Plaintiffs Appeal Order to Pay Defendants' Fees

thorpes alleged defendants denied them numerous constitutional rights and claimed merely claim the investigation was not thorough enough. thus, even if all the statements for the purpose of obtaining a-1's business records without a warrant. they also claimed probable cause. where probable cause exists, the subjective intent of the officer in the award of fees in a � 1983 case does not merely provide some compensation to robert thorpe contained erroneous charges, the mistake was clearly inadvertent and the facts of this case are well-known to the parties and do not bear lengthy frivolous: malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages." novitsky v. city of aurora, 491 f.3d 36, 46-47, 49.) despite the fact that the statute of limitations had run on their claims for for summary judgment would have been different. they argued they had not seen the prosecution of the criminal charges against them. jointly liable for the fees incurred after defendants filed their motions for summary investigate the veracity of [the] allegations against [them], subjected [them] to illegal burglary. remaining information in the affidavits failed to establish probable cause for their arrests. federal law governs when a civil rights claim accrues for purposes of the statute of defendants because stone concluded a logical person could believe the thorpes were 666 (9th cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also munson v. milwaukee bd. of sch. dirs., of subjectivity where he could not tell the difference between anthony's id. at 665 (footnotes omitted). any defendant supplied false information to a state agency; no evidence of under 42 u.s.c. � 1988(b), "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing stanley ancell; julia - 12 - v. lmc holding co., 497 f.3d 1135, 1245 n.12 (10th cir. 2007) (quotations omitted) case against the investigators went to trial. after baker had presented his case and rested, goichman v. city of aspen, 859 f.2d 1466, 1471 (10th cir. 1988). "this standard of the charging document for robert thorpe, attested to by culver, mistakenly included citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical review applies to both the court's decision to award fees in the first place and the court's "a much smaller amount . . .would suffice as a deterrent." (appellants' br. at 44-45.) a successful prosecution is not a constitutional violation. thorpe which contained erroneous charges. culver admitted he probably did not read the baker, testified . . . baker seized the wrong piano under [a] warrant . . . grand junction police department. the sheriff defendants also filed a motion to dismiss searches and seizures, harassed [them] and falsified evidence against them." (r. vol. i at the three employees reported numerous criminal activities perpetrated by the thorpes at operated by the thorpes, supplied the suspect's bond. several informants claimed heather fish, an a-1 employee, knowingly accepted the bank robbery proceeds with craig tyer; lissah norcross; substantiate its decision on fees, we will affirm. requests for search and arrest warrants established probable cause, thus negating any own bail bond business which was operating at the time the thorpes filed their complaint elisabeth a. shumaker by fish and the greens are eliminated, the thorpes could not reasonably believe the lot of falsehoods; and baker's report falsely stated that isham and other investigation of the thorpes or the district attorney's decision to pursue a criminal arnold miller, an expert in law enforcement investigation administration only claim not barred by the statute of limitations was based on allegations of malicious 969 f.2d 266, 271 (7th cir. 1992) ("it is possible for an initially nonfrivolous action to permission from the thorpes. because the alleged transaction occurred in the city rather entries . . . into the [thorpes'] criminal file[s]" to be viewed by the press. (r. vol. i at the litigation, not just at its inception." galen v. county of los angeles, 477 f.3d 652, while investigation of these allegations was proceeding, the thorpes lodged a complaint - 20 - - 14 - than the county, tyer passed the information to the grand junction police department. defendants "unlawfully caused [them] to be wrongly investigated, charged, arrested and tenth circuit determination of the amount of fees to be awarded." robinson v. city of edmond, 160 . and [t]he mesa county sheriff's department was being sued by the "[t]he decision to award or deny attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of influence a public servant charges were also initiated by the colorado department of likelihood of conviction. stone issued a report ("the stone report") criticizing the unreasonable or groundless, a district court must avoid "post hoc reasoning by would you trust these players?! would a logical person not ask about his investigation into the fire and theft at the inn which contained a insurance fraud following a fire at the motel where he was a manager. he was warrant a fee award. see jane l. v. bangerter, 61 f.3d 1505, 1513-14 (10th cir. 1995). take any depositions of the sheriff defendants after receiving their sworn affidavits court found the affidavits supporting the arrest and search warrants demonstrated charges written by the prosecutor before he signed the document. however, there was no of limitations would have run on all of their claims occurring prior to june 26, 2001. the withdrawn following an agreement with defendants. 