State Law Claims Not Preempted by ERISA

increase was never obtained. plaintiffs' claims against hillyer ("congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any plaintiffs that he had in fact done so when he had not. resolved in favor of remand." in re hot-hed inc., 477 f.3d 320, the defendants are haywood hillyer, a louisiana citizen and negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show that of erisa's civil enforcement provision � 502, even if preempted 502(a). implicate the plan's administration of benefits or `affect the warranting the client's assumption that the client was ineligible to recover. the plaintiff was unable to recover on a defendant, had the option of working for the new owner and maintaining the same pension benefits that he enjoyed with his federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under having submitted three rounds of briefs, has not identified which the new owner. the fifth circuit observed that the plaintiff's under her new disability plan, or alternatively the accrued enforcement of a state law claim, removal of a claim that falls undisputed for the purposes of this motion that plaintiffs asked plaintiff's conduct still would have been in violation of at only peripherally connected to an erisa plan. erisa preemption must inquire into whether the state law claim available under � [502(a)]; often, this will be a claim for factors "relevant for determining whether a claim is within the 4 plaintiffs. a little less than a year later in october 2001, increase had taken effect when in fact it had not. plaintiffs' and failure to notify the client promptly if he has failed properly insured. conflict preemption serves as a defense to a state action." preempts a state law claim does it raise a federal question pleaded complaint rule: "`[w]hen a federal statute wholly contends that plaintiffs' claims necessarily relate to the erisa cause of action under erisa � 502(a) completely preempts appear to be any case "in which � 502(a) preemption was found to that the existence of conflict preemption under � 514 of erisa 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by arana v. ochsner company, haywood hillyer, and plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful discharge against his 1467 (5th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 1034 (1987)). assessing whether removal is appropriate, the court is guided by essentially argues that plaintiffs, by pegging their claimed hillyer's arguments hew closely to the question of whether hillyer has not cited a single case in which a court has with his original employer because his right to benefits under claims that `relate to' an erisa plan under � 514(a)." woods v. claims for fraudulent inducement relating to an insurance agent's plan" as would a claim for benefits brought against standard. id. further, the fifth circuit recently commented that there did not benefits under the plan," because recovery against hillyer "would both blum and cefalu are distinguishable from the facts relationship between erisa entities. they arise from the alleged of defendants' liability in those case necessarily turned on applied for full disability benefits under the policy. standard circuit stated "[a] state law claim of that genre, which does not the plaintiffs in this action are gulf coast plastic making removal available to the defendant." mcclelland, 155 f.3d insurance agent, procured a group, long-term disability insurance 25 (explaining that the court must "determine whether a state law civil complaint raising this select group of claims is can not, mean that any lawsuit in which reference to a benefit plaintiff's state law claim cannot be resolved without an la. aug. 4, 2000), that hillyer quotes have no relevance in the new orleans, louisiana, this ___ day of june 2008. chidester did involve the principal erisa entities:" the the insurance agent's conduct "relate[d] only indirectly to the whether there is complete preemption under erisa � 502(a) that is they do not raise a federal question. therefore, the court has no administered the disability policy. indeed, there is no indirectly" and because they did "not affect the relations among the fifth circuit has emphasized that whether the claims plaintiff can enforce via � 502(a); and (3) whether liability insurer (collectively "hillyer"). plaintiffs initially co., 243 f.3d 912, 916 (5th cir. 2001). the well-pleaded interpretation and administration of the erisa plan" and that had" she never left her old employer. id. her new employer's (emphasis added). the perkins court made clear that the critical new employer had offered to transfer all of her existing appropriate. in holding that erisa did not preempt the perkins position because here plaintiffs' claims against him do not and resolved." id. (citing dukes, 57 f.3d at 355). when a case `well-pleaded complaint.'" merrell dow, 478 u.s. at 808 (citation by � 514(a), are still governed by the well-pleaded complaint the fifth circuit does not appear to have set forth a difference between the coverage received under the disability the court explained that the statement in cefalu "does not, and plaintiffs' claims do implicate a relationship governed by erisa. context of this case. those cases involved claims for benefits does not refer to federal law, a federal statute that completely 502(a)(1)(b) -- such a claim would relate to the disputed plan. breached its duty, which can be breached by omission as well 336 (citing met. life ins., 481 u.s. 58; mcclelland, 155 f.3d at from speculating on the proper amount of damages." id. it does the agent "derive[d] from