Cuiellette v City of Los Angeles

1 inc. (1997) 53 cal.app.4th 935, 950-951 ["an employer who knows of the disability of unable to identify or produce any such documents. there was no indication, moreover, 16 he was able to perform the essential duties of the court desk position. concern that the city could not place someone in the workplace who, for purposes of an accommodation policy pursuant to which the lapd would "[b]asically find the issue restrict the placement of disabled officers into temporary light-duty jobs. mount vernon (2d cir. 1997) 118 f.3d 92, 99 (stone); chin et al., cal. practice guide: at fires. (id. at pp. 93, 95-96.) displacing him from the position--i.e., medical restrictions that made him unable to the judgment is affirmed. plaintiff is awarded his costs on appeal. relevant inquiry is whether plaintiff was able to perform the essential duties of the light available and ready to perform fire-suppression duties. (stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 94.) maintained several permanent ,,light duty assignments and filled the assignment with provide greater protection than, the ada (see § 12926.1, subd. (a)), when, as here, robert e. racine and irving meyer for plaintiff and respondent. nearby courthouse to deliver papers. in his several days in the position, plaintiff went to defendant does not challenge the trial courts finding that plaintiff was able to perform in the second appeal concerned the issue of liability and not damages, we held that retrial available for that purpose and budgetary restraints on expanding the number of accordingly, we quote from the trial courts statement of decision at length as follows: fire suppression. (ibid.) plaintiff upon sending him home from work. were or the requirements of reasonable accommodation. because defendants challenge employees physical disabilities. (scotch v. art institute of california (2009) 173 caused an undue or unreasonable hardship to the lapd. (e.d.n.y. 1998) 995 f.supp. 298, 304.) the court reversed the summary judgment, of its firefighters, regardless of the bureau to which they were assigned, had to be weapons of mass destruction training for a day, engaging in computer training and certified for publication on he desired to fill. in this case, plaintiff proved that he could. lapd as a reasonable accommodation in accordance with its then existing practice. 1226, fn. 7.) "in general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following action for wrongful termination. defendant filed an answer to the amended complaint. undue emotional distress, heavy work, and exposure to dust fumes wetness and humidity cal.app.4th at p. 1223, fn. 5; stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 99; see school bd. of nassau the definition of "essential functions" under the americans with disabilities act while performing the same or similar administrative functions that he was asked to perform the essential functions of a patrol officer, when the accommodation sought is job allowing sworn officers to perform ,,light duty assignments that did not entail several fundamental job duties of the position that the person with a disability desires, rather than temporary disability becomes permanent. (raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th at p. 1224.) lieutenant lutz stated the policy "basically" came from a succession of los angeles and qualified for, those positions, if the employer can do so without undue hardship or if in the fugitive warrants unit, tasked with finding fugitives and taking them into custody prevention bureau (fpb): those who suffered an on duty injury and were entitled employees or has a policy of offering such assistance or benefit to any other categories of fire fighters to the fab and to another light-duty bureau--the fire he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation." (ibid.) duties within the los angeles police department, that it was the responsibility of v. "plaintiff proves he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can must ",,suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation the costs of which, facially, the essential duties of the court desk position on his return to work--an existing position the [findings]. [citations.] [citation.] we may not reweigh the evidence and are bound (id. at p. 93.) after a period of rehabilitation, stone sought to return to active duty in a the fire department asserted it had a policy that it would only assign two compensation cases--instigated the decision to send plaintiff home because of its testimony that during his 12 years as the officer in charge of the medical liaison unit he could not be accommodated and could not return to work. (ibid.) stone brought an was sent home and the facts presented to the trial court, and express no opinion as to the endanger his or her health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable the administrative duties in 2003. to the contrary, plaintiff testified that he had no then in effect, his removal from that position based on the 100 percent total permanent police chiefs--gates, williams, and parks--on down during the 10 years that lieutenant of his former colleagues, detective bokatich, to express his interest in returning to lapd court desk, the city routinely placed sworn officers in these positions. to the employer, finding that although stone was able to perform most, if not all, of the worked the court or rendition desk (even though many of these positions were strictly fire-suppression duties because the department needed to have all of the 109 firefighters at p. 100.) that stone was "seeking to retain the job he had under then existing policies," could perform all of the essential functions of the ,,light duty assignment. in other about 8,500 sworn police officers, approximately 3,000 of whom worked with medical essential functions of a sworn peace officer. consistent with the state of californias decision to send him home was an adverse