Consumer Awarded Damages from Credit Reporting Agency

cies and repeated denials of credit. this case provides support for the riage counselor, however skilled, could resolve that problem. suzanne this period, the inaccuracies in equifax's credit reports caused deleted but had mistakenly restored to suzanne's report. when equi- unquestionably harmful, are difficult to translate into monetary terms. 1681n and 1681o of the fcra. 15 u.s.c.a. � 1681h(e). but see yutesler fax, still disputing the two citifinancial accounts, and now also con- our previous cases establish the type of evidence required to sup- 13sloane v. equifax citifinancial, alleging violations of the fcra. after settling a sepa- loan in january 2005, eight months after their initial visit, they were and contemplate divorce. seeking to avert this, suzanne went to the equifax overlapped with exchanges with other credit reporting agen- fax to file a written opposition, the court also awarded suzanne erbated these mistakes independently of the others. thus, even during and remanded in part. brought this action against equifax for violations of the fair credit claims. cf. ferris v. haymore, 967 f.2d 946, 955-58 (4th cir. 1992) to correct her credit report -- suzanne filed this action against equi- iv. notify them of the identity theft. suzanne took the next two days off counsel time" or even affect the employee's ability to continue "to perform his equifax's counsel could offer no legal or factual basis for this evidence of "sufficiently articulated," true "demonstrable emotional 233, �� 10-12, 16-17 (2006) (summarizing case law finding no preemp- fees. this appeal followed. 2 10 sloane v. equifax further, during the period when suzanne attempted to correct the up her sleeves" and start calling all of her "20-some" creditors to practice and procedure � 2820 (2d ed. 1995). we have long recog- (n.d. tex. 2003) (same); dornhecker v. ameritech corp., 99 f. supp. sumer credit for seven months. but, in october 2004, after the report. � 602(a), 84 stat. 1127, 1128 (1970). since the mid-1980s, the intro- warehousing has led to the national consolidation of the credit- union and experian had rectified the errors in their reports. information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, 8 sloane v. equifax i. limit at $750,000 or more, see, e.g., 735 ill. comp. stat. ann. 5/2-1706.5 (e.d. mo. 1974). the statute also provides that a successful plaintiff in knussman v. maryland, 272 f.3d 625 (4th cir. 2001), we sum- pensated as a consequence of her prior settlements.2 54(d)(2)(c) provided that "[o]n request of a party or class member, tional distress." price, 93 f.3d at 1254. factual context in which the emotional distress arose; evidence cor- and further lower her score. the disputed citifinancial accounts. credit report, suzanne refrained from applying for any type of con- the case proceeded to trial with equifax the sole remaining defendant. tion by the fcra). it also directly contravenes the seventh amendment, which precludes nary people from the community," after having "listen[ed] to the evi- not only is such an unprincipled approach intrinsically unsound, but www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0203lead.pdf. each 7sloane v. equifax iii. a unique dilemma without clear precedent. when congress enacted 210459.pdf (citing synovate, federal trade commission -- identity reconcile in august 2005, when they returned home, they were of these national credit-reporting agencies has perhaps 1.5 billion moreover, equifax does not deny that suzanne suffered emotional communicated about an individual -- that provides some external a second simply reflects a modest jury award based on little or no ible from the other injuries sloane suffered. asked at oral argument to explain the basis for the proposed remittitur, weight of the evidence or based on evidence which is false." id. when citibank notified her that it had cancelled her credit card and 1 humiliation, and emotional distress). the district court entered judg- 2 sloane v. equifax plaintiffs offered no evidence as to how the "alleged distress mani- leonie m. brinkema, district judge. for a line of credit, and again the bank turned her down. mation, which, despite her best efforts, equifax failed to correct over garrett, jr., kilpatrick stockton, l.l.p., atlanta, georgia, r. civ. p. 54(d)(2)(c)(2006)(amended april 30, 2007, effective financing so long as suzanne's name appeared on the loan. similarly, equifax principally looks to three employment discrimination cases reports. moreover, although some of suzanne's interactions with gible harms and, a fortiori, emotional distress. for, unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, suzanne did not suffer from must be significantly less than these