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Can't Settle, Can't Sue

How Congress Stole Tort Remedies From Medicare Beneficiaries

By: Rick Swedloff *
Law School: University of Akron

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 9, 1993, Bernice Loftin, a 68 year-old woman and Medicare beneficiary, underwent hip replacement surgery. One week after her surgery, Ms. Loftin dislocated her surgically repaired hip. X-rays subsequently revealed that the hip prosthesis was displaced and pressing against her sciatic nerve. On June 19, 1993, Ms. Loftin underwent a second surgery, which led to a serious infection. Her doctors fought the infection with extensive medical procedures including radical debridement, the insertion of cement antibiotic beads, and prolonged physical therapy. At the time of these surgeries, Medicare was Ms. Loftin’s primary medical insurer, and it paid $143,881.82 for Ms. Loftin’s surgeries and subsequent medical care. [1]

Ms. Loftin, represented by Stephen Goetzmann, a personal injury lawyer, filed suit against the manufacturer of the hip prosthesis alleging defective design of the hip prosthesis. [2] Before trial Ms. Loftin settled with the manufacturer, although it never admitted liability. The manufacturer paid the full settlement amount of $256,000 to Mr. Goetzmann, who, after deducting his 40% contingency fee, distributed the balance of $153,600 to Ms. Loftin. The manufacturer paid all of the settlement; no part came from its liability insurance. [3]

In October 2000, after Ms. Loftin received her settlement, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) [4] filed suit against Ms. Loftin; her attorney, Mr. Goetzmann; and the manufacturer under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSP”). [5] Under the MSP the Secretary is allowed to seek reimbursement from a primary insurer [6] for payments made by Medicare to a Medicare beneficiary that the primary insurer should have paid or from any person that receives a payment from a primary insurer. [7] The Secretary argued that by making its own payment to Ms. Loftin, the manufacturer was self-insuring against any risk and was thus a primary insurer subject to the MSP statute. [8] Further, as allowed under the statute, the Secretary sought reimbursement from Ms. Loftin and Mr. Goetzmann out of the payments received from the manufacturer and, under a provision that allows the Secretary to seek double damages from a primary insurer, [9] the Secretary sought double damages from the manufacturer. [10] Had the Secretary won this lawsuit, Medicare could have taken almost all of Ms. Loftin’s payment, leaving her less than $10,000 to compensate her for her pain and suffering. Alternatively, Medicare could have claimed double damages from the manufacturer, thus increasing the manufacturer’s total payment to $543,763.64 [11] even though it never admitted liability for Ms. Loftin’s injury. Under these circumstances, Ms. Loftin and the manufacturer had no incentive to settle their dispute. And, had Mr. Goetzmann known of this liability before bringing the claim on behalf of Ms. Loftin, he likely would not have agreed to the representation, because his best chance of recovering a fee would have been a long and costly trial.

The Northern District of Texas, [12] the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, [13] and almost every court in every jurisdiction to consider the Secretary’s unprecedented argument rejected it. [14] And these courts did so with good reason: the Secretary’s position had no basis in the text of the statute or the legislative history [15] and, as is clear from Ms. Loftin’s case, the Secretary’s position makes it difficult to settle tort lawsuits.

Nonetheless, in 2003, as a small part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), Congress amended the MSP to reflect the Secretary’s litigation position. [16] The MMA is best known for adding a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries. The new drug benefit captured the national spotlight and occupied the bulk of Congressional debate over the MMA. Congress spent little, if any, time discussing the amendments to the MSP or the implications of the amendment.


 
Yet, this amendment significantly affects the ability of Medicare beneficiaries to bring or settle individual tort claims, the incentives for attorneys to represent Medicare beneficiaries in individual and mass tort litigation, [17] and the tort system generally. Because of this – and despite the fact that courts [18] and academics [19] have largely ignored this amendment – attorneys from around the country have sounded alarm bells since the government first took the litigation position now reflected in the MSP. Lawyers have raised serious concerns about their ability to bring and settle individual and mass tort litigation under the MSP’s harsh liability rules. [20]

In this article, I show that, as amended, the MSP will likely have unforeseen consequences to the tort system. I start by reviewing the history of Medicare and the forces that led Congress to enact and amend the MSP. [21] With illustration from the classic economic model of litigation, I then show that, not surprisingly, the MSP – as written – makes it more difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to bring and settle individual tort claims. [22] What may be less obvious is that this amendment may have a profound impact in the area of mass tort litigation. If individual parties to a mass tort cannot settle, plaintiffs’ attorneys, who make the litigation decisions in mass torts, may determine that it is not lucrative to include Medicare beneficiaries in mass tort litigation or to bring mass tort litigation at all. This could have several consequences. First, and most obviously, if certain plaintiffs cannot bring claims, they will not be appropriately compensated for their harms. Moreover, if tortfeasors are not made to pay for their tortious conduct, they will not internalize the harms caused and will not take the proper amount of precaution to protect against future harms. Further, if there are no mass tort actions, the Secretary will not have access to the discovery done by private litigation against these mass tort defendants. As such, the Secretary may have a harder time collecting Medicare’s conditional outlays from truly tortious parties. Lastly, I offer a simple means to rectify this complex problem: force the Secretary to use the clear statutory right of subrogation against tortfeasors. [23] Subrogation will not fundamentally change Medicare’s ability to recover its costs from an alleged tortfeasor, but will alleviate the disincentives to settlement in the tort setting.



 

Related Categories: Civil-Procedure, Civil-Remedies, Government-Politics, Health-Care
 






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raged throughout the eisenhower and kennedy (1953-63) whether there is a possibility of medicare recovery and the degree of liability when filing a lawsuit); data points to set the settlement range and ultimately enter a global caused by the alleged tortfeasors. least one employer that normally employed at least 100 employees on a typical business day during suits to signal a willingness to fight.175 primary plan under the msp), the secretary may claim a right to recover from a tortious act, the secretary must have a claim against tortfeasors medicare beneficiary where a "primary plan" defined as a group health swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm accidental tort reform especially when based on a provision designed to increase the secretary's and congress scrambled to reign 132. the law is not settled as to when the double damages provision is applicable. the the assignment provisions create an exception to the anti-lien statute for recovery of beneficiary. attorneys cannot afford or will otherwise refuse to bring mass tort but neither in the ambiguity caused by the definition of "primary plan." before 22. see infra part iii. receiving these benefits, and c) although states adopted the legislation, 557 opposed compulsory healthcare for business reasons, claiming that tortfeasor of its rightful defenses as the msp does. the msp creates a pocket expenses for medical care and settled only for pain and (noting that "[f]rom its inception until 1980, medicare was the primary source of payment for the payments that constitute reimbursement for medical costs paid by medicaid, any an allegedly harmful product. see byron g. stier, resolving the class action crisis: mass tort pharmaceutical mass tort, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals could be exposed to human right." id. at 10. as marmor observed, "new deal-fair deal champions of medical care 18. with the exception of judge weinstein in in re zyprexa products liability litigation, 451 the amount of the conditional payment or for double damages.101 generally h.r. rep. no. 96-1167, at 389, 522 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 u.s.c.c.a.n. 5526, amendment attorneys from around the country have sounded alarm against medicare, and could be liable to medicare for the settlement 68. in 1997, congress created medicare part c. see balanced budget act of 1997, pub. l. her settlement by $50,000 the parties would not have a settlement window. in this hypothetical, a health insurance for the poor.64 first and foremost, congress added a definition of "self-insured interdependence of the claim values." id. at 965. the authors explain that because of the money from a plaintiff who receives a settlement from a tort defendant, notions and ends with fierce lobbying and politically expedient recipient's compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a with medicare beneficiaries lose any tort defenses they may have had to expend money to defend the claims than the plaintiffs have to expend money to prosecute the goetzmann, who, after deducting his 40% contingency fee, distributed clear guidance has left many lawyers perplexed, trial, may 2006, at 64 (noting the frustration 191. whether one supports corrective justice or a deterrence rationale for tort, and whether one from an alleged tortfeasor, but will alleviate the disincentives to form in every jurisdiction,167 integrity of the medicare trust fund by clarifying that medicare must be reimbursed respectively (a reduction of 0.02% and 0.16% respectively).89 provision would save $8 million and by fiscal year 1985 it would save damages.187 swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 36 (2d cir. 2003) (tobacco); in re silicone gel breast implants prods. liab. litig., 174 f. supp. 2d transformed settling tort defendants into primary insurers. any time a average annual rate of 40.2%, prompting russell long, chairman of the senate finance committee, beneficiary "compromise[d], waive[d], or release[d]" her claims against secondary payer program and its implications for personal injury clients, 47 soc. sec. rep. 604 akron law review [41:557 damages from the manufacturer.10 often jurisdiction dependent. with thousands of potential plaintiffs, simply gathering the appropriate releases can be costly and labor weeks. see berenson, supra, at c1 (reporting on results of a two-week federal trial); alex berenson, the intensity of those services.75 injury." working group on mass torts, supra, at 10. these torts are typified by airplane crashes, odds with the history of medicare generally and the secondary payer after the collapse of the fair deal proposal, a small group of truman, like roosevelt, met stalwart opposition from the medical c. the government wants more: the secretary takes 164. fed. r. civ. p. 23(e)(1)(a) ("the court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, "impose punishment" on an industry they view as "morally blameworthy"); deborah r. hensler, between 1883 and 1913, ten other european watch the clock; attorneys agree to punch in, limit presentation, houston chronicle, feb. 25, were not negligent or that the tortfeasor did not cause the insured's which private citizens could seek double damages from recalcitrant primary plans. see id. that is, the medicare agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed c1. of those 27,000 claims, close to 17,000 were consolidated in front of one state court judge and estimates suggest that in 1934 over half of the elderly could not support themselves. social security compulsory governmental healthcare would eliminate the need for it will be more difficult for the parties to reach a settlement. thus, medicare payments on behalf of or to 11,614 medicare beneficiaries. see id. at 316. likewise in corning corp., 250 b.r. 298, 335 (bankr. e.d. mich. 2000) ("except for worker's compensation suffers. although there is no precise definition of self-insurance, to meet the conceptual definition by 1950, the ama's campaign against government- coverage gaps" for all claims other than claims arising under worker's compensation plans. dow the medicare secondary payer act ("msp").5 578 akron law review [41:557 reason to treat medicare differently in some circumstances. nonetheless, the msp strategy is self- seek reimbursement for conditional payments, but was not technically authorized to make medicare onto the social security program, medicare's architects made deal, and the medicare compromise..........................564 alternatively, the secretary could have taken mr. goetzmann's proposed eldercare, a state administered program to subsidize private secretary reasonably expected any of these insurance plans to cover a 200. united states v. r.i. insurers' insolvency fund, 80 f.3d 616, 622 n.5 (1st cir. 1996); see compromise of those claims, the manufacturer paid ms. loftin poor estimators of the probability of winning, and thus litigants make oppose nationalized health care. in particular, samuel gompers, the the imposition of medicare liability means that to consider bringing a rates.37 swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm improvement, and modernization act of 2003 [hereinafter mma], pub. l. no. 108-173, 301, 117 clear from ms. loftin's case, the secretary's position makes it difficult in sum, before the amendments to the msp, if the secretary 600 akron law review [41:557 in products liability cases.160 beneficiaries without fear of additional, automatic liability because they 140. id. payments made by medicare to a medicare beneficiary that the primary too diverse in terms of injury, operative law, and remedy to be aggregated with ease. substances. . . ." manual for complex litigation, supra, at 344. dispersed mass torts swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm the secretary can gain valuable information about potential third party the architects of the new medicare proposal intended to provide limited although this provision of the msp was never a model of "clarity more specifically, the courts concluded the term "self-insurance," with negotiating and entering into a settlement (cps). represented in a 20. before the mma, practitioners were concerned about their potential liability if the courts a. an economic model of individual tort settlements..588 their workers.29 without mention of compulsory health insurance, and with that, statute prohibited medicare from making conditional payments except as authorized by action unmanageable. required to reimburse the medicare trust funds for any payment made by the secretary if the cpj will make a potential case less attractive. under the msp, from medicare beneficiaries even if they win or settle a case, ther swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm (1980). in other words, if a the ama endorsed private health care insurance such as blue cross for hospitalization and blue savings of $9 billion over ten years.128 "promptly."98 minimum offer cover her costs of settlement. more specifically, a treating the beneficiary, medicare made payments to the health care 171. see lynn a. baker & charles silver, mass lawsuits and the aggregate settlement rule, attorney. but mass torts raise further complex questions about the 97. health ins. ass'n of am., inc. v. shalala, 23 f.3d 412, 414 (d.c. cir. 1994). strategy.104 enforcement of the msp act in the context of state worker's compensation "compromise and release provider. mr. goetzmann, representing ms. loftin, never believed that he was bringing a claim or presumably, however, plaintiffs' lawyers are paid to provide government health insurance program for at least its lowest-income workers. theodore marmor, procedure for processing claims made against that fund pursuant to the likewise, there was no real scholarly work on the provision after these as much as $3.75 billion, 223 the legal intelligencer 41 (aug. 9, 2000). thus, the defendant insured's primary insurer." black's law dictionary 823 (8th ed. 2004); see also douglas l. elderly had both practical and sentimental appeal. on the practical side, and cannot subparagraph (b). but subparagraph (b) did "not authorize any medicare payments; it deal[t] only than the amount paid to the beneficiary after the secretary takes medicare's share, the msp could may not invest properly in the litigation, which could, for instance, result 594 akron law review [41:557 medicare could have taken almost all of ms. loftin's payment, leaving and number of claims; the claims must arise out of an identifiable event or product, statute. . . ."). second, congress augmented a primary plan's duty to repay the social security bill passed in medicare liens: a stumbling block to settlement, 24 no. 2 ljn's prod. liab. l. & strategy 8, 8 will not get a preview of the defendants' responses to a more fulsome set taking office in 1949, truman again pushed for a national health 76. in 1972, medicare extended its coverage beyond the aged to two new categories of from financial catastrophes resulting from illness. at the time, hospitalization represented the liability above the limits of the exhausted primary insurance."). beginning, plaintiffs' attorneys identify a potential mass claim. they an aggregate settlement void and unenforceable when plaintiffs' attorney consented to settlement on states may bring an action against any entity which is required or responsible (directly, litigation can be (and has been) a free source of information about c. the government wants more: the secretary takes on mass tort (explaining that a plaintiff may "want to complete the process of litigation in order to feel that she united states to collect on medicare liens and of the states to enforce 159. see generally stier, supra note 155, at 878-79. influenced by great britain's insertion of a program for health insurance for low-income workers gary t. schwartz, mixed theories of tort law: affirming both deterrence and corrective justice, a. the push for government-sponsored health insurance: the cbo reports regarding the impact that these amendments would have on favorable court judgment or settlement than the cost of achieving that set aside funds to cover potential future liabilities and a formal identify each of the potential claimants and get releases for all current architects believed that large-scale change was out of the question, they aimed to protect the elderly insurance" only existed where an entity had an ex ante arrangement to plaintiffs' attorneys represent multiple clients, they are often driving much of the litigation strategy government has to sue to recover its conditional outlays on behalf of a medicare beneficiary). the amount of potential liability.147 insured high-risk individuals. as such, the non-profits had to raise 1395y(b)(3)(a) (2002). in addition, the federal government was subrogated (to the extent of any 27. public health insurance, like private health insurance, "covers individuals against the costs tests. see generally terry s. coleman, medicare law (2001); eric patashnik & julian zelizer, received the proceeds of the settlement).103 premiums paid by the insured. under part b, medicare pays 80% (after seniors pay a $100 be profitable, even if they go to trial, while other claims have value only further, by grafting percentage of the potential claimants or because medicare beneficiaries insurance at the turn of the twentieth century, as a part of the new iv. an inefficient life without mass torts............................603 9 (2005). consolidated for pretrial purposes in one federal court. see joyce gannon, bayer's latest job cuts 1999, shortly after a number of cigarette manufacturers settled lawsuits brought by individual states, participating in the social security system. to this group, the bill anticipates a benefit. if she does not anticipate a benefit from bringing and thus, in effect, make the plan's coverage secondary to medicare."97 against primary plans, which included incentives to encourage private citizens to recover on behalf representatives are not typical, because class members' claims rely on varying factual settlements break down not because the parties do not have a settlement window, but because they in the program's spending. most mass tort litigation defendants who have no set policy limits. 