7 the thorpes, the officers did not rely on information from "reliable" citizens. rather, fourteenth amendment violations for unreasonable search and seizure. these claims - 16 - order and judgment* mistake are insufficient" to sustain a claim for a constitutional violation; merit, "there is certainly nothing novel about holding clients responsible for the conduct the thorpes' repeated assertions, the affidavits do not premise probable cause solely on b. malicious prosecution and a criminal justice specialist, testified . . . baker's investigation was a a. statute of limitations the district court correctly rejected this argument because the relationship of these (affirming dismissal under rule 41(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure). had violated the thorpes' rights nor did he refute the sheriff defendants' sworn was given the voluminous investigation file. in january 2001, waite decided to dismiss defendants - appellees. - 9 - robert paul thorpe; maria reiteration. in december 1998, a bank robbery investigation by sheriff deputies lissah the thorpes' case without prejudice because he needed more time to review the police response were more than one hundred pages of exhibits primarily attacking the veracity documents. the thorpes do not allege any of this supporting information was false; they (10th cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). revealed the sheriff defendants had no connection to the thorpes' prosecution and were therefore, only the federal claims against defendants in their individual capacities in the complaint were improperly "concocted" to be publicized in judicial proceedings. veracity" and "known moral t[u]rpitude" to " seduce or solicit[] minor children to violate involved only in the bank robbery investigation (as attested to in their affidavits). it also the thorpes relied on the stone report to demonstrate thorpes maintain a judicial officer would not find probable cause for their arrests had the unconvinced, the district court ordered the thorpes to pay the fees requested by routine, this is not a case where the thorpes are being "punished for [their] failure to achieved a favorable result in the original action.") (citation and quotations omitted). limitations. fratus v. deland, 49 f.3d 673, 675 (10th cir. 1995). "a civil rights action legal theory, . . . [or] whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." neitzke v. williams, officers ancell and culver were not a part of stogsdill's investigation, although alleged defendants manufactured, altered and destroyed evidence, affirmatively sought on june 27, 2002. error was discovered. shortly after the criminal charges were refiled, the state court and was frantically pursuing anthony; and in his ten years as an officers revealed the known motivations of these witnesses to fabricate evidence. becoming familiar with the parties through the course of the proceedings. because the thus, that judge was particularly well qualified to make the partially subjective findings court dismissed the state law claims against defendants in their official capacities. it also officers conspired to have anthony pass a polygraph examination. ii. procedural background of their attorneys, even conduct they did not know about." ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, inc. - 18 - even so, the thorpes' first amended complaint continued to claim fourth, eighth and as the district court noted, the sheriff defendants' supporting affidavits to their they knowingly relied on material misrepresentations by unreliable witnesses. the - 8 - corroborated by computer checks regarding property ownership, interviews with the "[a] plaintiff should not be assessed his a-1, including forgery and the knowing receipt of a portion of the bank robbery money. anthony. undersheriff wooley and deputies gardner, norcross and tyer. claussen, wooley and due process claim for malicious prosecution arises only once the original action, sheriff's department (who the thorpes were suing for violations of their pending during the bank robbery investigation. suspicions at his deposition, he did not testify he believed any of the sheriff defendants granting a directed verdict based on the following evidence: cir. r. 32.1(a). citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. fed. r. app. 32.1. insurance and followed up by telephone calls to agencies the thorpes listed as former (3d cir. 1991) (quotations and alterations omitted). disregard for the truth when he attested to the june 2001 charging document for robert finally, the thorpes argue the stone report justified the lawsuit against the police and tyer?? in reality, fish was a police snitch, patton was a bank robber . . culver. they also included a letter from currie to waite inquiring whether waite was lawsuit claiming individuals from the mesa county sheriff's department and the grand attorneys' fees are unwarranted because ancell and culver deliberately presented false moreover, the thorpes' unsupported and sensational factual allegations were certainly theft by receiving charges) were corroborated by another witness and the thorpes' own united states court of appeals judgment in favor of the defendants, the court ordered the thorpes to pay attorneys' fees clerk of court concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been the law, misrepresented information or that the officers arrested the thorpes without norcross1 david wooley; riecke claussen; to have him found guilty of a crime or crimes that he could not have been the search and arrest warrants contained sufficient statements of probable cause deter the filing of frivolous lawsuits. they claim because their "reasonable belief they even after he was notified that it was the wrong piano [and] . . . that he did - 11 - - 15 - 1172, 1175 (10th cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). the district court concluded the defense of the thorpes' federal claims commencing on august 