Mother Sues Over IEP Efforts to Control Special Ed Student

federal rule of civil procedure 8(a)(2) "demands more than an unadorned, the- a special education teacher at the lincoln school abused her physically and superseded by statute and rule. official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the constitution requested an administrative hearing against the district, challenging the adequacy of held uniformly that reimbursement is barred where parents unilaterally arrange for inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise without notice to j.n., van der heiden completed the third grade at a catholic school in atwater, minnesota. she enrolled carlson, chair, willmar board of * appeal from the united states a free appropriate public education, because the student did not request a due process whenthisactioncommenced,c.n.,aspecialeducationstudent,attendedfourth instead, the complaint must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is warranted, because c.n. has not pleaded facts that plausibly support a reasonable which "guards and vindicates federal rights alone." doe v. gooden, 214 f.3d 952, c.n. contends that if this court adheres to the judicially-created notice power literally shocking to the conscience. against the individual defendants, in both their official and individual capacities, or additional factual allegations has been hampered by her communicative problems and do not even identify c.n. as the victim of the alleged mistreatment­rather, the appellees. * circumscribed," flowers, 478 f.3d at 875, and the pleading standard established by however, concerns events that allegedly occurred while c.n. was enrolled at lincoln in september 2006. ultimately, according to the complaint, the mde investigations submitted: june 11, 2009 official capacity, and van der heiden, leedom, lincoln principal rebecca simenson for denying the student's claim against his former district was not so limited. rather, c.n.alsocontendsthedistrictcourtignoredherabuseallegationsinconcluding qualified immunity on this claim as well. brockinton, 503 f.3d at 671-73.11 thus, we affirm dismissal of this claim too, in light of our resolution of c.n.'s case for reaching such issue today. as noted by justice ginsburg in her unanimous preconditions to relief. the second circuit observed, for example, that "courts have 3 (asd) in 2001. although the testing ruled out asd, further testing revealed c.n. had accepted practice." and although j.n. contends she objected to the use of those c.n. also contends she should be allowed to proceed with her idea claim, not request a hearing to challenge the education provided by the district until after we first address c.n.'s challenge to the dismissal of her idea claim against the guardian, j.n., * her claims under § 1983 for violations of her right to procedural due process and her . . . .'" mcvay v. sisters of mercy health sys., 399 f.3d 904, 909 (8th cir. 2005) in error, because van der heiden (1) used those methods excessively and punitively, ashcroft v. iqbal, 129 s. ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (third alteration in original) (quoting hearing and filed a complaint with the mde, challenging the adequacy of the resolved by the court, and the decision is therefore not controlling on this question. the hearing be held in the "district responsible for assuring that an appropriate -14- reported van der heiden to the minnesota department of education's (mde) shade, 309 f.3d at 1059 (quoting vernonia sch. dist. 47j v. acton, 515 u.s. 646, 656 court's opinion, however, refers to paragraphs in the complaint that discuss the 1998), the administrative law judge (alj) granted the district's motion to dismiss fit to remove the pupil from the district into a private school. then, after removing affirmed dismissal of m.p.'s idea claim under thompson. id. at 979-81. applying concluded c.n.'s idea claim failed under thompson, 144 f.3d 574, because she did individual and official capacities. as relevant to this appeal, c.n. asserted federal bath junkie, inc., 528 f.3d 556, 559-60 (8th cir. 2008) (quoting huelsman v. civic claims against willmar public schools, independent school district no. 347 (the is not preserved." id. at 579. rather, "[s]ubsequent challenges to the student's we agree with the district court that any such seizures were not unreasonable. we disabilities education act ("idea"), 20 u.s.c. § 1415(b)(6), (f), (i)(2)(a). c.n. v. * and fourteenth amendment violations. as relevant to this appeal, c.n. asserted -11- 2 amendment violation because c.n.'s iep authorized the use of restraints and rights under the idea, section 504 and the equal protection clause. decision, however, deals only with the facts of this action, ante, at 9 n.8, and does not student. id. the idea also provides certain "procedural safeguards to permit district receives notice, it has the opportunity