employment action based on discriminatory super. ct. no. bc311647) function of a position in the fab. (ibid.) the district court granted summary judgment training exercises simulating an arrest or emergency situation." assignment. (id. at pp. 93-94.) stones employer--the fire department--told stone that "at that time, the city of los angeles had a longstanding policy and practice of assignments. although plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of this ,,light in its statement of decision, the trial court said, "the court finds that the city is los angeles as a peace officer. after several years on the job, plaintiff was injured and perform all of the essential duties of a police officer in general. (see stone v. city of disabled employee whose only limitation is that he cannot engage in fire-suppression (green, supra, 42 cal.4th at p. 262) and when it failed reasonably to accommodate of 1990 (ada) (42 u.s.c. § 12101 et seq.) set forth at 29 code of federal regulations, by the feha; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the medical restrictions per se. cambridge associates--a third party workers compensation made reasonable accommodations. instead of engaging in a dialogue, the city summarily clearing plaintiff for "permanent light duty--administrative work only," the lapd duties: ,,this part does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an only if reassignment would impose an ,,undue hardship on its operations or if there is no "in addition to considering cambridges advice regarding workers compensation maintained permanent ,,light duty vacancies in the drug testing and fugitive warrants indefinitely to receive full salary without working and those who suffered a temporary stone opposed the motion on the ground that fire-suppression was not an essential to engage in an interactive process and to make an effort to accommodate plaintiff, rather that plaintiff was not judicially estopped, as a matter of law, from pursuing his feha state of california (2007) 42 cal.4th 254, 262 (green).) section 12940 specifically disabilities. the citys decision to bring him back to work notwithstanding its pre- exercises that simulated such duties. accommodation. noting that the court desk position was staffed with sworn police than the essential functions of the existing position. (jensen, supra, 85 cal.app.4th at p. this regard, lapd lieutenant lutz testified that in 2002 and 2003, the lapd employed in the court of appeal of the state of california giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of 12 essential functions of a peace officer such as making arrests, taking suspects into custody, meanwhile, the citys workers compensation administrator had extensive files and sections 701-797b2 cal.app.4th at p. 1223.) as noted, the lapds policy of accommodating disabled 14 prevented him from performing the essential functions of the position that he held or that "the case arises out of plaintiff rory cuillettes [sic] employment with the city of defendant and appellant the city of los angeles (defendant or city) appeals from 256; raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th at p. 1223, fn. 5.) an employer is not obligated, wrongful termination, we reversed a summary judgment in defendants favor, holding duty assignment, plaintiffs supervisors decided to ,,send him home after learning, from cal.rptr.3d 329] (hastings); see spitzer, at p. 1389.)" (raine v. city of burbank (2006) in refusing to accommodate his disability by giving him a light-duty unit, many of whom were already drawing workers compensation benefits. bokatich lutz worked in the medial liaison unit. the feha to make raines temporary front-desk assignment permanent. (id. at p. 1228.) perform the essential functions ,,of the position to which reassignment is sought, rather facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision. disabled by providing dr. bursteins note. although the letter did not specify or list the disabled officers who contacted him about coming [sic] working in the fugitive warrant testing, and performing regular duties on the court desk, without incident. on june 3, medical restrictions, could not perform all of the essential duties of a police officer. in without a reasonable accommodation. we did not consider what such essential duties included climbing ladders, entering burning buildings, and performing salvage operations position and the requested accommodation is reassignment, an employer must make nevertheless, if the city had concerns about these restrictions, it had an affirmative duty (jenkins v. county of riverside (2006) 138 cal.app.4th 593, 604.) what plaintiff had to county v. arline, supra, 480 u.s. at p. 289, fn. 19 [an employer may not deny a plaintiffs historical medical restrictions before deciding to send him home, the city was the instant case is distinguishable from raine because the lapd did not at the time in the trial court found that during 2003, when plaintiff was assigned to his court the officer in charge of the medical liaison department in may 2003, expressed concern by the trial courts credibility determinations. [citations.] moreover, findings of fact are "the citys evidence that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for a los angeles police department (lapd) officer, on his claims of disability physical disability as unlawful discrimination. (green, supra, 42 cal.4th at p. 262.) adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions background 2 accommodation is not reasonable, or that it imposes an undue hardship." (id. at p. 98.) the city, in fact, had an informal policy of permanently assigning disabled officers to stones employer brought a motion for summary judgment on the ground that all and driving a police vehicle in emergency situations. lt. lutz provided persuasive for defendant and appellant. as stated above, the trial court found that plaintiff could perform the essential duties of units for the specific purpose of accommodating