11, 2003, the day after the ancell and culver conducted a vigorous investigation or that law enforcement hoped for ordered the charges be tried separately. due to that decision and his concern over having i. factual background not care if it was the wrong piano . . .; baker stated words to the effect that investigator, to review and comment on the thorpes' investigation file to determine the affirmed. a second round of motions to dismiss ensued. on february 11, 2005, the district from their conviction that ancell and culver somehow did something to violate their and a witness, as well as the homeowner's identification of the allegedly stolen their lawsuit was not frivolous. they also continued to insist deliberate fabrications and b. motions for attorneys' fees employers on their resumes to obtain a license to instruct a bondsman class. burglary complaint." (r. vol. ix at 1146.) these findings are more than sufficient to justify the - 6 - charges intended only for maria thorpe. those charges were dropped as soon as the interviewing the thorpes and fish, stogsdill conducted a brief follow-up investigation bond with some of the robbery proceeds. a-1 bail bonds, a company owned and prosecution. see mondragon v. thompson, 519 f.3d 1078, 1083 (10th cir. 2008) ("[a] immediately remedied upon its discovery. there was no factual support for the stating they did not participate in the investigation leading to the thorpes' arrests. rather of defendants' investigations, the stone report did not state anyone knowingly violated statute of limitations does not start running before the elements of a claim are satisfied, going forward with the prosecution. of their claims and he only intended to zealously represent his clients. the thorpes he detective green, a deputy in the sheriff's office and a personal friend of prosecuted based upon information known to be false . . . . defendants failed to motivate the thorpes to depose any of the sheriff defendants in order to provide a the thorpes had filed a motion to appoint a special prosecutor and to recuse the guilt or innocence; baker became almost frantic about the anthony case these witnesses' credibility.10 plaintiffs, the supreme court has imposed a different standard for awarding attorneys' filed indeed, the thorpes have yet to retract the allegations or even address this transgression. attorney's fees to compensate defendants rather than award the least amount necessary to removed or withdrawn prior to the time summary judgment issued. the thorpes failed to subjective bad faith" to award fees to a prevailing defendant. christianburg, 434 u.s. at (only in "rare circumstances" will "a suit [be] truly frivolous so as to warrant an award of united states circuit judge and robert culver interviewed fish and two other a-1 employees, sherri and joe green.2 pursuant to 42 u.s.c. � 1988(b). the thorpes appeal from the district court's order police defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement. attached to their of title vii of the civil rights act of 1964. see 42 u.s.c. � 2000e-5(k). however, that united states court of appeals claim because ancell and culver knew these witnesses had a motivation to falsely accuse this order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th necessary for an award of attorney's fees." quiroga v. hasbro, inc., 934 f.2d 497, 503 original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with - 13 - rights during an investigation and malicious prosecution. after granting summary - 2 - robert and maria thorpe (together "the thorpes") filed a 42 u.s.c. � 1983 attorney's office declined to prosecute fish. however, the investigation of the thorpes found not only that the thorpes' claims were frivolous but that "courts are not proper - 19 - claims. nonetheless, the thorpes did not disavow any of the allegations. and craig tyer led to information that a suspect may have paid for his bail shortly after november 1, 1999, either the thorpes terminated fish's employment with a-1 or fish voluntarily resigned. fish and joe green then started their the complaint also named the mesa county sheriff's department and the mesa officer julie stogsdill was assigned to conduct an investigation of these charges.3 reports and conduct his own investigation. waite refiled the charges in june 2001, but laws." 42 u.s.c. � 1983. state law governs statute of limitations issues in � 1983 charges were instigated by a telephone call from the colorado department of insurance the knowing falsification of any document; no evidence any defendant "cultivat[ed] false "[t]he same judge who presided over all proceedings also determined the fee award. in sum, there was no evidence supporting the thorpes' claims that defendants u.s. at 171. avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters." hensley v. stogsdill; robert russell; one year later, the thorpes filed the current lawsuit pursuant to 42 u.s.c. � 1983 john c. jackson; robert m. david wooley, also known as jesse defendants altered or falsified evidence during the investigation and prosecution. the fora for publication of fantastic allegations of the sort that the thorpes concocted in their eeoc, 434 u.s. 412, 417, 421 (1978).9 1988(b). against fish for allegedly forging documents and stealing money from a-1. police claim for malicious prosecution. the law is well-settled: a constitutional violation exists factual basis for stone's flights of fancy. while stone reiterated some of the same defendants pursuant to 42 u.s.c. � 1988(b).8 3 the district court also held the affidavits in support of the police defendants' events from 1999 through 2002, but was primarily based on the investigation and remained. subsequently awarded them their attorneys' fees. we reversed, finding the court erred in rarely will a case be sufficiently frivolous to justify imposing attorneys' fees on any way to the suicide of the thorpes' son. nonetheless, the thorpes had never attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or judgment. the attorney filed a separate appeal (no. 06-1405) but the appeal was not created out of whole cloth by their attorney. the cause of action accrues." see roberts v. barreras, 484 f.3d 1236, 1238, 1240 (10th money) and conspiracy to commit these offenses. maria thorpe was also charged with to be groundless during discovery."). opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, despite knowing the charges were false. they further alleged defendants illegally actions and "that limitation period is set by the personal injury statute in the state where cause. credibility of opposing parties. 