state common-law claims, not the erisa plan and the coverage limits that hillyer allegedly assured participants and beneficiaries. behavior did not relate to plan administration). by erisa); morstein v. nat'l ins. servs., inc., 93 f.3d 715, 723- 65 f.3d 637, 639-40 (7th cir. 1995)). to the claims that gulf coast and dr. campbell bring here. the northbrook life ins. co., 904 f.2d 236, 249 (5th cir. 1990). that plan ceased the moment he was terminated and because he benefits under the plan but that he was entitled to a maximum of 514(a), 29 u.s.c. � 1144(a). giles, 172 f.3d at 337. section perkins and hobson because plaintiffs were already participants of action authorized by erisa � 502(a), "regardless of how at 247. plaintiffs' use of the difference in policy limits as a deceased husband's employer and the employer's broker that had reasonable diligence in attempting to place the insurance erisa entities that require interpretation of erisa plans. of any plan, regardless of the defendant's responsibilities and 502(a), and where there is no other independent legal duty that inquiry into the plan's terms. louisiana courts have recognized care, inc. v. union central insurance co., 295 f.3d 505 (5th cir. the court finds that plaintiffs' claims against hillyer do explicitly distinguished cefalu, explaining that the plaintiff's after analyzing whether such claims related to an erisa plan). is without merit. hillyer contends that plaintiffs' claims are insurance agent discussed the need to peg the insurance policy to relations among the principal erisa entities'"). procured and helped administer the plan, as well as the removal statutes should be strictly construed. see, e.g., manguno several causes of action that may be brought by an erisa plan generated in case one of them became injured. the dentist and involves "solely arguably conflict-preempted causes of action," 1989), to argue that plaintiffs' claims necessarily involve the 3rd some construction of federal law." merrell dow, 478 u.s. at 809. that she would keep what she had." id. at 155-56. the smith court iii. discussion the plan, and the beneficiaries) as such, [they were not] 32 concluded that erisa precluded the plaintiff's state-law fraud motion to remand. see hot-head, 477 f.3d at 323. because a defendant may remove a relations between an erisa entity and an outside party, rather instance, in chidester v. quoyeser, no. 94-40536, 1994 wl 685015 inform her that she could continue health coverage at her own ins. co., 402 f.3d 1267, 1281 (11th cir. 2005). the claim itself created a relationship between the plaintiff and breach of contract claim was inextricably bound to the erisa plan raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal an erisa entity or that he have ever had the responsibility or that she was insured only up to $26,000. plaintiffs then brought the loss he sustains as a result of the agent's failure to `arises under' federal law." franchise tax bd., 463 u.s. at 10 the action. see 28 u.s.c. � 1441(a). the removing party bears the co., 910 f.2d 224, 229 (5th cir. 1990). to establish a claim for aislic in state court. plaintiffs brought breach of contract in order for a district court to exercise removal state law claim for fraudulent inducement because it did "not plaintiffs on how to effect the increase and later advised b. federal question jurisdiction -- erisa preemption $10,000, that hillyer agreed to do so and represented to (1) the defendant, in the course of its business or other cannot be separated." the plaintiff in hobson brought state law by the reliable plaintiff could not "be severed from its remand is appropriate. id. at 338. under the terms of an erisa plan under erisa � 502(a)(1)(b). id. 20 21, 2005, dr. campbell suffered a disabling injury and later limits from $6,000 to $10,000 per month. hillyer conferred with at 516. see also giles, 172 f.3d at 337 n.7. "[c]omplete removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the such, is not preempted by erisa." perkins, 898 f.2d at 473 hygienist's annual earnings at $74,000, and the insurance agent cir. 1995)). see also franchise tax board, 463 u.s. at 23-27 benefits of $6,000 per month but not $10,000 because that (1) an undertaking or agreement by the insurance agent to 336. see also anderson v. electronic data systems corp., 11 f.3d acts and omissions of an independent insurance agent whose duties similar to the plaintiffs in perkins and hobson, the plaintiffs question does not exist. but there is an exception to the well- 516-17). see also arana, 338 f.3d at 437. even if a complaint maccabees life ins. co., 174 f.3d 1207 (11th cir. 1999), the gulf coast plastic surgery, into a federal one -- as occurs with complete preemption -- [conduct] too place." id. in addition, courts interpreting 13 section: r(4) (la. 1973) (citing cases). courts have since identified three profit sharing trust v. corrigan enters., inc., 793 f.2d 1456, first, there must be a relevant erisa plan. second, the be proper where the state law claims did not `relate to' the hillyer relies on blum v. spectrum restaurant group, inc., nos. because her injury occurred when she was not an employee and plan 1994), that the broad statement in cefalu about the effect of contracted with his agent to write a pension plan and later in policy limits and whether he misrepresented those limits. perkins have not adopted hillyer's suggested reading. the key damages to the $4,000 difference, are seeking to recover benefits action is not the plan itself . . . but the procurement of the 19 v. mahoney, 218 f. supp. 2d 8 (d. mass. 2002), which involved law claims as `arising under' federal law for the purposes of benefit plan." the fifth circuit in giles made clear, however, iii. conclusion e.g., danca v. private health care sys., inc., 185 f.3d 1, 4-5 10 plaintiff's employer, the plan fiduciaries, and the plaintiff as burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists. see allen v. been deprived of the compensation and benefits of his job. the same level of benefits as he had before and if he had worked for distinction between a claim for fraudulent inducement and a claim 808 (1986) (citing franchise tax bd. v. constr. laborers vacation commerce, 923 f.2d 406, 407-08 (5th cir. 1991); rice v. pachal, the district court "lacks power to do anything other than remand tied to their requested increase in policy limits and therefore administration of an erisa plan and they do not implicate a question. instead of "transmogrifying a state cause of action independent insurance agent, who had allegedly induced the question of whether complete preemption exists shares not fall within the scope of erisa � 502(a) because they do not solicitation of potential participants in an erisa plan prior to question is whether the state law claim "affects an aspect of the in rozzell v. security services, inc., 38 f.3d 819, 822 (5th cir. misrepresentation claims against his independent insurance agent action falls within the scope of an erisa provision that the coverage or benefits. in light of the fifth circuit's statements an erisa plan -- the cause of action authorized by erisa � (5th cir. nov. 23, 1994), a plan beneficiary brought state law not affect the administration of an erisa plan because hillyer, giles, 172 f.3d at 337. (citing soley v. first nat'l bank of civil action and nature of the defendant's role with respect to the plan at outside the scope of erisa � 502(a) is inappropriate). the mere (quoting beneficial nat'l bank, 539 u.s. at 8.). see also state law cause of action, those claims are completely preempted expense after being laid off. id. at *2. the fifth circuit against their managed healthcare providers were completely did not preempt the plaintiff's state law claims for fraudulent policy limit in effect and the $10,000 limit requested, hillyer inc., 923 f.2d 1100 (5th cir. 1991), for the proposition that states." 28 u.s.c. � 1331. whether a claim arises under federal retirement income security act (erisa), 29 u.s.c. � 1001, et preemption does not exist "when the claim merely affects (6th cir. 1995); jass v. prudential health care plan, 88 f.3d reliable was not merely responsible for procuring a plan but for described � 502(a) will rarely, if ever, differ from the set of seventh circuit in jass v. prudential health care plan, inc., 88 jass, 88 f.3d at 1487 (internal quotations and citations omitted) assuring him that the plan would provide certain coverage that in the defendant must be an erisa entity. finally, the another owes an obligation to his client to use reasonable plaintiff had implicated erisa because he alleged that he had (1) whether the plaintiff [is] eligible to bring a claim administration and his actions cannot be imputed to standard. see jurisdiction, complete preemption must exist. "when the doctrine 514(a)'s "relates to" standard without discussing � 502(a). see, [preempts] the state law cause of action, a claim which comes necessarily require the court to interpret the disability plan in original). the court reasoned that because plaintiffs' 1311, 1315 (5th cir. 1994) other circuits are in accord. see, inquiry into plaintiffs' disability plan is necessary. in graham, is appropriate because "`[w]hen the federal statute completely claim of negligent misrepresentation against insurance agent was entitled to the full $10,000 in benefits but for his actions also had the plaintiff's agent procured the requested change, the 355 (3d cir. 1995); warner v. ford motor co., 46 f.3d 531, 535 942, 944, 947 (5th cir. 1995) (explaining that courts addressing administrator or fiduciary. relevant to this case is erisa � the second form of erisa preemption is known as "ordinary" an erisa entity is not preempted by erisa if it does not in direct conflict with erisa � 502(a), and therefore is within sarah s. vance plan's existence are less important than facts about the quality on october 25, 2007, plaintiffs sued standard, hillyer, and the erisa plan . . . but, . . ., consists of run-of-the-mill court emphasized that "[w]hat plaintiffs really challenge in this calculating damages by referring to an erisa plan was only dicta. nothing in perkins or in later cases interpreting perkins, franchisor on the assurance that he would continue to receive the in determining whether erisa preempted the plaintiff's to the state court where the preemption issue can be addressed which involved a question of whether plaintiffs' state law claims plaintiff's state law claim for fraudulent inducement and that no preemption exists when a remedy falls within the scope of or is arguments such as hillyer's as "present[ing] a closer question on the action in federal court from the outset, "the question of 8 e.g., hobson v. robinson, 75 fed. appx. 949, 952 (5th cir. 2003) terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.'" id. texas aggregates, l.l.c., 459 f.3d 600, 603 (5th cir. 2006). plaintiffs' insurance agent, and american international specialty plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of a claim for benefits plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against standard. claims "relate to" a plan, courts should ask misrepresentation, violation of the texas insurance code and the presence of conflict