disabled officers who wanted to under the employers existing policies. [citations.]].) ,,the responsibility to reassign a as well. brennan was the commanding officer of personnel from 2000-2006, a position ii. application of relevant principles light-duty assignment in which his disability could be accommodated. (id. at p. 94.) assignment--the fab. (id. at pp. 93-94.) carmen a. trutanich, city attorney, paul l. winnemore, deputy city attorney, disposition officer position, the job title plaintiff held. (see stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 99.) was placed in a front-desk assignment, while he was attempting to recover from injuries. the employer offers similar assistance or benefit to other disabled or nondisabled vacant position for which the employee is qualified." (spitzer, supra, 80 cal.app.4th at "the testimony that no one could recall placing an officer with a 100% disability administrative assignments in the drug testing and fugitive warrant units. we review de novo. substantial evidence because the evidence showed that plaintiff was unable to perform the field making life or death decisions; working any patrol or field assignment; making a "officer thom brennan and his subordinate, gus martinez, deferred to cambridge desk position was staffed with civilians, not police officers, although the position was we concur: there was no question he could perform those front-desk functions. normally, that front- that defendant is liable for a feha violation, and therefore affirm the judgment. cal.app.4th 986, 1003.) section 12940, subdivision (m) provides that it is an unlawful does not challenge on appeal the trial courts findings of the underlying facts. gas co. (2000) 82 cal.app.4th 495, 501 [98 cal.rptr.2d 208] (mccullah) [,,the reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not on ,,light duty is beside the point because workers compensation and feha require accommodations. (§ 12940, subd. (a)(1).)" (green, supra, 42 cal.4th at p. 262.) about 250 officers in "permanent light duty positions that would not allow them to work administrative assignment requiring no field work other than occasionally driving to a 11 known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee." "the essential of permanent, light duty assignments in which it placed police officers who, because of administrative). provisions of the two acts are similarly worded, federal decisions interpreting the ada criteria. at trial, the city failed to prove any legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for buildings, and performing rescues, was rendered a paraplegic in an off-duty accident. "although the ,,light duty policy remained in effect until [lapd] chief bratton "the court also finds that the city is liable for failure to engage in an interactive a bench trial, ,,any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the disabled employee if an already funded, vacant position at the same level exists." for failure to accommodate a disability (§ 12940, subd. (m)), and omitted his cause of liberally construed to support the judgment. [citation.]" (estate of young (2008) 160 certified for publication essential duties that all police officers must be able to perform include "working in the light of existing policies, it sent plaintiff home from work based on the 100 percent total liable for disability discrimination based on adverse employment action. in may 2003, it peace officer standards and training (penal code section 13510 et seq.), these drafts discrimination and failure to accommodate claims on a single ground: the trial court (s.d.n.y. 2001) 154 f.supp.2d 640, 656.) the court determined that it had not been c. the trial court's ruling perform in 2003. plaintiff testified that his supervisors praised his performance as a here, the trial court properly focused on the essential functions of the court desk sought. (stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 99.) the court said that the proper focus is on the stone identified the fire alarm bureau (fab), a light-duty bureau, as one possible to feha. when plaintiff returned to work in 2003, he informed the city that he was would be limited to the issue of liability, including whether plaintiff was able to perform essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably pursuant to longstanding policy and practice, the lapd had a significant number d. analysis allowed plaintiff to return to work in may 2003 and placed him in the court desk position. employment and housing act, government code section 12900, et seq. (feha).1 i. standard of review introduction field work, or dangerous driving. he specifically recalled assigning officers to purely 15 compensation proceeding was not, as a matter of law, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory of the job held or desired." (nadaf-rahrov v. neiman marcus group, inc. (2008) 166 256.)"].) defendant contends that the trial courts findings of liability on plaintiffs a judgment of $1,571,500 in favor of plaintiff and respondent rory cuiellette (plaintiff), by the workers compensation personnel on such matters. he recalled that gus martinez, that included oversight of the medical liaison department. brennan admitted, at trial, solely the essential duties of the court desk position. according to defendant, the not required if ,,there is no vacant position for which the employee is qualified. (ibid.; evidence supports the trial courts findings that defendant violated the feha when in, cal.app.4th 952, 974.) "if the employee cannot be accommodated in his or her existing defendants action for disability discrimination under section 12940, subdivision (a) and failed to show that he was able to perform the essential functions of a firefighter, which admitted that although a civilian could be trained to perform the duties on the rendition or separate inquiries. for feha, the question is whether plaintiffs medical restrictions accommodate the disabled employee].) ,,what is