Taxi Commission Refuses Limousine Permit for Prius

eleventh circuit we begin with count ii of the complaint because leib's appeal makes no mention of3 8 assuming that the "purpose of the underlying statute" criterion left the commission opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly," and "must foremost ins. co., 511 f.3d 1300, 1303 (11th cir. 2008). to qualify as a limousine. if leib were granted a waiver, it is unclear why a waiver classification." id. if a law treats individuals differently on the basis of race or public vehicles upon the public highways of hillsborough county and its spaciousness, the amenities it provides to passengers, its comparison to current zoning ordinance examined in vfw john o'connor. we disagree. the (11th cir. 1990). the first step in assessing violations of the commerce clause is "environmentally-friendly passengers that desire to utilize ecologically superior _________________________ have appeared on a fuller presentation."). by common understanding." this that and other gift & tobacco, inc. v. cobb u.s. 620, 632 (1996). more importantly, there is no need to show that the rule we first reject leib's argument that the district court erred in dismissing his with a capacity for 15 passengers or less, including the driver"). but this hardly environmentally-friendly transportation services offered by leib's toyota prius, suggests that rule 1.15 burdens in-state and out-of-state commerce equally. leib's complaint under rule 12(b)(6). after thorough review, we affirm. in the united states court of appeals safety. but the commission need not show that luxury vehicles are always safer unconstitutionally vague (count v), and that they place an unconstitutional burden create a substantial hardship or would violate principles of fairness." leib argues constitutional review in federal court and deny state regulators the critical claim" is generally easier than in cases where governmental action is above, rule 15.5 provides that "[v]ariances and waivers shall be granted when the leib subsequently applied for a waiver of rule 1.15's "luxury" requirement. claims. limousine within hillsborough county, leib had to obtain a permit from the driver. this definition consists of vehicles which are recognized by accordingly, leib's interstate commerce claim was properly dismissed. its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the iv. (february 19, 2009) 383, 388 (5th cir. 2008) (although asserted independently, plaintiffs' "unbridled 20 we also reject the "class of one" equal protection argument asserted in allegations in his complaint as true, but this is simply incorrect. quite to the the literal application of a rule affects a particular person in a manner in sum, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed leib's federal claims, we also find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to retain health, safety, morals, or general welfare." but the test is not whether the luxury equal protection claim does not allege discrimination against a protected class, but even putting aside its uncertain doctrinal basis, leib's arbitrary and `similarly situated' could subject nearly all state regulatory decisions to confusion. leib contends that the district court erred by failing to accept the determinations concerning rule 1.15's "luxury" requirement involve the and thus did not meet the definition of "limousine" in hcptc taxi rule 1.15, decisions at issue in this case are of the latter variety because the commission's denied it. the commission based its decision on hcptc taxi rule 15.5, which at an august 2007 meeting, however, the hcptc considered the request and county, 938 f.2d 1239, 1241 (11th cir. 1991). this standard is easily met. as the common-sense understanding of what counts as a "limousine" and what counts as a only whether the rule, and in particular its "luxury" requirement, has any rational fundamental rights and are not discriminatory. in re wood, 866 f.2d 1367, 1371 that is the supposed beneficiary of the putative burden on interstate commerce. treatment." young apartments, inc. v. town of jupiter, fla., 529 f.3d 1027, 1032 supervise the operation of public vehicles upon the public highways and in all should not be given for virtually any other vehicle. plaintiff-appellant, supreme court has held, under rational basis review, a state "has no obligation to power claim and conclude that the district court was correct to dismiss it as well. claim pursuant to 28 u.s.c. � 1367. because we affirm the district court's dismissal of leib's affirmed. versus limousine so long as it meets rule 1.15's luxury and other requirements. claims asserted in the complaint. cf. lindquist v. city of pasadena, tex., 525 f.3d unbridled discretion claim is that the "purpose of the underlying statute" standard follows a fortiori that the rules survive rational basis review here as well. the commission violated his right to earn a living under the fifth and fourteenth efficient regulation because the prius simply does not have the features necessary leib emphasizes that under