preemption does not raise a federal hobson, the fifth circuit explained that "the timing of plan as by affirmative misrepresentation, and (4) the plaintiff in other words, because of the nature of the assurance made by hobson v. robinson, 75 fed. appx. 949, 954 (5th cir. 2003), in powers with respect to the plan. interpretation of the contract governed by federal law. assured plaintiffs had taken effect had in fact not taken effect. because they were not completely preempted by erisa � 502(a). the suffered damages or pecuniary loss as a result of its erisa may preempt state law claims in one of two ways. see facts that are highly analogous to those in this case. in plaintiffs in gianetti were a dentist and the dentist's wife and to show that an insurance provider would have provided particular or fulfilled any role that would make him a traditional erisa face of the complaint. see torres v. southern peru copper corp., 402 f.3d at 1287. what is important is whether the defendant was formulating it. therefore, the agent's underlying conduct alleged failed to procure the increase in policy limits that plaintiffs the preemption issue" but ultimately failing to establish that the conduct that resulted in the accident. here, without passing plaintiff must have standing to sue under that plan. third, administration of the disability plan but rather from hillyer's 18 after the plaintiff had begun paying premiums. the agent in which it explained that the critical question in determining hillyer contends that the employee retirement income security act by a competitor. the plaintiff, a former employee of the plaintiffs seek damages of $4,000 per month dating back to dr. v. northbrook life insurance, co., 904 f. 2d 236 (5th cir. 1990), complaint." merrell dow pharm., inc. v. thompson, 478 u.s. 804, require the interpretation of plaintiffs' disability policy. involve conduct by erisa entities is critical to the inquiry of subject matter jurisdiction. at issue is whether the employment of complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff's state benefits due under a plan. connection to the plan." id. at 516. conditions. the record showed that the plaintiff had requested basis for federal jurisdiction over state law claims existed status). . relations among the principal erisa entities . . . as such," law claims. plaintiffs now move to remand. any state cause of action that seeks the same relief as a cause united states district court their claims against a traditional erisa entity, as is the case original employer with the assurance that he would receive the 5 case to federal court only if the plaintiff could have brought the court observes at the outset that hillyer, despite plaintiffs that the policy limits had been increased. on october 323 (5th cir. 2007). though the court must remand the case to (8th cir. 1997) (holding erisa plan beneficiary's state law tort hillyer then removed this case on federal question grounds. i. background measure of damages is "unrelated to the [their] actual right to does not, by itself, create an exception to the well-pleaded misrepresentation claims against the agent and agency who basis to exercise jurisdiction over this case and must remand it here have brought run-of-the-mill state law tort claims that are regarding benefits. the plaintiff brought a host of claims under the fifth circuit held that the plaintiff could not recover however, suggests that such a cramped reading of perkins is versus no: 07-9363 cause of action was governed exclusively by state law and did not for more than four decades that an insured-plaintiff may have a beneficiary, participant, the secretary of labor, or plan (erisa), 29 u.s.c. � 1001, et seq., preempts plaintiffs' state insurance plan for terminating her health benefits and failing to (10th cir. 1999) (holding insurance agent's misrepresentation of matters in which it had a pecuniary interest, supplied false fail. hillyer has not established that louisiana law requires an handle enrollment of employees in insurance plans and a defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in or "conflict" preemption. it exists when erisa provides an directly affect the relationship among the traditional however, it has explained that in determining whether state law within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in against her former employer and administrator of her health because the plaintiff had operated his boat in violation of both well as multiple state law claims for fraud, negligent presents "questions [that] are intricately bound up with the terms of the plans in question. hillyer's several arguments that resolution of plaintiffs' thus encompassed in erisa's preemptive sweep"); perkins v. time perkins held a state law claim "against a third party other than failure to procure and negligent misrepresentation claims would warranties under the existing policy. there was no dispute that the eleventh circuit has explained that, in determining v. davila, 542 u.s. 200, 207 (2004) (quoting beneficial nat'l the terms of an erisa plan; and (2) whether the claims failure to procure the requested increase and his erroneous are instructive on whether plaintiffs' damages claim falls within plaintiffs that he had procured. a month after bringing suit and insurance] agents from personal liability." id. further, in causes of action for misrepresentation and breach of contract 24 (11th cir. 1996) (explaining that erisa preemption of claims company, but voluntarily dismissed their claims against standard coverage but for an agent's failure to procure. and the court has (alteration in original). preemption principles established in metropolitan life.'" id. nor is the fifth circuit's decision in reliable home health information, (2) the defendant had a legal duty to supply authority on which hillyer relies actually undermines his insured in the amount of the desired coverage. here do not amount to an allegation that hillyer improperly against his insurance agent on a failure to procure theory within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions in erisa � "arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the united fixed as of the time of removal. 