to address the alleged problem." id. -9- no. 08-3019 to similar exceptions. concluded van der heiden violated a number of c.n.'s rights as a child with a golden v. anders, 324 f.3d 650 (8th cir. 2003); wise v. pea ridge sch. dist., 855 with thompson v. board of special school district no. 1, 144 f.3d 574 (8th cir. after continued behavioral problems, the district and j.n. agreed c.n. should be against a student "does not effect a seizure of the student under the fourth process may file suit in state or federal court. id. at 979-80. see also 20 u.s.c. § agreement"). thompson is best understood as applying a similar equitable failure to exhaust, but limits her remaining arguments to her constitutional claims. heiden, leedom, smith and simenson.9 the concurring opinion suggests establishment of an "equitable" exception to thompson arguments. the idea seeks to ensure that all disabled children receive a free appropriate opinion for the court in union pacific railroad co. v. brotherhood of locomotive (8th cir. 2008) (citing 20 u.s.c. § 1415(l)). after dismissing c.n.'s idea claim, the against atwater if she believes her educational needs are not currently being met.6 physical harm or serious emotional harm to the student. she notes that when excessively and also mistreated c.n. for example, van der heiden allegedly made face restraint or seclusion. van der heiden also allegedly yelled and shouted at c.n., formulated given the statutory mandates considered in thompson, there is clearly no hearing. so, whether or not an equitable exception to the rule can be validly before us in this litigation. according to the complaint, an allegedly offending teacher to report a teacher's alleged abuse of students as required by a state child abuse ___________ fourteenth amendments. the district court concluded c.n.'s idea claim failed as unilaterally, bereft of any attempt to achieve a negotiated compromise and concluded c.n.'s idea claim failed as a matter of law because the district was no other courts have recognized, however, that because equitable considerations are c.n. may, of course, proceed with her state claims, which were dismissed without yet still an action without the system's agreement, and transfers made truly c.n. on two previous occasions in 2005 and 2006, the district had conducted similar education, in his representative * district court for the complaint simply asserts that on unspecified dates and under circumstances not miener ex rel. miener v. missouri, 800 f.2d 749, 754 (8th cir. 1986). s. ct. 452 (2009). relying on thompson and the applicable statute, the district court addressing her special needs. the iep was created through the collaborative efforts behaviors. during later evaluations, ardhoff recommended against seclusion, and supervisor of special education, in her * returned to lincoln on october 2, 2006. she remained at lincoln until october 6, idea claim.8 enhancement'" does not plausibly establish entitlement to relief under any theory. responsible for her education. rather, by the time c.n. requested a hearing against -5- dissatisfaction with their child's iep [individualized education plan]." m.c. ex rel. in this case, an administrative law judge for the state of minnesota dismissed c.n.'s notice requirement should apply in cases of likely physical or serious emotional harm. inference that continued enrollment at the willmar school during the course of a due she has done so, pointing again to her allegations that van der heiden physically and elementary, another district school, in january 2004. c.n.'s iep and bip were also emotional harm. see ante, at 9 n.8; aschroft v. iqbal, 129 s. ct. 1937, 1949-50 variety of ways. such vague allegations neither provide the appellees with fair notice added).5 thecourt'sopinioncorrectlyobserves,however,thattherationaleofthompson district before or after leaving that district. we disagree. as the thompson court minnesota, for the remainder of her third grade year. j.n. enrolled c.n. in the previous education become moot because the new school district is responsible for thompson, we concluded that "[i]f a student changes school districts and does not f.3d at 560. accordingly, we grant appellees' motion to strike pages 1-41 of the lincoln. on november 29, 2006, leedom wrote j.n. and informed her that leedom relating to the use of restraints and seclusion. assuming c.n. was seized within the 4 procedures authorized in c.n.'s bip, and recorded the incidents in behavioral and grounds. shefailedtoallegeafourthamendmentviolation,andsuggeststhoseallegationsstate the thompson rule. our opinion for the court, however, deals only with the facts personal and representative capacities; * 8 district), several officials affiliated with the district and her former special education emotionally during that time, and that the school district deprived her of the free because these documents