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Lack of Copyright Registration Does Not Affect Federal Jurisdicition


Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, Case No. 08-103 (Sup. Ct. , Mar. 2, 2010)

Subject to certain exceptions, the Copyright Act (Act) requires copyright holders to register their works before suing for copyright infringement. 17 U. S. C. A. §411(a) (Supp. 2009). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a copyright holder’s failure to comply with §411(a)’s registration requirement deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to adjudicate his copyright infringement claim. We disagree. Section 411(a)’s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to . . . their . . . Writings.” Art. I, §8, cl. 8. Exercising this power, Congress has crafted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the existence and scope of “[c]opyright protection” for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U. S. C. §102(a). This scheme gives copyright owners “the exclusive rights” (withspecified statutory exceptions) to distribute, reproduce, or publicly perform their works. §106. “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as pro-vided” in the Act “is an infringer of the copyright.” §501(a). When such infringement occurs, a copyright owner “is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action” for copyright infringement. §501(b) (emphasis added).

This case concerns “the requirements of section 411” to which §501(b) refers. Section 411(a) provides, inter alia and with certain exceptions, that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with thistitle.” This provision is part of the Act’s remedial scheme. It establishes a condition—copyright registration—that plaintiffs ordinarily must satisfy before filing an infringe-ment claim and invoking the Act’s remedial provisions.We address whether §411(a) also deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement claims involving unregistered works.



 

Jurisdiction: U.S. Supreme Court
Related Categories: Civil-Procedure
 
Supreme Court Judge(s)Supreme Court Judge Jurisdiction(s)
Clarence ThomasU.S. Supreme Court

 





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condition subject to these sorts of exceptions.5 those granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over those c rately, 411(c) permits courts to adjudicate infringement 1cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) opportunity commission (eeoc) filing requirement in holding that the ment claim and invoking the act's remedial provisions. "prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject- _________________ "rel[ied] on a long line of this court's decisions left undis- tioners' arguments below are in tension with those made in this held: section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a precondition to fil- issued our opinion in new york times co. v. tasini, 533 the statutory limitation in bowles was of a type that we those" earlier cases); see also national railroad passenger corporation more employees, 42 u. s. c. 2000e2(a)(1). after observ- diction to determine that issue." 411(a) (emphasis and recovery act of 1976 notice provision)--district courts for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to . . . 511513. similarly, 2000e(b)'s text and structure did not day v. mcdonough, 547 u. s. 198, 205206 (2006) (habeas 205. there, in finding that congress had ranked as jurisdictional 28 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for thomas, j., delivered the opinion of the court, in which roberts, had long held did "speak in jurisdictional terms" even syllabus and with certain exceptions, that "no civil action for in- tration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim ment suits that other freelance authors had filed after the granting section, distinguishing it from the "amount-in- jurisdiction." 551 u. s., at 211 (quoting scarborough, supra, at 413; is a party to the infringement suit. the word "jurisdic- arbaugh court anticipated that all federal courts would at 511513; ante, at 56. _________________ forfeited or waived"). u. s. 401 (2004), which characterized as nonjurisdictional an express bowles and arbaugh can be reconciled without distort- curiam), as cases in which the court properly held that certain time tional prescriptions and claim-processing rules, see, e.g., tation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdic- "for an employer . . . to discriminate," inter alia, on the principal theory of liability underlying copyright infringe- tion requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit amicus curiae, in support of the court of appeals' judgment. ms. second circuit and remand this case for proceedings the parties moved the district court to certify a class tion over infringement suits involving unregistered works. opinion of the court plaintiffs each own at least one copyright, typically in a statutory conditions for taking an appeal is thus consis- any other party urge the district court to dismiss the *e.g., eberhart v. united states, 546 u. s. 12 (2005) (per curiam); u. s., at 515516 (citation and footnote omitted). that a federal court plainly has adjudicatory authority to specified statutory exceptions) to distribute, reproduce, or jurisdictional. see id., at 513516. as we observed, the thereafter adhere to the "bright line" held dispositive that in arbaugh, we described the general approach to distin- fault the parties' lawyers for invoking in the negotiations sixty days after such service, but the register's failure matter jurisdiction over those respective claims. see numerosity requirement could not fairly be read to "`speak 3cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or limits for filing a notice of appeal stated in 28 u. s. c. ity to arbaugh and similarly reasoned decisions,* the ------------ tional, and this assertion should estop them from now turbed by congress." union pacific r. co. v. locomotive suing for copyright infringement. 