181. assuming that beneficiaries have standing to bring a claim for medical expenses for complex litigation, supra, at 344. in the latter category, parties may have latent injuries 142. there are really two assumptions contained here: 1) that the parties maximize their medicare expected the insurer to pay for the beneficiaries' medical care 586 akron law review [41:557 to fiscal change 19th annual asbestos litigation conference, 2004 wl 1718493 (april 29-30, 2004). second, the tortfeasor of its potential tort defenses. defendants settling tort claims to any entity."125 determining whether to bring mass tort claims. rather, plaintiffs' finally, i would like to restate the department's support for section 301 of h.r. 1, the represent medicare beneficiaries and bring mass tort claims. as a result, 122. medicare prescription drug, improvement, and modernization act of 2003, pub. l. no. in developing their clients' claims. plaintiffs' attorneys will invest "in dismissals, or compromises of claims,164 automobile or liability insurance plan (including a self-insured plan), or in truth, the amendments were designed face numerous barriers to settlement. parties face structural barriers that 10. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 493-94; complaint, supra note 1, at 57. risks across all workers.196 did "not mention a right by the government to recover from a tortfeasor. those companies with defined and distinct ex ante self-insurance plans professional conduct rule 1.8(g),166 beneficiary was entitled to have a worker's compensation plan pay for thus, several consequences. first, and most obviously, if certain plaintiffs this change, as it likely impacted their bottom line for contracts already written. the paradigmatic the context of the msp. under the msp, medicare was the secondary during the great depression, the in short, these provisions nullified any private continue to bring tort lawsuits, mass torts would continue to settle, and under the msp the 1874, 2011 (1986) (allowing double damages against a primary plan). see also social security act settlements that make up a global settlement of a mass tort the total disputes and their resolution, 27 j. econ. lit. 1067, 1075-82 (1989); see also korobkin & and ethical problems drive up the transaction costs related to settlement, supplementary ins. trust funds annual report 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 medicare ann. benefits from a medicaid beneficiary before her death. according to the court, while greater assignment or lien would be inconsistent with the medicaid "anti-lien" statute, 42 payer act a number of times. each of these amendments "expanded the proposed social security bill on the social insurance model, and paid out their income and social status.35 medicare's expenditures to medicare.132 economic loss torts to the list). mass accidents, or single event mass torts, "usually involve one and an aggregate resolution of claims against them. third, a court may reject the entire settlement reconciliation act of 1989, pub. l. no. 101-239 6202, 103 stat. 2106, 2225-35 (1989). a lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate as allowed under the statute, the secretary sought reimbursement from judgment or settlement, she will bring the claim.179 swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm were caused by defendants' tortious and unlawful conduct." see amended complaint 169, means to rectify this complex problem: force the secretary to use the beneficiaries (whether industrial workers, all workers, or all citizens) iii. suing and settling under the msp: individual tort 155. claims against pharmaceutical companies are typical of mass tort litigation today. in any unemployment and poverty rates among the elderly grew at drastic of its negative externalities, and would not invest in the proper amount a series of high-stakes and high-profile mass torts, the government claimants in a mass tort, plaintiffs' attorneys may determine that it is and the tort system generally. because of this and despite (defining the real options model and related literature); huang, supra note 152, at 50-53, 56-59. when its architects made clear that medicare would not create a relationship; the distributive rights under the tort system do not. thus, settlements the proposed social security bill from the ces originally included in 229 (tex. 1986). or money, regardless of the level of injury sustained by the plaintiff. expensive one in the blink of an eye"); matthew l. garretson, making sense of medicare set- plan provision "that would `carve out' expenses covered by medicare not be superior, because the adjudication of individualized issues may make the class secretary's ability to recover for those benefits by adding an explicit cause of action for the beneficiary. the regulations suggest that the government will not seek b. medicare as a secondary payer: an insurance 91. a westlaw search of the jlr database, with search term "medicare w/5 secondary" and benefits. first, it removed some of the stigma from the notion of liability. yet, alleged tortfeasors can settle lawsuits with medicare trends in medicare expenditures and financial status 1966-2000, 22 health care fin. rev. 35, have to pay more. because medicare may recover "double damages" cheaply. there may also be pressure on plaintiffs' attorneys in early swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm before world war i, american reformers looked to europe for policy models and very different actions. determined in accordance with regulations), with respect to such item or service, under a further, could not simply show that the defendant was using its own funds to disincentive to settle because a defendant is automatically liable if it an attorney must follow these procedures for each of his provisions specifically. further, congress created a remedy that is pension by 1935, only 3% of the elderly received benefits and the insurance program. but, by amending the msp as part of the medicare could have recovered up to the full amount of its payments139 general theoretical objection and a close reading of the statute. first, the 77. see ronald j. vogel, medicare: issues in political economy 18 (1999) (adjusted 87. see centers for medicare & medicaid services, medicare secondary payer represented the fourth wave in the campaign for national health insurance in the united states."). wrongdoing to light, to cripple an industry, or merely to have their day no. 108-173, 117 stat. 2066 (2003). 5903, 5924 (noting differences between the house, senate, and conference versions, but failing to would from trying a case to a judgment, whether through a trial or not only affects plaintiffs' counsel, but also undermines the defendant's goal of achieving finality this first push for compulsory healthcare ended by the time the medicare+choice, individuals who receive benefits under part a and part b can purchase private grounds sub nom health ins. ass'n of am., inc. v. shalala, 23 f.3d 412 (d.c. cir. 1994); in re dow have a different amount of tolerance for risk; and conflicts over control of the litigation). of scale in the litigation and translates into more power when it becomes time to select a steering "[p]laintiffs in a single event mass tort share the common characteristics of time, place, and cause of cannot decide how to divide the surplus created by the window. see robert cooter, et al., had the government prosecuted its case post mma, the secretary 168. see, e.g., tax auth., inc. v. lemaire-mccumsey group, inc., 898 a.2d 512 (n.j. 2006). were involved in litigation regarding autoimmune disease; and tens of millions were health care, capitalizing on the red scare and linking nationalized health high damages and/or who will be particularly sympathetic to a jury. with large settlement dollars available, and pressure on the 588 akron law review [41:557 moreover, defendants in mass torts are repeat players in the save money by shifting the costs of beneficiaries' medical care from the fund is financed by a 2.9% payroll tax workers and employers each contribute 1.45% of workers' its jury demand of $500,000. the weighted average recovery, (v * p), is even if medicare differs in some respects from private health mesothelioma. given the precedent-setting effect of early lawsuits, defendants are willing to expend great amounts requirements, and all but eliminated the class as a settlement mechanism rendered to enrollees and the "intensity of [those] services" accounts for large settlement allotments.171 jury begins to deliberate vioxx case, n.y. times, nov. 2, 2005, at c1 (reporting that jurors began 150. see generally cross, supra note 141, at 15-19; korobkin & guthrie, supra note 141, at wagner's annual appeal for comprehensive health insurance for all insurers loath to offer health insurance to the elderly, those over sixty- (ii) action by united states settlement.188 frivolous litigation games, 23 rev. litig. 47, 78 (2004). estimate was based on an assumption that medicare beneficiaries would scale). although this may increase transaction costs, it is not clear that those additional transaction practitioners continued to sound the alarm. see, e.g., john l. tate & demetrius o. holloway, stat. 2066, 2222 (2003). difficult to settle mass tort claims. as such, plaintiffs' attorneys may up to their primary obligations via a direct cause of action. further, the to 1980 rose because congress expanded the number of beneficiaries also supra note 102 and accompanying text. 2008] can't settle, can't sue 565 premiums paid by seniors; and 4% was financed by interest and other miscellaneous income. id. mass tort litigation. mass tort settlements sit at a tipping point, and it is 131. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002) ("the united states may, in accordance with ."). 2008] can't settle, can't sue 559 settlement numbers. contingency fee attorneys will have to bring claims to trial and thus to target social security beneficiaries. and, as before, objections from industry. meant to solve a gap in coverage created by the free market. pressing against her sciatic nerve. on june 19, 1993, ms. loftin medicare that is, the defendants will incur $50,000 of additional costs and the plaintiff will reduce to chase large damage awards for those plaintiffs who have particularly committee and a greater piece of a settlement pie once the settlement range is set. although there is 2,900 claims were consolidated in front of one federal judge. see andrew pollack, mixed verdicts government as always to "save" medicare and social security, it was mass tort litigation. even more than individual litigations, however, medicare beneficiaries' injuries in the settlement document. the swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 7. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002) (current version at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii) these lobbying efforts did not go unchecked. the insurance unknown in contract, tort, or insurance law. reprinted without appendices in 187 f.r.d. 293, 300 (1999)). this definition covers at least two plan) of, or contributed to by, an employer (including a self-employed person) or employee iv. an inefficient life without mass torts 44. see id. at 21. of the medicare program by requiring that medicare pay `secondary' to 2008] can't settle, can't sue 563 1996, at 20, 23 (warning that "[i]n the event that medicare's interest is not repaid, anyone who zyprexa, 451 f. supp. 2d at 470. and sickness benefits. see marmor, supra note 29, at 7; blevins, supra note 28, at 26. 1073 (s.d. iowa 1996). in re zyprexa prods. liab. litig., 451 f. supp. 2d 458, 470 (e.d.n.y. 2006) (citations omitted). i. introduction .......................................................................557 that the plaintiff estimates she will win (pp) minus the expected cost of goetzmann, no. 3:00-cv-2174-m, 2001 u.s. dist. lexis 9258, at *2-3 (n.d. tex. july 3, 2001); tort defendant may actually have to pay three times the settlement primary insurer. 152. see generally peter h. huang & ho-mou wu, emotional responses in litigation, 12 from the legislative history. it is meant to correct the courts that rejected 572 akron law review [41:557 settlement. likewise, a plaintiff will perceive a benefit from any offer asides: as medicare's role in workers' compensation and liability settlements evolves, a lack of attorneys to represent medicare beneficiaries in individual and mass tort 66. part a of the title xviii of the social security act of 1965, publ. l. no. 89-97, covers 167. see paul j. lesti, structured settlements, appendix y.1, fn. 8 (2d ed. 1993); ali additional costs. even under the weak theory that lawyers will not represent the presence of such [individualized] issues may mean that (1) the claims of class the court first held that the assignment provisions of federal medicaid law-requiring of precaution exceeds the benefit of the additional risk avoided."192 expanded; an entity engaging in a business, trade, or profession would be deemed as having a self- medicare beneficiaries to settle claims in the mass tort setting. indeed, difficult. terms of the `plan.'"118 pay its own liability claims and a plan for distributing the proceeds of clearly `within' the insurance industry,"200 however, these criticisms can be overstated and, with respect to the agreements"). aimed at regulating the services provided under medicare82 settlement is of the utmost importance to the parties to mass tort defendant may offer up to $130,000 ($100,000 + $35,000 - $5,000) to any payment under this subchapter ... shall be conditioned on reimbursement to the 134. see generally united states v. sosnowski, 822 f. supp. 570 (w.d. wis. 1993); steven m. increase the cost of settling those that are asserted."). as noted by judge weinstein: as with most legislation, the medicare story begins with idealistic 129. see 42 c.f.r. 411.37(d) (2006) ("if medicare payments equal or exceed the judgment countries adopted some form of compulsory healthcare insurance for as applied to a swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm plaintiffs' attorneys will be unwilling to do so for all other plaintiffs, 105. shortly thereafter, the government used this same logic for the first time in a case with an medicare beneficiary by a judgment. the mma added the following: a if the beneficiary chooses not to bring suit, the secretary will not seek recovery from the this amount is well below the plaintiff's minimum demand, and the case total recovery beneficiaries and their contingency fee attorneys expect. model rules of prof'l conduct r. 1.8(g) (2002). principles of the law of aggregate litigation 3.15, (discussion draft 2006). receive[s] payment from a primary plan."183 intensive.173 solution.53 them into uncertain litigation that burdens the courts and may result in little or no (1980) (amendment in italics). percentage of the potential claimants, plaintiffs' attorneys may decline to (sept. 2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.pdf; 2005-2006 medicare handbook 38. id. at para. 30. 15. orthopedic, 202 f.r.d. at 165; in re diet drugs prods. liab. litig., nos. mdl 1203, 99- the government's litigation position by sweeping into the definition of primary insurer was not likely to pay promptly for costs associated with attorney may not care whether a single case is profitable when an attorney who receives a portion of that settlement fund, or from the injured individuals of needed compensation for their pain and suffering, real options perspective, 58 stan. l. rev. 1267 (2006) (describing the real options model of run afoul of ethical rules for encouraging a settlement that violates rule 1.8(g) by assisting or 2008] can't settle, can't sue 591 costs are generally greater than settlement costs. see generally cross, supra note 141, at 3-4. that liability narrows or eliminates any potential settlement window.149 manufacturer, thus increasing the manufacturer's total payment to prevented the elderly from receiving benefits under these state plans: a) specified contingency will occur and undertake to indemnify an insured from the introduction. medicare paid $143,881.82 for ms. loftin's no. 105-33, 4001, 11 stat. 251, 275 (1997). under part c, which was originally called took its place as a super power after world war ii, the united states was more open to the and almost every court in every intended "to allow recovery only from an insurer"); united states v. philip morris, inc., 116 f. for the underlying tort. it is reasonable to think that the additional sides is smaller, if it exists at all.153 come to be known as the medicare secondary payer act. under the liability, and no-fault insurance as payers of first resort. as before, if the tortfeasors as a subrogee. under the strong theory, plaintiffs' attorneys settling mass torts .....................................................593 accepted the secretary's litigation position. see e.g., wesley s. caldwell iii, et al., the medicare 69. "part d initially provided access to prescription drug discount cards and transitional and thus the primary payer, for medical services provided to medicare coverage changed, but the bill remained limited in scope and continued reflected the expressed desire for a government-sponsored insurance potential costs of any settlement, makes it difficult to settle tort lawsuits, options values for settlement, such that medicare beneficiaries have no incentive to bring or settle the progressive stance of the aall and the ama, theodore roosevelt 104. for example, in the dow corning bankruptcy, the united states filed proofs of claims 112. see supra note 14. under this title with respect to any item or service shall be conditioned on reimbursement portion of any recovery and cpj is higher because the msp forces trials from 1980 until 2003, congress amended the medicare secondary medicare's payments.85 and insurance for prescription drugs.69 medicare beneficiary, and that medicare paid $100,000 for medical care bring and settle individual and mass tort litigation under the msp's that is, the government argued that by paying its own money to injured claims by or against non-settling defendants for contribution and pursuing of the claim. congress originally enacted the msp as a means of defraying medicare such settlement (i.e., from settlement funds or from any party that 2008] can't settle, can't sue 581 only do so when they represent enough clients that they have an incentive to match the outlays of the turn of the twentieth century: austria (1888), hungary (1891), denmark (1892), luxembourg costs of today's beneficiaries. id. plan) or no fault insurance" to the extent that one of these latter groups 40 (1980). although labor unions made great strides in the 1950s by obtaining of the harms, they will not invest optimally. decedent's estate); quintero v. jim walter homes, inc., 708 s.w.2d 225 (tex. 1986) (holding that payments.127 20593, 2001 wl 283163, at *10 (e.d. pa. mar. 21, 2001); phillip morris, 116 f. supp. 2d at 146, seek double damages when the primary plan knew that medicare paid the plaintiff's medical postwar reaction to progressivism that dampened enthusiasm for social insurance in the united settling beneficiary, the beneficiary's counsel if counsel received a progress, such as the ability to do open-heart surgery, but also changes in accounting practices and the solution to this problem is simple: revert to the understanding resolving multi-district litigation: the problem of federal medical liens (2004) (warning tortfeasor, the insurer has a derivative cause of action through the (ii) payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made promptly (as the previous calendar year." see id. at (b)(1)(a)(v), (b)(iii) (citing to 26 u.s.c. 5000(b)(1) and beneficiary's medical services except to provide secondary coverage. if compulsory payroll taxes.41 for making payments to medicare beneficiaries.111 recover from medicare beneficiaries and alleged tortfeasors, which is at secretary is allowed to seek reimbursement from a primary insurer6 medicare for past medical payments related to the claim." h.r. rep. no. 108-178 (ii), at 189-90 162. see chamblee, supra note 17, at 172 ("in all types of aggregated actions, lawyers by 1920, the practical barriers to achieving finality, and a whole host of economic and from a primary insurer.7 result of the medicare liability. otherwise, the tortfeasor would reap a windfall, would not internalize all swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm organizations like blue cross and blue shield initially provided some these causes of action. in contrast, when an insurer has paid its insured for injuries caused individual tort plaintiff. see thompson v. goetzmann, 337 f.3d 489 (5th cir. 2003). many elderly were left with no real options for private insurance. the social security amendments of 1965,25 102. united states v. rhode island insurers' insolvency fund, 80 f.3d 616, 622 n.5 (1st cir. bringing individual trials will yield great profits at the time of aggregate medicare expenditures in 1980 and 1985: $35 and $71.4 billion one group in particular shouldered the lobbying burden for or pay a certain sum if that contingency does, in fact, occur.113 into private insurance, these non-profit organizations increasingly only and all workers received benefits, the program received broad support 157. see generally stier, supra note 155, at 879-84. seemingly inconsistent or irrational decisions throughout litigation.150 the best possible settlement for a single client. plaintiffs' counsel may have incentives to favor or created a cause of action against recalcitrant primary plans. subparagraph (b) stated in relevant part: will invest efficiently to prevent these harms. that is, each firm will 154. castano v. am. tobacco co., 160 f.r.d. 544, 555-56, 560 (e.d. la. 1995). 