28 u.s.c. � 1447(c); doddy v. and/or determine conclusively that dr. campbell would have been amendments to the substantive terms of the plans. determination necessarily federal in character.") erisa is one of these 23 here, there is no suggestion that hillyer has ever acted as cefalu, 871 f.2d at 1294. similarities with an inquiry into whether a claim relates to a an the dentist to protect the income that he and his employees gianetti, the court remanded the plaintiffs' state law claims its erisa plan but on whether it "misled smith when it told her 31 an independent insurance agent similar to those that plaintiffs omitted). "[a] defendant may not remove a case to federal court company state court if at any time before final judgment it appears that the civil enforcement provisions of erisa � 502(a). hillyer unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case the principle, grounded in notions of comity and the recognition erisa plan under [a] � 514(a) analysis. . . . the set of claims 6 similar posture: they do not arise out of an alleged improper vessel owner, had an existing insurance policy that included two the requested coverage. plaintiff's insurer denied coverage any benefits that she could claim under [her new employer's] temporal fact about the date of an erisa plan's existence was necessarily depend upon the scope . . . of rights under [the] relate to an erisa plan. id. at 13. especially important to the 33 the fifth circuit reaffirmed its holding in perkins in plaintiffs asked hillyer to procure an increase in the policy that his insurance agent failed to procure requested coverage participant and resulted from acts unrelated to the plan. in a the plaintiff's new employer, "the value of the benefits that she 2008 wl 59174, at *3 (n.d. tex. jan. 4, 2008). first, it may which appellant was covered when he worked for" the defendant. other cases. see, e.g., smith v. texas children's hosp., 84 f.3d on november 1, 2000, hillyer, acting as plaintiffs' state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over ins. co., 898 f.2d 470, 474 (5th cir. 1990) (determining that no 26 113 f.3d 540, 542 (5th cir. 1997). a defendant who seeks removal in cefalu, the defendant-employer terminated all of its under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future united states district judge 152, 155 (5th cir. 1996) (holding that erisa did not preempt a american international coverage that changed the terms of one warranty but not the an increase in limits on an existing insurance policy as opposed u.s. 149); franchise tax bd., 463 u.s. at 12, 13-14. therefore, complaint rule means that the federal question must appear on the (1st cir. 1999); lupo v. human affairs int'l, inc., 28 f.3d 269, (emphasis in original). the mere presence of "[a] defense that objectives because plan participants and beneficiaries would not removed this case to federal court. their tangential connection to the erisa plan, "does not toward plaintiffs are governed entirely by state law and do not presented here. unlike the situation in blum, plaintiffs' claims association, 123 f.3d 281, 290 (5th cir. 1997), and roig v. the plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of erisa � 502(a), limits and negligent misrepresentation. plaintiffs seek the least one of the warranties, thereby rendering the plaintiff 12 entity. hillyer also overlooks the fifth circuit's clarification specific tests for determining whether complete preemption exists warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly argument may stem from the fact that some cases include analyses preemption,'" the state claim can be removed." aetna health inc. hillyer mistakenly relies on graham v. milky way barge, to claims for fraudulent inducement to participate in a new plan. 2002); neal v. kawasaki motors corp., 1995 wl 419901, at *2 (e.d. the standard insurance plaintiffs' state law claims. instead of explaining how a beneficiary id. at *3 (emphasis added). thus, the very benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 u.s.c. � 1132(a)(1)(b). 2002), on point in this case. in reliable, the fifth circuit hygienist. the insurance agent procured a disability policy for be able to rely on agents' representations and therefor unable to because hobson's claims doe not require either plan eleventh circuit explained that erisa � 502(a) completely campbell 9 28 11 an insurance agent who undertakes to procure insurance for whether they had acted properly under the terms of the plans. in under her disability policy. the smith plaintiff alleged that her plan." id. at 956. the fifth circuit further explained that erisa against the employer, the plan provider, and the broker as _____________________________________ original employer or becoming an independent franchisor for the "benchmark" for the calculation of damages and prevents "a court passage in chidester that hillyer quotes in his brief, the fifth due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights erisa plan. after all, if a plaintiff's state law claims can be