Fired Teacher Unsuccessful in Regaining Job

the illinois administrative review laws in gilbert's case on the matter. court is the proper tribunal to entertain that argument. a affected by the provisions, if that someone is not the the problem is that neither the district court nor this remand, and both the state-court judge and the federal appellate court's mandate that the isbe was "to reinstate complaint, he filed a two-count amended complaint on third amended complaint for declaratory relief. in order an abuse of discretion. tamayo v. blagojevich, 526 f.3d 1074, fms, inc. v. volvo const. equipment north america, inc., 557 gilbert worked as a social studies teacher at palatine concerned that these remand instructions left no room for thus, gilbert concludes, judge dow erred when he did appellate court itself, not to go down the street to followed up on the suggestion, but the isbe rebuffed him, gilbert's claim for declaratory relief. later, on october 20, a month later, gilbert sought leave to file a four-count rejected gilbert's argument that the "law of the case" free to entertain claims that are independent of any behind the court's decision to deny gilbert leave to file sented its evidence over the course of 40 days. after the (2005); johnson v. orr, 551 f.3d 564, 568 (7th cir. 2008). appeal from the united states district court review of the hearing officer's order in the circuit court of the present case. after voluntarily dismissing his initial the remainder of gilbert's arguments turn on the in perspective that occurs when it is the appellate court doctrine barred gilbert's claims no matter what form of of his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. may 23, 2005. the complaint named as defendants the a declaratory judgment. gilbert took advantage of this exercising de novo review, we must decide only whether that point (which flows from the fact that whatever ambiguity there may have been in the state's process claim, albeit unsuccessfully, in his petition to but whether that ruling was correct." id. at 503. the issues robert gilbert, midway through litigation; in general, the successor judge a second amended complaint raising essentially the duty to enforce federal law. u.s. const. art. vi, cl. 2. the vene his hearing so that he could present his side of the precise issue that is before the successor judge. see construed the scope of the remand. that was redressable, since subsequent events had cured review the decisions of state courts in civil cases. see because the due process rights on which he relies are 1081 (7th cir. 2008); st. john's united church of christ v. defendants-appellees. istrative hearing convened by the illinois state board of a state court failed to remedy"). moreover, because for the northern district of illinois, eastern division. district rested its case, gilbert filed a motion for "judgment amended complaint but granted him a chance to file a wrong, and if rescinding it would not cause undue harm district court erred by assuming that it did. properly order. he argued that further proceedings were necessary in the district court. in dismissing or rejecting each com- injunction to reconvene his hearing without effectively successor [district] judges are "significantly less con- law-of-the-case doctrine. looking at matters from the is discouraged from reconsidering the decisions of the relief he sought, the court denied gilbert's motion on 460 u.s. 462, 486 (1983). gilbert appeals to this court and gilbert was convinced that the district lacked adequate (7th cir. 1996). there are limits, however, to the reach of claim and sought an injunction to reconvene the adminis- right one. since gilbert has not challenged the correctness discretionary review from that court. this petition was no. 08-3678 3 jurisdiction on the federal courts for a particular set of issue a declaratory judgment "because someone may be the district's discharge of gilbert. believing that the illinois education ("isbe"). pursuant to the illinois school code, no. 08-3678 11 all nations church v. city of chicago, 486 f.3d 286, 292-94 an exception to the rooker-feldman doctrine that allows forbidden by rooker-feldman. this rationale also lay it clear that judicial review of the original order was at the court explained, flowed directly from the illinois had alleged that this wide group of defendants had tenured position at a state administrative hearing. in the ing suit in federal court in order effectively to set aside same claims. 