17 u. s. c. a. 411(a) tory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case" (em- undeniable tension between the two decisions. aiming to jurisdictional merely because it promotes important congressional supra, at 515. it does not. amicus disagrees, pointing to considered an element of a title vii claim, rather than a justice breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in its prior jurisdictional treatment.9 ties intended "to achieve a global peace in the publishing preted 411(a)'s precursor provision,4 which imposed a elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, bowles therefore demonstrates that the relevant ques- bowles v. russell, 551 u. s. 205 (2007). 509 f. 3d, at 129. 8 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick tional, then courts and litigants will be duly in- 6 see jones v. bock, 549 u. s. 199, 211 (2007) (treating the adminis- more like the [nonjurisdictional] employee-numerosity tional, then courts and litigants will be duly in- tional" only when it is apposite, kontrick, supra, at 455. the muchnick respondents appealed, renewing their 4 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick quirement does not limit federal subject-matter jurisdic- see united states v. detroit timber & lumber co., 200 u. s. 321, 337. fits in this mold. section 411(a) imposes a precondition to mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing ii plaintiffs ordinarily must satisfy before filing an infringe- `playing fast and loose with the courts' by `deliberately dispositive. the other factors discussed above demon- tion provisions as jurisdictional, see amicus brief 45--is similarly determine "that issue," 411(a) (emphasis added)--i.e., the tent with the arbaugh framework. indeed, bowles em- the condition's text, context, and relevant historical treat- that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter court of appeals' judgment vacating the district court's but when congress does not rank a statutory limita- in jurisdictional terms or in any way refer to the jurisdic- bases (and their insurers) negotiated. finally, in march 455 u. s., at 394. arbaugh's "readily administrable bright amicus relies states: conclusion, as our decision in zipes demonstrates. zipes we agree that some statements in the parties' submis- similar registration requirement, as prohibiting copyright federal court of jurisdiction to adjudicate his copyright infringement of unregistered works, and also lacked juris- overruled the objections; certified a settlement class of coverage requirement of title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 was that amicus places upon it. the sentence upon which 1(slip opinion) october term, 2009 3cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) court's subject-matter jurisdiction precludes the need for objectives. see arbaugh v. y & h corp., 546 u. s. 500, 504, 515516 u. s., at 393; 42 u. s. c. 2000e5(f)(1) (establishing ington, d. c. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 501(b) (emphasis added). our holding turned principally on our examination of ment.'" amicus brief 58 (quoting new hampshire v. tion whether 411(a) deprives federal courts of subject-matter juris- owners who had been refused registration by the register can bring title vii claims only against employers that suit, the district court referred the parties to mediation. tion indicated that congress had not ranked the rule as jurisdic- "except for an action brought for a violation of the that they had registered in accordance with 411(a). the tration process, and establish remedial incentives to encourage copy- iii infringement claims involving unregistered works. take some action before filing a lawsuit is not automati- opinion of the court arbaugh, supra, at 511512 (citing examples); steel co., changing positions according to the exigencies of the mo- tion here is not (as amicus puts it) whether 411(a) itself not a jurisdictional requirement because the provision did not being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. a opinion of the court at 210211. kontrick involved "time constraints applicable to objec- tion over infringement claims involving unregistered v. morgan, 536 u. s. 101, 109, 121 (2002) (relying on the analysis in court, and most are "`drive-by jurisdictional rulings' that it establishes a condition--copyright registration--that 5cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) numerosity requirement in arbaugh was considered an element of a amicus curiae in support of judgment below 26 (quoting jurisdictional if congress "clearly states that [it] count[s] as jurisdic- (noting that "the legal character of the requirement was not at issue in relief . . . ancillary to the judgment of a court' that already had plenary cally "a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit." zipes, 455 of limitation that 411(a) imposes is one that is properly claimants who had not complied with the statute's equal employment statute of limitations); and hallstrom v. tillamook jurisdiction to certify a class of claims arising from the 11cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) order approving the settlement and dismissing the case. mits of congressionally authorized exceptions. see central region, 558 u. s. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 13) eeoc). a statutory condition that requires a party to arguments here thus cannot create "inconsistent court 515516. in arbaugh, the court held that the employee-numerosity (d) the court declines to apply judicial estoppel to affirm the sec- opinion of the court has long been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type (a) "jurisdiction" refers to "a court's adjudicatory authority," kon- zipes). 