providing a basis for removal jurisdiction. giles, 172 f.3d at id. at 602. in aetna health inc. v. davila, 542 u.s. 200 (2004), concluded that erisa � 502(a) completely preempts claims against only $6,000 per month, not $10,000. the increase that hillyer simplification of plan interpretation and administration -- 27 elements are satisfied: fraudulent-inducement claim against her new employer after she insurance agent who had induced him to switch his employee group interpretation and administration of the erisa plan. because erisa plan." id. the court concluded that erisa did not preempt independent agent's conduct because of the agent's independent federal question jurisdiction does not exist unless the former employer after he was allegedly fired for filing a 2003), and cefalu v. b.f. goodrich co., 871 f.2d 1290 (5th cir. 7 entities--the employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the the amount of income generated. the plaintiffs listed the plan." id. at 156. f.2d 470, 473 (5th cir. 1990), the fifth circuit held that erisa agent occupied the role of a traditional erisa entity. and the fraudulent-inducement claim because "the measure of her injury benefits management group was not preempted because complained of plan by an insurance agent and his agency." id. at 12 (emphasis completely preempted by erisa because they concern a request for policy with limits of $6,000 per month from standard for the statements in weir v. federal asset disposition that the plaintiff's claims "`relate[d] to [his erisa] plan only a host of state law claims against the insurance agent, similar campbell's disability, which is the difference between the $6,000 explained that its holding in perkins "was based on our finding statutes. davila, 542 u.s. at 207. affect the relations among the principal erisa entities . . . as claims for failure to procure the requested increase in policy administration of the benefits, including communications inc. and dr. edward m. and concedes that he is not an erisa fiduciary. therefore, gravamen of plaintiffs' claims against hillyer is that hillyer ii. legal standards under that section; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of "the administration of the plan." blum, 2003 wl 1889036, at *5 hillyer does not contend that he is a traditional erisa entity found complete preemption have involved claims brought against 22 29 whether erisa preemption exists. in perkins v. time ins. co., 898 limited long term disability plan, 2000 wl 1146522, at *6 (e.d. other. despite plaintiff's request, the agent failed to procure karam v. st. paul fire & marine ins. co., 281 so. 2d 728, 731 health plan, 338 f.3d 433, 440 n.11 (5th cir. 2003)); cotner v. cir. 2006). see also hubbard, 42 f.3d at 947 (explaining that to state court. bank v. anderson, 539 u.s. 1, 8 (2003)). removal of such a claim other circuit courts are in accord. see, e.g., woodworker's liability turned "not on the quantum of benefits available" under offshore prod. contractors, inc. v. republic underwriters ins. 272 (2d cir. 1994); dukes v. u.s. healthcare, inc., 57 f.3d 350, congress is intended to apply. indeed, as the fifth circuit made policy not preempted); wilson v. zoellner, 114 f.3d 713, 720-21 that are similar to the criteria identified by the fifth circuit claims against its insurance agent. the reliable plaintiff had diligence in attempting to place the insurance requested and that plaintiff's state law claims were intricately related to hillyer also overlooks smith v. texas children's hospital, participant seeks to recover benefits from an erisa plan under a concern whether hillyer fulfilled their request for an increase circuit expressly distinguished its holding in perkins. the court hartford life and annuity ins. co., civ. a. no. 3:07-cv-0487-g, here, plaintiffs assert only state law tort claims against systems engineering and security, inc. v. science & engineering which the alleged unlawful conduct occurred before the existence than between two erisa entities"); memorial hospital system v. a peremption challenge under la. rev. stat. � 9:5606, it is displaces the state-law cause of action through complete 24 514(a) provides that erisa "shall supersede any and all state hillyer's argument that this case can be distinguished from worker's compensation claim. the employer argued that the lines insurance company (aislic), hillyer's professionally too tenuous and remote to administration of plan to be preempted seq., completely preempts plaintiffs' state law claims such that metropolitan life ins. co. v. taylor, 481 u.s. 58, 64-65 (1987) specialty lines insurance required a plaintiff who brought failure to procure and negligent (quoting dukes v. u.s. healthcare, inc., 57 f.3d 350, 355 (3d rule and, therefore, are not removable under the complete- erisa plan" and that the relationship between the plaintiff and relationship that is comprehensively regulated by erisa." bank of against erisa entities tied to oral modifications and written the time the allegedly tortious conduct took place. see cotton, clear in perkins, erisa does not exist to "immunize [independent determined that dr. campbell was disabled and entitled to full whether erisa preempts a plaintiff's state law claim is "whether procure insurance; (2) failure of the agent to use elements to a failure to procure claim. citing karam, the fifth shortly after filing suit in state court and before hillyer defendant that is so intertwined with an erisa plan that it plan. the fifth circuit explained that the plaintiff's claims and the underlying accident. id. at 1106. in graham, the plaintiff, a 15 whether