600, 605-06 (7th cir. 2008); lynk v. laporte superior law are challenged the question is not whether the second contests the issue of standing and the applicability decision on the alternate ground offered by the hearing order on remand, and so the illinois appellate court of its order and in his petition for leave to appeal with the hearing, the school district proceeded first and pre- appellate court meant only to return matters to the all that remains is for us to address gilbert's argument we review the former de novo, and the latter only for trative hearing. count ii requested similar injunctive relief the federal court. courts review judgments, not opinions, constitution. the appellate court denied gilbert's petition. moved from judge guzm�n to judge dow.) defendants appellate court judges. count i asserted a due process it from exercising jurisdiction over gilbert's claim for in illinois state court. cf. kelly, 548 f.3d at 606-07; beth-el though the circuit court left open the possibility for nor focused on justiciability. nothing in the law-of-the-case enough to demonstrate that gilbert did have a made by state administrative agencies. see verizon mary- * * * charged gilbert on july 12, 1995, citing his insubordination, 10 no. 08-3678 administrative agency, then in state court, and finally "reasonable opportunity" to pursue his due process claim 1-11-10 question. united states court of appeals gilbert turned instead to the federal courts and initiated i 644 n.3 (2002). high school, which was run by the board of education of see 28 u.s.c. � 1257; hemmer v. indiana state bd. of classroom, he continually sparred with colleagues and proceedings were not legally required. see orr, 551 f.3d at tional." kamilewicz v. bank of boston corp., 92 f.3d 506, 510 reviewing what happened before the district court. as feldman principle prevents a state-court loser from bring- this fundamental objection to gilbert's complaint. cf. f.3d 1219, 1227 (7th cir. 1995)). since judge guzm�n a creature of federal law and (he thinks) must be adjudi- jurisdictional questions." o'sullivan v. city of chicago, 396 doctrine therefore barred judge dow from addressing of a case without discussing jurisdiction does not bind chance by granting him leave to file a one-count third mandate the court had been given from the appellate court. cook county. on april 17, 2002, the circuit court rejected read, gilbert asserts (relying on coalfield coal co. v. peck, before us are exclusively questions of law, and thus, are applicable when a case is transferred to a new judge time as a result of an appellate court decision). this is argument is doomed. judge dow correctly pointed out that township high school district 211 (the "district"). while exxon mobil corp. v. saudi indus. corp., 544 u.s. 280, 283-84 f.3d 758, 762-63 (7th cir. 2009). here, judge guzm�n problem is the circuit court's order implementing the administrative code are void for vagueness. after gilbert we noted in williams v. c.i.r., 1 f.3d 502 (7th cir. 1993), appellate court's decision. that court had ruled that the court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitu- relating to the amenability of various defendants to suit, before a final judgment was possible, and that an immedi- nity to appeal as a matter of right to the illinois supreme (quoting avitia v. metropolitan club of chicago, inc., 49 gilbert took another bite at the apple and filed his third 2007, judge guzm�n denied gilbert leave to file a second district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss except reversing the appellate court's decision that further b rule on the merits of the district's decision to fire gilbert. to the party that had benefitted from it." hk systems, inc. structure of the parallel judicial systems in the united second amended complaint. this time gilbert added the does not bar "a federal claim alleging a prior injury that dunne, 829 f.2d 1387, 1399 (7th cir. 1987)). in addition to for the most part, this case turns on the rooker-feldman the state-court judgment. see exxon mobil, 544 u.s. at 284. the ultimate result reached in the district court was the lacked standing to seek declaratory relief. judge dow states, gilbert argues that his case is independent of the not afforded a "reasonable opportunity" to raise their deprived him of his due process rights by failing to recon- there is a second reason why gilbert's law-of-the-case without any further administrative proceedings. with that illinois state board of education, et al., to understand this issue, a little background is in order. case could accept gilbert's due process claim and issue an his acrimonious relationship with his colleagues, and his v. animal health, 532 f.3d 610, 613 (7th cir. 2008). the rooker- mately from the district's decision, his immediate state court--the circuit court of cook county--has gilbert finds this result harsh, because his evidence was appellate court's order foreclosed any further administra- the illinois supreme court. although both of these peti- jurisdictional questions must always be addressed), it is (noting that a court's decision that addresses the merits future courts' jurisdictional analysis). judge dow con- denied on march 24, 2004. curiously, gilbert did not try credit statute, 28 u.s.c. � 1738, to the ordinary rules of after the district discharged gilbert on july 12, 1995, gilbert to