defamation awards. but, consid- ities prove to be less than useful guides. one case equifax cites defendant-appellant, suzanne settled her claims in this action against experian, trans b. of $240,000 for "insult, pain, and mental suffering"); simon v. shear- december 1, 2007). prior to the hearing, equifax believed that it before us is neither whether suzanne offered sufficient evidence at theft, she suffered the systematic manipulation of her personal infor- curacies lacked the nearly inescapable reach of the national credit and ruined her credit, she notified the police and sought to have equi- in her credit report and requesting their deletion. equifax agreed to synovatereport.pdf). given the rapid emergence of identity theft in the respect to the motion in accordance with rule 43(e) or rule 78." fed. evidence of the financial crimes shovana had committed. suzanne distress. furthermore, suzanne's emotional distress manifested itself the single exception is bach. 149 fed. appx. at 362-63. as explained distress. see, e.g., guimond v. trans union credit info. co., 45 f.3d jailed the thief. but twenty-one months later, equifax still had not duction of computerized information technology and data- parties. she did not attempt to hold any of the credit reporting agen- $100,000, including a $75,000 award for emotional distress); ander- at the time of the hearing, federal rule of civil procedure to the contrary, suzanne provided credible evidence that her emo- experienced as a result of each occurrence. she also provided evi- � 60-19a02 (west 2006) (limiting recovery for pain and suffering in a excessiveness of an award for emotional distress. they include the amount requested -- $181,083. appellee. on brief: timothy j. mcevoy, odin, feldman & credit from a variety of financial institutions, only to be either denied reviewing this evidence in light of the appropriate factors already ciates, p.c., alexandria, virginia, for appellee. marized the factors properly considered in determinating the potential tracey, for instance, described in detail his wife's ongoing struggles have received absent equifax's improper conduct. at times, these of january 2004, suzanne discovered these fraudulent transactions declaring that the problem was obviously "bad credit" and no mar- sumer credit reports each day. id. at 48-49. v. sears roebuck & co., 263 f. supp. 2d 1209, 1212 (d. minn. 2003) ant v. aiken reg'l med. ctrs, inc., 333 f.3d 536, 546-47 (4th cir. that the jury's emotional distress award was in fact excessive, but not appeal from the united states district court suffered due to the emotional distress; medical attention resulting within, we regard the $400,000 award in that case an anomaly. tity theft and the rapid growth of the credit-reporting industry present 9.91 million adults discovering they were victims in 2003 alone. see the district court to permit equifax such an opportunity. dealership. following a credit check, the car salesman pulled tracey 15sloane v. equifax is easily susceptible to fictitious and trivial claims." price v. city of ii. for appellant. thomas b. christiano, blankingship & asso- in addition to citing these cases, equifax also argues that several fax's motion regarding this award. argued: mara mcrae, kilpatrick stockton, l.l.p., with equifax and the emotional toll these events took upon her. in tional and economic damages resulted from separate acts by separate lization of such information." 15 u.s.c.a. � 1681(b). addition, substantial trial evidence attested to the direct "nexus" in desperation, suzanne sought the name of a marriage counselor, but 1982); thompson v. san antonio retail merchs. ass'n, 682 f.2d 509, in terms of physical symptoms, particularly insomnia. turned down. the loan officer told them that suzanne's credit score of abuse of discretion. . . . giv[ing] the benefit of every doubt to the financial institutions consulted credit reports from other agencies, but suzanne discrete injuries independent of those caused by the other errors. first, her repeated denials of credit and continuous problems suing under the fcra may recover reasonable attorney's fees. 15 that party's favor, the court determines that the only conclusion a rea- charlotte, 93 f.3d 1241, 1250 (4th cir. 1996). for this reason, in which we have ordered remittitur of emotional distress awards. but equifax next argues that the evidence does not support any award that placed shovana sloan in the hospital's accounting department, united states court of appeals her credit file. then, on june 7, 2005, equifax sent copies of both dates and, in november and december 2003, began using suzanne's $61,500); cortez v. trans union, llc, no. 05-cv-05684-jf, 2007 in most other fcra cases.5 ments." id. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also bry- judge michael joined. offered only an adjustable rate loan instead of a less expensive 30- 3 ing the twenty-one months that she attempted to correct equifax's question in light of our holding that the injury caused by equifax is divis- in peril. furthermore, the district court underscored the deference defendants. sated suzanne for all of her injuries. nullify the jury verdict and grant it judgment as a matter of law. a 4 amount of the emotional distress award here. have been allowed to submit materials to the district court. accord- and reverse and remand in part. cific actions, as distinct from those of the other credit reporting agen- she begged her husband to enter counseling with her, but he refused, for attorney's fees, ordered equifax to pay $181,083 in attorney's ily and potential creditors knew of her disastrous credit file. we there- although specifically recognizing that a plaintiff's testimony can pro- together these three agencies issue approximately two million con- mental distress; mitigating circumstances, if any; physical injuries after suzanne sloane discovered that a thief had stolen her identity that state legislatures have adopted regarding monetary awards for intan- job," cline, 144 f.3d at 305; price, 93 f.3d at 1254-55 (noting that (4th cir. 1996) (noting that testimony showed plaintiff was only most ordinary consumer transactions. according to recent data, each to order remittitur of the mental anguish, humiliation, and emotional dures designed to assure maximum accuracy on her consumer credit find when she arrived at home from work one day. also, during this measure to the otherwise subjective question of emotional distress. fax information services, llc, a credit reporting service, correct the son lehman bros., inc., 895 f.2d 1304, 1319-20 (11th cir. 1990) corroborated her account in two ways. she offered "sufficiently artic- the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence" in certain repeatedly requested such an opportunity during the fees hearing. the mission estimate that, between 1998 and 2003, approximately 27.3 other exchanges. for example, suzanne initially contacted equifax on suzanne proved that it violated the fcra in all of these respects. "briefly distraught"). moreover, in stark contrast to the corroborated grounds is "entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court and negligent violations, id. � 1681o(a). actual damages may include not or remittitur on the jury's award of damages for emotional distress. secure a lease in her own name or to arrange for household utilities. recovering twice from the same assessment of liability."). but, in the trans union -- and rendered credit reporting an integral part of our failing to delete information from the report that it found after rein- find that there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable cies responsible for damages arising from either the identity theft own invention -- offering $25,000 in place of $245,000. yet when see zamora v. valley fed. sav. & loan ass'n of grand junction, 811 reporting industry into the "big three" -- equifax, experian, and f.3d at 171-72. last decade, it comes as no surprise that past precedent fails to fully for suzanne. therefore, the district court did not err in denying equi- s.e.2d 694, 695-701 (w. va. 1990). the remainder occurred twenty- nonetheless, we are not wholly without help. first, there are a few, serting information into her credit file that it had previously deleted. although such determinations depend a great deal upon the specific $106,000 for economic loss and $245,000 for mental anguish, humili- her husband refused to go. for his part, tracey researched how the equifax moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial of $400,000 for compensatory damages in factually similar circum- has suffered from a single, indivisible injury or has been doubly com- itself or the initial inaccuracies that the theft generated in her credit a matter of law only if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable poor credit history would make it exceedingly difficult for her to denied equifax's motion. we review de novo the grant or denial of the stress of these problems weighed on suzanne and significantly 512 (5th cir. 1982); millstone, 528 f.2d at 834 (8th cir. 1976). trial to sustain an award for emotional distress nor whether we believe the fcra); carlson v. trans union, llc, 259 f. supp. 2d 517, 521-22 distress damages award to no more than $25,000. see fed. r. civ. p. finally, equifax challenges the district court's order regarding impairment of [the plaintiff's] reputation, personal humiliation, and dence" and being "given proper instructions about . . . not letting credit information provided by equifax. based on these incidents, we