erisa preempts a state law claim, temporal facts about a intentional infliction of emotional distress. the court concluded allegedly assured the plaintiffs that they had adequate coverage. giles v. nylcare health plans, inc., 172 f.3d 332, 336 (5th cir. if a plaintiff "could have brought his claim under erisa � 502(a)(1)(b), which provides that "[a] civil action may be giles, 172 f.3d at 337. thus, if a plan beneficiary or on the merits of plaintiffs' claims or whether they could survive specifically requested and that he then misrepresented that the deceptive trade practices act, breach of contract, and surgery, inc., a louisiana medical practice, and dr. edward m. power to administer or make any decisions about the scope of hobson, 75 fed. appx. at 955 (explaining that an insurer, as a fairly characterized as a claim for benefits under the terms of preempted by erisa." id. (citing sommers drug stores co. employee (1) whether the state law claims address areas of exclusive louisiana v. aetna u.s. healthcare, inc., 468 f.3d 237, 243 (5th 2 derive from his conduct as a principal erisa entity. the jurisdiction of federal court." mcgowin v. manpower int'l, court rejected that argument, observing that the plaintiff's r & h oil & gas co., 63 f.3d 1326, 1335 (5th cir. 1995). in inducement and negligent misrepresentation against his definitive test for evaluating whether a state law claim falls at issue here, as the fifth circuit explained in woods, the against an independent agent would not promote congressional to the second warranty and therefore had no basis to assume that cases on which he does rely are inapposite in this context. for cause of action against insurance agents who fail to procure obtain the insurance; and (3) actions by the agent erisa plan"); hubbard v. blue cross & blue shield ass'n, 42 f.3d benefits relinquished or benefits denied." smith, 84 f.3d at 155. suggestion that hillyer had any authority to administer the plan that the plaintiff had requested a change to the existing policy regarding preemption." id. in the absence of complete preemption, 16 preempts a plaintiff's state law claim when the following four fact it did not provide. id. at 472. the perkins court explained resolution does not require interpretation of an erisa plan. the 84 f.3d 152 (5th cir. 1996). in smith, the plaintiff brought a because there was no evidence from which it could be inferred complaint did not "target the insurance company that underwrote about the propriety of removal within the context of erisa � artfully pleaded as a state action," is completely preempted. implicate a relationship governed by erisa and because their 14 17 contradict congress's intent in enacting erisa -- the the plaintiff's fraudulent-inducement claim because she lost "a formation is not the critical factor in erisa preemption. rather, hillyer has not pointed to a single case in which the 502(a). in the context of addressing the propriety of removal, the extent the claim itself relates to an erisa plan guides our ass'ns, inc., 962 so. 2d 1089, 1092 (la. ct. app. 2007). in woods that also provide helpful guidance. in butero v. royal gianetti court's ruling was that the plaintiffs did not bring determination." hobson, 75 fed. appx. at 954. 3 preempts a field effectively "`recharacterizes' preempted state that the fraud `[did] not affect the relations among the interpretation or administration." id. allegedly procured the wrong plan," plaintiffs claims did not learned that its agent had delayed in creating the plan until for failure to procure a requested increase in policy limits on employees and ended their pension plans after it was bought out to notify the client promptly if he has failed to obtain the under the disability plan. the fifth circuit has described health insurance plan but never actually procured the promised make informed choices); delany co. v. selman, 98 f.3d 1457, 1466- before the court is plaintiffs' motion to remand for lack of when the hygienist became injured, however, it became apparent became permanently disabled and was unable to obtain benefits (emphasis added). employment benefits but failed to do so. she sought benefits he argues that perkins should be read narrowly to apply only to that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that affirmative defense to state law claims and involves erisa � that would have covered the plaintiff's conduct that triggered other words, their duties toward the plaintiffs derived from the requested insurance: benefits under the preexisting plan that she gave up when she circuit has explained that a plaintiff must prove plan and therefore preempted by erisa because they dealt with gave up by leaving [her old employer] is equal to the value of 1999) (citing mcclelland v. gronwaldt, 155 f.3d 507 (5th cir. although it is the court's subject matter jurisdiction and preempted under erisa � 502(a), the supreme court explained that into an agreement with a broker in which the broker agreed to 67 (4th cir. 1996) (holding that misrepresentation claim against at 822-23. here, plaintiffs' claims against hillyer are in a claims related to the erisa plan because to compute plaintiff's dispositive of the issue of whether an independent insurance v. prudential prop. & cas. ins. co., 276 f.3d 720, 723 (5th cir. additional benefits under the policy. the employer had entered claim that he was illegally denied benefits under state law. id. eastern district of louisiana (explaining that even though erisa � 514(a) may preclude found none. 4:02-cv-92, 4:02-cv-98, 2003 wl 1889036 (e.d. tex. apr. 14, failure to procure theory because he had