required is the "duty to reassign a filed 4/22/11 disability rating plaintiff received in the workers compensation proceeding violated the beneficiary of this policy. he was uniquely qualified to perform the administrative duties cause of action for disability discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (a)), added a cause of action 5 this matter is before us for the third time. in the first appeal, concerning "there was circumstantial evidence that this letter was satisfactory to the city on its conclusion that the district court gave undue weight to the title of "firefighter" injuries." (id. at p. 1219.) the court ruled that the city of burbank had no duty under the feha imposes on employers the duty reasonably to accommodate their 2009); raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th at p. 1223, fn. 5 ["although the city urges light duty does not compel a contrary result. regardless how the positions were labeled, instead, such distinctions are prohibited "only if the adverse employment action occurs officers, defendant argues that officers who were employed in the court desk position perform the ,,light duty assignment with or without accommodation--was not (1991-2002), his marching orders were to accommodate disabled officers by providing the essential duties of a police officer with or without reasonable accommodation. b224303 even if defendant could not perform all of the essential functions of a police officer, he taking suspects into custody, operating vehicles in emergency situations, and training the position to which reassignment is sought, rather than the essential functions of the martinez told brennan that with a 100% disability rating, there was no way to continue to work. restrictions. of the 3,000 police officers with medical restrictions, the lapd employed qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of compensation litigation, the city had extensive knowledge about plaintiffs past persuasive. although lindsay testified that he saw one or more documents detailing filled the assignments with sworn officers whose disabilities prevented them from suppression duties, which principally included extinguishing fires, entering burning or ,,renditions desk in the fugitive warrants unit [court desk position], a purely forcible arrest; driving a city vehicle under emergency situations; and participating in show in order to prevail on his feha claim is a question of statutory interpretation that because the lapd maintained permanent, light duty positions that it staffed with employees effectively precluded adding to the workforce those who could not engage in guys, inc. (2000)] 80 cal.app.4th [1376,] 1389 [(spitzer)].) a reassignment, however, is reason for defendants adverse employment action. in the second appeal, following a process or to otherwise accommodate plaintiffs disability. after years of workers instructed him to leave the workplace and is therefore liable." existing knowledge of his disabilities was sufficient to shift the burden of proof and essential duties of a police officer with or without a reasonable accommodation, even if (los angeles county 17 135 cal.app.4th 1215, 1223 (raine); § 12926, subd. (n); prilliman v. united airlines, "the more persuasive evidence suggested that lindsay was more focused on the cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available would be undue." (stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 101.) according to the court, the plaintiff reassignment, the relevant inquiry is whether the employee is qualified and able to performing the essential duties of the job, at least not with reasonable accommodation. employee an inside job, either working a desk or an administrative position or staff "the citys evidence that it did not formally designate the positions as ,,permanent do not clearly exceed its benefits. [citation.] . . . the defendant must then show that the action claiming that his employer violated the americans with disabilities act of 1990, indeed, detective bokatich confirmed this when he testified that only sworn officers (none of which would necessarily impact his performance on the renditions desk). fugitive warrants investigator and that he was performing his administrative functions the trial courts statement of decision sets forth the relevant facts, and the city "when he was placed in the fugitive warrants unit in may 2003, plaintiff was a because plaintiff reported to work on may 27, 2003. the city assigned him to the ,,court 7 8 perform his duties. plaintiff therefore proved, by a preponderance of evidence, that the discrimination and failure to accommodate a disability under the california fair position, the position plaintiff sought, and not on the essential functions of the police permanent disability rating plaintiff received in the workers compensation proceeding otherwise and no evidence that plaintiffs disabilities compromised his ability to perform that the departments policy back then was always to follow restrictions communicated in stone, supra, 118 f.3d 92, an active firefighter (stone) assigned to fire- officers by allowing them to perform light-duty assignments has been changed. we accommodation provisions of section 12940, subdivision (m). (see raine, supra, 135 defendant and appellant. because of a disability and the disability would not prevent the employee from to which he had been assigned in conformity with then existing policies. substantial "questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard city placed him into one of several fully funded, vacant ,,light duty positions and that he them with ,,light duty assignments. during his tenure, the city accommodated hundreds 42 u.s.c. sections 12101-12213 (ada), and the rehabilitation act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. could perform the essential functions of a position into which he had been placed by the affirmative efforts to determine whether a position is available. (spitzer [v. the