphy Berg & Androphy
Samuel L. Boyd Boyd & Associates
Guy W. Horsley, Jr. Office of the Attorney General of Virginia
Timothy Lewis Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP
Jennifer Nestle Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP
Carl Solano Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

Defendant Lawyer(s) Defendant Law Firm(s)
Michael T. Reynolds Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP
David Engstrom Harkins Cunningham LLP
John Harkins Jr Harkins Cunningham LLP
Eleanor Illoway Harkins Cunningham LLP



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2800 one commerce square and apart from the settlement, observing: non-qui tam states' settlement proceeds based upon its monarch pharmaceuticals agreement referred to the aggregate settlement amount and the settlements, bogart filed a third amended complaint, asserting harkins cunningham attorneys seeking recovery of a fee under common fund enrichment was not at the expense of either the litigating parties "[t]he mere fact that a large number of parties has reached such __________ 410 f. supp. 2d at 409-10. virginia, are not parties to this litigation. although bogart may cal. gov.code 12652(g)(2); nrs petition for fees, claiming that he was entitled to one-third of 71-5-183(d)(1)(a); 6 del. c. on december 20, 2005, bogart filed his first amended worldwide plaza against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately id. at 410. common fund doctrine where the judgment expressly provided third amended complaint, bogart asserted: to the current context would essentially impose parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. at that point, king was by way of contrast to the context in which prudential was settlement against a defendant. 31 the disbursement even before filing objections to the report and we also reject bogart's contention that, notwithstanding customers after a magistrate judge had issued a report and under the fca fee-shifting provision, 31 u.s.c. 3730(d)(1).4 expenses attributable to prosecution of the fca claims were and the district of columbia that had statutes similar to the appellees court reasoned that bogart's request for litigation costs under increase, or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim, "[j]urisdiction over the fund involved in the litigation allows a claim. bogart did not participate in negotiating the settlements suite 300 settlement agreements." 20 did not have jurisdiction over the fund or the non-qui tam states, monarch pharmaceuticals; cendant, 404 f.3d at 187; gen. motors corp., 55 f.3d at 820, vanaskie, district judge. on other grounds, 205 f.3d 97 (3d cir. 2000). the common fund doctrine was simply a veiled attempt to obtain relief recommended by a judicial officer, nor did king 10 (2007). actions and insurance subrogation." id. moreover, the district district court would no longer have jurisdiction to provide from district judge common fund, although he did not specify whether this 2001 pennsylvania avenue, nw a regulatory scheme for rewarding the relator for ex rel. edward bogart; common fund, this figure only represents the sum of the b. regard, bogart represented that he had "committed, in summary, contrary to the assertion of bogart's counsel 15 ii as the district court observed: reward for providing information about king from states that 1998), involved a class action settlement in which the defendant arguments presented by virginia that the eleventh amendment presented here. for instance, in re prudential ins. co. am. sales by the states pursuant to separate settlement agreements), rev'd behalf of the non-qui tam states. significantly, but for the rockwell int'l corp. v. united states, 127 s. ct. 1397, 1402 n.2 district of columbia allow "not even if the district court had such authority, an award to 31 u.s.c. 3730(b)(1). designation. their enrichment was not at the expense of [bogart] or [his] amounts somehow constitutes a common fund in the manner of name of the united states to recover for alleged false or there must still be a sound basis that the party was investigation or commitment of time or resources allowed such claims to be made against them. under these order to be considered a "material factor" and king pharmaceuticals; 8 settlement agreements with the individual states, and that recognition of a common fund appropriate here. lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated the supreme court first recognized the common fund 18 arise only under the namfcu agreement and the state defendant." 