in the present case, suzanne offered considerable objective verifi- court may award judgment as a matter of law only if it determines year fixed rate loan in part because of equifax's still inaccurate credit to the extent that equifax maintains. the court shall afford an opportunity for adversary submissions with this handful of cases, while helpful, differs from the case at hand. stances, involving protracted attempts to resolve reporting inaccura- ysis leads us to the conclusion that both equifax and suzanne's posi- cies, her encounters with equifax both predate and postdate these account of her prior settlements with other defendants. according to million adults discovered they were the victims of identity theft, with ment in the amount of $351,000. in addition, without permitting equi- 45. but equifax relies on cases which are in fact not very "similar" jury in its special verdict, the number of errors contained in equifax's [such determinations] will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing 4 sloane v. equifax moreover, unlike many of the employment discrimination claims from work in the evening. even after the couple took a vacation to to deliver a baby. she left the hospital not only a new mother, but also repeated breakdown of their family car, suzanne and tracey port an award for emotional damages. we have warned that "[n]ot we consider each of equifax's contentions in turn. for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hinges on the same type of conclusory testimony described above. see accorded jury verdicts, noting that, in the present case, a jury of "ordi- ing the thief, not suzanne, that the thief's personal information was in those cases the asserted emotional distress did not "persist[ ] over vi. v. argued: november 1, 2007 12 sloane v. equifax vestigation to be inaccurate, incomplete, or unverified; and (4) rein- we also believe that some guidance can be gained from case law ture support such an award, and so the district court erred in denying equifax simply proposes replacing the jury's number with one of its son v. conwood co., 34 f. supp. 2d 650, 656 (w.d. tenn. 1999) a. claims to $1,000,000). even though such non-economic harms often go a crucial objective dimension -- the extent of the false information limit recovery for non-economic losses typically set a cap between in frustration, on march 9, 2005, more than thirteen months after with equifax furnish an objective and inherently reasonable "factual (4th cir. 1998). equifax contends that the jury's award of $245,000 trict court granted suzanne's motion for attorney's fees in the entire attorney's fees in the amount of $181,083. on appeal, equifax chal- differs significantly from those cases. a $150,000 award reflects distress" offered by suzanne, price, 93 f.3d at 1254, the plaintiffs in returned an award of $245,000 for mental anguish, humiliation, and award of $50,000); boris v. choicepoint servs., inc., 249 f. supp. 2d with different inaccuracies, and each agency either corrected or exac- equifax, the prior settlements have fully, or almost fully, compen- fered by suzanne, we believe that the evidence does support an award with one of the court's own choosing. see cline, 144 f.3d at 305 n.2 and contacted equifax, which assertedly february 2, 2004, more than a year before she contacted experian and a protracted period of time. of course, equifax bore no responsibility isolated or accidental reporting errors. rather, as a victim of identity ment must represent common damages arising from a single, review 14 (2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ tion marks omitted). a district court abuses its discretion only by is inconsistent with awards in similar cases and is disproportionate to court concluded that it could not so hold in this case and therefore $250,000 and $500,000, see, e.g., cal. civ. code � 3333.2 (west 2007) at other times these institutions relied exclusively on the erroneous dence that the distress was apparent to others, particularly her family; corrected the errors in suzanne's credit report. accordingly, suzanne more recent fcra cases, upon which equifax does not rely, that pro- fcra cases demonstrate that violations of the statute warrant only those differences -- the repeated violations of the fcra found by the states. while earlier estimates placed identity theft at between as equifax's authorities indicate, finding helpful precedent for passion or sympathy affect them," made a "rational decision" and 2d 918, 930-31 (n.d. ill. 2000) (same); see also tracy bateman farrell, facts of each case, courts frequently sustain emotional distress awards specified contexts, except as those causes of action arise under sections and loss of consortium, these statutory caps do suggest the boundaries (holding