were presented for the first time on appeal, "they are not when thompson was decided, the minnesota statute implementing the idea express requirement that a student provide notice to a school district, or request a due 1. individual appellees demeaned and belittled c.n., once pulled c.n.'s hair when she would not hold a idea. f.3d at 1252. for these reasons, the district court correctly concluded van der principles­it too requires that any hearing be held in the district currently responsible 1415(b)(6), (f) & (i)(2)(a). c.n.'s time at lincoln, however, the iep team continually adjusted her iep, and at all accident. c.n. also reported to j.n. that van der heiden "choke[d] her and that the incidents or resulting injuries. "[t]he scope of substantive due process is carefully c.n.'s time under her care, van der heiden used those techniques improperly and claim." c.n. broadly asserts that the district court erred in dismissing this claim for -12- to the child," or, in the discretion of the court, where compliance with the notice . . . so severe . . . so disproportionate to the need presented, and . . . so i. background the use of restraint holds and seclusion when c.n. exhibited various target behaviors. "this court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, taking all facts parental involvement in all matters concerning the child's educational program and [to c.n. also challenges the dismissal of her § 1983 claims against the district. which the student is enrolled. minn. stat. § 125a.091, subd. 12. under the present (2009); bell atl. corp. v. twombly, 550 u.s. 544, 555-57 (2007). the court's j.n. thereafter repeatedly contacted defendant kathryn leedom, district "intolerable situation" he endured through informal means, they did not request a due condition to school authorities. 326 f.3d at 977-81. although his parents engaged in found evidence that van der heiden denied c.n. access to the restroom but attributed van der heiden did engage in maltreatment. the preceding sentence in the district f.3d 168, 171-72 (3d cir. 2001) (concluding the momentary use of force by a teacher to that end, the idea "provides federal money to state and local education agencies do not consider them. see ante at n.4. 6 cloth," and that we should abandon it. it is true that the statute does not include an -8- failed to stop that conduct. the delinquent district if the student wishes to preserve his or her right to challenge the * the student's parents and which they are statutorily required to follow." couture, 535 2006, but was not at school the following week and had no further contact with c.n. allow] parents to obtain administrative and judicial review of decisions they deem restraints hurt her very much." investigations but found no misconduct by van der heiden. this time, the district educ., 535 f.3d 1243, 1250-52 (10th cir. 2008); shade v. city of farmington, 309 see m.p., 326 f.3d at 980-81. although the facts in m.p. might have supported an willmar public schools from kindergarten through the third grade. she alleges that c. constitutional claims district, c.n. had an individualized education program (iep) geared toward leaving the district. c.n. contends that ruling was in error because recent changes to reimbursement for private school placement. see 20 u.s.c. § 1412(a)(10)(c)(iii). she has no complaints regarding her current educational situation. in the atwater public school district for the fourth grade in the fall of 2007. in 2. the district ___________ process hearing under the idea was likely to result in physical harm or serious appellant, * requirement of thompson, then the court should recognize an exception when a argument for an exception to thompson, the point was not raised by the appellant or and "must be held in the district responsible for ensuring that [a fape] is provided." (alterations in original) (quoting monell v. dep't of soc. servs., 436 u.s. 658, 690 had no obligation to provide that information to j.n. j.n. subsequently withdrew her colloton, circuit judge, concurring. daughter from lincoln and enrolled her at st. john's, a private school in atwater, a communications disorder and attentional and hyperactivity problems. ultimately, dismissed c.n.'s claim under the idea on the same ground. notwithstanding her failure to request a hearing before leaving the district, because i agree with the court, on this record, that no exception to thompson is difficult position if we did not allow them "to rely on a plan specifically approved by failed to stop that conduct. the district court concluded c.n. failed to allege a fourth statute also included exceptions. notice is not required for private school 570; see also id. at 565 n.10 (disapproving of factual allegations which fail to mention c.n., by and through her mother, j.n., appeals the dismissal of various federal golden,324f.3dat652-53(firstalterationadded)(quotationomitted). c.n.contends grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a the incident to a lapse in judgment. thus, van der heiden was never disciplined by elementary school within the district in willmar, minnesota, where c.n. attended requirement "would likely result in serious emotional harm to the child." 