31 u.s.c. 3730(d)(1). bogart and king filed a not disburse any settlement amounts in the face of injunctive expressly stated that "king's obligation to pay the state non-qui tam states' settlement proceeds. the settlement amounts what bogart contends are his legal fund." (appellant's br. 32-34.) none of the cases cited by the honorable thomas i. vanaskie, united states district 3729-3732.2 granted attorneys' fees and expenses under erisa, but denied claimants, and does not involve a settlement negotiated by the 2 3730(d)(1). (app. 765.) while portions of the record indicate to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's the common fund doctrine. edward bogart, 409-10. therefore, the district court denied bogart's request consideration of the common fund doctrine to avoid inequity limited to a narrow range of situations involving "trust law, class regard, bogart, citing savoie v. merchants bank, 84 f.3d 52 (2d in excess of $9 million. king also entered into settlement assessment of the reasonableness of a fee the defendant has 31 u.s.c. 3730(d)(1) did not "include services performed with fca, seeking a relator's share and attorneys' fees under these pool of money generated to which the non-qui tam states had a on october 31, 2005, the united states, the states, and __________ received by the united states exclusive of the amounts received law." king made payment only after the district court had defendant, rather than the plaintiffs, ultimately bore the entire the non-qui tam states retained their own counsel to negotiate independently by non-qui tam states who, with the exception of that king misrepresented pricing information it supplied to the court. maximum. see 740 ilcs 7 incorporatedthisopinionintoanorderdenyingbogart'srequest under the so-called `common fund relief' as asserted in (d.c. civil no. 03-cv-01538) court "control over a fund or jurisdiction over the parties. . . ." agencies would undermine the equitable 6 (cont'd) obligation to pay the united states was independent of king's that results where one party bears the cost of litigation that f.3d 173, 187 (3d cir. 2005) (quoting in re gen. motors. corp. richmond, va 243219 a fee award under the common fund doctrine. discussing the final judgment, dismissing "[a]ll claims and counts, including bogart once again failed to specify within the submission common fund theory of recovery did not apply. id. at 409-10. 7 settlement." (id. at 1035.) because king, rather than bogart, circumvent any applicable procedural rules in "defiance of the 3704 travis states under the common fund doctrine. though one might vincent v. hughes air west, inc., 557 f.2d 759, 774 n.15 maybecreditedforextra-judicialbenefitscreated, whether this percentage constituted a relator's share or counsel agreement gave it control over the non-qui tam states' to fees, costs and expenses with king." (id.) it thus appears has not cited any authority that holds that jurisdiction over the non-qui tam states, he has shown nothing more that would make association of state attorney general offices that coordinates counsel for appellee 19 a. of common fund relief. is entitled to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, settlement agreement with king. while bogart argues that the (b) denied bogart's request for an award from the non-qui tam whether plaintiffs' attorneys were entitled to a fee award under doctrine is an exception to this rule. it "`provides that a private respect to relator share issues and post-fairness hearing motion states, 982 f.2d 1573, 1580-81 (fed. cir. 1993). therefore, we followed. separatelynegotiatedandindependentsettlementsbetweenking award from the common fund generated. the benefit. allowing private counsel to receive washington, dc 20006 was the valuation of claims to be pursued through the adr negotiated settlement agreements between the non-qui tam state of delaware their own attorneys' fees. id. at 241-42. the common fund its approval. to the contrary, the federal settlement agreement counsel for appellees u.s.c. 3730(d)(1). ten of the 13 after the completion of pertinent discovery. produced settlements totaling more than $30 million for the percentage represented a relator's share or counsel fees. relator's extension of the common fund doctrine 825 eighth avenue non-qui tam states, bogart unsuccessfully argued in the district recovered by non-qui tam jurisdictions. in paragraph 221 of the v. philadelphia, pa 19103 state of california ex rel. edward bogart; counsel." brytus, 203 f.3d at 246. a qui tam statute, including service of the district judge: hon. marvin katz non-qui tam states. indeed, bogart does not argue to the (app. 1066.) king thereafter satisfied its obligations to the states. see 31 u.s.c. 3730(c)(2)(b). bogart claims that the 23 and the non-qui tam states. as the district court observed, a request for "common fund relief" with respect to amounts court to prevent . . . inequity by assessing attorney's fees to grant such request would pervert the intentions process plus the valuation of other aspects of the settlement. "did not compromise on the amount of his statutory entitlement expense.'" id. at 245 (quoting boeing co., 444 u.s. at 478). effectively impose qui tam statutes on sovereign state of his attorneys' fees claim. bogart noted in his first amended at the time bogart filed the second amended complaint, settlements the so-called "common fund" because the consideration of bogart's preliminary injunction motion until may support common fund relief). state of texas settlement agreements because (1) the federal settlement settlements does not mean that the sum of the settlement 14 argued on may 8, 2007 the common fund doctrine is equitable in nature, including attorneys' fees.'" in re cendant corp. sec. litig., 404 the employee retirement income security act of 1974 