86. blue cross and blue shield ass'n v. sullivan, 794 f. supp. 1166, 1169 (d.d.c. 1992). enact the msp as a means to curb mass tort litigation. and it should not be used as such. with a carrier." see dow corning, 250 b.r. at 338 (citing 42 c.f.r. 411.50(b)(2)). this general 580 akron law review [41:557 advancing the cause of national health insurance, if only incrementally.59 congress made medicare's liability secondary to additional sources of (1901), norway (1909), serbia (1910), great britain (1911), russia (1912), romania (1912), and hundreds or thousands of parties.169 under the msp, vp is lower because the secretary may take a could have been, made by a workers compensation law or plan") aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other determining who should bear the costs are different under both systems. mma, the government is limited to claims against "entities which are provider expecting that it could (and would) recover from the rightful as planned, medicare gained credibility because of this connection lost wages, and other non-medical damages."140 lawyers to "[b]eware" of the changes); william e. pipkin, jr. & conley w. knott, in plain affecting a very large number of people and causing a large number of lawsuits asserting the attorneys to any valid thus, these provisions reduced the number of beneficiaries for whom seeing the writing on the wall, trial"). will settle when a plaintiff's demand (d) is less than the amount the swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm harms. of the insurance policy. that is, the government likely could not force an insurance company to pay workmen's compensation law or plan of the united states or a state or under an 182. even if a contingency fee attorney is compensated based on the settlement amount rather medicare and adopted the government's litigation position that the unfortunately, post mma, the msp conflates these two actions. remove income as a barrier to accessing medical care.49 the area of the medicare "super lien" to protect against "later msp collection efforts by the although he health and human services v. ahlborn, the supreme court held that states could not recover the 1.01 (judith a. stein & alfred j. chiplin, jr., eds. aspen publishers 2006); blevins, supra note 28, health and human services in numerous court cases. actions because the msp disrupts the financial life cycle of a mass tort have difficulty settling tort claims under the msp. what may not be as subparagraph.... provided aid only to those over sixty-five and only to those already congress' overriding concern regarding the mma was the radical insurance to a fear of a communist takeover. the ama also warned little 100. see generally thompson v. goetzmann, 337 f.3d 489, 496-97 (5th cir. 2003). beneficiaries to bring or settle individual tort claims, the incentives for the courts rarely write opinions. see generally david a. hoffman et al., docketology, district amount medicare expended for the plaintiff's medical care. represented the congressional budget office, [the clarifications to the mma] alone promise to restore medicare risk, and both society in the abstract and each individual therein will settles that is, it has no defense to the secretary's claim for to put this in stark terms, consider again the case of ms. loftin commentators largely ignored the amendment to the msp. neither the rep.]. after 2006, part d provides subsidized access to drug insurance on a voluntary basis for all settlement.141 the congress took unprecedented action by directing that these legislative changes be compromises. by the time congress passed medicare as title xviii of claims. see generally david rosenberg, mandatory-litigation class action: the only option for could make a conditional payment on the beneficiary's behalf. the as such, the secretary may have a harder time collecting medicare's "not take into account" that an individual was disabled or suffering from the elderly had vast political appeal, and to the extent they were viewed extent of a primary insurer's liability should be clear from the face of the "the larger inflation nor new enrollees can account for all of the increases in drugs prods. liab. litig., no. 99-20593, 2001 wl 283163 (e.d. pa. mar. 21, 2001) (phentermine, u.s. 815 (1999); see also mcgovern, supra note 158, at 627-28. even if parties could certify a voluntary outpatient medical insurance program for the aged and inefficient to invest the time and energy to bring mass aggregate claims. behalf of the medicaid beneficiary. see ark. dep't of health and human servs. v. ahlborn, 547 . . . all became potential liabilities after 1917. 24. see infra part ii.a. amendment to section 1862(b) of the social security act, which has aggregate settlement with the defendant for all of the claimants the attorney represents and securing their research assistance in producing this article, thanks to kara borski and andrew russell. not unreasonable to think that any additional burden on the settlement of expected value of the litigation. but the plaintiff will require that the then recruit clients who have suffered the injury and file complaints. minimum amount the plaintiff will demand (dmin) is represented in in short, a party will settle a lawsuit if it expects to be insurance contract interpretation. whereas a secondary or excess insurer "is liable for settling any part of a claim not covered by an indemnity. if defendants settle only with the plaintiffs, they can gain no could have taken almost all that ms. loftin received in settlement of her annually for universal healthcare. by 1943, senator james murray (d. so long as the mass tort litigation follows this predictable course, 582 akron law review [41:557 radical debridement, the insertion of cement antibiotic beads, and paragraph 3(a) collect double damages against any [primary plan]."); see also 42 c.f.r harsh liability rules.20 services from a liable third party. it then concluded that any state statute providing for a have other potential future claims. the answers to these questions are consent, in a writing signed by the client. the lawyer's disclosure shall include the individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or is clear from formulae (3) and (4) above, when the cost of settlement group health plan," or "a workman's compensation law or plan, an precaution; thus, when firms invest efficiently, the welfare of society and the individual increases). social security online, medicare electronic booklet 3, 7, publication no. 05-10043 medicare beneficiary and once to medicare. but the defendant could 141. see generally frank b. cross, in praise of irrational plaintiffs, 86 cornell l. rev. 1, 3 settlement in the tort setting. comply with the rule may face forfeiture of his fees, see, e.g., burrow v. arce, 997 s.w.2d 229 to deliberate after seven weeks of testimony); susan todd, idaho couple's second vioxx trial pins double damages); walter c. morrison, nat'l bus. inst., settle medical negligence cases 39. id. at para. 31. 121. a house report stated that the 2003 mma amendments were added to address "recent 2008] can't settle, can't sue 603 settlements altogether if unanimous consent is impossible, especially if msp, congress created a remedy that has no basis in contract, tort, or or articles on the history of medicare discussed this provision in depth. although academics and unfazed by risks associated with bayer drug, n.y. times, dec. 22, 2004, at w1. insurance derived from a nineteenth-century movement in europe for case law regarding the proper means to settle these aggregated, but non-class, claims. upward, the larger the expected value of the litigation."186 stakes if one side benefits more from the precedential effect of a remarked: "that little line was responsible for so many telegrams to the insurance, it is a quintessential insurance program. like a private reconciliation (s. 2885) and special rules for its consideration together with the litigation. if individual parties to a mass tort cannot settle, plaintiffs' (1982)). as discussed above, the benefits included in the plaintiff's calculations can be non- would be deemed as having a self-insured plan if it carries its own risk. . . ."); 149 cong. rec. three outcomes are possible. (1) medicare beneficiaries will have no attorneys are governed only by against the primary insurer for indemnification. if the third party is a depending on the nature of the third party. if the third party is a primary adding a prescription drug benefit for medicare beneficiaries. the new that congress intended the program to be a social insurance program, not litigation). was ms. loftin's primary medical insurer, and it paid $143,881.82 for retirement benefits based on contributions paid into the fund through 23(e), which governs court approval for class action settlements, the statute also grants the secretary the right to be subrogated to that a third party should have paid, the insurer generally has rights to in short, reverting to the pre-mma understanding of the msp would other plaintiffs will not find representation and defendants will not pay of this article: under the msp, the window for creating a benefit for both formula (4):145 this is virtually insignificant compared to overall could find herself without any compensation after medicare has taken its sense within the context of an insurance paradigm. but by amending the plaintiff pays for her attorneys' fees on a fee-for-service basis, the determined that the primary plan was liable to pay the medical costs of a 46. see marmor, supra note 29, at 8; oberlander, supra note 26, at 47. 1917], that strategy had backfired. `the very explicitness of the american borrowings 566 akron law review [41:557 where attorneys bring claims on contingency, the attorneys have an true peace through settlement. in any tort case, parties may struggle to as edwin witte, the chair of the committee on economic security house nor the senate report predicted that this provision would result in spare region, the pittsburgh post gazette, dec. 3, 2004, at c1; mark landler, investors continuum from cases that can easily be aggregated and litigated as one case to cases that are simply act...............................................................................582 tort lawsuits. nos. mdl 1203, 99-20593, 2001 wl 283163, at *10 (e.d. pa. mar. 21, 2001); united states v. 2008] can't settle, can't sue 587 but even aggregate settlements even those in which each individual plaintiff is swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm version); omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 953, 94 stat. 2599, 2647 for instance, the tortfeasor could argue that her actions multi-jurisdictional, multi-party disputes. thus, it is best to think of these cases as arising on a beyond congress' initial expectation,74 but until 2003, the msp kept its same conservatives and the ama focused on the evils of socialism. this against the tortfeasors to recover medicare's costs, the beneficiaries' lawsuits to trial instead of settlements.180 further, post mma, the secretary can collect from medicare discovery done by private litigation against these mass tort defendants. 80. see h.r. rep. no. 96-1167, at 1 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 u.s.c.c.a.n. 5527 34. blevins, supra note 28, at 27: 193. see id. (arguing that ex ante individuals prefer firms to invest in the proper amount of 101. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(a) (2002). the statute also created a private right of action by sought to recover medicare's expenditures from alleged tortfeasors who respect to the item or service, and may join or intervene in any action related to the (msp) manual, rev. 34, 10 (sept. 7, 2005). was unclear whether a primary insurer was responsible or where a 165. see model rules of prof'l conduct r. 1.8(g) (2002); model code of prof'l psychological barriers to litigation settlement: an experimental approach, 93 mich. l. rev. 107, medicare beneficiaries; (b) the prices paid for services, which reflect beneficiaries and any other entity that receives a part of the proceeds of a convention reference materials 921 (2005) (calling the amended msp "awful," and warning through the litigation process.142 rejected three attempts to pass some form of universal healthcare invest more time into a given representation. lastly, the msp may wasteful, fraudulent items, and services to the tune of $31.3 billion over 10 years. . . . according to and/or other medical expenses which medicare did not pay. in "the intent of this statute was to cut the costs later economic models criticize the neoclassical model arguing that politics of medicare 7 (1973). settlement costs as the defendants do. either way, the algebra is the same, and dmin will rise as a waive the provisions of this subsection in the case of an individual claim if he determines in other words, a "primary plan of self- coverage for retirees. however, as the market moved healthy workers conservative approach); frank verderame, medicare reimbursement claims, 1 atla ann. that take years or even decades to develop. see id. examples of latent injury claims include those expected return will be lower, and it is unlikely that they will invest the swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm ethical pitfalls in representing multiple parties: how to get through the case without tripping, 8. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 493; goetzmann, 2001 u.s. dist. lexis 9258 at *4-5; 37 n.1 (2000). i.e. a secondary payer. revisited, 56 j. mo. b. 44, 44-45 (2000) (warning that "attorneys should proceed with caution" in loftin would have been left with less than $10,000 to compensate her 2008] can't settle, can't sue 569 598 akron law review [41:557 where the primary plan failed to make payments. subparagraph (a) in light of these issues, putative class representatives in a 71. see social security amendments of 1965, pub. l. no. 89-97, 1862(b), 79 stat. 286, 325 manufacturer and, under a provision that allows the secretary to seek 188. see mcgovern, supra note 187, at 872. primary plan was obligated to make payment." h.r. rep. no. 108-178(ii), at 189-90 (2003). with ms. loftin for any amount, the secretary could rightly claim that associated with [the litigation]; the commonality of the issues and actors within a litigation; and the (requiring the secretary to send a questionnaire to new beneficiaries to determine if the beneficiary in 1912, influenced, in part, by compensation plan would reimburse medicare.71 automatically increase a defendant's exposure, take a share of the entity received from the primary insurer,135 [b]ecause it may deprive them of any compensation for their injuries, the full the amount claimed by arguing that the plaintiff did not pay the amount billed by the health care injuries, 75 n.y.u. l. rev. 354, 384-85, 399 (2000) (defining subrogation). 2008] can't settle, can't sue 575 in mass torts. see infra note 184 and accompanying text. ms. loftin's surgeries and subsequent medical care.1 unions. see generally daniel s. hirshfield, the lost reform: the campaign for thus, congress attempted cause of action against primary insurers.199 id.; see also blue cross and blue shield ass'n v. sullivan, 794 f. supp. 1166, 1168 (d.d.c. 1992) kohn & colleen t. davies, avoiding traps for the unwary: understanding u.s. government amount once to the settling beneficiary and twice the amount of reimbursement provisions were not triggered unless a medicare recipient msp focused solely on the insurance industry: the government only generally arise in one of two ways: exposure to a pharmaceutical drug or devise that is removed arguments regarding the msp's scope.121 adequacy, commonality, predominance, superiority, and notice.158 suffering.136 payment under this title may not be made with respect to any item or service to the settlement, or collect from a contingency fee, the total settlement class actions, 43 stan. l. rev. 497, 501-02 (1991); george l. priest & benjamin klein, the although congress claimed that it intended to make only "technical" settlement.133 with premiums on the rise from non-profits and private civil rules & working group on mass torts, report on mass tort litigation 10 (feb. 15, 1999), swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm defendant or defendants, these attorneys may face a conflict of interest between securing an 98. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2) (2002); see also health ins. ass'n am., inc., 23 f.3d at 414-15 65. social security amendments of 1965, pub. l. no. 89-97, 79 stat. 286 (1965). revenue policies. . . . congress directed its spending and tax-writing committees to msp defines group health plans both as small group health plans: "a plan (including a self-insured (2001). 1982, pub. l. no. 97-248, 116, 96 stat. 324, 353-54 (1982). that is, congress required employers mass tort can struggle to achieve finality. in any tort, the parties must plaintiffs' attorneys push the most meritorious and sympathetic claimants and defendants often push that restriction, however, is president of the american federation of labor, claimed that any form of states to enact laws providing for assignment of medicaid beneficiaries' rights to seek may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the 136. zinman v. shalala, 67 f.3d 841 (9th cir. 1995); see also denekas v. shalala, 943 f. supp. as with the original push for social security, the focus on the and an expanded program of federal assistance for a one-line proposal to authorize a study of compulsory health insurance. are forced to pay for all of the harms caused to some set of plaintiffs, expenditures and administrative costs per enrollee rose rapidly. in 2005 illness and disability, and distributes the costs of the individual financial actions for mass torts. however, many plaintiffs' attorneys unofficially aggregate claims together plaintiff win (vd) multiplied by the defendant's belief that the plaintiff 161. further, without a class mechanism, the court has no role in the settlement process. the self-insured plan any party that pays its own judgment or settlement.123 that is, after the amendment, the secretary can take will not settle. nonetheless, in 2003, as a small part of the medicare numbers, it is not hard to see how mass torts with tens or hundreds of thousands plaintiffs could in this article, i show that, as amended, the msp will likely have 5. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 493; complaint, supra note 1, at 4-6, 11. cholesterol drug, baycol; the diet drug, phen fen; and the anti-arthritis drug, vioxx. see manual incentives for bringing suit, because some law firms represent hundreds 1996); see also health ins. ass'n of am., inc., 23 f.3d at 427 (henderson, j., concurring) in the late 1990s the government found a potential new source of most injured, or some combination of both) and bring these as individual double the amount of settlement or more without ever admitting liability potential repercussions of ignoring potential medicare liability). payment to ms. loftin, the manufacturer was self-insuring against any contract 31 (1999), www.nasi.org/usr_doc/med_report_soc_contract.pdf. common risks dealt in formula (5). if, on the other hand, beneficiaries cannot bring claims on behalf of medicare, a individual counties failed to put the welfare plans into action.39 this bill such an item or service) to any right under this subsection of an rise or fall with plaintiff awards, defense verdicts, or evidentiary rulings in other cases within the continue lawsuits simply for the psychological benefits.152 199. see 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002). of opening, closing, and witness examination, and limiting the defendants to 35 hours of trial time). defendant is responsible to medicare for medicare's payments to the focuses on procedural fairness for each individual claimant or on efficiency in the overall process, both wages for health care workers and price of the goods and services the direct and derivative rights are would only make payment on the condition that the workmen's in a dispute where a 2008] can't settle, can't sue 583 were "primazy [sic] plans from whom repayment is required for items and services paid for by the 110. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002). 32. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 18. will win (pd) plus the costs of defense at trial (cdj) minus out-of-court determined in accordance with regulations), with respect to such item or service, under a can't settle, can't sue: how congress stole basic shape.93 were injured in auto accidents, because medicare refused to pay for medical costs that it used to fee attorney is compensated based on the size of the plaintiffs' recovery in turn, a defendant will settle any time it can settle for less than it balance the equation and restore the natural balance of the tort system. aged employees and aged employees' spouses as to other employees and s. settlement, an alleged tortfeasor demonstrated that it was "required or recovering from tortfeasors on behalf of medicare. first party liability swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm sure that the public understood that the bill provided an earned benefit, bargaining power, the parties will split the difference, and settle for needs of the nation, "[a]ccess to the means of attainment and preservation of health, is a basic incentive to represent them. not a welfare entitlement. when an insurer pays benefits to an insured payment could be made would be clarified; an entity engaging in a business, trade, or profession beneficiary is liable for medicare's conditional payments to the service to the extent that -- alternatively, to the extent that medicare beneficiaries make up a large (2)). for purposes of this paper, there is little reason to distinguish between the two and i will refer under the current federal rules, courts generally cannot certify mass this proposal would have been financed two-thirds from the public will not find redress, because the claims of medicare beneficiaries will medicare secondary payer act, 54 la. b. j. 173 (oct.-nov. 2006) (warning practitioners that if recent court decisions such as thompson v. goetzmann resulted in a narrow recognize an increase in welfare.193 by a concern that compulsory health insurance would negatively impact subsidize the premium payments the elderly made for private insurance. her less than $10,000 to compensate her for her pain and suffering. in despite the fact that the statute had been in existence for twenty years." orthopedic, 202 f.r.d. at numbers change and the window for settlement shrinks. additionally, would result in substantial savings in fiscal year 1981. settlements under state workers' compensation acts: law, policy, practice, and ten years of the catastrophic event that causes harm to a readily identifiable group of putative plaintiffs." id. at 166. tortfeasors for future suits or intervene in suits brought by beneficiaries. without a rule, like rule consortium or society claim, and which non-settling defendants might conditional payments. congress made no changes to the first paragraph, c. can't settle, can't sue................................................599 4. medicare is presently administered by an agency known as centers for medicare and national counsel or multiple law firms, as is quite common today. been made under such a law or plan, policy, plan, or insurance. the secretary may 166. rule 1.8(g) states: explicit terms of the settlement (e.g., the parties do not have equivalent (citing theodore marmor & julie beglin, medicare and how it grew. . . and grew. . . and grew, american medicine 197 (1963). in an effort to limit government action in the health care arena, manual for complex litigation (fourth) 22.1, at 343 (2004) (quoting advisory comm. on discounted settlement from a third party."137 the harm, that the scope of the contract did not cover the insured's the fact that courts18 given the number of medicare beneficiaries in recent mass tort time, however, new liberal lobbying efforts rebuffed the ama's some amount between $70,00 and $130,000. assuming equal of mass torts, hensler and peterson noted that three factors distinguish mass torts from other high involved in litigation pertaining to birth defects; at least two million women used dalkon given a handout.43 courts have regularly denied plaintiffs' motions to certify mass torts as agencies, including cms, "as a result of injuries allegedly caused by breast implants." dow service under a primary plan."202 to both small group health plans and large group health plans simply as "group health plans." and accompanying text. decision to limit the scope of benefits provided was politically expedient. because medicare's distribute the costs of injuries to non-injured parties, the mechanisms for of subrogation against tortfeasors. the statute contemplates both of in october 2000, after ms. loftin received her settlement, the spouses.95 medicare began as and remains a government-sponsored insurance complaint] included the medical expenses paid for by medicare." id. this characterization does not n.22; dow corning, 250 b.r. at 340. hospital rather than the amount paid by the plaintiff. it is common for defendants to chip away at create a further barrier to aggregate settlements. under model rule of 108-173, 301(a)(2)(b) (codified at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(i)). swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm as a third-party administrator, or otherwise) to make payment with respect to such item class action fairness act of 2005, cases filed as national class actions in state court likely will be berenson, legal stance may pay off for merck, n.y. times, aug. 4, 2006, at c1. in light of these wage and price controls, voluntary efforts by the american hospital association and the american procedures that insurance companies employ: estimating likely losses during the period, inducing another lawyer to violate the rules of professional conduct. see james m. mccormack, it may also preclude some aggregate cannot bring claims, they will not be appropriately compensated for their welfare benefits had been earned was politically crucial."60 95. see 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(1)(a)(i)(ii) (2002). 584 akron law review [41:557 (noting that the "msp program fails to sufficiently account for" settlements where the merits of the damages provision. as will be discussed below, this drives up the attorneys face deciphering their potential obligations to medicare, and advising them to take a swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm zyprexa prods. liab. litig., 451 f. supp. 2d 458, 465 (e.d.n.y. 2006). insurance for the entire population, the new proposal had smaller aims. 52. id. at 11. to take the entire settlement amount, even if a plaintiff paid no out of private health insurance for their members from employers, this healthcare entitlement: the american association for labor legislation unique attention often considered concomitant with individual reconciliation act of 1981, pub. l. no. 97-35, 2146, 95 stat. 357, 800-01 (1981). the next year, 192. rosenberg, supra note 189, at 843-44. 108-173, 301(b)(2)(a) (codified at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2006)) (emphasis added). litigation. defendants must be concerned about the outcome of each of attorneys base their estimates about the expected value of mass tort scope of the msp scheme."92 the msp. likewise, even if parties are poor estimators of winning or defendant's maximum offer (omax) is represented in formula (3) and the 20 (1971); see also joseph a. grundfest & peter h. huang, the unexpected value of litigation: a could expect a primary plan to pay for her medical expenses whether representation.162 although the criticisms are justified, they do not change the conclusions this, of course, will not create the proper incentives for optimal writing.168 secretary could then seek reimbursement for those payments by suing disabled (part b),67 if it is more difficult for medicare beneficiaries to settle tort claims, deal, and as part of the fair deal.26 64. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 30. medicare fisc was unclear. senator grassley and the cbo predicted a twice considered whether mass torts can be certified for settlement swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm if each of these cases were tried separately, the cases could clog a court's docket for hundreds of that is, the truly profitable aspect of mass torts is settling swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm to treat those over sixty-five the same as those under sixty-five with respect to the provision of insurance contracts. likewise, the primary insurer's defenses sound in plaintiff alone is the decision maker. she will bring suit if she 59. oberlander, supra note 26, at 24; see marmor, supra note 29, at 16-17. likewise, the selection of disputes for litigation, 13 j. legal stud. 1, 3-6 (1984); richard a. posner, an 602 akron law review [41:557 a promise of individual representation, when individual firms represent a large number of individual preserve your fiscal health, 64 bench & b. minn. 25 (feb. 2007) (warning practitioners of the liability the msp creates makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for under the msp, the window for settlement is smaller, if it exists at above, significant numbers of plaintiffs will not find redress for some to determine whether the claims at issue are viable that is, whether the 144. see generally robert d. cooter & daniel l. rubinfeld, economic analysis of legal a simple example will help illustrate this model. consider a insurers, unlike tortfeasors, enter into a contract to assume the risk that a in a narrower discovery campaign or a more limited scope of litigation that the probability of recovery or amount involved in such claim does not warrant the bring a claim when it is not. 886 (11th cir. 2003); brown v. thompson, 252 f. supp. 2d 312, 319-20 (e.d. va. 2003), aff'd 374 plaintiffs, may forgo their economic interest to get their "day in court," exact "vengeance," or to to social security, which had gained widespread acceptance. as with likely that the value of plaintiff's claim will exceed the value of m. this assumption is represented reimbursement rights, 66 def. couns. j. 193, 200 (1999). secretary should retain its right to bring direct claims against insurers or 107. the implementing regulations defined a "self-insured plan" as "a plan under which an in this country, two lobbying organizations led the charge to create a individuals whom medicare would otherwise cover. one can assume plaintiff will settle when the defendant's offer (o) is more than the value 72. from 1965 until 1980, medicare was the "primary payer" for the "health care claims of by the beneficiaries; and (d) the average complexity of the services, i.e., 36. oberlander, supra note 26, at 20-21. autonomy in non-class collective representation, 2003 u. chi. legal f. 519, 533 (2003). claims to compensate medicare. that is, once the manufacturer settled ms. loftin and mr. goetzmann out of the payments received from the environmental hazards such as oil spills or chemical leaks, and fires. dispersed mass torts, in harms. moreover, if tortfeasors are not made to pay for their tortious swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm urban, academically minded doctors.31 (2) plaintiffs' attorneys will refuse to represent medicare beneficiaries in industry, and the ama made sure that medicare followed a definition did not persuade courts that it was appropriate to transform a tortfeasor into a primary alternate sources."86 torts swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm policies around medicare to fill the gaps created for those over 65.73 for pain and suffering, lost wages, or other non-medical damages would constitute an that is acceptable to all parties involved. it is reasonable to think that 2008] can't settle, can't sue 599 consider again the hypothetical above. assume the plaintiff is a 111-14 (1994); janet cooper alexander, do the merits matter? a study of settlements in securities thus, we can imagine that insurance companies had to pay more for medical costs for elderly that the direct cause of action is based on the insurer's contractual torts (sean wajert & andrew gaddes eds., law journal press) (forthcoming 2009). national health insurance program.46 due. likewise, a defendant could find itself liable to medicare for thus, the secretary can step into the id. part a was and is financed through the hospital insurance trust fund ("hi"). id. the hi trust i. introduction 60. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 24. 33. oberlander, supra note 26, at 20, marmor, supra note 29, at 7. in part gompers creates. when threatened with liability for all of the harms caused, firms progressives, and the american medical association ("ama"), led by causing an injury instead of taking out insurance with a carrier.109 risk occurs.27 when plaintiffs' attorneys, lower. thus, the settlement amount is likely to be smaller as well. 120. medicare prescription drug, improvement, and modernization act of 2003, pub. l. no. 2008] can't settle, can't sue 597 other insurance companies, in fact, wrote their insurance defendant's maximum offer will be $80,000, but the minimum a plaintiff would accept to settle is the ethical rules in fashioning settlements.165 benefits for outpatient services, home health services, durable medical equipment, and diagnostic damages.157 removed to a federal forum. class action fairness act of 2005, pub. l. no. 109-2, 4(a), 119 stat. u.s.c. 1396p, which prohibits states from placing liens against or seeking recovery of 108. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 497; see also philip morris, 116 f. supp. 2d at 145. litigation on the number of claims brought, the commonality among settle tort claims; the government had to show that the defendant had the natural reading of the msp is to give the secretary a direct conclusions of this article are not changed by this criticism. the msp significantly closes the precedent and to signal to the plaintiffs that the defendant will not settle significant social stigma and objection to being on the government dole; swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 568 akron law review [41:557 medical coverage under a `primary plan.'"115 extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made (as drug benefit captured the national spotlight and occupied the bulk of mass tort litigation or to bring mass tort litigation at all. this could have government's claim.112 redress the harms they cause, they will not invest the proper amount in amount, the amount of medicare's expenditures, or more. retain their tort defenses. likewise, plaintiffs' attorneys can continue to conditional outlays from truly tortious parties. lastly, i offer a simple 25. social security act amendments of 1965, pub. l. no. 89-97, 79 stat. 286, 291-343 claims as a mass tort. the first of these outcomes is unlikely and the last 1 lee r. russ, couch on insurance 3d 10:1 (1997). had no basis in the text of the statute or the legislative history15 tortfeasor's insurance carrier funded part of a settlement and the tortfeasor funded another part, from the market or exposure to a substance over a prolonged period of time. id.; see chamblee, paint an accurate picture. texas pleading rules allow plaintiffs to sue for the amount billed by the making the group health plan the primary insurer. tax equity and fiscal responsibility act of the msp, however, could disrupt the expected progression toward insurer, the secondary or excess insurer has a direct cause of action expected utility and 2) that parties' utility function of wealth is just wealth, i.e., u(w) = w. defendant estimates it will have to pay out post-judgment should the seeking to "recover the costs of medical care either provided or paid for by" certain government ("aall"), a political group of academics, lawyers, and other behalf of 349 clients without informing each client of the existence and value of the other claims before trial ms. loftin settled defenses.198 190. presumably medicare has already covered some portion of the beneficiary's medical bills. the msp discourages medicare beneficiaries and their contingency proposal. grows, a defendant's maximum offer will shrink and the minimum the supreme court has formula (4): dmin = (vp * pp) cpj + cps analysis of law (3d ed. 1986); steven shavell, suit, settlement, and trial: a theoretical the ethical rules, however, analysis under alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs, 11 j. legal stud. 55 will refer to the secretary of the department of health and human services as the decision maker in 3d suit over vioxx, n.y. times, dec. 13, 2005, at c1. similarly, in baycol litigation, over the the individual cases in a mass tort, both in terms of actual precedent and phillips petroleum co. v. shutts: article: a proposed settlement rule for mass torts, 74 u.m.k.c. single court, working every week of the year would take over seventy years to complete the medicare: inequitable distribution of medical services." id. at 9-10. 194. id. at 848. rosenberg argues that the only way that mass tort plaintiffs' attorneys will exposed in the workplace to asbestos that spawned litigation concerning lung cancer and over $9 billion out of that $31 billion."). plans, medicare was made the `primary payer' for the health care claims of federal beneficiaries . . . with under social insurance are old age, ill health or injury, and unemployment. see id. philosophy by enacting the german sickness insurance act, which $543,763.6411 easily overwhelm the court system. thus, a court must think systematically about settlement from lawyers whose fees are paid from settlement proceeds"); h. kennard bennett, settlement issues in swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 196. of course, medicare is forced to cover everyone who is medicare eligible e.g., minor changes to the msp. the impact of these changes on the 1. thompson v. goetzmann, 337 f.3d 489, 493-94 (5th cir. 2003); thompson v. d. congress amends the medicare secondary payer act underlying claim are in dispute); robert s. dampf, mediations & settlements: applicability of the the mma is best known for 6. a primary insurer is one "who is contractually committed to settling a claim up to the acting in concert, represent fewer than all who are harmed, their 143. see generally korobkin & guthrie, supra note 141, at 112-14. supra note 17, at 172 ("representing catalogues or inventories of claimants often leads to conflicts pol'y & l. 7 (2001). part b is a voluntary program financed by general treasury revenues and 93. in 1989, congress redrafted the msp into its current structure. see omnibus budget 146. robert cooter, stephen marks, and robert mnookin famously proposed that most 2008] can't settle, can't sue 589 bells since the government first took the litigation position now reflected a program or a method for accomplishing a goal.117 to real 2005 dollars). the efficacy of state welfare programs suffered significantly. only natural that the government would push to recover from these expected to make prompt payment.") (letter from william e. moschella, assistant attorney recovery for either the beneficiaries or for medicare or medicaid. events that gave rise to the need for the item or service. . . . plaintiff, a plaintiff would only bring suit when: with illustration from the classic economic model of 67. supplementary medical insurance ("smi"), established in part b of title xviii, provides amendments are "[c]larifying amendments to conditional payment provisions"); see also 149 complaint, supra note 1, at 45. attorneys, who make the litigation decisions in mass torts, may that the number of medicare beneficiaries involved in mass tort cases insureds, the government insures medicare beneficiaries from the cost of provided to individuals receiving benefits to treat end-stage renal disease. see omnibus budget 23. see infra part v. swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm supp. 2d 131, 146 n.22 (d.d.c. 2000) (noting that "[c]ourts have uniformly recognized that the proposals did not view it primarily as a measure to further income security but as a remedy for the the msp made sense specifically because medicare functioned as an 119. see goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 498. as one leading treatise noted: swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm in sum, economic theories of settlement suggest that the window the beneficiaries' claims. the statute states: "the united states shall be provided assistance for sixty days of hospitalization, sixty days of 570 akron law review [41:557 settlement: an institutional account of american tort law, 57 vand. l. rev. 1571, 1602 (2004). so, what is the practical impact of these changes and what does this more than the amount of the settlement.129 restricted to 1978-1990 yielded only articles by the practicing law institute. nor have later books for merck in vioxx cases, n.y. times, mar. 3, 2007, at c8; alex berenson, a mistrial is declared defendant is responsible for the conditional payments, as long as the however, that single line motivated the ama to oppose the entire bill.44 release wrongful death claims, who has a right to bring a loss of direct and derivative rights of other insurers corrects the problems liability for the payment of services required by a beneficiary as a result of an injury or illness 28. oberlander, supra note 26, at 18; sue a. blevins, medicare's midlife crisis 25 settle the suit, but no more. after that, the defendant will not recognize "primary plan's responsibility" for any conditional payment made by private doctors were influenced both by the comparison to socialism and the poor (medicaid). over time, medicare expanded to include private who had paid into it, not simply as another government program that went to help `others.'"). 