20 u.s.c. thompson also reasoned that "[t]he purpose of requesting a due process hearing is to iep team). c.n.'s iep included a behavior intervention plan (bip), which authorized the district, atwater had already assumed responsibility for providing c.n. with an "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." twombly, 550 provided that such hearings "shall be 'initiated and conducted by and in the school her fourteenth amendment right to substantive due process. the district court district for any maltreatment. thus, we think the court simply meant to indicate the minnesota. claims under the individuals with disabilities education act (idea), section 504 of support services. after the evaluation, the district transferred c.n. to lincoln until after she left willmar and enrolled in school at atwater. the district court request a due process hearing, his or her right to challenge prior educational services v. twombly, 550 u.s. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). c.n. does not challenge the dismissal of her idea or section 504 claims c.n. sit at a "thinking desk" and hold a physical posture for a specified time, or else lisa van der heiden, in her personal * the act." m.p. v. indep. sch. dist. no. 721, 326 f.3d 975, 979 (8th cir. 2003). the honorable david s. doty, united states district judge for the district of relevant to fashioning relief under the idea, see sch. comm. of burlington v. dep't appendix and any corresponding facts and arguments in appellant's briefs. the hearing request for lack of jurisdiction because c.n. was no longer enrolled in the however, and not the fourth amendment. see, e.g., doe v. gooden, 214 f.3d 952, theywerenotconstitutionallyunreasonable. onappeal,c.n.contendsthatrulingwas conclude the individual appellees are entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity j.n. allegedly continued to object to the use of restraints and seclusion. throughout plausible on its face." id. at 570. states and local agencies implement the substantive and procedural requirements of recognized, the hearing process is in place to ensure that a "disabled child's the fact she has not been provided complete access to the district's records. we are, (1995)). district and had transferred to atwater without requesting a hearing against the district's internal investigation revealed no wrongdoing by van der heiden. rule on an appropriate set of facts. nor does the decision in m.p. ex rel. k. v. seclusion and we agree with the district court that the iep "set the standard for a litigant may state a fourth amendment violation by alleging facts which see webster v. fall, 266 u.s. 507, 511 (1925) ("questions which merely lurk in the 11 school from midway through kindergarten to midway through her third grade year. request a due process hearing under the idea while still enrolled in the allegedly seizuresbyseizing,restraining,secluding and confining c.n., and the other appellees assaulted by his classmates after a district employee disclosed his mental health 7 c.n. appealed that ruling to the district court,2 violations of her fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and challenge an aspect of a child's education and to put the school district on notice of dismissed those claims as to the district after concluding the complaint failed to mde's investigations, the district placed van der heiden on leave and conducted its times, places, or persons involved in the specified events, and noting that a defendant ___________ formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." bell atl. corp. -6- pursue these equitable remedies. i concur on the understanding that the parameters held in the district "responsible for ensuring that a [fape] is provided") (emphases due process violation. finding no error, we affirm. state's care is reasonable if his or her actions are "not a substantial departure from where compliance with the notice requirement "would likely result in physical harm 1 congress, in the context of private school reimbursement, "codif[ied] the previously district's investigations and allege that van der heiden was never disciplined by the c.n. also argues that van der heiden's use of those procedures sometimes need not include detailed factual allegations, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the -16- ___________ u.s. at 570. c.n.'s vague allegations fall far short of that standard. of a child's education and to put the school district on notice of a perceived problem. filed: january 7, 2010 (corrected 1/11/10) during c.n.'s third grade year (the 2006-07 school year), a paraprofessional accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards." heidemann v. rother, 84 seclusion to manage her behavior and thus, even if such actions amounted to seizures, and representative capacities, * while attending lincoln, c.n. worked with defendant lisa van der heiden, district in which the student previously was enrolled. see minn. r. 3525.4110, subp. revised to incorporate some of ardhoff's suggestions. ardhoff did not specifically record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be maltreatment of minors division for maltreatment of c.n. this was the third such district no. 1, 144 f.3d 574, 578-79 (8th cir. 1998), that a minnesota student did not over j.n.'s alleged objections and despite the fact ardhoff did not recommend the -19- b. fourteenth amendment this court held in thompson ex rel. buckhanon v. board of the special school school in the district. because c.n.'s iep authorized such methods, van der heiden's report made against van der heiden. j.n. learned of those allegations in august it is immaterial whether a student requests a due process hearing against a particular offending school district, this court has not considered the appropriateness of an private educational services without ever notifying the school board of their to the extent c.n. suggests her september 2006 complaint to the mde united states court of appeals conscience" standard to claims alleging excessive force by public school officials) recommend the use of restraint holds or seclusion. over j.n.'s alleged objections, a matter of law because she did not request a hearing on her claims against the district we now turn to whether c.n. has adequately pleaded a substantive due process 955 (8th cir. 2000) (noting that physical abuse by a teacher might amount to a willmar public schools, independent * for the eighth circuit minnesota law has changed since thompson, and it now provides that a due (quotation omitted). accordingly, we agree with the district court that c.n. failed to state claims against the district, district board chairman michael carlson in his student shows that continued enrollment in the school district likely would result in our prior precedents in this case, we are likewise bound to affirm dismissal of c.n.'s claim under the idea based on thompson, because c.n. did not file her complaint was educationally separated from the pupil almost two months before the parent saw claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction over her state providing a due process hearing." id. accord m.p., 326 f.3d at 979-81; smith v. 5 v. city of sherwood, 503 f.3d 667, 671 (8th cir. 2007). because we agree with the of the thompson rule in this context remain open for consideration. therefore resolve this claim below, in our discussion of c.n.'s § 1983 claim against c.n., on her own behalf and by and * a. fourth amendment have held that an authorized professional's treatment of a disabled person within the reporting statute did not amount to "unconstitutional misconduct"). moreover, to the communication logs she kept for her students. the complaint alleges that during -4- constitutional violation if it was "literally shocking to the conscience"); see also the educational services provided by the district. like the alj, the district court minn. stat. § 125a.091, subd. 12(a) (2008) (emphasis added); see also m.m. v. of the circumstances, however, mccoy, 342 f.3d at 848, and "[c]ontext is [therefore] critical to reasonableness analysis." couture, 535 f.3d at 1251. and in a school b. idea claim claim. to do so, c.n. must allege actions by a government official which "violated until after leaving the district. the court also dismissed c.n.'s remaining federal plausibly establish c.n.'s entitlement to any relief. twombly, 550 u.s. at 555 n.3, case law suggests otherwise.7 educational services provided by the district. relying on a line of cases beginning raise the appropriateness of an iep in a timely manner," m.c., 226 f.3d at 69 n.9, the for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of c.n.'s federal claims. the pupil from the district, the parent waited ten months to request a due process methods, she did not request a hearing to challenge those methods while c.n. attended superintendent, and asked to be notified if and when van der heiden returned to -20- § 1412(a)(10)(c)(iv). c.n. argues that the equitable thompson rule should be subject foreclosetherecognitionofanequitable exception to the judicially-createdthompson public education (fape) designed to meet their needs. 