good mosk, j. employment opportunity reasonably available under the employers existing policies]; were required to be able to perform all of the essential duties of a police officer, not however, that notwithstanding the essential nature of these duties generally, the city placed on disability leave. after his workers compensation claim resolved with a finding 2003, however, his supervisor, capt. lindsay, informed him that the city could not allow note did not list or specify any particular restrictions on plaintiffs activities. duty assignment he was given on his return to work and not whether he was able to a. disability discrimination under the feha, "reasonable accommodation" means "a modification or showing or claim that assigning plaintiff to this position or that the policy then in effect and others involved in the decision deferred to cambridges presumed expertise, not employer is not required to create new positions or "bump" other employees to employment practice for an employer to "fail to make reasonable accommodation for the 9 in raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th 1215, plaintiff raine, a burbank police officer, claimed failure reasonably to accommodate a disability, a "plaintiff proves he or she is a prior to retrial, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in which he retained his that basis, sent him home." the court desk position, and defendant does not challenge that finding. for purposes of a essential functions of the fire alarm bureau with reasonable accommodation, stone had perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sought, rather accommodation policy, if an officer was "marginally capable of performing some sort of "there was no dispute, at trial, that in 2003, plaintiffs disabilities prevented him "in the spring of 2003, after an extended disability leave, plaintiff contacted one discussion identified, as essential duties, many stressful and strenuous tasks, such as making arrests, issues, the city should have independently evaluated plaintiffs situation with reference put an end to it, long after the events giving rise to this case, the city discussed changing "similarly, detective bokatich testified that he helped reassign as many as 25 employee whose limitations cannot be reasonably accommodated in his or her current job an independent duty to comply with feha. limits the reach of this proscription, however, "excluding from coverage those persons accommodation for a handicapped employee. although they are not required to find activity is neither an accommodation that would be unreasonable nor a hardship that 2 who are not qualified, even with reasonable accommodation, to perform essential job return to work. on that basis, brennan approved the decision to send plaintiff home. from performing these more rigorous functions. there was persuasive evidence, the parties tried the liability issues to the trial court. writing position that would not require him to be exposed to the restrictions that he had, discrimination, we held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that plaintiff functions of a sworn police officer. the city placed plaintiff into one of these existing position." (jensen, supra, 85 cal.app.4th at p. 256; raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th 62, 75-76.) on climbing and descending stairs, lifting heavy objects, walking, prolonged standing, i. procedures section 12940 does not classify all distinctions employers make on the basis of accommodate the plaintiffs disability. (jensen v. wells fargo bank (2000) 85 6 ii. facts desk position, the lapd "maintained several permanent ,,light duty assignments and b. reasonable accommodation require the city to demonstrate that it engaged in meaningful dialogue with plaintiff and second appellate district noting that the decision did not preclude "a judgment as a matter of law upon further of disabled officers [by] placing them in assignments that did not require any arrests, appeal from a judgment of the superior court of los angeles county, amy d. [citations.] (hastings v. department of corrections (2003) 110 cal.app.4th 963, 972 [2 perform the essential duties of a police officer with or without a reasonable 10 appeal, defendant contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial courts to fill and actually filled for a brief period of time. employee because of the employees physical disability. (§ 12940, subd. (a); green v. $1,571,500 jury verdict in plaintiffs favor on plaintiffs claim of disability cal.app.4th 245, 256 [102 cal.rptr.2d 55] (jensen).)" (wilson v. county of orange than the essential functions of the existing position." (jensen, supra, 85 cal.app.4th at p. accommodate plaintiff, and that no one else with a 100% disability had ever tried to to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [citation.]" to work in the fugitive warrants unit. detective bokatich asked him to provide a doctors on appeal, the court reversed the order granting summary judgment, in part based are instructive in applying feha. [citations.]" (raine, supra, 135 cal.app.4th at p. employee with a physical or mental disability . . . where the employee, because of his or and to place that individual in that position." lieutenant lutz explained that under the kriegler, j. commissioner said that all of the firefighters had to be available and ready to perform police officers who could not perform all of the essential duties of a police officer, the however, to make a temporary position available indefinitely once the employees duty work and, with nothing more specific, the city allowed plaintiff to return to work. disability discrimination and failure to accommodate claims are not supported by the citys workers compensation administrator, that he was ,,100% disabled. the citys positions that did not require many of the essential functions of a sworn police officer. worked less than five days before the city realized that he was ,,100% disabled and, on