impermissibly narrow view of what constitutes a "common 16 of states which have decided not to codify qui tam the ten states were california, delaware, florida, hawaii, "qui tam is short for `qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se pa. 2006). new mexico argued that its false claims statute did responsibility to approve king's settlement with the united whether or not it is prudent for state governments amount as attorneys' fees under a common fund theory of tex. hum. res.code 36.110(a); attorneys' time and expense and . . . effort which resulted in [a] entitlements. thus remains a party to this case. 6440 north central expressway, #600 accordingly, bogart and his attorneys did not create a common committee to negotiate a settlement with king on behalf of its 22 boyd & associates we determined that "there is no inequity to redress" because the more severe liability on the non-qui tam states n.39 (3d cir. 1995)). in light of our decision, it is unnecessary to consider the lacked control over the purported "common fund." after notice of this lawsuit, the namfcu formed a not apply because king's alleged fraudulent activity had ended (a) denied bogart's motion for a temporary restraining order; office of attorney general of virginia bondholders. the court held that the plaintiff, who incurred the iii. * states would have been to commence litigation on their own. schnader harrison segal & lewis samuel l. boyd t e n n . c o d e a n n . not apply retroactively and dismissed the claim under the new states under the common fund doctrine; and (c) approved the significantly, the attorneys' fees were not payable from the 1132(g)(1), and plaintiffs' counsel sought an additional award the dismissal of the qui tam states' claims against king and the 822. bogart contends that the district court took an was payable to the non-qui tam states. bogart did not disbursed the entire settlement amount of $9 million to its united states and each individual state. although the federal 3 legally obligated to make payments to the non-qui tam states, states bogart added to this case in amended complaints. united bogart argued alternatively that he was entitled to a share whistleblower reward statutes on 38 sovereign intended to avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of the bogart would be inappropriate. first, we agree with the district common fund doctrine is but a thinly-veiled attempt to obtain a benefits others was not implicated because new mexico and resolution of all of bogart's claims, "with the exception only of new mexico has settled bogart's claim for attorneys' fees. and/or sovereign immunity preclude an award against it under redress. "the [non-qui tam states] may have been enriched, but dallas, tx 75206 district of columbia mexico false claims act.5 district court concluded that a common fund did not exist added).) there is nothing in the settlement agreements executed underthe"americanrule,"litigantsgenerallymustbear circumstances, the district court properly concluded that edward bogart, individually; 1205(a); hrs 661-27(a); state of virginia asserting that this is a "classic" common fund case, agreements with the nearly 40 states without qui tam legislation statesunderthestatesettlementagreementsandthenamfcu neither fact, however, shows that the non-qui tamstates' appellant/relatoredwardbogart("bogart")commenced 3 of new mexico's settlement under the common fund doctrine. non-party beneficiaries are unjustly enriched, it is not at the 2005 market street ex rel. edward bogart; settlement agreement noted that king agreed to pay the states in a well-reasoned opinion, the district court concluded that the ex rel. edward bogart; united states ex rel. merena v. smithkline beecham corp., statutes, effectively requiring them to offer a a reward for providing information about king to states that of stare decisis. see sprague, 307 u.s. at 166; cf. city of of columbia, and ten states with qui tam legislation.1 ex rel. edward bogart; king executed separate settlement agreements with the that the fees and expenses incurred by bogart in connection with cravath, swaine & moore for the eastern district of pennsylvania n.m. stat. ann. 27-14-9(a). fees based on the benefits created by public virginia, however, refused to pay any amount to bogart, and counsel for appellant no merit in bogart's contentions, we will affirm the district ________________ cir. 1996), argues that king is liable for its "`defiance of the on appeal from the united states district court prison health services state of massachusetts ex rel. edward bogart; for the reasons stated, we will affirm the district court.8 preserves the right of the litigant or counsel to an settlement agreements with king. id. second, the primary common fund doctrine should apply in this instance. first, the american service group; more than twenty percent" (20%). 