20 u.s.c. § 1400(d)(1)(a). allege a fourth amendment violation, and the individual defendants are entitled to described, van der heiden allegedly mistreated unidentified disabled children in a setting, "[t]he fourth amendment's reasonableness inquiry . . . must account for 'the contemporary conscience." flowers v. city of minneapolis, 478 f.3d 869, 873 (8th 3525.4110. disagree, as "[v]iolations of state law do not state a claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983," an immediate transfer was necessary for her physical and psychological safety. our * -18- c.n. also asserted a claim against the district for a violation of her rights under allegations set forth in c.n.'s complaint do not plausibly state a claim for a violation process hearing, as a precondition to obtaining equitable relief, except in the case of through her parent and natural * verbally abused the disabled children in her care, and the other individual defendants constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." brockinton representative capacities; susan smith, * c.n., however, did not request a due process hearing while the district was turning first to c.n.'s fourth amendment claim, the complaint alleges, in teacher lisa van der heiden. we affirm. on october 17, 2007, c.n., by and through j.n., requested an administrative mrs. c, 226 f.3d 60, 68 (2d cir. 2000); see also town of burlington v. dep't of educ. district responsible for assuring that an appropriate program is provided.'" 144 f.3d 9 the district court stated "[u]ltimately, the district dismissed the maltreatment c.n. argues that the notice requirement of thompson is created "out of whole arising from deficiencies in c.n.'s prior education). under these circumstances, we beam, circuit judge. alleging that the willmar school district denied her a free appropriate public education * ______________________________ nor are we persuaded by c.n.'s related argument regarding minnesota rule minnesota law have rendered thompson invalid. we disagree. c.n. was born in march 1998 and was tested for autism spectrum disorder indeed, as the tenth circuit recently observed, we would place educators in a very methods; and (2) also verbally and physically abused c.n. hearing do not suffice for exhaustion purposes." weber v. cranston sch. comm., 212 ___________ rebecca simenson, principal, in her * city of monticello, 411 f.3d 920, 922 (8th cir. 2005). [s]ubstantive due process is concerned with violations of personal rights on appeal, c.n. suggests thompson is no longer good law after the statutory thompson, 144 f.3d at 580. we note, however, that c.n. indicated in her brief that f.2d 560, 564-65 (8th cir. 1988); accord gottlieb v. laurel highlands sch. dist., 272 iii. conclusion one or more fundamental constitutional rights" and were "shocking to the excessive force by public school officials under the rubric of substantive due process, ctr. corp., 873 f.2d 1171, 1175 (8th cir. 1989)); see also fed. r. app. p. 10(a). section 504 of the rehabilitation act. "the idea exhaustion requirement applies to does not state a viable substantive due process claim. some of the abuse allegations special sch. dist., no. 1, 184 f.3d 764, 767-68 (8th cir. 1999). under the version of exception to the notice requirement where continued enrollment likely would result of the nature of c.n.'s claims and the grounds upon which those claims rest nor however, c.n.'s bip continued to authorize such procedures to address certain target -3- recognized discretion of a court to reduce or bar reimbursement where parents fail to claims brought under section 504 . . . to the extent that those claims seek relief that is appropriate education geared toward addressing her specific needs (including any and facts before the district court and thus only those papers and exhibits filed in the the statute in effect at the time of thompson, the applicable statute reflects these begin."). and even those allegations that are specific to c.n. are little more than educational services provided by that district. district court also dismissed this claim as "little more than [a] rehash [of the] idea state a cause of action against a school district under the idea for failing to provide a perceived problem." 144 f.3d at 579. the court explained that "[o]nce the school indicate a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable. see mccoy v. city of own investigation into allegations that she mistreated two students, one of whom was educational needs are being met by the student's school district." 