2 see la resolana architects, pa v. clay realtors angel fire, 416 v. citizens for better environment, 523 u. s. 83, 89 (1998) county, 493 u. s. 20, 26, 31 (1989) (resource conservation "jurisdiction" refers to "a court's adjudicatory author- tional limitations on causes of action, kontrick, supra, at the class, however, included both authors who had registered their did not purport to have any jurisdictional significance. see 551 u. s., its registration requirement is "jurisdictional." arbaugh, of appeal within 30 days of the judgment, this court analyzed 2107's tory under the plra and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought justice ginsburg, with whom justice stevens and governing the existence and scope of "[c]opyright protec- "conferring jurisdiction over objections to discharge," and observed that amicus insists that our decision in bowles, 551 u. s. notice: this opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the trick v. ryan, 540 u. s. 443, 455. thus, "jurisdictional" properly ap- crimination charge with the eeoc before filing a civil at 136. amicus cites well over 200 opinions that charac- diction to approve a settlement with respect to those second court was misled." id., at 750 (internal quotation plies only to "prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject- and the ground on which i would reconcile those rulings. tion)" implicating that authority. ibid.; see also steel co. nia, 530 u. s. 392, 412413 (2000) (res judicata defense); but this reference to "jurisdiction" cannot bear the weight parties' request to approve their settlement. preted and if congress has not disturbed that interpreta- 751 (internal quotation marks omitted). we therefore hold sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving un- [march 2, 2010] treatment of the type of limitation 2107 imposes (i.e., 4 see act of mar. 4, 1909, 12, 35 stat. 1078. u. s. c. a. 411(a) (supp. 2009). that provision, which rights of the author under section 106a(a), and sub- money records inc., 394 f. 3d 357, 365 (ca5 2004); xoom, inc. v. the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. ap- (emphasis added)). bowles also distinguished kontrick v. ryan, 540 publicly perform their works. 106. "anyone who violates the constitution grants congress the power "[t]o pro- of the civil rights act of 1964, which makes it unlawful gravel co. v. united states, 552 u. s. 130 (2008). there as well. brief for court-appointed amicus curiae in requirement in arbaugh [v. y & h corp., 546 u. s. 500 register the work and registration was refused. sepa- as the above-quoted passage indicates, the unanimous 411(a) does not implicate the subject-matter jurisdiction ingly, the term "jurisdictional" properly applies only to u. s. c. 2107's requirement that parties in a civil action file a notice ment, id., at 393395; see also national railroad passen- appeals rejected their arguments. see app. to reply brief second circuit's erroneous reading of 411. the court also declines registered works. pp. 1516. in arbaugh, we held nonjurisdictional a prescription analysis must focus on the "legal character" of the re- "jurisdictional," and what does not, i set out my under- least unusual to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a court to certify a settlement class and approve a settlement agree- 2 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick consolidated in the united states district court for the we granted the owners' and publishers' petition for a concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to certify the turn, treated as nonjurisdictional certain rules that the court held (2006) (holding that title vii's numerosity requirement is nonjurisdic- conclusion that 411(a) is nonjurisdictional. section we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals for the u. s. 244, 274 (1994) ("[j]urisdictional statutes `speak to no. 08103. argued october 7, 2009--decided march 2, 2010 the case, and thus did not require close analysis. see only when it is apposite. ibid. a statutory requirement is considered for infringement of the copyright in any united states of 411(a) and contending that the use of the term there c. j., and scalia, kennedy, and alito, jj., joined. ginsburg, j., filed tice, federal courts and litigants should use the term "jurisdictional" the text of 2000e(b), the section in which title vii's nu- engineers and trainmen gen. comm. of adjustment, vii's numerosity requirement, is located in a provision according to amicus, petitioners asserted previously in the relevant proceedings in this case began after we opinion of ginsburg, j. 23(a) and (b)(3); approved the settlement as fair, reason- bowles and john r. sand & gravel co., as just explained, demonstrate that congress "rank[ed]" that requirement as fringement suit alleged that the named plaintiffs each own at least 9cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) opinion of the court justice sotomayor took no part in the consideration merosity requirement appears. section 2000e(b) does not the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this one copyright, typically in a freelance article written for a newspaper trans world airlines, inc., 455 u. s. 385, 394 (1982)). we in bowles, we considered 28 u. s. c. 2107, which re- small businesses from title vii liability"). 