478 (1980). the doctrine operates to charge an award against to reward whistleblowers, it is not the role of this practice." (app. 1137 n.3.) he also asserted, however, that he ex rel. edward bogart; and the state settlement agreements." (app. 282 (emphasis for the recovery by non-party beneficiaries. in other cases cited but not limited to, common fund allegations against all states ex rel. edward bogart; "king's obligation to pay the state settlement amount . . . shall at oral argument, this is not the "classic" common fund case. interstate efforts to prosecute medicaid fraud claims members. the purpose of assessing the value of the settlement judge for the middle district of pennsylvania, sitting by klawock v. gustafson, 585 f.2d 428, 431 (9th cir. 1978) on a motion to dismiss filed by new mexico, one of the two 4 (collectively, "king") ultimately settled the claims of the state of florida ipso in hac parte sequitur,' which means `who pursues this california and nevada allow up to before: rendell and jordan, circuit judges, bogart, however, involves circumstances similar to those the district court addressed bogart's claim for relief and the fact that bogart's claim for common fund relief was still (filed: july 16, 2007) court to say. june 17, 2004, to assert claims on behalf of appellee virginia association of medicaid fraud control units ("namfcu"), an filed a joint stipulation of dismissal and order, acknowledging philadelphia, pa 19103 fees. the amended petition, however, stated that king had the fund itself, rather than to impose personal liability against a thoughbrytuswasanerisacase,itsreasoningjustifies recommendation proposing that $500,000 of the settlement __________ 357.210(1). louisiana and the jennifer j. nestle another reason for denying common fund relief in this $50,637,093, the agreement explicitly stated that king's states and king, the only recourse available to the non-qui tam settlement agreements. among other things, bogart alleged that approximately $12.5 million. id. at 240-41. plaintiffs sought state of illinois while the states possessing qui tam statutes have agreement. on march 15, 2006, the district court entered a court's determination as to new mexico, bogart did not oppose court that he was entitled to be paid up to one-third of that the court's jurisdiction." (appellant's br. 55.) savoie, discretion, but exercises plenary review over the lower court's to recover a relator's fee from sovereign states that have not have declined to enact qui tam laws providing for such a reward. persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing the other bondholders to share in the recovery without and vanaskie,* paid in full by king. where, as here, someone other than the 5 may 19, 2004. the district court agreed that the statute could or their counsel." id. governments that have decided against such legislation. id. at (9th cir. 1977). it lacked the authority to award common fund relief from the on march 3, 2006, the qui tam states, king, and bogart recommendation. id. unlike the defendant in savoie, king did added). application of the common fund doctrine thus requires because the united states, the qui tam states, and the non-qui purported fund or the parties against whom bogart directed his bogart, a former employee of king, alleged relief, even though the non-qui tam states were not participants claims were paid by king. and finally, bogart essentially seeks (25%) of the final judgment or attorneys'feesundererisa'sstatutoryfeeprovision,29u.s.c. ex rel. edward bogart this litigation. bogart was also permitted to notify the national determined an additional fee award was not warranted. id. on proceeds be held in escrow pending a determination as to decided, this case is not a class action, does not involve an appeal, this court affirmed the district court's decision denying carl a. solano [argued] (administrative policy change attributable to litigation efforts 1600 market street, suite 3600 __________ motion for a temporary restraining order. the court deferred tam states negotiated and executed "separate and severable" eleanor m. illoway bogart sought recovery of up to one-third of the purported funds to be paid or monetary benefits provided to class 24 id. at 337. in this litigation, because king was the party responsible for litigation generates a pool of money, either through a judgment (cont'd) he also asserted claims on behalf of ten states ex rel. edward bogart; in boeing co., the supreme court explained that 246. "the class members may have been enriched, but their court impose the inequitable result of imposing a and litigation expenses attributable to prosecution of fca district court that he "committed, approximately, $800,000 of 52 f. supp. 2d 420, 440 (e.d. pa. 1998) (calculating relator's expense of the plaintiff. see brytus, 203 f.3d at 245. bogart contends that the district court had control over the in brytus, plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit under portion. see, e.g., boeing co., 444 u.s. at 479, 481; the recovery of fees under the common fund doctrine because it he would be irreparably harmed if king paid the non-qui tam greenough, 105 u.s. at 529; wininger v. si mgmt. l.p., 301 the court noted that the common fund doctrine has never been 6 pass such statutes.5 13 on october 30, 2005, one day before the announcement 2 state of virginia the "classic" common fund case, like a class action, the fees and expenses of approximately $800,000, plus relator fees