Seat Belt Claim Preempted by FMVSS

serious injuries which led to her death. u.s. 51 (2002) is controlling, not geier. in sprietsma, the supreme court also played a part in the decision not to require lap/shoulder belts in rear seating positions. 4 in 2002, anton's law was signed into legislation. pub. l. no. 107-318. anton's law behalf of those entitled to recover for the wrongful we look to the version of fmvss 208 in effect at the time the 1999 pontiac grand am was united states court of appeals upon close review of the record, the expert testimony fails to identify any v. automobile manufacturer under district of columbia tort law, arguing that the involved a complete absence of regulatory action, which was not the case here. geier, thus, compels the conclusion that a state tort suit that would foreclose a in the rear center seating position as well, but decided to leave manufacturers the daughter, twelve year-old alexa wilson, was seated in the rear center seat at the by the national highway traffic safety administration ("nhtsa") under the et seq. the safety act was enacted to "reduce traffic accidents and death and all manufacturers of similar cars also install airbags. the court held that the seatbelt claims where preempted by fmvss 208 for two reasons. first, they moreover, fmvss's extensive rule making history indicates that child safety concerns 1 center rear seating positions would yield small safety benefits and substantially court's grant of summary judgment to gm. cir. 2003). the question before this court is whether appellants' state common --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 303 f.3d at 1282; irving v. mazda motor corp., 136 f.3d 764, 770 (11th cir. 1998) court held that the claim was not preempted, reasoning that although the coast no. 06-11182 2 (mar. 5, 1999) (discussing the difficulty of designing seat belts that both restrain older gather, it appears that carden's and wilson's defective marketing and failure to plaintiff-appellant, premised on defective design claims found to be preempted, the defective use. the district court found that carden's and wilson's seat belt claims were see, e.g., frank, 314 f.3d at 199 n.6 (5th cir. 2002) (distinguishing sprietsma i. factual and procedural background common law suit that would effectively foreclose one of these options is support their claim that design aspects of the 1999 grand am were such that kind of car might require airbags, rather than automatic belts, and that a suit department of transportation's comments accompanying the promulgation of on june 17, 2004, ronald lee wilson, ii, was driving a 1999 pontiac proper if the record reflects "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact wilson argue that the nhtsa's decision to allow manufacturers the option exemption from preemption analysis. accordingly, we affirm the rulings of the suit that depends on foreclosing one or more of those options is preempted."); wilson, ii, (hereinafter "carden and wilson") filed suit against general motors 2 wearing at the time of the accident. as a result of the impact, alexa sustained warn claims are based on gm's decision to install a manual lap-only seat belt. v. and as an heir to alexa lee wilson, as technology advanced and seatbelt use became more widespread, seatbelt clerk 2 belts in rear outboard seating positions would made the installation of conventional child "there [were] more technical difficulties associated with any requirement for lap/shoulder belts at center rear seating positions, and that lap/shoulder belts at as discussed above, the nhtsa identified particular policy reasons for its time the 1999 pontiac grand am was manufactured, fmvss 208 required that wilson's no-retractor claims is not necessary as these claims would also foreclose plaintiffs-appellants, reasons we affirm. significant differences between the 1999 grand am and other vehicles designed worthiness requirements . . . [and] by specifying equipment requirements for a. defendant-appellee. general motors corporation, accident ins. co., 497 f.3d 536, 538 (5th cir. 2007). summary judgment is 1282 (11th cir. 2002) ("[u]nder geier, when a federal motor vehicle safety pontiac grand am was defectively and negligently designed because: (1) the rear federal motor vehicle safety standard ("fmvss") 208 was promulgated truck manufacturers must install in their vehicles. it is undisputed that at the during the same time period that would justify this claim. further, carden and summary judgment should nevertheless be reversed because the unique design carl e. stewart, circuit judge: corporation ("gm") under texas tort law. appellants claimed that the 1999 ronald lee wilson, ii, individually, no. 06-11182 charles r. fulbruge iii (nov. 2, 1989). the commentary preceding the final rules indicates that the and explaining that frank involved "the preemptive effect of adopted faa no. 06-11182 and (3) the vehicle lacked side impact airbags or other side impact protections. supreme court was confronted with essentially the same question presently frank v. delta airlines inc., 314 f.3d 195, 197 (5th cir. 2002). the option to install either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts in the rear center vehicle safety standards implement the safety act "by specifying vehicle crash under this defective design theory are not preempted. see 529 u.s. at 885 ("it is greater costs, given the lower center seat occupancy rate and the more difficult carden and wilson attempt to distinguish their claims from those in geier, imposing a duty on the manufacturer to have installed airbags in their vehicles ("because plaintiff's defective-design claim is preempted by fmvss 208, there airbags. geier, 529 u.s. at 865. the court interpreted the petitioners' claim as cir. 2004) (citation omitted). actual conflict between state and federal law exists requirements evolved. in 1989, noting the decreased cost and increased use of promulgated, the dot required either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts in each federal law. we conclude that it is. the supreme court's decision in geier governs this case, and as such we civ.p.56(c); see also celotex corp. v. catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 323 (1986). a genuine judgment in favor of gm on their defective marketing and failure to warn claims. de novo, using the same criteria as the district court. plyant v. hartford life and an express option given to manufacturers. accordingly, carden's and wilson's seeking to impose that requirement could escape pre-emption"). the question option to select between lap-only and lap/shoulder belts.1 decision to employ a unique vehicle design might foreclose certain options no. 06-11182 appeal from the united states district court carden and wilson contend that these claims are not preempted by fmvss 208 not give rise to preemption analysis. gm argues that because federal law gave circumvent the preemption bar and also does not justify a reversal of the district id. at 46258. in the section of carden's and wilson's brief addressing their defective no. 06-11182 requiring propeller guards on motorboats preempted a claim alleging an engine for the northern district of texas similarly, fmvss 208 gives manufacturers the option of selecting between grand am when it was struck near the left rear door by another vehicle. his nhtsa considered comments suggesting that lap/shoulder seat belts be required where "the federal scheme expressly authorizes an activity which the state engineering task." id.2 hold that carden's and wilson's design defect and defective marketing claims are installation of a lap-only seat belt in the rear center seat made the car unsafe. or its purposes. at&t corp. v. pub. util. comm'n of tex., 373 f.3d 641, 645 (5th ronald lee wilson, ii, no. 06-11182 carden and wilson present evidence in the form of expert testimony to fmvss 208 "make clear that the standard deliberately provided the imposition of common law liability. second, carden and wilson contend that pervasive federal regulatory scheme, or when state law conflicts with federal law preempted and granted summary judgment to gm. subsequently, carden and in that case, an injured motorist brought a defective design action against an of lap/shoulder belts in all rear seating positions. id. at � 5. the nhtsa promulgated a new lap/shoulder belts was deliberate and for specific policy reasons, particularly the under the supremacy clause, federal law will preempt state law when disagree. a review of the regulatory and rule making history of fmvss 208 otherwise available to it under the federal standards and that suits brought the rule-making and legislative history of fmvss 208 indicates that the preempted. this court reviews the district court's preemption analysis de novo. designs, and included this option as a part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could standard leaves a manufacturer with a choice of safety device options, a state finally, carden and wilson appeal the district court's grant of summary carden and wilson argue that the district court erred in finding that their authority of the national traffic and motor vehicle safety act of 1966 (the vehicle lacked adequate warnings and instructions associated with the vehicle's district court. regulations as opposed to the preemptive effect of the coast guard's decision not 5 petitioners' claim actually conflicted with fmvss 208, explaining that the showing that the 1999 pontiac grand am was uniquely designed so as to warrant the option of installing manual lap-only seat belts, carden's and wilson's seat 6 technological problems associated with requiring the installation of lap/shoulder arguing that their claims are consistent with the policy objectives identified by time. this position was equipped with a lap-only seat belt, which alexa was b. decision to allow manufacturers the option of selecting between the two seat belt return a verdict for the nonmoving party." plyant, 497 f.3d at 538. positions that could accommodate adult passengers and also properly restraint child safety hurley v. motor coach indus., inc., 222 f.3d 377, 383 (7th cir. 2000). congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the existence of a before jones, chief judge, and demoss and stewart, circuit judges. general motors corporation, safety standards is preempted. see griffith v. gen. motors corp., 303 f.3d 1276, wilson agreed to dismiss their remaining claims. carden and wilson timely belts, and the resulting cost. because carden's and wilson's claim would center position. we agree with carden and wilson that pursuant to geier a manufacturer's standard regulated the instructions or warnings for the rear center seat in nhtsa's decision not to mandate lap/shoulder belts in the rear center seat does marketing and failure to warn claims are also preempted federal law. griffith, remains, however, whether carden and wilson submit sufficient evidence to meet considered whether the u.s. coast guard decision not to adopt a regulation wilson have produced no other evidence to support their claim that the 1999 preempted by fmvss 208. also, carden and wilson have not succeeded in assert that the regulation sets a minimum standard and therefore does not exert carden and wilson also brought a defective marketing claim, arguing that the because carden's and wilson's defective marketing and failure to warn claims center position of the vehicle was equipped with a lap-only seat belt ("type 1 seat belt") as opposed to a lap/shoulder belt ("type 2 seat belt"); (2) the rear center based on this language, it is clear that the agency's efficiency. seat belt was equipped with a manual adjusting device, rather than a retractor; to regulate propeller guards."). thus, sprietsma does not control. scheme disallows." wells fargo bank of tex. v. james, 321 f.3d 488, 491 n.3 (5th seating position in passenger vehicles. 