that damages award against defendants under the motor vehicle five or more years ago and involved local credit bureaus whose inac- months later, in november 2005, suzanne again applied to wachovia take, on may 23, 2005, equifax sent a letter to suzanne's house willful violations of the fcra, id. � 1681n(a), and actual damages for the fcra in 1970, it recognized the vital role that credit-reporting common-law causes of action parallel those offered under the fcra the fcra provides a private cause of action for those damaged by vide assistance in this regard. suzanne points to a recent sixth circuit minimal emotional distress awards. yet, once more, equifax's author- duct of the defendant and the emotional distress; the degree of such the police subsequently apprehended shovana sloan, and she was emotional distress. clearly, the district court, which observed the trial incorporated, upholding an award of damages when "the jury's verdict is against the incorporated; citifinancial, emotional distress award to $150,000 and grant a new trial nisi remit- graeme r. newman & megan m. ncnally, identity theft literature we disagree. the evidence at trial in this case clearly demonstrates fax's express request to submit a written opposition to suzanne's failed to correct suzanne's credit file. accordingly, we reduce the f.2d 971, 984 (5th cir. 1983); millstone v. o'hanlon reports, inc., suzanne proved by a preponderance of the evidence that equifax vio- reporting act (fcra), 15 u.s.c.a. � 1681 et seq. (west 1998 & when the sloanes returned to the mortgage company to obtain a home placed a fraud alert on her credit file. equifax told suzanne to "roll a survey of the other, more recent fcra cases that involve first reporting the identity theft to equifax, suzanne sent a formal let- circumstances of [the] injury and not resort to mere conclusory state- we do not believe the evidence presented here permits an award fore believe that the maximum award supported by the evidence here the district court denied equifax's post-trial motions and then, with- an appellate court from replacing an award of compensatory damages mental anguish and suffering").4 promptly notified the police1 851, 860-61 (w.d. ky. 2003) (remitting a jury award of $197,000 to submitted numerous notarized forms to correct her credit history. numerous respects and awarded suzanne $351,000 in actual damages cation of her emotional distress, chronic anxiety, and frustration dur- suzanne sloane, to secure a pre-qualification letter to buy a vacation home, but were charles alan wright, arthur r. miller, & mary kay kane, federal of this evidence, however, and insists that an award of $245,000 is arguably, the "one satisfaction rule" does not even apply to fcra 5sloane v. equifax the jury returned a verdict against equifax, awarding suzanne (limiting non-economic losses to $250,000); kan. civ. proc. code ann. faction rule' is that the amounts recovered by settlement and the judg- we begin with federal rule of civil procedure 59(a), which pro- moreover, suzanne offered evidence that this stress eventually credit accounts held by approximately 190 million individuals. see 1329, 1333 (9th cir. 1995); johnson v. dep't of treasury, irs, 700 testimony that "sufficiently articulate[s]" true "demonstrable emo- would not remove these two items. at trial, equifax admitted that affirmed in part and reversed only is emotional distress fraught with vagueness and speculation, it sonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving party. consumerism. see fair credit reporting act, pub. l. no. 91-508, failed to do. a reasonable jury could conclude that equifax's repeated on june 25, 2003, suzanne sloane entered prince william hospital amount, conceding that the number had been taken "out of the air." 528 f.2d 829, 834-35 (8th cir. 1976), aff'g 383 f. supp. 269, 276 these testimony that amounts only to "conclusory statements" and plaintiff equifax's motion for judgment as to this award. affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part by published tracey. in may 2005, the credit situation forced tracey, a high school tors as equifax had advised, suzanne and her husband, tracey, tried but, as explained earlier, the case at hand award. to resolve this question, we set forth the relevant governing in the maximum amount of $150,000. we recognize that even this whether disputed information in her credit report was inaccurate; (3) on november 4, 2005 -- following twenty-one months of struggle in that they typically involve a defendant found liable for propagating that, despite its numerous statutory violations, the jury erred in award- (quoting atlas food sys. & servs., inc. v. crane nat'l vendors, inc., would have an opportunity to submit a written opposition, and it actual distress. see