144 f.3d at 578. a. standard of review monticello, 342 f.3d 842, 846 (8th cir. 2003). moreover, the fourth amendment's asserts that she left the lincoln school in november 2006 to avoid further abuse, and district to avoid physical or serious emotional harm, or (2) remain in an abusive grade in the atwater public school district in atwater, minnesota. this action, -10- for mass., 736 f.2d 773, 799 (1st cir. 1984) (recognizing a reasonable distinction of the local education agency, teachers, parents and behavioral service providers (the law claims.3 this appeal follows.4 contravened state special education rules and was therefore unconstitutional. we repeated discussions with school authorities and otherwise tried to remedy the the statute applicable to this case, due process hearings are "conducted by the state" independent school district no. 721, 326 f.3d 975 (8th cir. 2003), preclude an extent c.n. relies on facts not before the district court in making those arguments, we which requires that a student request a due process hearing before transferring from program is provided"); minn. stat. § 125a.091, subd. 12(a) (requiring the hearing be agree with the district court that c.n.'s idea claim fails but she may request a hearing "'[t]he touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that personal and representative capacities; * noting she alleged the mde conducted the maltreatment investigation and concluded essence, that van der heiden violated c.n.'s right to be free from unreasonable of educ. of mass., 471 u.s. 359, 374 (1985), the courts also may establish equitable -13- warrant to answer a question that may [or may not] be consequential in another case." october 2007, c.n. filed a complaint with the minnesota department of education the rehabilitation act and 42 u.s.c. § 1983 for violations of the fourth and -17- -7- hearing to resolve the matter, and the party aggrieved by the outcome of the hearing schools'custodial and tutelary responsibility'overthestudentsentrustedtotheircare." governmental actor in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental qualified immunity protects individual state impairment. thus, during kindergarten at jefferson elementary, a school within the process hearing must be conducted by the state rather than by the school district in (1978)). because c.n. has not alleged a violation of her constitutional rights, it and asserted various federal and immunity because c.n. failed to allege either a fourth amendment or a substantive district court can constitute the record on appeal.'" bath junkie branson, l.l.c. v. congress contemplated that a student in that situation must either (1) forfeit equitable twombly, 550 u.s. at 555, 557). judged against these standards, c.n.'s complaint amendment. specifically, because the state now conducts all hearings, c.n. suggests reimbursement where the public school prevented the parent from providing notice, -15- a claim for excessive force. this circuit has generally analyzed claims alleging in her appendix, c.n. has included two administrative decisions which are not cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). we bear in mind, however, that although a complaint after all, "'[t]he purpose of requesting a due process hearing is to challenge an aspect alleged in the complaint as true." owen v. gen. motors corp., 533 f.3d 913, 918 (8th once the school district receives notice, it has the opportunity to address the alleged c.n. was designated as developmentally delayed with speech and language in order to assist them in educating handicapped children on the condition that the -2- assessed by tim ardoff, an outside evaluator from southern minnesota community in physical harm or serious emotional harm to the child. it seems unlikely that atwater public school district for the 2007-08 school year. in sum, while thompson creates an equitable requirement that a student must of her substantive due process rights, and the individual defendants are entitled to district court that c.n. failed to allege a violation of her constitutional rights, we use of those and similar methods like the thinking desk, even if overzealous at times and not recommended by ardhoff, was not a substantial departure from accepted we first consider the allegations against the individual appellees van der hearing under § 1415(f) until after he left the district and enrolled in another school. meaning of the fourth amendment when van der heiden employed those methods, amendment" and collecting cases applying the fourteenth amendment's "shocks the superintendent in her personal and * have authority to order a former school district to provide equitable relief, see minn. engineers, 130 s. ct. 584, 596 (2009), in the absence of a live issue there is "no heiden's use of those procedures did not violate c.n.'s fourth amendment rights. cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). this is a high standard, as appropriate public education to which she is entitled under the individuals with 2(a)(3). to the extent that thompson rested on the lack of authority for a new school protections extend to actions by public school officials. see, e.g., couture v. bd. of also available under the idea." m.y. v. special sch. dist. no. 1, 544 f.3d 885, 888 process hearing until after removing their son from the delinquent district and we ii. discussion services to make up for the educational deprivations that she allegedly suffered. see seeking to respond to such "conclusory" allegations "would have little idea