501(a). when such infringement occurs, a copyright gants to "facilitat[e]" clarity by using the term "jurisdic- writ of certiorari, and formulated the question presented held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed within 30 days of the judgment being appealed, and rule 4 bowles does not detract from that determination. shire, that doctrine typically applies when, among other case, we hold that the threshold number of employees "clearly stat[e]" that the employee numerosity threshold mencing suit for infringement, "is a precondition to filing a federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit.6 a f. 3d 1195, 12001201 (ca10 2005); positive black talk inc. v. cash case, or to refuse to certify the class or approve the settle- ------------ they " `shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the united states ment, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. as "jurisdictional" is a factor in the analysis, it is not "the issue of registrability of the copyright claim" even if the courts of appeals. see 551 u. s., at 209210, and n. 2. would be improper to characterize the statutory condition tion of the district courts.'" arbaugh, 546 u. s., at 515 ject-matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregis- limits were nonjurisdictional because they were imposed by rules that tation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdic- the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." 546 desire to curtail such "drive-by jurisdictional rulings," author "declare[s] an intention to secure copyright in the the court concluded, largely on stare decisis grounds, that it did not contain a timeliness requirement. kontrick, 540 u. s., at 453. actions over certain kinds of unregistered works where the supreme court of the united states "separate" from those granting federal courts subject- quirement, id., at 395, which we discerned by looking to opinion of ginsburg, j. online databases and print publishers had infringed the 2 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick imageline, inc., 323 f. 3d 279, 283 (ca4 2003); murray hill publica- dissent in bowles observed, would have yielded the conclu- actions based on 28 u. s. c. 1331 and 1338. but neither copyright litigation, 509 f. 3d 116, 119 (ca2 2007). the infringement claim concerns rights of attribution and ject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action to become a party shall not deprive the court of juris- (c) a contrary result is not required by bowles v. russell, 551 u. s. 2 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if interpretation of 411(a) as jurisdictional. second, when 8 this conclusion mirrors our holding in zipes that title vii's eeoc ing bowles, supra, at 209, n. 2). this argument focuses are available are exhausted," 42 u. s. c. 1997e(a)--as an affirmative it is so ordered. in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks not located in a jurisdiction-granting provision, and ad- over, 411(a)'s registration requirement, like title vii's employee- ing either decision, however, on the ground that bowles first, the parties made their prior statements when nego- nonetheless imposed a jurisdictional limit. see id., at bowles did not hold that any statutory condition devoid to register. amicus urges us to prevent the parties "from class, however, included both authors who had registered tional." 546 u. s., at 515. although 411(a)'s last sentence contains the second circuit "the register [of copyrights] may, at his or her op- b an amicus curiae to defend the court of appeals' judg- settlement even under the court of appeals' erroneous tion in a provision separate from title vii's jurisdiction-granting sec- an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which 1332." arbaugh, 546 u. s., at 514515. accordingly, the first sought mandamus against the register. see termine that issue." second circuit held that a copyright holder's failure to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial accep- [march 2, 2010] at 515516 (citation and footnote omitted). phasis in original)); landgraf v. usi film products, 511 omitted). bowles mentioned arbaugh only to distinguish grounds. shortly before oral argument, the court of ap- as nonjurisdictional because doing so would override "`a underlying copyright registration support construing 411(a)'s registra- opinion of the court corp., 354 f. 3d 112, 114115 (ca2 2003); morris v. busi- quirement as jurisdictional. pp. 1114. 1 other sections of the act--principally 408410--detail the regis- syllabus such. nor did it hold that all statutory conditions impos- of copyrights from suing for infringement until the owners statutory time limit for initiating postjudgment proceedings for attor- prerequisite to initiating a lawsuit, does not change this judgment. at no time did the muchnick respondents or reed elsevier, inc., et al., petitioners v. irvin that case, we first examined 28 u. s. c. 157(b)(2)(j), the statute title vii claim rather than a prerequisite to initiating a lawsuit. see watch co., 260 f. 2d 637, 640641 (ca2 1958) (construing defense even though "[t]here is no question that exhaustion is manda- ter such service, but the register's failure to become a claim for relief." 546 u. s., at 503. we held that it does (e) because 411(a) does not restrict a federal court's subject- this court has overturned, or that it should now overturn, refers to a court's power to hear a case, a matter that "can never be marks omitted). for petitioners 3a5a, and n. 2. accepting petitioners' the syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been vided" in the act "is an infringer of the copyright." 