jones v. credit bureau of huntington, inc., 399 ter to the credit reporting agency, disputing twenty-four specific items containing suzanne's social security number. compounding this mis- 2003); dennis v. columbia colleton med. ctr, inc., 290 f.3d 639, before niemeyer, michael, and motz, circuit judges. human resources department of her employer and asked if marriage approved awards more typically range between $20,000 and $75,000. jury to have found that equifax's conduct resulted in economic losses 6 sloane v. equifax ($106,000 for economic losses and $245,000 for mental anguish, of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other brought the theft to the company's attention; this equifax utterly titur at suzanne's option. that equifax's "out of the air" $25,000 represents a fair estimate of roborating the testimony of the plaintiff; the nexus between the con- of the identity theft, bearing the name of the identity thief and warn- on march 31, 2004, almost two months after reporting the identity credit reporting agencies. equifax does not challenge the constitutionality or applicability of unable to reach equifax by telephone on a friday evening, fered from a "single, indivisible harm" that has already been redressed comparison here is not a simple task. the recent emergence of iden- tion was one of several common-law actions used by plaintiffs in ation, and emotional distress. example of equifax's specific actions, the court recalled the letter that attorney's fees. at a post-trial hearing, the district court denied equi- fested itself"); hetzel v. county of prince william, 89 f.3d 169, 172 flying j, inc., 389 f.3d 429, 439 (4th cir. 2004) (upholding an award that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable equifax relies on the "one satisfaction rule" to support its argu- 14 sloane v. equifax atlanta, georgia, for appellant. alexander hugo blankingship, iii, chagrined that equifax had not yet corrected these errors in her the victim of identity theft. a recently hired hospital employee named in the range of $250,000 in defamation cases. see, e.g., stamathis v. period, suzanne was frequently unable to sleep at night, and as her information and cost savings act, pub. l. no. 92-513, � 409(a), 86 stat. access her credit report and discovered shovana sloan's name and addressed to shovana sloan, warning shovana that she was possibly that on numerous occasions suzanne attempted to secure lines of witnesses first-hand, concluded that the weight of the evidence sup- 16 sloane v. equifax (upholding an award of $250,000, given that the slander caused "an equifax first argues that because suzanne assertedly suffered a sin- any actual injury proved at trial. suzanne, by contrast, contends that of the constant denials of credit, she refused to seek routine credit requests for remittitur of emotional distress awards suggests that trans union, llc; experian opinion. judge motz wrote the opinion, in which judge niemeyer and evidence supports an emotional distress award. equifax ignores much the court noted that the jury could base its award on equifax's spe- suzanne, however, continued to experience problems with equifax. frustration and distress that suzanne felt for almost two years. as one jury to find for the non-moving party. fed. r. civ. p. 50(a). thus, have required a plaintiff to "reasonably and sufficiently explain the equifax or, alternatively, her recovery should be reduced to take u.s.c.a. �� 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2). plaintiff, ization surveys conducted by synovate for the federal trade com- only economic damages, but also damages for humiliation and mental greeted with the denial of a line of credit from wachovia bank. two cited by equifax, both defamation and fcra cases usually contain cessful plaintiff can recover both actual and punitive damages for mony of specific events and the humiliation and anger she gle, indivisible injury, she should not recover any damages from f.3d 125, 129 (4th cir. 2001). for the eastern district of virginia, at alexandria. decade as one of the fastest growing white-collar crimes in the united ing agencies maintain "reasonable procedures for meeting the needs sufficient evidence to sustain some award for this injury. rather, vides that if a court concludes that a jury award of compensatory the victim of identity theft and offering to sell her a service to monitor 11sloane v. equifax principles, apply these principles to the evidence before the jury, and in suzanne's equifax credit report had been corrected. the loan offi- months of emotional distress, mental anguish, and humiliation suf- accounts with citifinancial, inc., equifax notified suzanne that it with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper uti- teacher, to abandon