the rule "all passengers (including those engaged in defendant unequally applied a facially neutral ordinance for the purpose of the "arbitrary and capricious" cause of action is uncertain. in advancing the claim, generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. id. for purposes of this section, "principles of fairness" are violated when similarly situated businesses or properties." given the complaint's complete lack amendment (count ii). in addition, the complaint alleges that the commission before marcus, wilson and pryor, circuit judges. [publish] d. c. docket no. 07-01598-cv-t-24-tgw rule 1.15 easily survives rational basis review. because leib does not any guidance in ruling upon waiver requests, and that the rule therefore gives the what the standards would be for other types of claims such as physical taking and yet even on the merits, leib's unbridled discretion claim is unpersuasive. no rule or standard at all." seniors civil liberties ass'n, inc. v. kemp, 965 f.2d comparator." id. at 1204. appeal from the united states district court 6 conceivable basis that might support it, even if that basis has no foundation in the with potentially too much discretion when considered in isolation, the impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. the constitution's contrary, the court concluded that, even assuming that all of his allegations were protectionism, in which case the measure is generally invalid per se. city of creating the commission, the legislature gave it the authority to "[r]egulate and equal protection claim in count ii. the equal protection clause requires the3 18 dispensation from rule 1.15's requirements might well undermine orderly and regulating the operation of public vehicles on hillsborough county's public it is true that the definition of "limousine" in the hcptc's enabling act does not the commission "unbridled discretion" in the enforcement of its rules. as noted government has the power or authority to regulate the particular area in question, variances and waivers shall be granted when the person subject to the and the means it has chosen to achieve it. cash inn of dade, inc. v. metro. dade person subject to the rule demonstrates that the purpose of the underlying statute on interstate commerce (count vii). each count asserts both a facial and an as-2 explains the circumstances under which waivers and variances are to be granted: (11th cir. 1989) ("the standard for evaluating substantive due process challenges (defining "limousine" as "any motor vehicle for hire not equipped with a taximeter, appeal presuppose that his claims are subject only to rational basis review. commerce clause gives congress the power to regulate commerce among the the rule is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. id. moreover, claims. see, e.g., douglas asphalt co. v. qore, inc., 541 f.3d 1269, 1275 (11th regard this as a straightforward substantive due process claim, the precise basis for 1990). while eide indeed recognized an "arbitrary and capricious due process the court are deemed abandoned). defendant-appellee. "limousine," the hcptc's was doing precisely what it was created to do. highways. act of may 25, 2001, ch. 2001-299, � 2(1). the commission denied (internal quotation omitted). 3 one" claim was properly dismissed. post #4833 v. santa rosa county, fla., 506 f. supp. 2d 1079 (n.d. fla. 2007). v. "luxury" quality of vehicles will be determined by assessing aesthetics record. id. under rational basis review, a court must accept a legislature's "unreasonably required the plaintiff to submit to controls not imposed on other hcptc rule 1.15 is not an overtly protectionist measure. on its face, the principles of fairness. for purposes of this section, "substantial _________________________ violated leib's right to due process by arbitrarily and capriciously denying his government to treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. gary v. city of his complaint makes only the barest conclusory assertion that the hcptc's rules complaint as true. specifically, he claims that the complaint's "allegations of his precise nature of this claim or to indicate the way in which it differs from other subject only to rational basis review. the rational basis test asks (1) whether the ii. furthermore, we have observed that where the challenged governmental significantly different from the way i[t] affects other similarly situated standard. at the most general level, for example, the statute makes clear that the such "rights are state-created . . . , not `fundamental' rights created by the constitution." omitted). the commission's definition of "luxury" easily meets this standard. procedural due process claims." id. at 720 n.6. leib's failure to articulate the inherent degree of imprecision in making "aesthetic" judgments. but "the hcptc, the administrative agency charged by the florida state legislature with the hcptc's rules violate a fundamental right, his equal protection claim is4 arbitrary and capricious claim because it failed to accept the allegations in his of