422; see also hensley, 461 u.s. at 429 n.2 ("a prevailing defendant may recover an only activity after june 26, 2001, was the final dismissal of criminal charges. thus, the omissions in the affidavits supporting the arrest and search warrants vitiated probable witnesses. disregard for the truth and the remaining material contains insufficient content to support several state law violations. the factual basis of their complaint covered miscellaneous were obviously without merit and should have been withdrawn. anthony v. baker, 767 f.2d 657 (10th cir. 1985), wherein anthony was charged for continual, blatant, unrelenting effort both to accuse anthony and ultimately claims were omitted from the amended complaint nor were these allegations voluntarily - 5 - subsequently tried and found not guilty. anthony then filed suit under 42 u.s.c. � 1983 citizens (fish, the greens and the bank robber). (r. supp. vol. i at 25, 40.) the thorpes might there not be some history between the thorpes, the mesa county - 10 - rights. plaintiff - appellant, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. � 1927, the court held the thorpes' original attorney sheriff defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint negated any factual basis to junction, the grand junction police department, police chief martyn currie and officers the thorpes claimed the defendants enlisted fish to seduce their sixteen�year-old son flatly contradicted by the undisputed facts. at the time of the thorpes' response to the thorpes received the affidavits attached to the sheriff defendants' first motion to submitted pages of documents irrelevant to this case in an attempt to challenge the the thorpes also complain culver knowingly misrepresented or showed reckless the thorpes' steadfast refusal to accept the district court's conclusion is notable in this is not to say their credibility would be unimportant to a finding of guilt agencies to destroy the thorpes' business and intentionally misstated facts to the media. fees to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases. see christiansburg garment co. v. the thorpes were charged with, inter alia, motor vehicle theft, theft over included in the affidavits any false information or that any omissions were intentionally cir. 2007). the limitations period for a personal injury action in colorado is two years. christianburg standard to cases in which a defendant seeks fees under � 1988(b). see the thorpes filed their original complaint on june 26, 2003. therefore, the statute after completing discovery, defendants filed motions for summary judgment. supported and corroborated by several avenues of evidence, the thorpes do not budge 1244, 1258 (10th cir. 2007). the district court held that the affidavits attached to the alleged fish was a known prostitute and known to have made false allegations in the past. v. (d. colo.) interference with business and intentional infliction of emotional distress, none of these should not order him or the thorpes to pay defendants' attorneys' fees under 42 u.s.c. � a. summary judgment provision is virtually identical to � 1988(b) and the supreme court has applied the unreasonable or without foundation." christiansburg, 434 u.s. at 421-22. dismissal of than seeking the facts, the thorpes obviously intended to rely on stone's speculations to investigator he had never seen anything like baker's investigation of february 11, 2005, the day the district court dismissed the thorpes' state law claims. robert isham, a former sergeant in the sheriff's office, testified . . . baker the bank robbery investigation in 1999 or 2000 when they turned the case over to the view of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of party, other than the united states, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" in an "conspiratorial meetings"; and no evidence any defendant "placed anonymous false support them. each knew of the other's investigation. culver; martyn currie; against mesa county sheriff riecke claussen, undersheriff david wooley, and deputies after to support their contention that the claims against the sheriff's defendants were not evidence inferring the oversight was deliberate. "allegations of negligence or innocent their "spurious assertions" which were supported only by "misrepresentations and the exhibits included material from the personnel files of tyer, ancell, and gardner stated they had no connection with the police investigation of the thorpes or to prove each of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt in separate trials (although he baker and newton moved for and were granted a directed verdict. the court the constitutional rights of others" causing the suicide of a minor child; no evidence of demonstrating a substantial probability that a crime has been committed and that a civil rights) and heather fish that might cause robert thorpe to distrust terrence l. o'brien out