his plans to take a sabbatical during which he had testified that she worried that if she and her husband separated, her then convicted of and imprisoned for the identity theft. inaccurate information about the plaintiff, and the effects, while out permitting equifax to submit an opposition to suzanne's request delete the majority of these items, but after assertedly verifying two 5 and the loss of income, if any. id. at 640 (citing price, 93 f.3d at by other parties. see id. ("the essential requirement for the `one satis- equifax information services, cies, and that equifax's actions directly led to the mounting set forth, we conclude that substantial, if not overwhelming, objective language of rule 54(d)(2)(c) was not discretionary; equifax should figg v. schroeder, 312 f.3d 625, 635 (4th cir. 2002). the district damages is excessive, it may order a new trial nisi remittitur. see 11 reporting agencies. see bryant v. trw, inc., 689 f.2d 72, 75 (6th cir. (6th cir. 2005) (unpublished), in which the court upheld a jury award ment. see chisholm v. uhp projects, inc., 205 f.3d 731, 737 (4th lenges the award of damages and attorney's fees. we affirm in part errors engendered more emotional distress than that found in these for the initial theft, but the fcra makes the company responsible for we recognize that, in cases that involve physical injuries, states that other fcra cases. no. 06-2044llc, (finding the plaintiff's common-law defamation claim not preempted by 3sloane v. equifax any of these statutory provisions. rather, the company simply insists ingly, we vacate the grant of attorney's fees and remand the case to report; (2) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation to determine lated the fcra by negligently: (1) failing to follow reasonable proce- theft to equifax and despite her efforts to work with individual credi- information solutions, for economic losses. equifax claims that only speculation and conjec- theft survey report 7, 12 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/ under its "verified victim policy," it should have automatically outright or offered credit on less advantageous terms that she might 653 (4th cir. 2002). thus, we have distinguished between plaintiff john t. sloane, social security number to obtain credit cards, loans, cash advances, (remitting a jury award of $2,000,000 to $50,000). taking reasonable steps to correct suzanne's credit report once she two months later, on may 9, 2005, suzanne again wrote to equi- to do so in violation of its own written procedures. diana gribbon motz, circuit judge: judgment of the trial judge." cline, 144 f.3d at 305 (internal quota- was "terrible" -- in fact, the "worst" the loan officer had ever seen "inconsistent with awards in other similar cases." br. of appellant at 2007)), cannot be reduced by the amount plaintiff received in settlement of this magnitude because, after all, this case does not involve actual v. personal injury action to $250,000), with a handful of states setting the congress enacted the fcra to require that consumer credit report- and evidence presented at trial. see id. 144 f.3d at 305. 9sloane v. equifax couple could secure a divorce and left the information for suzanne to response to the dissemination of inaccurate credit information.3 decided: december 27, 2007 ported the amount of the jury's award. in this case, the jury specifically found, via a special verdict, that cline, 144 f.3d at 304-06; price, 93 f.3d at 1251, 1255; hetzel, 89 aside and informed him that it would be impossible to approve the to the case at hand and so provide little assistance in assessing the concerning defamation. prior to the enactment of the fcra, defama- by generating a second credit file bearing shovana sloan's name but removed these citifinancial items at suzanne's request, but it failed far beyond emotional distress to include awards for pain and suffering shovana sloan noticed similarity in the women's names and birth published 500,000 to 700,000 individuals per year, more recent random victim- when a jury has returned its verdict, a court may grant judgment as f.2d 1368, 1371 (10th cir. 1987) (upholding a jury award of equifax sent to suzanne, many months after she had notified equifax pittleman, p.c., fairfax, virginia; bradley j. miller, c. allen frequently fought during the day and slept in separate rooms at night. resulting errors in her credit report. the police promptly arrested and (1:05-cv-01272-lmb) preemption of state law by fair credit reporting act, 8 a.l.r. fed. 2d from work to contact each of her creditors, and, at their direction, she these cases relied almost exclusively on conclusory testimony. see for the fourth circuit 1254). context" for her resulting claims of emotional distress. suzanne also her reputation, and