2008] can't settle, can't sue 567 thus, one is left with the conclusion that the "volume of services" 115. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 497 (emphasis in original); 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(a) (2002). subsection of an individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or service under the direct cause of action will and future claims. in a mass tort, this process can be a logistical morass. refused the government's request for payment and necessitated litigation. see 42 c.f.r. the second paragraph of the msp provided the means by which and the settlement numbers at stake drew the government to this 180. see cooter & rubinfeld, supra note 144, at 1083 ("[l]aws that increase the costs of intended this change to fix the ambiguity created in earlier versions of stated that medicare would not pay for any medical service for a devoid of any instances in which the government attempted to sue a tortfeasor under the msp, 170. there are several potential consequences to the parties, their counsel, and the settlement if particular model. for instance, the msp changes both the expected values for settlement and the settled with injured medicare beneficiaries and from the proceeds of any the secretary sought double as such, resolving each individual swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm the secretary may be entitled two lead to an inefficiency in the tort system. expenditures per enrollee. from 1967 through 1980, the total medicare these defenses will be based on the contract and the common law of liab. litig., nos. mdl 1203, 99-20593, 2001 wl 283163, at *10 (e.d. pa. mar. 21, 2001). 178. see, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text. despite the government's plea, almost every court to rule on the reducing the deficit.80 many claims will never be brought. plaintiffs' attorneys may be willing of interest that attorneys may not be able to foresee at the beginning of litigation, such as differences for the pain and suffering from her botched surgeries and hip and makes it difficult for medicare beneficiaries to obtain legal 58. id. swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm litigation, it is not hard to imagine that these beneficiaries likely make up in december 1980, congress passed, and president carter signed, tortfeasors, in contrast, owe compensation to injured parties because of i am not suggesting that medicare should have no recourse against msp. this is not entirely unexpected. courts will rarely write about the true impact of the msp at a minimum, a defendant help define the limit and scope of the secretary's claims against the second-class settlements, 65 la. l. rev. 157, 165 (2004) (adding property damage mass torts and settlement amount, and a fifty percent chance of receiving twice that 574 akron law review [41:557 thus, aggregate settlements can raise basic concerns this common understanding changed in 2003 with the amendment plaintiffs' attorneys determine that they cannot obtain a significant ensuring full due process for each plaintiff. rule 23 is less hospitable to personal injury cases."). addition to workers' compensation, congress included automobile, with the explicit intent of $112 million.88 beneficiaries: the disabled and end-stage renal disease patients. see oberlander, supra note 26, at includes individualized issues related to choice of law, causation, and medicare beneficiaries go unrepresented in any of the forms discussed under the first paragraph and provided the mechanism for recovery high standard for settling later cases. thus, the parties may skew the 117. see id. congress moved swiftly to amend the msp to reflect the the first paragraph of the msp imposed certain 75. 2006 medicare ann. rep., supra note 69, at 30. one can also think of intensity as "the 48 and accompanying text. manufacturer paid the full settlement amount of $256,000 to mr. creating a norm for settlement.174 (concluding that, in light of the definition of primary plan and the legislative history, the statute was united states for the care and treatment of medicare beneficiaries. . . ." id. 170. (1965). checks."58 influences of european countries than ever before or since). american politicians were particularly may have to pay twice any settlement amount once to a settling insurer that distributes the risk of individual harm across a portfolio of 109. dingell bill in his run for the presidency, even though he knew that the must (a) inform each of their clients of the terms of an aggregate shields, an intrauterine antipregnancy device involved in litigation regarding infections representing similar claims necessarily prepare the litigation on a group basis with little personal claimants in the same litigation, it is clear these firms, not individual plaintiffs, drive litigation pennsylvania experience, 16 widener l. j. 199, 389-98 (2007) (addressing the implications of plaintiff will only bring a claim where her damages (including pain and suffering and medical 596 akron law review [41:557 clients who are covered by the settlement, even if the settlement involves services provided to medicare beneficiaries. 721 f.2d 431, 435 (3d cir. 1983); abrams v. heckler, 582 f. supp. 1155, 1157 (s.d.n.y. 1984). problems also make it less likely that the parties can find a common premiums simply to stay in business, and by 1958, this insurance "was a. the push for government-sponsored health recover against the third party. those rights may be direct or derivative number of private primary payers. although approximately thirty states had some form of old-age hospitalization benefit of part a and the medical insurance of part b opportunities for collusion in the settlement process). moreover, boston globe, may 7, 1995). distinct types of tort claims: mass accidents and dispersed mass torts. see id. at 343-44; see also l. lawsuit, plaintiffs must expect to recover significantly more than the out of the bill."45 services included in a claim against the primary plan or the primary see shannon p. duffy, judge approves fen phen settlement, american home products could pay 56. sheri i. david, with dignity: the search for medicare and medicaid 3 (1985); insurance, or self-insurance plan.116 reimbursement approach gives many beneficiaries little incentive to pursue valid claims counsel.134 amount a plaintiff will accept to settle the suit will grow. the valuation 13. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 500-01. inserted among these other changes was a little-discussed rather than settlements. dollars, medicare spent $976.50 per enrollee in 1967; by 1970, medicare 83. see omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 911-929, 94 stat. 2619- that is, a defendant will settle where: 2007). 411.24(c)(1) and (c)(2) (2006). at least one court, however, has suggested that the secretary can safe and secure"); thomas j. nyzio, medicare recovery in liability cases, s. c. law., may-june makes it more difficult for medicare beneficiaries to bring and settle those provided by small employers to provide the same benefits to the mean for settling parties? first, under the msp congress irrefutably expenses not covered by medicare) exceed (m + cpj)/pp. lawsuit where the parties agree that the plaintiff has a 20% chance to win chancellor otto von bismark, embraced the "social insurance" l. rev. 623, 626 (2006) ("[t]he civil procedure of mass torts has discouraged mass treatment by administration, historical background and developments in social security, paras. 30, 40, 116. see goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 497. plan's insured, or by other means.124 individual or mass tort lawsuits; or (3) plaintiffs' attorneys will not bring reference materials 1811 (2006) (advising practitioners that "[t]here is no specific solution to large roster of clients, seeking complex and extensive discovery, and this liability before bringing the claim on behalf of ms. loftin, he likely actually created a plan of self-insurance. 1980 amendment, for the first time since medicare's inception, case after the 1980 amendments was that of a medicare beneficiary hit by a tortious driver. before including potential claimants who are not medicare beneficiaries, representative litigation, 100 colum. l. rev. 370, 386 (2000) (recognizing four distinct conflicts republicans and the ama offered different proposals to shape thus, the decision about whether to litigate a case rests in large part with (including any physician or provider) that has received payment from that entity with similarly, the msp dissuades attorneys from taking a medicare consistent with the litigation positions taken by this department and the department of had the secretary won this lawsuit, medicare. there is no discussion in any of the legislative history or under the neoclassical economic model, a plaintiff will settle a otherwise) in whole or in part."122 mass torts are like other personal injury claims. plaintiffs' robert wagner (d., n.y.) who in 1935 first introduced legislation to number of people or damage their property." a mass tort is defined by both the nature not set aside for his or her own future healthcare costs; rather, today's medicare taxes pay for the settlements, plaintiffs' attorneys likely cannot bring mass tort claims. the primary plan failed to pay or reimburse medicare, the secretary payment for medicare beneficiaries' medical costs and services.84 universal healthcare poisoned the debate by arguing that nationalized in 1934, roosevelt created the advisory committee on economic "inpatient hospital care, home care, hospice care, and care in a skilled nursing facility." blevins, problems. it is, of course, true that parties act for reasons other than 163. because plaintiffs' attorneys often represent multiple mass tort claimants against the same settlement funds, congress added that the secretary could "recover [on (arguing that plaintiffs' attorneys can, and do, work in litigation networks to achieve efficiencies of requirement may create further expense and delay in a settlement, represented plaintiffs medicare beneficiaries the msp makes it more 48. the ama and other critics saw the social security bill as the first step toward a health bill would never pass the republican-controlled congress.51 590 akron law review [41:557 determine the maximum amount the secretary could re 201 included compulsory health insurance for industrial workers as part of yields only one academic article that addresses the topic. see david b. torrey, compromise third, congress enhanced medicare's ability to recover from of unpredictable illness and disability by sharing individual financial risks across a large insurance to employees to provide the same coverage to employees aged sixty-five to sixty-nine and settlement dollars at stake matter. defendants certainly track their total marmor, supra note 29, at 15. to settle tort lawsuits. dissuade contingency fee representation because the secretary can formula (5): (vp * pp) cpj > m181 according to the government, an alleged tortfeasor who settled with would evaporate, the roosevelt administration withdrew its support for a roosevelt and the new deal.36 recognize the automatic liability that attaches under the msp. as such, likely reach a negotiated settlement, because it is in their economic interest to do so as litigation id. at 1395y(b)(2)(b) (2002) (emphasis added). social security, individuals paid in over time and received benefits upon uncovered medical bills.190 probability of victory (those plaintiffs that are the most sympathetic, the 81. omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 900, et seq., 94 stat. 2599, information or a different legal standard; (2) class representatives are not adequate 47 (2005) (warning practitioners that "[i]t is imperative that you make yourself aware of the new proposal to the elderly provided some political cover, while still insurer should have paid or from any person that receives a payment because it generally affects the incentives for bringing or settling tort lawsuits two areas in which 114. orthopedic, 202 f.r.d. at 165. progressives, the new deal, the fair deal, and the medicare ability to bring lawsuits); glenn e. bradford & melinda m. ward, the medicare "super lien" the neoclassical classic model makes certain assumptions about the 179. see cooter & rubinfeld, supra note 144, at 1082 (citing richard a. posner, economic of absolute priority might preclude settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the v. balancing the equation......................................................605 democratic majority into congress, and medicare finally had the the judicial system, which has no real means to try each of the cases. for instance, by august of because the tortfeasor would be self-insured to at least some part of the risk. to control medicare's rising costs by limiting the volume and intensity of compulsory healthcare for industrial workers. in 1883, germany, under formula (3): omax = (vd * pd) + cdj cds amount. lastly, the model assumes that parties have equivalent stakes in the ces based the hoffmann, 883 so.2d 425, 435 (la. 2004) (attorney suspended for three months for failure to obtain despite this achievement, the original bill and its later expansions the weaker claims. the strategic bargaining over these early cases can impact the ultimate spent $1,741.55 per enrollee, and by 1980, $3,090.97 per enrollee.77 id. lastly, as william jordan, senior counsel to the assistant attorney general for the civil worked as follows: if a medicare beneficiary had medical insurance after the amendment, although resigned to the inevitability of their difficulties, make sense internally and will not impact tort settlements. this will there is little, if any, recorded debate about the wisdom of this change; these settlements are the lifeblood of mass tort litigation. without government"); see charles f. preuss, alan j. lazarus & krista l. cosner, the keys to successfully programs. and settlement. 2008] can't settle, can't sue 573 mass tort likely cannot satisfy the rule 23 requirements of typicality, reduce vp. if there is a window for settlement after the msp is accounted for, the surplus will be 103. see, e.g., mason v. am. tobacco co., 212 f. supp. 2d 88 (e.d.n.y. 2002), aff'd 346 f.3d courts read it charitably,100 agreement that would not include such a waiver and release of claims. (2006)). calculable damages in settlement negotiations, so also is there a countervailing concern that a rule counsel fails to meet the requirements of rule 1.8(g). first, a plaintiff's attorney who fails to as void for violating rule 1.8(g). see, e.g., quintero v. jim walter homes, inc., 708 s.w.2d 225, 113. see goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 497-98 (citing 3 lee r. russ, couch on insurance 3d merck with $47.5m verdict, the star ledger, mar. 17, 2007, at 43; john curran, ticktock -- be conditioned on reimbursement to the appropriate trust fund established by this title swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm when other sources should be, in fact, paying instead of the taxpayer paying. . . . [w]hen in 1948, harry truman supported the wagner-murray- make it difficult to settle claims in a non-class aggregate fashion, distributive rights under the insurance system arise from a contractual without support and without a strategy second, from a deterrence standpoint, if tortfeasors are not made to claims on behalf of all potential plaintiffs. thus, even if the defendants incentives for physicians to provide quality services. together with 11. this amount is equal to the total payment to ms. loftin plus double the amount of congressional debate over the mma. congress spent little, if any, time courts reasoned that claims against insurers are different from claims 1980). 21. see infra part ii. those claims, and the interdependence of the case values.185 reports to the budget committee of the instructed committees 92-93, 153 (comm. print 145. if the parties are relatively close in their assessment of the outcome of litigation, they will by the health care financing administration ("hcfa"). both agencies were organized under the 1242 (n.d. ala. 2001), rev'd sub nom united states v. baxter int'l inc., 345 f.3d 866 (11th cir. or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class."). because it would be inefficient to bring mass tort actions. and coherence,"99 party. for example, defendants will want to resolve claims derivative to 2d 131; in re dow corning corp., 250 b.r. 298, 307 (bankr. e.d. mich. 2000) (silicone breast medicare beneficiaries in individual or mass tort litigation some claims under amchem and ortiz. in the diet drug litigation, american home products created a $3.75 51. id. at 11. proponents of the fair deal legislation had a greater distributive goal than had little effect on the rise in medicare spending. see id. at 17-19. under the neoclassical economic model of litigation, parties make occur, and, usually, arranging for commercial insurance for losses in excess of some it is clear that these formulae generate the following conclusions. a. an economic model of individual tort settlements swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm case to that judgment or the cost of settling the case. thus, a defendant secretary to seek recovery via litigation). on the other hand, a plaintiff weinstein: among bargaining positions, clients' divergent desires to settle or litigate, or the extent of latent 2008] can't settle, can't sue 595 similar provisions provided that group health plans could gearing up to defend hundreds or thousands of similar claims. supra note 28, at 5. medicare beneficiaries are required to pay a deductible for each hospitalization. formula, the plaintiff will settle when: rights and responsibilities vis--vis the insured and other insurers. the tort remedies from medicare beneficiaries automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or under feared that any form social insurance would draw workers closer to the state at the expense of the been able to draw out their settlements and avoid repaying medicare for payment of (1965). in 1965, section 1862(b) of the social security act stated: b. the structural, ethical, and practical barriers to would not have agreed to the representation, because his best chance of b. medicare as a secondary payer: an insurance based approach compulsory health care would be a means for the government to control alleged tortfeasor was "self-insured," because it carried its own risk of thus, despite its early rejection of national health care, by the time nursing home care, and some surgical benefits.56 programs, in turn, became the model for medicare's part a and part b. (i) payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, ... as required to some extent, the expenditures prior litigation as network, 2005 utah l. rev. 863, 869-70 (2005). as stier noted: that is, "the msp legislation [allows] full reimbursement the government individual tort claims.22 shield for surgical and medical expenses. marmor, supra note 29, at 9. interestingly, these insurance: the progressives, the new deal, the fair f. supp. 2d 458, 470 (e.d.n.y. 2006), no court has addressed the settlement implications of the for the harms that the tortfeasors cause medicare beneficiaries. simple failure to reach a negotiated settlement between individuals. the v. balancing the equation lawyer, filed suit against the manufacturer of the hip prosthesis alleging and diversity of plaintiffs in mass tort litigation, the unanimity 187. see francis e. mcgovern, settlement of mass torts in a federal system, wake forest 2008] can't settle, can't sue 571 merely stands in the shoes of its insured, the insurer's rights are no jules b. olsman, medicare liens in personal injury litigation, 2 atla ann. convention victims, due to and to the extent of the unsolicited benefits conferred. as such, the subrogee's 9. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002) (current version at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii) united states entered world war i. after 1917, those who opposed some wrong committed by the tortfeasor. in short, although both the balance of $153,600 to ms. loftin. the manufacturer paid all of the representatives, because their claims differ factually or legally from the class members; three significant reasons complaint at 17, 28, thompson v. goetzmann, 337 f.3d 489 (5th cir. 2003) (no. 3:00-cv-2174- (2000) (summarizing the classic economic model); russell korobkin & chris guthrie, second, the msp reduces the possibly handle the workload associated with these trials.155 which has been adopted in some defective design of the hip prosthesis.2 person in the settlement. a plaintiff was, "ipso facto a `self insurer' under the msp statute."108 settlement or a plaintiff's attorney's contingency fee. as such, the requirements on group health plans.94 suit and discourage attorneys from bringing mass torts altogether. 185. see hensler & peterson, supra note 176, at 1033. in an early work describing the nature government to recover when a primary plan failed to pay; see deficit reduction act of 1984, pub. 31 (1980). in part, these courts rejected the government's claim, because the msp medical costs, the other insurer not medicare was primary. where it ignore one pivotal plaintiff's claims in the settlement over the claims of others. see chamblee, after, or while, seeking discovery, the parties try a small group of cases medicare program to private sources of payment.87 61. see generally marmor, supra note 29, at 23-28. 2008] can't settle, can't sue 585 based on what they paid in.42 maximum damage award for those claims that they choose to bring. swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 174. see generally cross, supra note 141, at 7- 15. on behalf of medicare. 173. see richard l. berkman & rick swedloff, settlement issues in mass torts, in mass deterrence.195 parties are risk neutral; that is, that they are equally attracted to a whenever another insurer's responsibility to pay has been established. this section is the defendant as part of a settlement. it is hard to imagine a settlement of precaution. the cause of action, however, should not strip an alleged settlement may not be binding upon a plaintiff who claims he never consented to the terms. this their sixty-fifth birthday. in a country that was "traditionally skeptical of settlement; no part came from its liability insurance.3 the sense that the parties will attempt to maximize their expected wealth settlement fund itself. reflect the secretary's litigation position.16 clients' informed consent); in re jaeger, 213 b.r. 578 (bankr. c.d. cal. 1997) (disqualifying particular substance over a relatively short period of time. examples of these cases are the anti- intuitively obvious is that the msp's effects could be greater than a ii. the history of the medicare secondary payer act population." national academy of social insurance, medicare and the american social plaintiff "holdouts" undermine collective action.172 behalf of medicare] . . . from the proceeds of a primary plan's payment the coding of claims by health care providers to optimize medicare payments." richard s. foster, 17. there is no universal definition of "mass torts." however, one commonly accepted into a more general social security program that provided pensions, unemployment compensation, 54. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 22. lawsuit when she expects to get more out of the settlement then she underrepresented in torts generally and mass torts specifically. let's call mass tort cases could result in a total failure of the settlement process. developing [their clients'] side of a claim to the extent that [their] net language: medicare and the secondary payer statute, 48 no. 3 dri for def. 44 (mar. 2006) despite these strategies, the debate over the medicare proposal carrying risk." h.r. rep. no. 108-178 (ii), at 189-90, (2003). further, as senator grassley noted: litigation. this hypothetical, however, vastly overestimates the efficiency of the courts. in the which are clearly `within' the insurance industry."102 96. see id. 1395(y)(b)(1)(b) and (c). from the common understanding of the msp's purpose: to force interpretation of the statutory reference to `promptly.' liability insurers would have received that payment for such item or service has been made under such a law or plan. (1998) (arguing, in part, that after the end of the american civil war, but before the united states entire fee or forced the manufacturer to pay three times the settlement 79. omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 94 stat. 2599 (1980). the manufacturer had a plan of self-insurance. as such, the secretary 14. see mason v. am. tobacco co., 346 f.3d 36, 43 (2nd cir. 2003); in re orthopedic bone individual, or a private or governmental entity, carries its own risk instead of taking out insurance definition is found in the manual for complex litigation, which states that: even those claims that are brought may reap smaller rewards either or settlement amount, the recovery amount is the total judgment or settlement payment minus the 2. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 493. the fifth circuit stated that "loftin's claims [in the 49. marmor, supra note 29, at 10. could "reasonably be expected" to make payment "promptly."106 the purpose of the [msp] is to ensure that medicare pays first for seniors' medical needs 92. blue cross and blue shield ass'n v. sullivan, 794 f. supp. 1166, 1169 n.5 (d.d.c. nursing home litig. rep. 11 (2000) (noting the "chilling effect" of medicare liens on plaintiffs' the same result occurs if the secretary tries to recover from the alternatively, medicare could have claimed double damages from the the moment mass tort cases are filed. bring claims in aggregate or mass tort form altogether. that is, if prolonged physical therapy. at the time of these surgeries, medicare for instance, a non-exclusion supra, at 168. in the former category, the injured parties know that they were exposed to a and academics19 statute did not, however, define "self-insured plan."107 theme: the idea that healthcare costs would be paid through a social insured and sue the tortfeasor for its harmful acts. because the insurer cover. 562 akron law review [41:557 paying for medicare: benefits, budgets, and wilbur mill's policy legacy, 26 j. health pol. is, where (vp * pp) = (vd * pd), the parties will likely settle, because cj > cs. mass tort cases, 115 harv. l. rev. 831, 847 (2002). 45. see eugene feingold, medicare: policy and politics 91 (1966); marmor, supra payments, but did not explicitly allow the secretary to make conditional to legislate around the court decisions striking down the government's 160. see amchem prods., inc. v. windsor, 521 u.s. 591 (1997); ortiz v. fibreboard corp., 527 members of congress that the entire social security program seemed 124. medicare prescription drug, improvement, and modernization act of 2003, pub. l. no. the northern district of texas,12 extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made (as medicare's interests are ignored the government has a right to collect damages or, potentially, 564 akron law review [41:557 111. see generally id.; goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 495. the 1980 amendments, medicare would pay for a beneficiary's hospital stay and certain medical in a simple two-party dispute, a defendant will only perceive a benefit when notice or other information is received that payment for such item or service has a defendant settling a tort claim or a series of tort claims, the courts amendments.91 m). carries its own risk (whether by a failure to obtain insurance, or the feasibility of reaching an acceptable [settlement] agreement."); thomas c. regan & seamus m. expertise in negotiation and litigation. these attorneys may dampen for more than the limits of the policy at issue. that reasoning, however, does not apply to and ms. reasoned, was not automatically a self-insurance plan. the government swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm no incentive to settle their dispute. and, had mr. goetzmann known of as all, because of the additional liability created by settling the lawsuit. a parties trying to settle mass tort litigation: automatic liability for swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm j.d. 2000, university of pennsylvania; b.a., 1994, haverford college. for their comments and swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm court has neither the responsibility nor rule-mandated authority to determine whether the settlement extent of medicare's expenditures. 592 akron law review [41:557 151. see cross, supra note 141, at 19-20 (observing that plaintiffs, especially mass tort suit, she will not do so. in personal injury torts, however, plaintiffs are funds.105 litigation. see id. against insurers and their payees."114 story.'"); roy d. simon, jr., the riddle of rule 68, 54 geo. wash. l. rev. 1, 63 (1985) industrial workers.28 a welfare entitlement. this is important because, as originally enacted, billion trust to handle the class claims, but tens of thousands of plaintiffs opted out of the settlement. assistance to low-income beneficiaries." 2006 the bds. of trs. of the fed. hosp. ins.and fed. members compete over allocation of a capped fund; external conflicts where some members or settlement cost (cds).144 reverting to this understanding and giving the secretary both the courts, and doctrine, 85 wash. u. l. rev. (forthcoming 2008). msp's harsh liability rule could make it difficult to settle or even bring impose on the privacy of settling parties, and encourage individual minus the costs of procuring that recovery, a lower vp after her surgery, ms. loftin dislocated her surgically repaired hip. x- volume personal injury litigation, such as automobile accidents: "the large number of claims decisions. c. can't settle, can't sue surgery. but those were not ms. loftin's only damages. it is likely that entities that receive payments from primary plans. fearing, in part, that "specter of thousands, if not millions of similar trials of liability under the best of circumstances, parties to a mass tort who wish to settle thus, the decision about whether to bring individual claims is made by an of the services.78 compulsory health insurance in the united states from 1932 to 1943 20 (1970). "plan" of "self-insurance," the courts held that the term "connotes some issue before the medicare modernization act of 2003 rejected the ama withdrew its support as rural and private doctors took control of and collect payment for medical care from a responsible third party-only provide for a have largely ignored this applicable policy limit before any other insurer becomes liable for any part of the same claim" that "unless an alleged tortfeasor qualifies as a primary plan or received payment from a primary a significant percentage of the plaintiffs in many mass tort cases.178 that is, post mma, a defendant who settles a tort claim with a medicare portion of the damages they suffer pain and suffering, lost wages, and 106. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(a) (2002) (emphasis added). total procurement costs."). 3. goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 493-94. torts as class actions for trial or settlement.156 settling a claim on behalf of medicare. telephone interview with stephen r. goetzmann (mar. 12, could have protected medicare's interest may be liable for repayment," and that "this even includes costs by forcing other insurers to act as a primary insurer. as discussed lawsuits and mass tort litigation settlement becomes less likely if it is possible at all. care entitlement. see marmor, supra note 29, at 9. see also james g. burrow, ama: voice of efficiently and successfully 55, 60 (2006) (warning practitioners that it is "imperative" to know litigation: to settle a lawsuit, the parties must, at a minimum, have a settlement window. and the with the manufacturer, although it never admitted liability. the 137. zinman, 67 f.3d at 845. process, and the ability to abandon litigation. one model that adds a significant advancement is the program.24 82. see omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 930-939, 94 stat. 2631- primary insurer. for instance, the primary insurer's policy limit would of the msp before the mma. give the government a direct indemnity liability insurance or the entity itself, if it has no insurance, or it might be self-insured, is resolving disputes are likely to decrease the frequency with which legal claims are asserted and 128. see s15584-s15585, 108th cong. (2003) ("these measures in [title iii of the mma, medicare was the primary payer and concomitantly expanded the working population. it is paid for by the working population and is to combat the smear campaign, the first movement toward compulsory 2008] can't settle, can't sue 577 states."). 135. see 42 c.f.r. 411.24(c) (2006). in other words, the government can seek recovery from a $100,000. general); id. ("the technical amendments of section 301 clarify other provisions of the msp vioxx litigation, for instance, each individual trial has ranged from a low of two weeks to over eight private insurers can exclude certain risks. therefore, it is not an exact analogy and there may be a second, the model assumes that the reimbursement post mma. before obtaining consent). payment when certain primary plans do not pay promptly."); id. 301(b) (noting that the the courts based their holdings on both a s8499, s8535, (daily ed. june 25, 2003) ("the technical changes in section 301 make clear that the time it took to try a case by limiting the plaintiffs to 40 hours of trial time for their presentation second, because all workers contributed 42. see id. at 79 ("the trust fund was seen, in effect, as the public property of the individuals in the msp. lawyers have raised serious concerns about their ability to attorneys must be concerned with their total fees. if the secretary can attacks.61 personal injury or property damage to be filed. fearing that support for the entire social security bill and a higher division) (emphasis added). grundmeyer, insurance, 64 loy. l. rev. 31, 94 (2000) ("`primary' insurance coverage attaches these proposals shared a unifying 195. although mass tort litigation soaks up scarce judicial resources, congress likely did not medicare became the secondary payer with respect to coverage required rick swedloff* procuring and collecting on the judgment (cpj) plus the costs associated reflect the united states' deep ambivalence for welfare benefits. rather amendments wrought significant change. as before, the first paragraph otherwise make it more difficult to settle the claims, the attorneys may dichotomy is only somewhat helpful as mass accidents, like dispersed mass torts, can result in the legislative history reflects little debate and scholars and ground for settlement. thus, these barriers to settlement make it more regulations suggest that the secretary only can seek double damages when the primary plan has 189. see generally samuel issacharoff & john fabian witt, the inevitability of aggregate internalize all of the negative externalities that their harmful conduct conduct, they will not internalize the harms caused and will not take the of the settlement. externalities their actions create by threatening the tortfeasors with full in addition to the structural and ethical barriers, the parties to a difficulty finding representation and continue to bring tort claims to trial; time of its enactment." oberlander, supra note 26, at 47. in 1968 and 1969, costs rose at an insurance benefits to a small, but vulnerable population so that the most swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm associated with settlement plus any potential liability to medicare lawsuits and mass tort litigation....................................588 because medicare beneficiaries can make up a significant percentage of http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/. the government alleged that the tobacco defendants as needy, they were also considered deserving. thus, limiting the open to foreign models and imported ideas," considered following suit.30 services regardless of whether either party had automobile insurance or whether the state had no- perceive the liability as reducing the amount that they can expect to social security amendments of 1965, pub. l. no. 89-97, 1862(b), 79 stat 286, 325 (1965) (prior insurance scheme, not as a direct health benefit. that is, the intended formula (1): o > (vp * pp) cpj + cps first, and quite simply, from a corrective justice standpoint, if oberlander, supra note 26, at 20 (quoting rodgers, supra note 30, at 257). exposure, plaintiffs want to know their total recovery, and plaintiffs' welfare, because individuals believed that they were receiving benefits under the strong theory that plaintiffs' swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm the second push for compulsory healthcare effectively died.48 the defense attorneys. if plaintiffs' attorneys do not aggregate all of the potential claims against a power to refill his own coffers is not the answer to problems created by mass torts swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm b) complicated eligibility requirements that precluded many seniors from 35. see blevins, supra note 28, at 27 ("the links with germany and russia created a better off after settlement than it would be after a judgment, taking into into mass tort settlements. adding the msp into the mix could make it nearly impossible to enter proceeding in thousands of courtrooms around the nation,"154 settlement amount or recover from, and thus eliminate, a plaintiff's monetary benefits, including a desire to have her day in court or a desire to punish an industry least three congressmen who had been in favor of truman's plan.54 the dispute. that is, that neither side will receive a benefit other than the note 29, at 8. makes her decision about whether to bring a legal claim based upon her above, post mma, the msp transforms settling tortfeasors into primary related to asbestos, silicone gel breast implants, and radiation exposure. id. at 344-45. this 75 tex. l. rev. 1801, 1827-28 (1997) (reconciling deterrence and corrective justice theories by 32 wake forest l. rev. 733, 736 (1997). other costs will not be compensated. 608 akron law review [41:557 earlier movements. as stated in the 1952 report of president truman's commission on the health litigants are not motivated solely by wealth maximization, that they are rather than try to provide nationalized health defendant will consider its cost of settling to be the transaction costs filed suit against corning, 250 b.r. at 335; see also health ins. ass'n of am., inc. v. shalala, 23 f.3d at 414; in re to vioxx. see alex berenson, legal stance may pay off for merck, n.y. times, aug. 4, 2006, at type of formal arrangement by which an entity consciously undertakes to fee attorneys from bringing suit in simple tort disputes for two reasons. fenfluramine, dexfenfluramine also known commonly as phen fen); philip morris, 116 f. supp. judge weinstein made this same observation stating: "settlement of 30. daniel t. rodgers, atlantic crossings: social politics in a progressive age 4 of conditional medicare payments even though a beneficiary receives a effects of the msp can be quite large. parties' non-economic profession. the ama launched another campaign to defeat nationalized claims, minor injuries, and latent claims.184 administrations. during this time, the proposals for medicare's potential suits that the government could bring against alleged 118. orthopedic, 202 f.r.d. at 166; goetzmann, 337 f.3d at 497 n.22; in re diet drugs prods. yet, this amendment significantly affects the ability of medicare in other words, the governments' argument also necessarily implied that it had made employer, others associated or formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or 169. see, e.g., state ex rel. okla. bar ass'n v. watson, 897 p.2d 246 (1994) (rejecting lawyer's the third push for compulsory health insurance began with senator if, in fact, the claims are viable, the parties use the trials as although the regulations limit recovery to the amount the greatest threat. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 25. medicare spending is a function of four factors: (a) the number of medicare beneficiaries and premium and cost-sharing subsidies for low-income beneficiaries. id.; congress (b) payment under this title may not be made with respect to any item or service to the swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm as long as omax dmin > 0, the parties should settle a lawsuit.146 148. even if one assumes that the plaintiff and the defendant will split the risk of liability to title xviii of the social security amendments of 1965.65 congress hastily added these changes and barely contemplated the perceived of wrongdoing. medical insurance programs68 and full amount of their payments for medical expenses to medicaid recipients. 547 u.s. 268 (2006). included elements of the proposals from the democrats, the to the extent that an 183. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii) (2006). claim. where a plaintiff expects to receive a greater benefit from a parties. first, the model assumes the parties will behave rationally; in 29. the following european countries introduced some form of compulsory medical care at http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited december 2006). average benefit was only $0.65 per day.38 medicaid services ("cms"). prior to being administered by the cms, medicare was administered claim against insurers. give the government a derivative claim a claim for earnings. id. although it is called a trust fund, the money taken out of each person's paycheck is msp liability, these criticisms will likely not change the underlying insurance through the medicare program and receive their care through coordinated care plans. see resolving mass toxic torts: myths and realities, 1989 u. ill. l. rev. 89, 99 ("[t]he most his platform for president. although roosevelt lost the 1912 election, optimal amount in their claim. as such, they may not achieve the accrue to the plaintiff, if any, are court costs, time, and opportunity cost. have the proper incentives to optimally invest in trial preparation is to create mandatory class reduction); h.r. rep. no. 96-1479, at 133 (1980) (conf. rep.), as reprinted in 1980 u.s.c.c.a.n. formula (2): d < (vd * pd) + cdj cds 5752, 5885 (explaining that the amendment will give medicare "residual rather than primary id. (emphasis added). subparagraph (b) allowed the secretary to make conditional payments and practitioners about the possibility of a medicare lien and double damages). plan (including a self-insurance plan) or under no fault insurance. 158. as byron g. stier noted: that government insurance would ruin the quality of care by reducing the choose to abandon the mass tort form. in doing so, the attorneys may on june 9, 1993, bernice loftin, a 68 year-old woman and organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the if plaintiffs' attorneys can negotiate an aggregate settlement. thus, an alleged tortfeasor has a primary plan under the msp. as such, the 16. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii), amended by the medicare prescription drug, beneficiary even if the defendant explicitly denies liability for the 63. oberlander, supra note 26, at 29. the united states brought suit against eleven tobacco-related entities seeking, to recover subrogation is procedurally and substantively fair. therefore, parties have been left with little guidance from 26. see jonathan oberlander, the political life of medicare 18 (2003) ("medicare (2003). the report stated more explicitly that: insurer. fanfare, congress changed the msp as a small part of the mma. average complexity of the services reimbursed by medicare. it can reflect not only technological determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or although each individual was financed by the afl-cio specifically to lobby for medicare.62 the insurance and pharmaceutical industry of plaintiffs' theories. for a settlement with an alleged tortfeasor, a court must hold that the l. no. 98-369 2344(a)(c); 98 stat. 494, 1095-96 (1984), and a private cause of action to recover faced over 14,000 federal and state lawsuits, which covered approximately 27,000 plaintiffs related the statute, which allowed the secretary to recover conditional 2006, two years after withdrawing vioxx, a popular anti-arthritis drug, from the market, merck with reimbursement for certain payments." id. that is, before the mma, medicare was allowed to guthrie, supra note 141, at 111; posner, supra note 141, at 417-20. bought little peace from a class action settlement. (3) there may be no common issue among representatives and absent class members; (4) contract. for instance, a primary insurer could argue that it is not liable and "clarifying" amendments,120 value of each individual case such that settlement becomes more accomplished through the reconciliation process. to implement these spending and contributing to a fund large enough to guarantee benefits if the covered workmen's compensation law or plan of the united states or a state. any payment 576 akron law review [41:557 reasonably expected that another insurer would pay for the beneficiary's settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated number of enrollees only grew by 6% from 19.5 to 20.7 million. blevins, supra note 28, at 59-60 fault insurance. private insurance (to the extent that the driver had it) would only pay to fill in the b.r. 298, 349 (bankr. e.d. mich. 2000); but see united states v. baxter int'l inc., 345 f.3d 866, determined in accordance with regulations) under a workmen's compensation law or plan 184. the motivation for this aggregation is simple: a large roster of clients provides economies litigation and the courts that administrate them. parties and courts face a second paragraph creates the means by which medicare can make mass torts litigation "emerges when an event or series of related events injure a large end stage renal disease.96 swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm exploited this ambiguity in its suits against mass tort defendants and medicare would not be able to partake in the bounty of mass tort id. at 878. see also francis e. mcgovern, class action symposium: the twentieth anniversary of underwent a second surgery, which led to a serious infection. her this was a clear departure her medical services, medicare would act only as a secondary insurer, settling a suit creates immediate liability to medicare, defendants will and, from august 2005 to august 2006, only 8 trials reached juries nationwide. see alex 2003, the msp defined a "primary plan" as "a group health plan," "large screw prods. liab. litig., 202 f.r.d. 154, 165 (e.d. pa. 2001); brown v. am. home prods. corp., because multiple plaintiffs are often represented by a small number of attorneys, there are payments if a "primary plan . . . has not made or cannot reasonably be medicare. under the republican proposal, the government would discuss the import of those differences); staff of comm. on the budget, 96th cong., settlements earned on medicaid recipients for the full value of the state's medical expenses on 2006, at business 1 (reporting that after several vioxx trials, judge carol higbee attempted to limit those claim 119 ms. loftin had legitimate claims for pain and suffering, lost wages, f.3d 262 (4th cir. 2004). (2006)) (allowing the secretary to seek "double damages against [a primary plan]" which the statute's clear purpose was to grant the government a right to recover medicare costs from u.s. 268 (2006). although the court based its decision on the statutory construction of the security ("ces") to seek a method to provide minimum income for the modernization act of 2003, congress granted the secretary the right to than dmin plus the total amount of medicare liability; i.e., the defendant the legislation only gained popular and legislative support 2. mass tort settlement funds. congress truly expanded the scope of the statute by requiring employers who provide health account the probability of a plaintiff's victory and the costs of litigation nursing home cases: medicare liens, medicaid and other complications, 2 no. 11 andrews united states v. philip morris, 99 cv 2496 (gk) (1999), available at determine that it is not lucrative to include medicare beneficiaries in the crux of the government's argument in the pre-mma cases lay swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm the term "plan," in turn, indicated after a judgment to their estimated economic position after a settlement decisions by comparing their estimated economic position although not defined in the statute, was subject to a narrow definition in rights can be no greater than the rights of the subrogor." id. at 398. 133. the msp authorizes the secretary to recover conditional payments from any "entity that necessary approvals during the settlement process. given the number $35,000 and the cost of settlement at $5,000. in this example the 73. see sullivan, 794 f. supp. at 1168 ("[prior to 1980] most insurance companies' contracts subjective valuations of the claim and the expense of succeeding on the unforeseen consequences to the tort system. i start by reviewing the $120,000. thus, there can be no settlement. implants). before the government's claims in phillip morris and dow corning, the "case law [was] insured a right of subrogation.197 31. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 18; marmor, supra note 29, at 7. will perceive the secretary's claim as reducing the defendant's offer by to warn that medicare had become a "a runaway program." id. in its first five years, medicare years in a medicare eligible job, those with end stage renal disease or are otherwise disabled while modernization act of 2003 ("mma"), congress amended the msp to costs are significantly greater than the transaction costs incurred when a defendant is represented by citizens.50 176. see deborah r. hensler & mark a. peterson, understanding mass personal injury if defendants do not internalize all gaps left by medicare's coverage. after the 1980 amendments, the driver's private insurance motivational barriers that make it difficult to reach a settlement number greater than those of the insured and the tortfeasor retains all of its tort litigation: a socio-legal analysis, 59 brook. l. rev. 961, 1031 (1993) ("transaction costs medical care when the secretary could expect "reimbursement" for (discussing the statutory scheme before the mma). subparagraph (a) stated in relevant part: through judgment by motion. if the case settles, a plaintiff would not see mma, pub. l. no. 108-173, 117 stat. 2066 (2003). based approach to fiscal change.............................571 effects of an anti-cholesterol drug, bayer and gsk faced over 13,000 lawsuits, many of which were authority of the united states department of health and human services. throughout this paper, i 139. see 42 c.f.r 411.37(d) (2006); zinman, 67 f.3d at 845. in arkansas department of 182 at 5-6. in 2003, congress changed the name of part c to medicare advantage. see mma, pub. l. ms. loftin, represented by stephen goetzmann, a personal injury individuals who are sixty-five or older and have worked, or be a spouse of one who worked, for ten could recover "from `primary plans,' whose definition lists only entities blue cross, the ama again pushed private insurance as the alternative part of a large aggregate settlement.161 but four significant changes to the second. the number of potential claims and the greater the likelihood that the recover in a judgment, plus the costs of litigation, minus the cost of industry, pharmaceutical companies, and organized labor united to as with the decision about whether to settle a lawsuit, a plaintiff plan" to the statute. post mma, an entity has a "self-insured plan if it amount once to ms. loftin and twice to medicare under the double 40; social security amendments of 1972, pub. l. no. 92-603, 86 stat. 1329 (1972). serv. 807, 807 (1995) (warning that "[a]ttorneys should realize that medicare may be lying in wait, attaining that judgment, plus the costs associated with settlement. the when firms invest up to that point, the firms will avoid unreasonable not be brought. even if the secretary brings direct or subrogation claims about conflicts of interest and fairness.163 94. see 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(1) (2002). borrowing from the internal revenue code, the clear statutory right of subrogation against tortfeasors.23 representation. medicare's conditional payments. [under a group health plan], or make it difficult to bring or settle claims as a class, ethical barriers that republicans, and the ama: hospitalization insurance (part a),66 mont.) and representative john dingell, sr. (d., mich.) had joined medicaid anti-lien statute, it addressed the policy issues associated with imposing a full lien with 126. medicare prescription drug, improvement, and modernization act of 2003, pub. l. no. swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm insurers and transforms what should be an action sounding in tort into an perceive this as an additional cost of settlement and plaintiffs will impermissible lien on the beneficiary's property. economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration, 2 j. legal stud. 399, 417- years. for example, if trials in a mass tort with only 2,000 plaintiffs took two weeks per plaintiff, a revenue for medicare and a new avenue to expand the msp's reach. in (aug. 2005) ("in cases involving catastrophic injury, . . . staggering [medicare] liens often control sustained in an auto accident. . . ." and providing the amendment's budgetary effects in cost optimal deterrence occurs when firms are made to government handout. rather, as constructed by its architects and as it e is 70. see infra part iii. [insurers]"); in re dow corning corp., 250 b.r. 298, 337 n.22 (bankr. e.d. mich. 2000) (stating rules or risk sanction and dissolution 170 their medicaid liens."177 there are no mass tort actions, the secretary will not have access to the and miscarriages; more than two million women received silicone breast implants, which national health care advocates designed a new strategy to garner support plaintiff. because the plaintiff will perceive the secretary's claim as the netherlands (1913). id. by 1940, every western european country had some form of 2609 (1980). insured plan if it carries its own risk. failure to obtain insurance would be required as evidence of has had her day in court," even when a "settlement would be more favorable to the outcome at recovery by the state of settlement funds intended to reimburse the medicaid beneficiary 43. see id. jurisdiction to consider the secretary's unprecedented argument rejected 123. "the list of primary plans for which conditional payment could be made would be invest "up to the point at which the expense of taking an additional unit swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm the minute they begin recruiting plaintiffs that some of their claims will early victories in court may set a insurer "if and only if a medicare recipient ha[d] another source of existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each the second push for compulsory healthcare began with franklin waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs: hearing before the h. comm. on ways & means, the legislative record contains minimal discussion about the provision.90 responsible"110 mass torts tend to follow a predictable litigation pattern. at the 177. in re zyprexa prods liab. litig., 451 f. supp. 2d 458, 461 (e.d.n.y. 2006). able to avoid paying medicare for past medical payments related to the claim. claims. let's call this the "strong theory." both the weak and the strong third, under the msp, the secretary may have a more difficult time settlement of her claims.138 a great deal of the increase, and not the number of enrollees or the cost litigation,17 eligible to receive services and because of inflation.76 aligned against universal health care conservatives, the pharmaceutical 130. if the statute applied to traditional insurers, as it did as originally enacted, the maximum litigation, it is not necessary in this article. my conclusions are robust and not dependent on any that plaintiffs could have obtained through discovery and the secretary as originally enacted in 1965, medicare was the primary insurer, a settling targets for fiscal year 1981, it agreed that growth in federal spending should be restrained."); id. at bargaining in the shadow of the law: a testable model of strategic behavior, 11 j. legal stud. contrast, "typically arise from widespread use of, or exposures to, widely distributed products or 198. as dagan and white explain, a subrogee's rights are "derivative of those of the direct systems allow an injured party to share the costs of his injury, the when those plans fail to cover medicare beneficiaries. if, as before the corning, 250 b.r. at 307. the government sought reimbursement for at least $32,588,197.02 in 201. see supra note 130 and accompanying text. injuries."); john c. coffee, jr., class action accountability: reconciling exit, voice, and loyalty in over the amount she expects to attain from judgment, minus the cost of try to resolve a number of claims in addition to the claims of the injured this the "weak theory." but the msp could yield a greater problem. expected to make payment" for medical treatments.126 parties from any tort lawsuit would continue to pay their due to practitioners largely ignored the amendment, insurance companies may have been concerned about plaintiffs to withhold their consent until they receive disproportionately during this period, however, medicare expenses rapidly expanded by a third party's tortious act, the insurer can step into the shoes of the settlement; and (b) each client must consent to the settlement in 193547 89. see 2006 medicare ann. rep., supra note 69, at 187. than allow congress to create a government entitlement, the forces that appeals for the fifth circuit,13 (reporting on the omnibus reconciliation act of 1980) ("when congress approved the budget for (and not internalize) the full extent of the injuries caused. this country had already benefits without regard to whether another insurer covered the the united states, which at that time "was peculiarly should accept, any offer over $70,000 ($100,000 - $35,000 + $5,000). the 39.1 (2002)). not apparent in the text of the statute.130 argued that the united states had fallen behind its european counterparts . . . . [after congressional backing it required.63 private insurance and stifle the development of the pharmaceutical contingent payment from the settlement funds and possibly defense represented by the same attorneys, many individuals do not get the any benefit. likewise, a plaintiff will perceive a benefit from, and thus recover medicare conditional payments from any "entity that [] id. amendment may have a profound impact in the area of mass tort five were often left with no real means to insure themselves. further, and, as is rather, the court held that a state may only recover that portion of the settlement or judgment that 62. see id. at 24. each of these problems exists in any mass tort case. the structural to defend these early trials. plaintiffs' attorneys must be willing to match those outlays. they can swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm immediately upon the occurrence that gives rise to liability, whereas an `excess' policy covers of self-insurance, an entity would have to engage in the same sorts of underwriting the aall and the ama continued to push for a governmental solution the secretary argued that by making its own recipient in others." id. at 288 (emphasis added). arguing, in part, that both schools of thought are generally interested in reducing negligent conduct). risk and was thus a primary insurer subject to the msp statute.8 federal beneficiaries with the beneficiaries' other health insurance plans filling in some or all of the the bulk of the medicare amendments were motivations would have to be equally as large to counteract the effects of 108-173, 301(a) ("technical amendment concerning secretary's authority to make conditional poised to recapture prior medical payments from awards that were considered by the client to be return on investment is maximized."194 out of the price range of those living on a pension or social security payment under [the medicare program] may not be made ... with respect to any item or parties, an alleged tortfeasor demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the 88. h.r. rep. no. 96-1167, at 522 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 u.s.c.c.a.n. 5885. 90. the house and senate reports do little more than repeat the wording of the statute. see favorable verdict).143 is received that payment for such item or service has been or could be made under such medicare beneficiary compromises or releases his claims in exchange 411.24(c)(2) (2006) ("if it is necessary for cms to take legal action to recover from the primary workmen's compensation plan to cover a beneficiary's claims, medicare typically represented on a contingent fee basis. the only costs that the msp.21 received payment from primary plan," 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(ii) (2002), or from "the proceeds healthcare was a foothold to socialism and bolshevism.34 responsibility dr. 5-106 (1980). see also chamblee, supra note 17, at 170-77 (arguing that provision required group health plans offered by employers except for in litigation or settlement, because plaintiffs' attorneys may under-invest medicare beneficiary, underwent hip replacement surgery. one week these emotional responses because they are less likely to bring or medicare, a group called the national council of senior citizens, which attorney accepts a contingency fee from a settling tortfeasor (now a cover. private insurance companies likely increased their premiums to cover these anticipated 2008] can't settle, can't sue 579 rather, they will cherry pick the plaintiffs who have the greatest the $100,000 as an additional cost of settlement. thus, the defendant's public assistance to `undeserving' recipients, the notion that social provided by a primary plan, then medicare could not pay for the swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm in court.151 because courts will not certify mass torts as class actions, parties recovering a fee would have been a long and costly trial. b. the structural, ethical, and practical barriers to settling mass compensation."). 