injury. stone did not fit into either category. (stone, supra, 118 f.3d at p. 94.) the fire of disability in violation of the feha, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving "although the legislature has declared that feha is intended to be independent of, and when it considered whether stone could perform the essential functions of the position he about plaintiffs return to work based on a recommendation from a cambridge employee. that the documents he reviewed reflected plaintiffs medical condition as of may, 2003. disabled employee who cannot otherwise be accommodated does "not require creating a [citations.] [citation.] in a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the appellate 100 percent total permanent disability rating plaintiff received in the workers part 1630.2(n) (2011) is comparable to the definition of that term under the feha. armstrong, acting p. j. 13 "under the feha . . . an employer is relieved of the duty to reassign a disabled has been considered significant. (parisi v. coca-cola bottling co. of new york therefore, in order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis claim based on a position taken in a prior workers compensation proceeding, and that the accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the trial courts determination another employees rights . . . ." (spitzer, at p. 1389; see also mccullah v. southern cal. hogue, judge. affirmed. consistent with its accommodation policy, upon presentation of a doctors note another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they court will ,,consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, prilliman v. united airlines, inc., supra, 53 cal.app.4th at pp. 950-951.) there was no under the feha, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an claims administrator recently hired by the city for its expertise in managing workers development of the record." (stone, supra, at p. 101.) all statutory citations are to the government code unless otherwise noted. words, he proved that he could perform the essential functions of the position he aspired "also reserved as a temporary light-duty assignment for police officers recovering from the field." (italics added.) him to work because he was ,,100% disabled. by most persons holding that title. (ibid; see also felix v. n.y. city transit authority of 100% disability, the city accepted his request to return to work in may 2003. he new job, moving another employee, promoting the disabled employee or violating position and was placed in that position pursuant to the lapds accommodation policy established as a matter of law that the assignment to the fab and the fpb "of a single medical liaison to find [the officer] that job." asked to explain the source of the policy, terminating his employment, and is therefore liable for discrimination. summary judgment was properly granted because it is undisputed raine could not equally well when he returned to the unit in 2003. there was no evidence suggesting problem getting to work, getting around the office, or getting to the courthouse in order to opportunities with the employer and to determine whether the employee is interested in, that the city assigned to him. before he became disabled, he worked as an investigator 307, 107 s.ct. 1123] [,,employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable city of los angeles, the court noted that a career placement in the fab and fpb "is not unprecedented." (id. liability determination because the evidence showed that plaintiff was unable to perform rory cuiellette, affirm the trial courts finding of liability under the lapd policy in effect when plaintiff see school bd. of nassau county v. arline (1987) 480 u.s. 273, 289, fn. 19 [94 l.ed.2d information about plaintiffs disabilities and past restrictions which included restrictions had to prove that he was able to perform the essential duties of a police officer with or "handicapped" employee who is not qualified for the job he was doing an alternative defendant challenges the trial courts liability findings on plaintiffs disability medical limitations on plaintiffs activities, it indicated that plaintiff could perform ,,light the essential duties of a police officer with or without a reasonable accommodation. 4 workers compensation, was ,,100% disabled. there is a strong inference that lindsay 3 solely on the title held by a person occupying that position or the other positions occupied feha requirements under later policies or other factual scenarios. employees"].) an employee has an affirmative duty to make known to the employee other suitable job the policy from time to time. various supervisors drafted documents defining the workers compensation administrators concern about re-employing plaintiff than on any erred in finding liability because plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that he was able to note. at plaintiffs request, his treating physician, dr. burstein, sent the city a note because plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential duties of the court desk than simply take him off the job." (footnotes omitted.) authorizing plaintiff to perform ,,permanent light duty--administrative work only. the plaintiff and respondent, employment litigation (the rutter group 2010) ¶ 9:673, pp. 9-66 to 9-67 (rev. # 1, p. 1389.) for purposes of an alleged failure reasonably to accommodate a disability, a realizing that having already placed plaintiff into the ,,light duty assignment, the city had (2009) 169 cal.app.4th 1185, 1192.) division five supported by substantial evidence. lieutenant lutz testified that in 2003, the lapd had elements of a failure to accommodate claim are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered sworn officers whose disabilities prevented them from performing the otherwise essential performing the otherwise essential functions of a sworn police officer." this finding is her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with