address his request to the isbe, the judge made tions were cursorily denied, gilbert passed up his opportu- state court actions and thus not barred by rooker-feldman, on appeal, gilbert challenges the dismissal of his before easterbrook,chief judge,and posner and wood, the district filed a complaint seeking administrative appropriate. (this was the point at which the case was and ordered his reinstatement. no. 08-3678 9 case. gilbert did not file an appeal from the circuit court's tember 7, 2004, that court issued an order reinstating stating that it no longer retained jurisdiction over the granted that motion and dismissed the case. decision. nor did gilbert ever file a petition for a writ of the due process claim in gilbert's amended complaint see fed. r. civ. pro. 50(a). on april 2, 2001, the hearing review of state court judgments only to the supreme court. no. 08-3678 certiorari with the united states supreme court. one of the bases for reinstatement, but it affirmed the the proceedings should be reopened, and it rejected relevant evidence on his behalf. 105 ilcs 5/24-12 (2006). at exception, however, cannot help him. he presented his due strained by the law of the case doctrine with respect to but gilbert's argument loses sight of the critical shift for the sake of completeness, however, we note that the district's termination of gilbert from his employment." court no. 2, 789 f.2d 554, 564�65 (7th cir.1986). this at 486. these two decisions establish the proposi- of federal law, including questions of constitutional law. that position, finding that it would conflict with the supreme court has held that state-court judgments in and there is no way that a federal court in the present once strong and reasonable that the earlier ruling was argued september 11, 2009--decided january 11, 2010 court determinations, it presents no jurisdictional obstacle not presented at the agency hearing, and the state gilbert was entitled to present witnesses and any other relief on his due process claim would require the 6 no. 08-3678 gilbert's remedy was to seek further clarification from the plaintiff-appellant, attorneys' fees, and any other form of relief the court found also true that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not come claims in state court. see kelly v. med-1 solutions, 548 f.3d cated in federal court. but that is not how the system betraying a fundamental misunderstanding about the against the district. in addition to resolving some issues neither approved gilbert's new complaint in advance gilbert invoked his right as a tenured teacher to an admin- tion that the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to plus a declaration that the illinois school code and courts (he asserts) did not squarely address his argument 2 no. 08-3678 4 no. 08-3678 rooker-feldman doctrine, absolute immunity, and a lack transferor judge. see brengettcy v. horton, 423 f.3d 674, 680 judge should have deferred to the ruling of the first judge, plaint, the district court (acting first through judge to judicial review of executive action, including decisions complaints. gilbert also attacks judge guzm�n's denial 12 no. 08-3678 status quo ante, before his hearing ever began. v. eaton corp., 553 f.3d 1086, 1089 (7th cir. 2009) "[a]t that point, if rulings by the district court on issues of � 1983 cases are subject, by virtue of the full faith and that court concluded that the appellate court meant to granted on september 24, 2008. it concluded that gilbert that the district court erred when it dismissed his state courts possess not only the authority but also the school officials. tired of the conflicts, the district dis- state court proceedings. see long v. shorebank dev. corp., isbe, the individual members of the isbe, the legal no. 08-3678 7 violated his due process rights. on march 30, 2007, the of rooker-feldman. we affirm. filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, which the court land, inc. v. public service com'n of maryland, 535 u.s. 635, ferred to judge dow. defendants soon thereafter filed a of the illinois appellate court's remand instructions. but current plaintiff." city of chicago, 502 f.3d 616, 625 (7th cir. 2007). cause to end his employment, and he fought to save his with regard to gilbert's claim for declaratory relief reconvening his administrative hearing, gilbert petitioned did not have standing to seek declaratory relief and declaratory relief, gilbert contends that judge guzm�n 415-16 (1923); district of columbia ct. of app. v. feldman, to use illinois supreme court rule 317, which permits court rule 315, which spells out the way to request see allen v. mccurry, 449 u.s. 90 (1980). such a holding that this amounted to a denial of due process. there is ii gilbert was widely regarded for his skills in the federal court as a practical matter to reverse the illinois already interpreted the appellate court's ruling, and of judge dow's ruling, there is nothing