parties to assert false complaints against them and continued to prosecute them the testimony in anthony is easily distinguished from stone's second-hand again blamed their former attorney for failing to present evidence. attached to the 490 u.s. 319, 327 (1989). however, the court need not find the lawsuit was "brought in the malicious prosecution claim for failure to state a claim or in the alternative for a more order to show cause, they still did not concede their claims were frivolous but, instead, on june 15, 2000.4 action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause to support the a finding of probable cause. see franks v. delaware, 438 u.s. 154, 171-72 (1978). thorpes for two million dollars for an alleged bad search warrant on a-1. retained different counsel, who filed a response to the order to show cause on their being "set . . . up" by law enforcement. (r. vol. iv at 507.) they rely on our decision in in 1997, the thorpes filed a separate � 1983 action against members of the the court granted these motions on may 1, 2006. it noted the thorpes were relentless in sheriff defendants filed a motion seeking $65,060 in attorneys' fees for their a second set of search warrants issued on june 23, 2000. (d.c. no. 03-cv-01181-ltb-bnb) district court offered sound reasons to conclude the thorpes' action was frivolous and to concluded the thorpes had failed to present any evidence demonstrating the police thorpes' claims were not only frivolous but the "fantastic" factual allegations contained tyer, norcross and william gardner (sheriff defendants) and the city of grand allegations that fish was "a known prostitute" or that the investigation was connected in what will deter any particular plaintiff is uniquely within the trial court's expertise after he was going to get anthony whatever it took; . . . baker reached a point defendants; the thorpes did not object. the district court granted the motion. support their own view of events. similarly, despite the fact the affidavits in support of elizabeth thorpe, were treated unlawfully by defendants . . . justified . . .their complaint" and, in any event, william "bill" gardner, 34-35.) some of the factual allegations were astounding. for example, the thorpes recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in [their] claims." hughes, 449 u.s. at 15. entered by the court: while christiansburg makes clear the award of attorney's fees to a defendant are not and submitted her investigation report to the district attorney's office. the district pleadings before the order to show cause but relied on their attorney to handle their dismiss. police defendants also moved for $88,392.50 in attorneys' fees commencing on exaggerations" of the record. (r. vol. 5 at 725.) it determined the undisputed evidence ancell, culver, stogsdill, robert russell and john jackson (police defendants).6 motion were the thorpes' arrest and search warrants and supporting affidavits. sheriff on october 27, 1999, grand junction police department officers stanley ancell whatever form it has taken, has been terminated in favor of the plaintiff. because the notation b (unpublished). id. against them), waite decided to dismiss the charges with prejudice. they were dismissed 10 dismissed the claims against the city of grand junction and its police department. withdrawn any of these sensational accusations even though there was no factual basis to the statute of limitations for this due process claim cannot start until the plaintiff has defendants filed a motion to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject matter [and] clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award." houston v. norton, 215 f.3d misrepresentations must be deliberate or in reckless disregard of the facts. franks, 438 8 or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." id. at and, in any event, they should not be sanctioned more severely. while the thorpes may definite statement. the district court granted the motions for a more definite statement section 1983 provides a federal civil cause of action against state officials for the the actions of law enforcement caused their son's suicide in may 2000. the thorpes fish (a former sheriff's department's "booking tech." in the jail), patton embarrass the defendant."). a frivolous suit is one "based on an indisputably meritless the district court sua sponte ordered the thorpes' counsel to show cause why it their prosecution; deputies norcross and tyer testified they ended their involvement in 5 jurisdiction based on the thorpes' failure to comply with the requirements of the the district court noted that throughout the proceedings the thorpes played fast 421. "a defendant can recover if the plaintiff violates this standard at any point during first motion to dismiss refuted any involvement with the police department's award of fees to defendants. and loose with the record in supporting their arguments to the point some assertions were county board of commissioners. sheriff defendants filed a motion to dismiss these iii. discussion patently frivolous and groundless suits. the court "consider[ed] the . . . plaintiff[s'] statements made while fish was wearing a wire; the motor vehicle theft charges were only when an affidavit contains information that is deliberately false or in reckless see colo. rev. stat. � 13-80-102; workman v. jordan, 32 f.3d 475, 482 (10th cir. 1994). the absence of any appeal of the court's grant of summary judgment. instead, they argue special prosecutor david waite was assigned to the case in october 2000.5 february 26, 2010 (quotations omitted). be trying to set me up?" original suspicions of wrongdoing. but the disclosure of these speculations did not resulted in search and arrest warrants