it appears that few people beyond suzanne's fam- receives more than two billion items of information every month, and nized that the decision as to whether to grant a new trial on such distress. nor does equifax contend that suzanne failed to produce 947, 963 (1972) (current version at 49 u.s.c.a. � 32710(a) (west testing two washington mutual accounts that equifax had previously mistakes made by all three agencies, each agency produced reports the evidence provides more than adequate support for the jury's robert b. avery et al., an overview of consumer data and credit amount is appreciably more than that awarded for emotional distress tress award was "not an unreasonable conclusion from this evidence." in this case, the district court found that the jury's emotional dis- and other goods and services totaling more than $30,000. at the end fax attempted to correct these mistakes, it exacerbated matters further 59(a); see also cline v. wal-mart stores, inc., 144 f.3d 294, 305-06 came to affect her marriage to tracey; the couple began to sleep apart opinion union, and citifinancial. equifax, however, refused to settle. thus, violations of the statute. see 15 u.s.c.a. �� 1681n, 1681o. a suc- from the emotional duress; psychiatric or psychological treatment; tions must be rejected. for reasons that we explain below, we find and for all of these reasons, we reject equifax's argument that suzanne a provision of the fcra bars consumers from bringing actions "in hoped to develop land for modular homes with his father. the sloanes agencies had assumed within the burgeoning culture of american trans union, and equifax's reporting errors persisted long after trans supp. 2007). a jury found that equifax had violated the act in fax, trans union, llc, experian information solutions, inc., and case, bach v. first union nat'l bank, 149 fed. appx. 354, 362-63 -- and that no loan would be possible until the numerous problems told her to contact equifax if she had any concerns. equifax initially contends that the district court erred in refusing to ing suzanne damages and the court erred in awarding attorney's fees. motion for attorney's fees. instead, after brief oral arguments, the dis- to suggest that equifax's violations of the fcra resulted in harm to a motion for judgment as a matter of law. anderson v. russell, 247 additionally, equifax asserts that the district court erred in refusing defamation. moreover, suzanne presented almost no evidence at trial rate suit against prince william hospital and the personnel company $245,000 award here, but it seems to stand alone. to the non-moving party and drawing every legitimate inference in blankingship & associates, p.c., alexandria, virginia, for case at hand, we cannot find, as a matter of law, that suzanne has suf- cer also told suzanne not to apply for additional credit in the mean- insomnia worsened, she found herself nodding off while driving home cir. 2000) ("[t]his equitable doctrine operates to reduce a plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling defendant to prevent the plaintiff from cousin v. trans union corp., 246 f.3d 359, 370-71 (5th cir. 2001). on appeal, equifax does not challenge the jury's findings that from local stores, which, in turn, sparked angry recriminations from those damages, but whether the jury's award is excessive in light of reporting, fed. res. bull., feb. 2003, at 49, available at http:// ulated" descriptions of her protracted anxiety through detailed testi- compare the evidence and emotional distress award in suzanne's case attempted to rely on suzanne's credit to purchase a used car at a local 99 f.3d 587, 594 (4th cir. 1996)). (citing kennon v. gilmer, 131 u.s. 22 (1889)). in short, the issue ering the extensive corroboration offered at trial concerning the many time, because each credit inquiry would appear on her credit report with the evidence and award in all assertedly relevant cases. our anal- reflect the unfortunate current reality. (west 2007) (limiting non-economic damages for medical malpractice indivisible harm."). credit reports, and the protracted length of time during which equifax counseling were available. after receiving the name of a counselor, 17sloane v. equifax suzanne went instead to the equifax website, where she was able to between equifax's violations of the fcra and suzanne's emotional vide sufficient evidence to support an emotional distress award, we credit reports to suzanne; notably, both credit reports still contained from other persons participating in the violation). we need not reach this contributed to the deterioration of her marriage to tracey. as a result wl 2702945, at *2 (e.d. pa. sept. 13, 2007) (refusing to remit a jury plaintiff-appellee, against this backdrop, identity theft has emerged over the last