more we need say end, however, he was unsuccessful, first before the state amended complaint to seek a declaratory judgment. the rooker-feldman doctrine is concerned only with state october 30, 2007. nonetheless, it gave gilbert one last the court held that the rooker-feldman doctrine barred the appellate court for rehearing and clarification of the ate order confirming the end of his employment would motion in federal court for judgment as a matter of law. claim and issue preclusion in later federal-court cases. ever, that the isbe might reconvene the hearing if it 182 f.3d 548, 555 (7th cir. 1999) (noting that rooker-feldman wood, circuit judge. from 1978 until july 1995, robert tive proceedings, the judge denied gilbert's request to must have concluded that whatever gilbert came up reversed and remanded "with directions to reinstate the remand to the hearing officer. the court suggested, how- relying on rooker-feldman, the district court dismissed a claim for damages. concluding that the rooker-feldman guzm�n and later through judge dow) relied on the district's termination of gilbert from his employment." on remand. as gilbert reads the appellate decision, that illinois circuit court judge, and the two surviving illinois advisor to the isbe, the district, the state of illinois, the the circuit court had before it gilbert's argument that decision and the way that the circuit court implemented it arises for the first time as a result of an appellate court works. unless congress has chosen to confer exclusive cluded that gilbert's complaint failed to state an injury for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. recall that gilbert individual defendants in their official capacity and inserted perspective of the district court, law-of-the-case principles cases--and it has not done that here--either the federal or circuit judges. no. 08-3678 5 appealed to the illinois appellate court. that court violate his due process rights under the united states congress has granted the power to engage in appellate provisions of the illinois school code and the illinois in mind, the district court reasoned that granting gilbert court did not mean to preclude further proceedings on into play when the transferor judge never decided an end. this may have been an erroneous interpretation we affirm the judgment of the district court. in the gilbert then filed a petition for leave to appeal with plaintiffs to litigate in the federal system if they were officer. proceeding up the chain of review, the district amended complaint requesting declaratory relief, damages, proper interpretation of the illinois appellate court's jezierski v. mukasey, 543 f.3d 886, 888 (7th cir. 2008) amended complaint, judge guzm�n chose not to dismiss specifically permitted gilbert to file a complaint seeking 8 no. 08-3678 failure to complete a remediation plan. of standing. see rooker v. fidelity trust co., 263 u.s. 413, instead, the case returned to the circuit court. on sep- 105 ill. 529 (1883)), it is apparent that the illinois was never asked whether the circuit court had properly in review over a state court judgment, a federal court is transferor judge's decision only "if he has a conviction at injunctive relief. the state courts are competent to adjudicate questions this jurisdictional bar applies even though "the state (7th cir. 2007). gilbert contends that judge dow's ruling violated the concluded that it possessed the authority to do so. gilbert would be impossible if gilbert's position were correct. court. see ill. sup. ct. r. 317 (providing for appeals as a with in the new complaint was necessarily justiciable. third amended complaint limited solely to a claim for filed that iteration of the complaint, the case was trans- for the seventh circuit order ending gilbert's employment was to be reinstated no. 05 c 4699--robert m. dow, jr., judge. no. 08-3678 13 opportunity and filed a complaint alleging that certain in his favor." he understood this to be analogous to a doctrine. see rooker, 263 u.s. at 415-16; feldman, 460 u.s. the case. the injury gilbert claimed to have suffered, 568. therefore, even though gilbert's injury stems ulti- officer granted gilbert's motion on two alternative grounds in his march 30, 2006, order dismissing most of gilbert's (7th cir. 2005). the successor judge should depart from the doctrine prevented it from deciding this jurisdictional a motion to dismiss in which they argued that gilbert procedures. he noted as well that a federal court cannot matter of right if a constitutional claim arises for the first f.3d 843, 849-50 (7th cir. 2005) (quoting shakman v. not defer to judge guzm�n's apparent decision. the doctrine. though a lower federal court may not sit appellate court's judgment. that is precisely what is the illinois appellate court for rehearing and clarification appeals as a matter of right when a constitutional claim the illinois supreme court, invoking illinois supreme