32 fed. reg. 2408, 2415 (feb. 3, 1967). manufacturer was negligent for failing to equip the automobile with driver's side manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices." coast guard's decision in sprietsma. this argument is without merit. sprietsma supports the conclusion that the nhtsa's decision to allow car manufacturers marketing and failure to warn claims is sparse. however, from what we can safety seat much less convenient than with current type 1 belt."); 64 fed. reg. 10786, 10788 seats. see, e.g., 49 fed. reg. 15241, 15241-15242 (april 18, 1984) ("the installation of type the use of lap/shoulder seat belts in rear outboard seating. 54 fed. reg. 46257-01 appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to gm. for the following death on behalf of alexa lee wilson; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." fed. r. 7 seatbelts in rear seating positions, the nhtsa amended fmvss 208 to require manufacturers the option between lap-only and lap/shoulder belts, a state law tort claim actually conflicts with fmvss 208, and is thus preempted by for the fifth circuit seating position of passenger vehicles was deliberate, and the agency identified for allowing manufacturers to install either lap belts or lap/shoulder belts. we because at the time the 1999 grand am was manufactured, no federal safety possible that some special design-related circumstance concerning a particular plaintiffs-appellants lisa ann carden, decedent's mother, and ronald lee c. alternatively, carden and wilson contend that even if this court were to active and passive restraint systems." 49 c.f.r. � 571.208.s2 (1996). fmvss in the united states court of appeals 3 before this court: whether fmvss 208 preempted a state common law tort claim. rather than another passive restraint system, and in turn, as a requirement that defendant-appellee. foreclose a deliberate option left to manufacturers under standard 208, namely guard intentionally declined to require propeller guards, it did not convey an authoritative message of a federal policy against them. id. at 64. carden and 8 fifth circuit belt claims are preempted. retractor or a manual adjusting device. separate analysis of carden's and manufactured. between lap-only belts and lap/shoulder belts is essentially the same as the u.s. ii. discussion manufacturers install either a lap-only seat belt or the lap/shoulder belt in a rear no. 06-11182 the nhtsa because the agency never enunciated any specific regulatory policy iii. conclusion children, teenagers and adults and tightly secure child seats). the nhtsa has since retractor claims are also preempted. was no defect about which to warn."). decision to allow manufacturers the option of selecting either lap-only or in geier v. american honda motor co., inc., 529 u.s. 861 (2000), the injuries resulting from traffic accidents." 49 u.s.c. � 30101. federal motor belt installed in the rear center seat. we review a grant of summary judgment of the 1999 pontiac grand am rendered the vehicle unsafe without a lap/shoulder lisa ann carden, individually and for and on decision was deliberate and based on managing technological constraints and cost find that their seatbelt claims are preempted, the district court's grant of this legislation, however, has no bearing on this court's preemption analysis in this case as "safety act"). 15 u.s.c. � 1391 et seq., recodified as amended, 49 u.s.c. � 30101 9 promulgated standards that attempt to address these concerns with child safety by using no. 06-11182 passenger vehicles. the eleventh circuit addressed a similar issue, and held was defectively designed because it was not equipped with propeller guards. the the summary judgment bar. no. 06-11182 specifically, the nhtsa struggled to find balance between seat belt options in rear seating f i l e d carden and wilson also contend that sprietsma v. mercury marine, 537 preemptive effect absent some regulatory policy that would be undermined by the version of fmvss 208, requiring that lap/shoulder belts be phased into all passenger vehicles december 4, 2007 either a lap-only or a lap/shoulder belt which may be equipped with either a excluding the rear center seat from this requirement, the agency explained that safety option intentionally left to vehicle manufacturers by federal motor vehicle devices other than seat belts. see 49 c.f.r. � 571.213. appear to be tied to their defect claims, these claims are also preempted. grand am is in fact unique. this claim appears to be merely an attempt to over a three year period beginning in september 2005. 69 fed. reg. 70904-01 (dec. 8, 2004). directed nhtsa to complete rule-making within two years that would require the installation that where the defective marketing and failure to warn claims are themselves specific policy reasons for its decision. in 1967, when fmvss 208 was initially therefore establishes the types of passenger restraint systems which car and