issued on june 7, 2000, and criminal charges filed witnesses to the thorpes was set forth in the officers' affidavits. moreover, contrary to 4 inter alia, that two investigators, baker and newton, "conspired to deprive him of his affidavits provided to the thorpes in response to their original complaint. action to enforce civil rights. while courts apply this provision liberally to prevailing it is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. information to the grand jury and covering up exculpatory information." id. at 660. the in response to the defendants' specific requests for attorneys' fees, the thorpes probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. there was no evidence ancell or culver sheriff's department including norcross. the case was eventually dismissed but was 2 the plaintiff. see clajon prod. corp. v. petera, 70 f.3d 1566, 1581 (10th cir. 1995) christiansburg addressed the standard applicable to the attorneys' fee provision ruminations. even assuming it was somehow admissible and recognizing that it is critical behalf. in their response to the order to show cause, the thorpes asserted the summary of the individual defendants.7 a � 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the following elements: "(1) the involved in; and baker's efforts were made at virtually any cost. the summary judgment response but, had he done so, the result of defendants' motions themselves, "wait a minute! this stinks! could the sheriff's department false arrest, unconstitutional searches, unconstitutional seizures, defamation, intentional before murphy, holloway, and o'brien, circuit judges. "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and attorneys' fees to the defendant"). in determining whether a claim is frivolous, - 3 - mishandling of the case. they averred their lawyer had not presented critical evidence in the thorpes argue the district court abused its discretion because it awarded the court, and, on appeal, review is subject to an abuse of discretion standard." - 17 - become frivolous when, for example, the factual basis supporting the complaint is shown the * defendant caused the plaintiff's continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original constitutional rights by making him the target of their investigation, giving false for malicious prosecution and deprivation of his constitutional rights. anthony alleged, junction police department (collectively "defendants") violated their constitutional allege the sheriff defendants caused the thorpes' prosecution. similarly, the affidavits charges against maria thorpe were corroborated by an interview with the homeowner searched their home after their son's death, communicated false information to state beyond a reasonable doubt. but "[p]robable cause for an arrest warrant is established by claims at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage does not automatically in august 2000, the district attorney's office asked gilbert stone, its lead ability to recognize the objective merit" of their allegations and "provide[d] a concise awarding fees. we affirm. the thorpes filed their first amended complaint on march 29, 2004, alleging f.3d 1275, 1280 (10th cir. 1998). an abuse of discretion standard "is appropriate in no. 06-1404 testimony" in exchange for a reduction of sentence; no evidence of threats; no evidence - 7 - the thorpes' attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a response to the 1 plaintiff must produce to avoid an adverse award of fees. however, the district court the defendants for costs incurred in defending a suit but also deters a plaintiff from filing $15,000, attempt to influence a public servant, theft by receiving (the bank robbery but denied, without prejudice, sheriff defendants' motions to dismiss. prosecution. the thorpes disagree, relying on the following statement in stone's report eckerhart, 461 u.s. 424, 437 (1983). allegations concerning the bank robbery money (i.e., the 6 the thorpes also argue they should not be punished for their attorney's decisions fabricated evidence; no evidence they "use[d] as their agents, persons of questionable judgment result was not due to the lack of evidence but solely to their attorney's mesa county district attorney's office because some of its employees were potential accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent." id. - 4 - tenth circuit specific individual committed the crime." see bruner v. baker, 506 f.3d 1021, 1026 effectuating an arrest is irrelevant. malley v. briggs, 475 u.s. 335, 341 (1986). the fact believed probable cause existed for the thorpes' arrests on each of the charges filed investigation. in support of the requests for the search and arrest warrants established probable cause. 9 wish to blame their attorney for continuing the suit after it was proven to be without statements when they averred the information in the affidavits was given by "reliable" unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th cir. r. 32.1(a). or recklessly made. while the court acknowledged the 2002 charging document against against fish. (r. vol. iv at 507.) to be sure, stone's speculations provide support for the thorpe's had submitted an interdepartmental report to the sheriff and other officers order to show cause on his own behalf, alleging the thorpes had assured him of the verity hensley, 461 u.s. at 429 n.2; hughes v. rowe, 449 u.s. 5, 14-15 (1980). christiansburg did not provide precise guidance on the amount of evidence the victim and his girlfriend, and copies of the towing charges. the theft of over $15,000 colorado governmental immunity act. they attached the affidavits of sheriff claussen, followed by interviews with a-1's insurance company and the victims; the attempt to