411(a)'s registration requirement can be read to "`speak diction of the federal courts over copyright infringement the consolidated complaint alleged that the named subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement opinion of the court among the circuits that section 411(a) is jurisdictional").2 we address whether 411(a) also deprives federal courts of opinion of the court (2006)]" than the jurisdictional statutory time limit in works and authors who had not. the parties moved the district fringement of the copyright in any united states work multidistrict litigation. any threshold ingredient akin to 28 u. s. c. 1332's mone- tasini, resumed after we issued our opinion and were court, accepting their arguments here does not create the type of "in- at issue in bowles.8 we thus conclude that 411(a)'s regis- statutory deadlines for filing appeals), we concluded that rather, the "time constraints applicable to objections to discharge" ing 2107's specific language and this court's historical jurisdiction, they argued that it did not, and the court of here, that same analysis leads us to conclude that tional"; a condition "not rank[ed]" as such should be treated "as non- permission. see id., at 493. in so holding, we affirmed the u. s., at 393 (emphasis added). rather, the jurisdictional able, and adequate under rule 23(e); and entered final opinion of the court positions. perhaps more importantly, in approving the circumstances: where the work is not a u. s. work, where congress did not explicitly label a statutory condition as today. amicus cites bowles for the proposition that where thus "refrain[ed] from" construing the numerosity re- tion on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat court there held "mandatory and jurisdictional" the time decisions had characterized it as jurisdictional. see 455 u. s., at 395 tension with their arguments here. but we decline to (ca6 2001); brewer-giorgio v. producers video, inc., 216 f. 3d 1281, congress added this sentence to the act in 1976, 90 opinion on the settlement's merits. tion" for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangi- to adjudicate claims for infringement of unregistered works. more- tional even though it serves the important policy goal of "spar[ing] very questions of federal law, nor 1338(a), which is specific to we relied on longstanding decisions of this court typing because they were contained in a statute, not merely a 411(a) restricted the district court's subject-matter arbaugh, supra, at 514515. federal district courts have stat. 2583, to clarify that a federal court can determine 1331, which confers subject-matter jurisdiction over specific time periods within which a discrimination claim- ing a copyright infringement claim. a copyright holder's failure to tration requirement is nonjurisdictional, notwithstanding id., at 514, we have encouraged federal courts and liti- jurisdiction." ante, at 1. i further agree that arbaugh v. y i 2005, they reached a settlement agreement that the par- preliminary print of the united states reports. readers are requested to after muchnick respondents), objected. the district court ------------ limitation, justified a departure from this view. that was opinion of the court issue of registrability--regardless of whether the register reed elsevier, inc., et al. v. muchnick et al. cases compelled the conclusion that even though the nu- between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdic- respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright 16 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick work shall be instituted until preregistration or regis- tion of the district courts.'" id., at 515 (quoting zipes v. court of appeals had issued its opinion in tasini. these his or her option, become a party to the action with that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. have been delivered to the copyright office in proper claims, 509 f. 3d, at 121 (citing "widespread agreement tion. amicus brief 26. specifically, amicus relies on a which 501(b) refers. section 411(a) provides, inter alia the district court had authority to approve the settlement under the opinion of the court employed. section 411(a) provides: peals sua sponte ordered briefing on the question whether the register does not appear in the infringement suit. appeals for the second circuit ney's fees under the equal access to justice act. see 551 u. s., at 211. dance with this title. in any case, however, where the comply with that requirement does not restrict a federal court's sub- the presence of the word "jurisdiction" in the last sentence under our precedents. that the numerosity requirement in arbaugh could be copyrights of six freelance authors by reproducing the infringement claim. we disagree. section 411(a)'s regis- sions to the district court and the court of appeals are in work because context is relevant to whether a statute "rank[s]" a re- because of the growing size and complexity of the law- the copyright act (act) generally requires copyright holders to register confining title vii's coverage to employers with 15 or including this court's interpretation of similar provisions transmission." 17 u. s. c. 411(c)(1)(2). it would be at actions. 555 u. s. ____ (2009). because no party supports owner "is entitled, subject to the requirements of section jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction court of appeals concluded that the district court lacked title."1 this provision is part of the act's remedial scheme. ten freelance authors, including irvin muchnick (herein- copyright claim by entering an appearance within ------------ app. 94. the court of appeals' jurisdictional holding, we appointed apply judicial estoppel. as we explained in new hamp- tions to discharge" in bankruptcy proceedings. 540 u. s., at 453. in ant must file a lawsuit after filing a charge with the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve to decide whether 411(a)'s registration requirement is a mandatory in light of the important distinctions between jurisdic- registration requirement was jurisdictional, see 509 f. 3d, ity." kontrick v. ryan, 540 u. s. 443, 455 (2004). accord- ronment, 523 u. s. 83, 91 (1998)); see arbaugh, 546 u. s., tury's worth of precedent.'" brief for court-appointed 10 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick ries 2107 into practice." 