never requested a change campbell, gulf coast's sole shareholder and a louisiana citizen. principal erisa entities," whereas the "alleged fraud against a federal question under erisa exists. for the following reasons, his agent had procured coverage that would have insured against according to plalintiffs' complaint, dr. campbell has received in perkins and later cases, the court finds no meaningful plaintiffs' claims "relate to" the disability insurance plan the principal erisa entities (the employer, the plan fiduciaries, cited any other case in which a court applying louisiana law has same benefits as before. the plaintiff opted to become a switched jobs. the fifth circuit observed that a difficulty arose for the foregoing reasons, the court grants plaintiffs' inquiry is whether the claims implicate the relations of erisa in an erisa plan when they requested the policy limits increase rejected chidester's argument that her claims were not preempted employer] allegedly owed him as a continuation of its erisa correct information to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant procure the desired coverage if the actions of the agent provider of an erisa policy, cannot be held responsible for an warranties, restricting coverage to operations under particular supply, inc. v. principal mut. life ins. co., 170 f.3d 985, 990 also brought claims against a third defendant, standard insurance plaintiffs' claims do not require the interpretation or la. 1995). "[a]ny doubt as to the propriety of removal should be "acting in [the role of an erisa entity] when the alleged 30 a. removal becuase plaintiffs' claims against hillyer do not implicate erisa necessitates interpretation of the plan is also unavailing. under [erisa] � 502(a), 29 u.s.c. � 1132(a)." giles, 172 f.3d at hillyer to procure disability insurance with a policy limit of non-diverse defendants. on the face of their complaint, a federal law must be determined by referring to the "well-pleaded complaint rule. "`state law claims [that] fall outside the scope here. id. at 14. jurisdiction." merrell dow, 478 u.s. at 808 (citing mottley, 211 employer's insurance carriers, claiming that she was entitled to is implicated by a defendant's action, then the individual's its formation. that is, it should apply only to situations in [was] the same regardless of whether she pursues recovery of within the meaning of erisa � 514(a). the confusion in hillyer's 1482, 1487 (7th cir. 1996); cotton v. massachusetts mutual life brought by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits as an independent agent, is not responsible for plan misrepresentation. not affect the on-going administration or obligations of an erisa claim is arguably preempted under � 514(a), the district court, quantifiable stream of income that she would now be receiving being without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute bring here. as discussed, supra, the cases in which courts have the court grants plaintiffs' motion. scope of � 502(a): id. at 1212 (internal quotations and citations omitted). the therefore, graham does not apply in this context. hillyer has not order and reasons laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employer federal district courts have jurisdiction over cases damages, the court would have to "refer to the pension plan under hillyer improperly processed benefits or administered the plan. an existing policy. therefore, this lawsuit does not "affect . . before hillyer and aislic removed this case to federal court, basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim existed, the fifth entities to which the uniform regulatory scheme enacted by the fifth circuit's statements in memorial hospital system complaint must seek compensatory relief akin to that "occupy a particular field, resulting in complete preemption disability is covered under the policy or whether standard or erisa and is removable to federal court." id. in rozzell, the claims against standard, and against hillyer they brought tort cause of action is completely preempted by erisa � 502(a)(1)(b)." justifiable reliance upon the omission or affirmative representation that the increase had taken effect. the fifth circuit has applied this reasoning in several claim for fraud and misrepresentation `relates to' a plan and is oxy usa, inc., 101 f.3d 448, 456 (5th cir. 1996). hillyer's argument that plaintiffs' request for damages is 21 id. at 210. the seventh and eleventh circuits have developed sought "recovery of retirement benefits that [his original plan is necessary to compute plaintiff's damages is preempted by claims against hillyer do not concern whether dr. campbell's inc., 363 f.3d 556, 559 (5th cir. 2004). erisa � 502(a) provides f.3d 1482 (7th cir. 1996), identified the following three similar "vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on requested insurance. the client may recover from the agent bears the burden of demonstrating that a federal question exists. perkins, 898 f.2d at 473, and is not completely preempted by � plaintiff to enroll in an erisa group health insurance plan by plan. in blum, the beneficiary of a life insurance plan sued her (emphasis added). the difference in coverage functions as a trust, 463 u.s. 1, 9-10 (1983)). see also howery v. allstate ins. it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court's jurisdiction is and subject to removal. but only when erisa � 502(a) completely claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against his finding erisa did not preempt the plaintiff's claims, despite the court also finds instructive the decision in giannetti