147. alternatively, the plaintiff may also perceive the medicare liability as additional discussing the amendments to the msp or the implications of the will not fundamentally change medicare's ability to recover its costs 47. social security act, pub. l. no. 74-271, 49 stat. 620 (1935). an aggregate settlement. at least with respect to some portion of defeating, as discussed above. l. rev. 871, 872 (2001); hensler & peterson, supra note 176, at 1034. in picking these early trials, 149. in 2006, the supreme court ruled that states could not impose a lien on tort judgments or this model had several significant political after insurance generally ended at the time of retirement.57 aggregate settlement must adhere strictly to the requirements of these titled combatting waste, fraud, and abuse] directly reduce medicare's spending on overpriced, the ability of individual or mass tort lawsuits to settle or bring lawsuits. rays subsequently revealed that the hip prosthesis was displaced and spending increased by more than 70% from $4.6 billion in 1967 to $7.9 billion in 1971 while the frequently cited objective of lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to `tell my side of the the suit and the expected costs of litigating suit and settling. because 138. see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. decline to represent medicare beneficiaries in mass tort actions. only from the defendant. as noted above, the defendant will consider plan, large group health plan, workman's compensation plan, an 2008] can't settle, can't sue 607 it should be intuitively obvious that medicare beneficiaries will no fault insurance provided medical insurance for the beneficiary and 202. 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iv) (2006). from the attorneys. if attorneys cannot recover their contingency fees lawsuit may have value beyond the intrinsic value of one person's claim. medicare proposal lacked the usual stigma associated with welfare $100,000. assume further that each side estimates its litigation costs at for example over thirty million pregnant women took benedictin, an antinausea drug (quoting united states brief). presumably this same argument would hold even if the alleged eliminating fraud and waste in the system.83 difficult to settle a lawsuit. "conditional payments for items and services for medicare beneficiaries whose injuries and diseases as in an individual tort, the msp adds an additional difficulty for ii. the history of the medicare secondary payer act...........563 swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 165. medical expenses for nearly all of its beneficiaries" except when "payments had been, or reasonably always required to pay first instead of having the taxpayers pay. against a primary plan that fails to recompense medicare,131 attorneys representing multiple clients on july 30, 1965, president johnson signed medicare into law as class for settlement, some defendants might be unwilling to do so given the opt-out requirements 50. id. limited assignment from the recipient to the state for payment for medical items and medicare may make a conditional payment when the primary plan has not made or is not reasonably d. congress amends the medicare secondary payer across generations and classes. no one felt that another group was being division testified before the house ways and means committee: it.14 186. id. 560 akron law review [41:557 would expect to lose via judgment, including the costs of litigating the created by the mma. the secretary can still force other insurers to live recognizable insurance model. that is, congress ensured that the and, with that, the third campaign for national health insurance ended. history of medicare and the forces that led congress to enact and amend maximum offer would be $30,000 ($100,000 + $35,000 - $105,000). this act included the medicare and medicaid spousal and dependent claims, at the same time they settle with the defendant, they will not enjoy the same economies of scale that the defendant enjoys, and may not in order to recover payment under this subchapter for such an item or service, the united chiefly, legal fees dwarf the amounts paid to injured claimants, who often wait years to receive ms. loftin; her attorney, mr. goetzmann; and the manufacturer under company had to pay for the beneficiary's medical care. see, e.g., colonial penn ins. co. v. heckler, replacement. thus, this full reimbursement rule "deprives poor and for instance, the parties must determine who can bring and potentially attorneys from representing all defendants in the proceeding). likewise, defendant's counsel may payment for an item or service to which subparagraph (2)(a) applies) "to any right under this scheme. id. although only fractions of those exposed generally file suit, these cases threaten to overwhelm report, "a primary plan, as well as an entity that receives payment from a primary plan, would be presumably, however, any 57. david, supra note 56, at 4. vulnerable could avoid complete financial collapse. the new bill 99. brown v. thompson, 252 f. supp. 2d 312, 317 n.5 (e.d. va. 2003). for example, the invest properly in the prosecution of the claims. that is, the defendants will have a greater incentive or, if they do, to accept otherwise reasonable settlement offers, thereby tending to push endangered until the ways and means committee unanimously struck it shoes of the beneficiary and assert a tort claim against a third party to the medicare expenditures, as is clear when one looks at real dollar or service (or any portion thereof) under a primary plan ..., or against any other entity wealth maximization. plaintiffs may initiate a lawsuit to bring what is clear from this is what the mma ignored. before 2003, the their families," and large group health plans: a small group health plan "that covers employees of at harms, or that another insurer should be the primary insurer. each of there is pressure on defendants to litigate each case for the value of the 41. see oberlander, supra note 26, at 77-78. thus, there is a window for settlement, and the parties should settle for mass tort litigations for personal injuries have [sic] become common factors among claims will pull the values of many claims theory lead to inefficient outcomes for achieving corrective justice and injury. under these circumstances, ms. loftin and the manufacturer had 53. oberlander, supra note 26, at 22. see marmor, supra note 29, at 12; see supra notes in this section, i first trace the roots of the medicare bill to show swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm 108th cong. 88 (july 17, 2003) (statement of william jordan, assistant att'y gen. for the civil action sounding in contract. in this, the statute strips the settling the injured party, such as survivor claims, wrongful death claims, and subtracts the amount of the costs of procuring the judgment from the 109. see in re orthopedic bone screw prods. liab. litig., 202 f.r.d. 154, 164 (e.d. pa. 2001) examine the laws within their jurisdictions and to recommend legislative changes which the first push in the united states for government-sponsored health in 1964, lyndon johnson won the presidential election, swept a as discussed below, the medicare secondary payer act best makes for health care.55 traditional insurers to provide and pay for the healthcare costs of potential ramifications. the legislative history makes clear that real options model. see generally grundfest & huang, supra note 141, at 1272-75, 1289-92 including the timing of litigation costs, the ability of the parties to learn throughout the litigation and thus make settlement a less attractive alternative to litigation.176 secretary of health and human services ("secretary")4 healthcare ended. s15584-85, 108th cong. (2003). 40. marmor, supra note 29, at 8. argument that he was required to consult only with his "true client," the representative of the deterrence. moreover, under both theories the government likely non-profit preventing harm.191 however, it is neither simple nor efficient to gather all of the window for settlement. plaintiff. settling defendants will also want to resolve any potential the amendment. the intent of this provision is clear conditional payments. services.72 175. although ostensibly individual plaintiffs drive the litigation in a non-class setting, because secretary could recover from a primary plan even when a court had not against tortfeasors. although both claims create a means for society to government's failed litigation positions. with little debate and no sponsored healthcare of any kind had been credited with the defeat of at and these courts did so with good reason: the secretary's position 606 akron law review [41:557 class actions for either trial or settlement.159 to medicare because the insurance policy was not in force at the time of 2003); in re orthopedic bone screw prods. liab. litig., 202 f.r.d. 154 (e.d. pa. 2001); in re diet must offer more than $170,000. this a defendant will not do.148 for the plaintiff's claims. assume first that the secretary seeks recovery economic incentive to tamp down on their clients' non-monetary desires. and share the costs of litigation by pooling their resources. see generally stier, supra note 155 deductible) of the services covered under part b. blevins, supra note 28, at 5. in 2001, in mass tort representative litigation: internal conflicts within a class or between subclasses, where the omnibus reconciliation act of 1980,79 127. see generally brown v. thompson, 252 f. supp. 2d 312, 317 n.5; see also supra note 99 plaintiffs' attorneys expect that early cash outlays toward enrolling a proper amount of precaution to protect against future harms. further, if exists today, medicare provides health insurance to a select set of the stated amount. 172. see id. medical association to control hospital costs and medical fees, and a fee schedule set by medicare) lien" provision in the medicare regime. insurance law.70 double damages from a primary insurer,9 2008] can't settle, can't sue 593 the plaintiff has placed on the claim (vp) discounted by the probability an attorney. as with a plaintiff, a contingency fee attorney will bring a attorneys favor a settlement over litigation; conflicts that arise because different members or counsel 78. see id. at 19. vogel also persuasively shows that various exogenous schemes (such as 74. "in its first years, medicare costs vastly outpaced the actuarial projections made at the the insurance entity that should have provided the primary coverage for of am., inc. v. shalala, 23 f.3d 412, 417 (d.c. cir. 1994). appropriate trust fund established by this subchapter when notice or other information amendments of 1980.81 of the united states or a state or under an automobile or liability insurance policy or 2008] can't settle, can't sue 561 2008] can't settle, can't sue 605 153. later scholars have introduced new models of litigation that consider a number of factors would insure against identifiable risks to individual beneficiaries by amendments of 1994, pub. l. no. 103-432 151(a)(1)(a), 108 stat. 4398, 4432-33 (1994) or thousands of individual plaintiffs and represent plaintiffs with serious insurance program as part of his fair deal policy for social change.52 receive from a settlement. in either case, this additional and automatic extraordinarily complex and difficult as a result of the attempts by the failed to gain support for this bill, senator wagner continued to push 197. see generally hanoch dagan & james j. white, governments, citizens, and injurious had other insurance that should be considered a primary plan). congress enacted medicare, organized labor fully supported the purposes. in both cases, the court took a narrow view of rule 23's swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm a medicare beneficiary is injured by wrongful conduct of another entity, that entity's other than that exception, from 1965 until 1980, medicare paid expended by medicare on their behalf, vp includes m as part of its value, in which case, it is more of a primary plan's payment to any entity," 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii) (2006). compromise settlements.189 purchased by health care providers; (c) the number of services consumed fourth, the mma clarified that the secretary could, in fact, make no fault insurance. any payment under this title with respect to any item or service shall further, the secretary can force a defendant to pay two to three times the in a formula, if m represents the costs medicare expended on behalf of a 19. a review of the search results for "medicare /5 secondary" in the westlaw jlr database aged, unemployed, blind, and the widowed.40 beneficiary's claims, medicare would only pay for the beneficiary's 84. after the medicare and medicaid amendments of 1980, section 1862(b) stated: criticism, like others of the classic model, does not change the underlying understanding of a large number of claims where the attorney has invested little to no time additions to part d, the new prescription drug benefit, not the relatively (tex. 1998), or disciplinary penalties for failing to obtain his clients' informed consent, see in re depends upon the values of other claims." id. at 967. thus, the expected value of any claims may for settlement is defined by the amount between the expected value of 12. goetzmann, 2001 u.s. dist. lexis 9258, at *5-9. suggestions, thanks to richard greenstein, david hoffman, peter huang, and scott thompson. for thus, the plan, the mspa does not grant the united states the right to initiate a direct action against it"). at a minimum, because of the msp, medicare beneficiaries will be from paying the plaintiff an amount less that it expects the plaintiff to setting up a mechanism for creating sufficient reserves to meet those losses as they absolute priority, stating: "for just as there are risks in underestimating the value of readily automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured tortfeasors. to the extent that medicare covers medical costs that result expect that they can bring individual claims without the defendants industrial workers.33 the goal of any tort regime should be, in part, to reduce the rate of negligent conduct. see generally beneficiaries, with one exception: if the secretary reasonably expected a 108-173, 301(b)(3) (codified at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii) (2006)). as stated in the house 125. medicare prescription drug, improvement, and modernization act of 2003, pub. l. no. thus, after paying her attorney, ms. loftin only received $153,600 in (which could include double damages should the defendant force the a medical expenses. moreover, firms that self-insure for product liability would have been the amendments left the structure of the msp in place and the while there is value in adding complexity to the classic, expected value economic model of rather, the express wording of the statute create[d] a cause of action (i) primary plans client involvement."); howard m. erichson, beyond the class action: lawyer loyalty and client first, the msp increases the costs of resolving the dispute by forcing tort * abraham l. freedman fellow and lecturer in law, temple university beasley school of law. beneficiary's tort claims on a contingent basis. because a contingency common issues may not predominate over individual issues; or (5) a class action may commonality of facts and players, the "likely amount that one plaintiff will receive for a claim a primary plan." id. 1395y(b)(2)(b)(iii). $256,000, out of which her attorney kept a contingency fee of $102,400. phillip morris, inc., 116 f. supp. 2d 131, 145-46 (d.d.c. 2000); in re dow corning corp., 250 amount of the payment would be clear: an insurance plan's exposure would be capped at the value aggregate settlement because the medicare beneficiaries make up a large 55. id. at 23. 37. unemployment rates reached over twenty-five percent during the depression and some `medicare prescription drug and modernization act of 2003,' which would protect the must settle each claimant's case individually or must settle each case as to the appropriate trust fund established by this title when notice or other information is doctors fought the infection with extensive medical procedures including have to expend money on procuring the judgment; thus, the plaintiff medical care resulting from complications related to hip replacement of medicare, see omnibus reconciliation act of 1986, pub. l. no. 99-509 9319(b), 100 stat. reducing the defendant's offer, the defendant's offer must be greater attorneys in a mass tort generally work on a contingency fee basis and, swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm elizabeth chamblee, unsettling efficiency: when non-class aggregation of mass torts creates created a redistributive model for the provision of medical care for 108-173, 301(b)(1) (codified at 42 u.s.c. 1395y(b)(2)(a) (2006)). swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm morley, deluding the unwary: the revised medicare secondary payer act, 47 no. 1 dri for def. under both the strong and the weak theory, attorneys will not bring iii. suing and settling under the msp: individual tort subrogated (to the extent of payment made under this subchapter for plaintiffs can establish causation and liability and the range of provisions [of the msp]" because "a relatively modest settlement can become an extremely what may be less obvious is that this to the msp. the seeds of that change are discussed in the next section. to the issue of healthcare.32 theoretically acting autonomously or in each of the individual claim when she believes that it would be profitable to do so, and will not 225 (1982). thus, they claim that trials occur in part because of strategic bargaining. this medicare's costs. as such, a medicare beneficiary settling a tort claim medical benefits. in addition to expanding the scope of the msp, congress expanded the 1992). for example, in 1981, congress added secondary payer provisions for medicare services secretary can force tortfeasors to internalize all of the negative the attorneys know from of the msp imposes certain requirements on group health plans and the this vexing problem" of medicare liens); patty l. wisecup, minding medicare's interests: it may as with individual torts, the msp creates disincentives to settle that same rationale is not applicable in the medicare context because there is no equivalent "anti- swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm int'l rev. l. & econ. 31, 32 (1992); peter h. huang, lawsuit abandonment options in possibly litigation, i then show that, not surprisingly, the msp as written is attributable to repayment of medical services. see id. at 285. as summarized by judge 156. although state fora may be more amenable to certifying mass tort class actions, under the plaintiff is represented in a mass tort, given the numbers of plaintiffs even though it never admitted liability for ms. loftin's further, expenses, but the defendant paid the settlement funds to the plaintiff anyway. see health ins. ass'n holding that the statute otherwise fail to behave as wealth-maximizers, the parties will instantly the united states court of court decisions" that allowed "firms that self-insure for product liability . . . to avoid paying with employers and [employer group health plans] only covered `secondary' costs."). conditional payments to medicare beneficiaries for their medical costs strategies. thus, the secretary may be deprived of valuable information coffers and one third from premium payments. the ama, in turn, payer, cms may recover twice the amount specified in paragraph (c)(1)(i)."). from a group health plan, workmen's compensation plan, liability 558 akron law review [41:557 further, according to the government, by paying all or part of the approximately 73% of part b was financed through general tax revenues, 23% was financed by significant savings. the house report predicted that after one year, this cong. rec. h12026 (daily ed. nov. 20, 2003) ("the list of primary plans for which conditional 2008] can't settle, can't sue 601 85. omnibus reconciliation act of 1980, pub. l. no. 96-499, 953, 94 stat. 2599, 2647 the organization's message from the urban, academic doctors. rural and thus, the msp could discourage worthy claimants from bringing swedloff_final 3/23/2009 2:35 pm on mass tort settlements............................................579 additions to the text of the statute are not extensive. nonetheless, the in other words, congress ostensibly intended to


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