551 u. s., at 208. after analyz- instructs authors to register their copyrights before com- authors' works electronically without first securing their the power of the court rather than to the rights or obliga- we hold 411(a) jurisdictional lest we disregard "`a cen- ing that "the 15-employee threshold . . . `d[id] not speak in their . . . writings." art. i, 8, cl. 8. exercising this power, "affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, in- stave off continuing controversy over what qualifies as whether the district court had authority to approve the opinion of ginsburg, j. plying that readily administrable bright line to this 7cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) states v. cotton, 535 u. s. 625, 630 (2002) ("[j]urisdiction" properly tiating or defending the settlement agreement. we do not goud, 108 u. s. 567 (1883), and united states v. curry, 6 subject to certain exceptions, the copyright act (act) it as involving a statute setting "an employee-numerosity other suits, which were stayed pending our decision in arbaugh opinion announced and applied a "readily admin- subsection (a), within three months after [the work's] first opinion of the court trative exhaustion requirement of the prison litigation reform act of the plaintiff in arbaugh brought a claim under title vii ------------ comply with 411(a)'s registration requirement deprives a 515516, and n. 11. and nothing in our prior title vii shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of would create the perception that either the first or the jurisdiction to approve the settlement, we express no ble medium of expression." 17 u. s. c. 102(a). this tional conditions and claim-processing rules can be confusing in prac- amicus, reading bowles as i do, urges on its authority that this case concerns "the requirements of section 411" to of the federal rules of appellate procedure, which "car- 456; see also arbaugh, 546 u. s., at 511. notify the reporter of decisions, supreme court of the united states, wash- reading of 411. in concluding that the district court had the court of appeals asked petitioners to brief whether for the reasons stated, i join the court's judgment and or magazine, that they had registered in accordance with 411(a). the settlement agreement even though it included unreg- u. s., at 511 (quoting steel co. v. citizens for better envi- nothing about whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction absent a "jurisdictional" label, and nothing about 2107's 411(a) "does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in settlement, the district court did not adopt petitioners' while perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between the latter. ("title vii's jurisdictional provision" does not "specif[y] phasized that this court had long treated such conditions a requirement as jurisdictional. or decision of this case. that clarification was necessary because courts had inter- tion requirement as jurisdictional. amicus brief 26 (quot- 509 f. 3d 116, reversed and remanded. zipes v. trans world airlines, inc., 455 u. s. 385, 393. pp. 711. authority to determine a copyright claim's registrability and says 411(a). the complaint in this consolidated, class-action copyright in- dent, see ante, at 6, and that bowles v. russell, 551 u. s. accordingly, he reasoned that 411(a)'s registration re- as we explained, the time limit in scarborough "concerned `a mode of its earlier precedent."). _________________ trans world airlines, inc., 455 u. s. 385, 394 (1982)), the support of judgment below 18 (hereinafter amicus brief). for settlement and to approve the settlement agreement. tary floor"). rather, bowles stands for the proposition that context, before suing for infringement. cf. arbaugh, supra, at 515 were contained in the bankruptcy rules, which expressly state that 12 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick action with respect to the issue of registrability of the amicus argues that even if 411(a) is nonjurisdictional, sua sponte consideration of a lawsuit's timeliness. id., at does not "clearly stat[e]" that its registration requirement is "jurisdic- notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served action in federal court was nonjurisdictional. see 455 publishers (and their insurers), and the electronic data- 411(a)'s precursor). the 1976 amendment made it clear u. s. 443 (2004), and eberhart v. united states, 546 u. s. 12 (2005) (per appeals for the second circuit that several owners of in court"); woodford v. ngo, 548 u. s. 81, 93 (2006) (same). standing of the court's opinions in arbaugh and bowles, the registration requirement in 17 u. s. c. a. 411(a) any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts." zipes, scarborough v. principi, 541 u. s. 401 (2004); kontrick v. ryan, 540 party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to de- filing requirement was nonjurisdictional, even though some of our own i agree with the court's characterization of 17 things, a "party has succeeded in persuading a court to opinion of the court tional. our focus in bowles on the historical treatment of syllabus right holders to register their works, see, e.g., 410(c); 17 u. s. c. a. matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)" implicat- "separate" from 2000e5(f)(3), title vii's jurisdiction- (upon which arbaugh relied) held that title vii's require- federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate consistent court determinations" in their favor that estoppel is meant not the case, however, for the types of conditions in zipes u. s. 483 (2001). in tasini, we agreed with the court of copyrights. all parties filed briefs asserting that the we now apply this same approach to 411(a). as jurisdictional, including in statutes other than 2107, opinion of the court ered in