where to unsatisfactory or inappropriate." id. thus, a parent who is dissatisfied with certain environment that is likely to result in physical or serious emotional harm in order to special sch. dist. no. 1, 512 f.3d 455, 460 & n.4 (8th cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 r. 3525.4110, subp. 2(a)(3), the "notice" rationale of thompson still prevails. see prejudice by the district court. however, bound by the supreme court's directive that a complaint must contain 10 c.n. also challenges the dismissal of her 42 u.s.c. § 1983 claims for fourth identify an unconstitutional district policy or custom that caused the alleged injuries. dismissed c.n.'s fourth amendment claim. we first consider c.n.'s allegations disability and also maltreated c.n. by denying her access to the restroom. during the * qualified immunity on this claim. see brockinton, 503 f.3d at 671-73. consideration that requires notice to the school district of an alleged deficiency, and defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." iqbal, 129 s. ct. at 1949. the vague district to order relief from a former school district, that rationale likely has been school district no. 347; michael * the district for any maltreatment allegations.1 remedies to which the child is entitled under the idea by leaving the offending c.n. was a special education student at the lincoln elementary school in the applying those principles here, we conclude the district court properly as the supreme court has recently reiterated, however, "[a] pleading that offers a special education teacher. van der heiden sometimes used the controlled confirms that state and federal complaint procedures other than the idea due process f.3d 41, 53 (1st cir. 2000). nor does the filing of such a complaint satisfy thompson, substantively, for example, school districts must develop an iep for each disabled entity itself." brockinton v. city of sherwood, 503 f.3d 667, 674 (8th cir. 2007). we judgment,practiceorstandardsandwasnotunreasonableintheconstitutionalsense.10 m.m. ex rel. l.r. v. special sch. dist. no. 1, 512 f.3d 455, 460-61 (8th cir. 2008). an opportunity to resolve the problem, before a student may obtain relief under the for the student's education. see former minn. stat. § 120.17, subd. 3b(e) (requiring longer responsible for providing c.n. with a fape when she requested the hearing. before melloy, beam and colloton, circuit judges. actors from liability under § 1983 unless they violate "clearly established statutory or and supervisor of special education programming susan smith, in both their district. as noted above, after transferring to the atwater public school system, c.n. considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents."). capacity; kathryn leedom, * district of minnesota. provided the district with adequate notice of her claim, we disagree. "the case law the district. even though a hearing officer acting on behalf of the state of minnesota now may posture at the thinking desk and once denied c.n. use of the restroom, causing an allegations against van der heiden," which c.n. vigorously contests on appeal, follows that the district cannot be liable under § 1983. see id.; see also mccoy v. exception to thompson. the court in m.p. never considered how the thompson f.3d 1021, 1030 (8th cir. 1996). here, c.n.'s iep authorized the use of restraints and 955 (8th cir. 2000) (quotation omitted) (concluding school district officials' failure 2006, and filed a complaint with the mde's accountability and compliance division the court further concluded the individual defendants were entitled to qualified in m.p., a student was verbally harassed and physically [merely] 'labels and conclusions'" or "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual a part of the record below. "'an appellate court can properly consider only the record at 578 (emphasis added) (quoting former minn. stat. § 120.17, subd. 3b(e)). and in general assertions of harm, lacking elaboration as to the context of the alleged under the idea while she attended lincoln. she sought compensatory education excess of zeal that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official problem.'" m.m., 512 f.3d at 460 (quoting thompson, 144 f.3d at 579). and like f.3d 1054, 1059-62 (8th cir. 2002). reasonableness is judged in light of the totality district. carlson was named in his representative capacity only, and "[a] suit against a "between a unilateral parental transfer madeafter consultation with the school system, system, the state presumably has authority to order compensatory relief from a school relevant times, the iep authorized controlled procedures. we are not unsympathetic to c.n.'s arguments that her ability to provide aspects of a child's special education may request an administrative due process part of the record for our review," and we cannot consider them. bath junkie, 528