decision whether to award attorneys' fees for abuse of "contribut[ing] their due proportion of the expenses." id. at 532. more than an initial impetus behind the creation of conclude that, given its title, the petition was for counsel fees, applied in a qui tam action, but rather its application has been court that bogart's litigation did not create a common fund. in against king under the false claims act ("fca"), 31 u.s.c. 165 b.r. 344, 348 n.14 (bankr. d. me. 1994). this case."7 thirty-three percent (33%). see party to any of the settlement agreements. court's jurisdiction over king allowed it to award common fund tothesettlementagreements,thepaymentofthesettlementswas counsel to recover substantial fees from settlements negotiated __________ virginia's motion to dismiss. virginia, like new mexico, is the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by bogart may have precedential united states court of appeals or settlement, to which the beneficiaries are entitled to claim a recover up to twenty five percent than the qui tam states, even though the non-qui reject bogart's contention that king is liable to him for payment houston, tx 77002 improper in light of his claim to common fund relief. in this for common fund relief as to new mexico, and later 5 party or beneficiary. see in re smithkline beckham corp. sec. and new mexico, respectively, which had recently enacted false schnader harrison segal & lewis not parties to this litigation. each state individually negotiated john g. harkins, jr. edward bogart alm gl ch. 12, 5f(1); 5 settlement amount [of $50,637,093], or any individual state's 900 east main street however, is readily distinguishable. there, the defendant bank with king as well. bogart did not participate in these settlement by the non-qui tam states that would indicate they were subject nor did the district court have jurisdiction over the complaint and the opportunity to review and $30,397,776 paid to the non-qui tam states constitutes the new york, ny 10019 share under 31 u.s.c. 3730(d) based upon the amount no. 06-2098 court was not persuaded by bogart's arguments that the on october 31, 2005, the district court denied bogart's joel m. androphy be pursued under a plan that had been put into place separate case is there is no inequity that needs redress. bogart's fees and brytus v. spang & co., 203 f.3d 238, 244 (3d cir. 2000). fraudulent claims submitted for payment to the united states. jurisdictions with qui tam statutes, and bogart was paid counsel paragraph 221 of the plaintiff's third amended complaint." the common fund doctrine. id. at 54. the defendant bank made illinois, louisiana, massachusetts, nevada, tennessee, and 9 participate in the negotiation of the settlements and was not a 4 entitling the non-party beneficiaries to recover under principles on september 22, 2004, in anticipation of impending by bogart, the efforts of counsel had created binding precedent coming forward, those which have none will contrary. bogart does contend, however, that the district which resulted in [the] settlement." (id. at 1035.) king paid bogart approximately $800,000 in full satisfaction to restrain king from making any payments pursuant to the principles. instead, this case presents an attempt by bogart's cost of litigation under erisa's statutory fee provision. id. at 1984), another case cited by bogart, the court of appeals for the "application of the common fund theory cannot be justified in the united states permitted notification to the qui tam states of amount of $410 million to resolve claims through a streamlined without qui tam statutes." (id. at 25.) this timely appeal 175/4(d)(1); fla. stat. 68.085(1); practice litig. agent actions, 148 f.3d 283, 295-96 (3d cir. plaintiff, or plaintiff's attorney, whose efforts create, discover, approximately, $800,000 of attorneys' time and expense . . . same grounds asserted by new mexico. in light of the district 21 not receive payment before the united states was paid. state of tennessee action on our lord the king's behalf as well as his own.'" plaintiff ultimately bears the costs of litigation, there is no this qui tam litigation on behalf of the united states, the district we have also recognized the common fund doctrine. see, e.g., berg & androphy petition for fees that the amount king agreed to pay pursuant to the district court did not have jurisdiction over either the (cont'd) we have jurisdiction over bogart's appeal pursuant to as to the remaining non-qui tam states.6 before new mexico's false claims statute went into effect on bogart's litigation did not create a legal entitlement on $20,239,317 was payable to the qui tam states; and $30,397,776 fees and expenses had been paid by king. finally, the district state governments that have decided not to enact virginia also moved to dismiss its claim against king on the bogart filed amended complaints on july 1, 2003, and propriety of including in the valuation those claims that would appellant ex rel. edward bogart; in puerto rico v. heckler, 745 f.2d 709, 711 (d.c. cir. united states of america a similar conclusion in this matter. under the fca, bogart was expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the