zipes and arbaugh than to the statutory time limit courts.' " see ibid. (quoting fed. rule bkrtcy. proc. 9030). eberhart, in if that is how the condition consistently has been inter- tered works. pp. 516. filing a claim that is not clearly labeled jurisdictional, is for more than three years, the freelance authors, the to ask whether 411(a) restricts the subject-matter juris- work" and "makes registration for the work, if required by that the district court had authority to adjudicate the requires copyright holders to register their works before numerosity requirement, is located in a provision "separate" from _________________ fringement claims involving unregistered works in three precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce 411(a) deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdic- gress had "approved" at least some cases awarding title vii relief to 15cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) quires parties in a civil action to file a notice of appeal merosity requirement lacks a clear jurisdictional label, it "if the legislature clearly states that a threshold limi- 3cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) us to address the parties' alternative arguments as to requirements or elements of a claim: ment.3 556 u. s. ____ (2009). we now reverse. ------------ should be accorded `no precedential effect,'" arbaugh, 546 our decision, subsequent to bowles, in john r. sand & and arbaugh. 7 bowles, for example, distinguished scarborough v. principi, 541 diction over infringement claims involving unregistered copyrights, diction . . . in diversity-of-jurisdiction under 28 u. s. c. whether copyright holders have registered their works registration requirement can be read to " `speak in jurisdictional on title vii's scope "count[s] as jurisdictional." id., at indicates the jurisdictional cast of 411(a)'s first sentence jurisdictional in character." arbaugh v. y & h corp., 546 u. s. 500, terize 411(a) as jurisdictional, but not one is from this any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as pro- vacheron & constantin-le coultre watches, inc. v. benrus the relevant prescriptions "jurisdictional." bowles, 551 requirement, not a time limit." 551 u. s., at 211. section analogous to the nonjurisdictional conditions we consid- ness concepts, inc., 259 f. 3d 65, 7273 (ca2 2001)), the determinations" in their favor. new hampshire, supra, at day. line" is therefore controlling. 546 u. s., at 516. congress has crafted a comprehensive statutory scheme our holding that 411(a) does not restrict a federal reed elsevier, inc., et al., petitioners v. irvin ibid. this conclusion is not affected by the fact that the employee- note: where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is text or context, or the historical treatment of that type of cantly, 411(a) expressly allows courts to adjudicate in- ing a time limit should be considered jurisdictional.7 2107's time limits were "jurisdictional," bowles explained, century's worth of precedent'" treating 411(a)'s registra- of an express jurisdictional label should be treated as 412 (2005 ed. and supp. 2009). appeals for the second circuit 4 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick we should nonetheless affirm on estoppel grounds the their works before suing for copyright infringement. 17 u. s. c. a. "if the legislature clearly states that a threshold limi- ment. the district court did so over the objections of some freelance we similarly have treated as nonjurisdictional other types 1285 (ca11 2000); data gen. corp. v. grumman systems support matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdic- such circumstances do not exist here for two reasons. respect to prison conditions under 1983 of this title, or any other ment that sex-discrimination claimants timely file a dis- 3 we appointed deborah jones merritt to brief and argue the case, as stead, delineates a substantive ingredient of a title vii ibid. these proceedings that copyright registration was jurisdic- sion that statutory time limits "are only jurisdictional if basis of sex. 42 u. s. c. 2000e2(a)(1). but employees and specifically in statutes that predated the creation of specific language and the historical treatment accorded to that type this court's prior title vii cases did not compel the conclusion that how. 106 (1848)); john r. sand & gravel co., 552 u. s., ("subject-matter jurisdiction" refers to "the courts' statu- muchnick et al. ------------ (citing bowles, 551 u. s., at 209211). the same is true of time is `mandatory and jurisdictional,'" id., at 209. fidel- congress had ranked the statutory condition as jurisdic- concurring))). nor does any other factor suggest that 17 u. s. c. a. at 121 (citing well-made toy mfg. corp. v. goffa int'l tions, inc. v. abc communications, inc., 264 f. 3d 622, 630, and n. 1 respective claims, ibid., and no other factor suggests that 411(a)'s ------------ concur in part in the court's opinion. filing requirement was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit); united moreover, 411(a)'s registration requirement, like title footnote in bowles to argue that here, as in bowles, it 2107(a), (c). 551 u. s., at 209 (internal quotation marks of threshold requirements that claimants must complete, claim by entering an appearance within sixty days af- freelance article written for a newspaper or a magazine, opinion of the court marks omitted). jurisdictional, a court nevertheless should treat it as such supreme court of the united states syllabus bowles moved in a different direction. a sharply divided & h corp., 546 u. s. 500 (2006), is the controlling prece- claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue." 546 u. s., ger corporation v. morgan, 536 u. s. 101, 119121 (2002). 9 amicus' remaining jurisdictional argument--that the policy goals asserting a right to waive objections to the authors' failure form and registration has been refused, the applicant justice thomas delivered the opinion of the court. iv have "fifteen or more employees." 2000e(b). arbaugh * * * provision." arbaugh, supra, at 515 (internal quotation ing that authority. ibid. because the distinction between jurisdic- tion, become a party to the [copyright infringement] guish "jurisdictional" conditions from claim-processing terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,' " jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be bowles, 551 u. s., at 209, n. 2); see ante, at 12. but in rule, id., at 210213, and because "[t]his court ha[d] long the word "jurisdiction," that sentence speaks to a court's adjudicatory tance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding 411, to institute an action" for copyright infringement. tion on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat confusing in practice. courts--including this court--have authors. on appeal, the second circuit sua sponte raised the ques- we must consider whether 411(a) "clearly states" that particularly when that characterization was not central to opinion of the court ond circuit's judgment vacating the settlement. while some of peti- quirement to "constric[t] 1331 or title vii's jurisdictional unavailing. we do not agree that a condition should be ranked as that--like the threshold conditions in arizona v. califor- for application of title vii is an element of a plaintiff's relying on two circuit precedents holding that 411(a)'s (supp. 2009). in this case, the court of appeals for the jurisdictional simply because courts have long treated it as congress says so." 551 u. s., at 217 (opinion of souter, j.). the rule nonetheless was jurisdictional, and the requirement's loca- addressed whether that employee numerosity requirement ibid., which too easily can miss the "critical difference[s]" "clearly stat[e]" that the numerosity rule counted as jurisdictional, on writ of certiorari to the united states court of subject-matter jurisdiction over copyright infringement judge walker dissented. he concluded "that 411(a) is ami v. united states, 506 u. s. 80, 100 (1992) (thomas, j., istered works. 13cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) on the register of copyrights. the register may, at 136 ("[p]etitioner can succeed only by convincing us that strate that 411(a)'s registration requirement is more but when congress does not rank a statutory limita- copyright claims, conditions its jurisdictional grant on the court of federal claims statute of limitations requires consistent with this opinion. in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdic- jurisdiction. istrable bright line": tion," as used here, thus says nothing about whether a ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation. of federal courts. although 411(a)'s historical treatment u. s., at 209210 (citing, inter alia, scarborough v. par- of limitation. that analysis is consistent with the arbaugh frame- cite as: 559 u. s. ____ (2010) 1 tration of the copyright claim has been made in accor- 205, compels a conclusion contrary to the one we reach prepared by the reporter of decisions for the convenience of the reader. ------------ employee numerosity requirement is located in a provision condition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment no. 08103 6 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick maine, 532 u. s. 742, 750 (2001)). "closely parallel[ed]" those in kontrick. 546 u. s., at 15. freelance authors under federal rules of civil procedure (quoting zipes, 455 u. s., at 394). first, and most signifi- we also decline to address whether 411(a)'s registra- stevens and breyer, jj., joined. sotomayor, j., took no part in the of the district courts,'" 546 u. s., at 515 (quoting zipes v. added). 5 cf. zipes, 455 u. s., at 393394, 397 (relying on the fact that con- 523 u. s., at 91 (same). our recent cases evince a marked tional. pp. 57. u. s. 443 (2004). their copyrighted works and authors who had not. see structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. class or approve the settlement. structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. scheme gives copyright owners "the exclusive rights" (with on the result in bowles, rather than on the analysis we * * * the judgment. controversy threshold ingredient of subject-matter juris- 205 (2007), does not counsel otherwise. there is, however, to address. see new hampshire v. maine, 532 u. s. 742. pp. 1415. claims involving unregistered works. tions of the parties'" (quoting republic nat. bank of mi- deposit, application, and fee required for registration (b) like the title vii numerosity requirement in arbaugh, 411(a) binding circuit precedent that supported their clients' muchnick et al. matter jurisdiction, this court need not address the question whether industry." in re literary works in electronic databases claim that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter 1995 (plra)--which states that "no action shall be brought with merritt has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities. claims for infringement of unregistered works. integrity under 106a, or where the holder attempted to b 411(a)(c). section 411(a) thus imposes a type of pre- no. 08103 consideration or decision of the case. opinion of ginsburg, j. may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing copyright ------------ on writ of certiorari to the united states court of 14 reed elsevier, inc. v. muchnick corp., 36 f. 3d 1147, 1163 (ca1 1994). objections to the settlement on procedural and substantive southern district of new york by the judicial panel on plainly read, arbaugh and bowles both point to the


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