king announced an aggregate settlement of $124,057,318. of entitled to "reasonable attorneys' fees and costs," and "[a]ll such defendant, alone, is sufficient to confer authority to grant states ex rel. bogart v. king pharms., 410 f. supp. 2d 404 (e.d. 11 25 prudential had agreed to pay. moreover, we questioned the regard, the court observed that granting bogart's request would was to determine the reasonableness of the $90 million fee agreed to pay a set amount in counsel fees in addition to a base entire expense of the litigation, was entitled to an award of fees to pay the former $787,088.56 pursuant to 31 u.s.c. common fund . . . . id. at 408. to district court approval or control. the district court thus share thereof, shall arise only under the namfcu agreement opinion 2-308.15(f)(1). successful litigant. boeing co. v. van gemert, 444 u.s. 472, inequity to redress because, irrespective of whether the i effectively a non-qui tam state. the aggregate settlement proceeds payable to the non-qui tam federal and state governments as a condition of its participation ultimately subsidized this litigation, there is no inequity to wyeth pharmaceuticals; ex rel. edward bogart; that "the common fund doctrine `rests on the perception that portion thereof allocated to the states, and (2) the states could for the third circuit on march 12, 2003, bogart commenced a qui tam action supreme court's decisions in greenough and boeing, we noted 12 higher award in qui tam actions than the federal district court's power to approve the federal settlement finally, bogart's request for litigation costs under the the fca allows a relator to ex rel. edward bogart; jointstipulationwiththedistrictcourtwherebythelatteragreed fund for the benefit of the non-qui tam states. states with existing qui tam statutes them. as noted above, relator would have this in various medicaid programs. michael t. reynolds [argued] claims statutes. in accordance with the fca, the original alternative dispute resolution process. at issue in prudential law' in disbursing the full settlement amount to a party outside to the recovery. the common fund doctrine 17 1 have declined to authorize payment of relator fees. id. in this payment of the settlement amounts. see knight v. united (see app. 22.) this amount, $73,420,225 was payable to the united states; recovery. he has appealed the district court's ruling. finding state of louisiana under the common fund doctrine in connection with its decision state of nevada making payments to the non-qui tam states. bogart, however, principles which underlie the concept of the 8 discussions. only a court order could impose a duty on king to withhold doctrine in internal improvement fund trs. v. greenough, 105 king's disbursement of the purported "common fund" pursuant settlements were under the district court's control or subject to ex rel. edward bogart; timothy k. lewis state of new mexico have been the "impetus for the creation of the benefits" to the litig., 751 f. supp. 525, 531 (e.d. pa. 1990); in re dn assocs., ("erisa") that yielded a favorable judgment to the class of been higher, bogart conceded in a subsequent filing with the 28 u.s.c. 1291. this court reviews the district court's __________ investigate. see 31 u.s.c. 3730(b)(2). state of hawaii government or other states who have chosen to under the common fund doctrine. id. at 241. the district court while a party need not be the only catalyst in claim. instead, each non-qui tam state separately negotiated a guy w. horsley, jr. [argued] agreed to pay in addition to the amount to be recovered by and execute the settlement agreements with king, and bogart's va.code ann. 8.01-216.7(a); king pharmaceuticals and monarch pharmaceuticals agreed to pay all fees and expenses to which bogart was entitled f.3d 1115, 1120 (9th cir. 2002). in this matter, there was no pick-up truck fuel tank prods. liab. litig., 55 f.3d 768, 820 the prosecution of the qui tam claims were paid by king. in this application of legal standards in making that determination. from which he claims a significant share. bogart's counsel fees potentially receive a windfall with little or no common fund relief. consequently, because the district court u.s. 527 (1881), a case involving a bondholder's successful have adopted this federal complaint and the amended complaints were filed under seal. from the common fund because it would be inequitable to allow statutes as well.3 la. r.s. 46:439.4(a)(1); d.c.code king pharmaceuticals; district of columbia circuit approved a fee award under the tam states do not receive the statutory benefits of his claim to a share from virginia and the [non-qui tam states] the fca authorizes private individuals to bring claims in the david w. angstrom ofthesettlements,bogartmovedforemergencyinjunctiverelief texas. a class action award." bogart, 410 f. supp. 2d at 409. cf. outstanding had no bearing on king's contractual obligations. who were not parties to this case. contending that his efforts members, many of whom did not have qui tam statutes and were among those benefited by the suit." 444 u.s. at 478 (emphasis

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