this opinion. which states: discretionary decisions made over an extended period of time." id. at 1203; cf. is only one of the criteria mentioned in rule 15.5. the rule goes on to say that a waiver may be granted when application of a rule would "create a substantial clerk leib owns and operates tb limo.com, a limousine service in the tampa other matters affecting the relationship between such operation and the traveling industry standards -- in terms of which "luxury" is to be judged. true, there is an forbids a state or municipality from impeding the flow of goods and services across 4 permission to operate a toyota prius as one of the limousines offered by his for the eleventh circuit conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured inc., 455 u.s. 489, 498 (1982). in particular, the court has "expressed greater indeed, even in run-of-the-mill discrimination cases, we have emphasized that discretion they need to effectively perform their duties." griffin, 496 f.3d at 1203. jurisdiction over the state law claim. see, e.g., parker v. scrap metal processors, inc., 468 f.3d persons who are subject to the rule.1 review. see, e.g., tyler, 70 f.3d at 465. vi. "limousine" means any motor vehicle for hire not equipped with a for the middle district of florida discussed more fully in the next section, is the gravamen of a void-for-vagueness moreover, leib's argument rests on a factual mistake: he argues that count ii alongside leib's traditional equal protection claim. a "class of one" "luxury" vehicle. rule 1.15 gives these concepts even further content and meaning hence, the district court was correct in dismissing leib's "unbridled discretion" is too nebulous for people of ordinary intelligence to comply with -- which, as is 5 limits imposed by the "substantial hardship" and "principles of fairness" standards. discriminating against him. id. at 1045. leib's "class of one claim" fails to meet provide explicit standards for those who apply them." grayned v. city of applied challenge to the commission's rules. affects a particular person in a manner significantly different from the way i[t] 2009. minor changes were made to rule 15.5's text but none of these is important for purposes ________________________ claims. indeed, because they are so poorly developed, the substantive due process amendments (count i), and his right to equal protection under the fourteenth his argument in support of the claim rests almost entirely on vfw john o'connor rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. id. be unconstitutional if they somehow burdened interstate commerce. nat'l solid count i (which alleged a violation of his right to earn a living under the fifth and fourteenth process claims are subject to rational basis review, so long as they do not infringe states. u.s. const. art. 1, � 8, cl. 3. correlatively, "the commerce clause also suggests that the requirement is contrary to the legislature's intent. rather, in the definiteness of either of the latter standards. indeed, the rule goes on to define for vehicles performing limousine service in hillsborough county. the hcptc made changes to certain of its rules that became effective on january 2,1 survived rational basis review for purposes of leib's equal protection claim, it commission unbridled discretion in making decisions. we disagree. 1030, 1036 (11th cir. 1992). hardship" means a demonstrated economic, technological, legal, or claim from his void-for-vagueness claim. leib's chief argument in support of the "seems unwise . . . or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." romer v. evans, 517 traditional limousines, leib bought a prius. in order to operate the prius as a officials (count vi). finally, leib's suit alleges that the commission's rules are other legitimate governmental aim. we are therefore unpersuaded by leib's police we are also unpersuaded by leib's claim in count vi that rule 15.5 gives accordingly, the district court properly dismissed leib's void-for-vagueness claim. as an initial matter, we note once again that leib fails to articulate the other type of hardship to the person requesting the variance or waiver. for largely the same reasons, we reject leib's suggestion in count v that the in addition to the claims arising under � 1983, the complaint asserts a claim under2 420 f.3d 1288, 1290 (11th cir. 2005). since prearranged public transportation the industry as "luxury" vehicles, that are considered as high-end leib further contends that the luxury requirement fails rational basis review, than other vehicles; it need only show a rational relationship between luxury and standard is no more definite than the "proper showing" waiver standard of the local to social and economic legislation is virtually identical to the `rational relationship' forth a "class of one" claim should not be regarded as a perfunctory matter. vii. requirement is rationally related to preventing such misrepresentations and "degree of vagueness that the constitution tolerates . . . depends in part on the include a luxury requirement. act of may 25, 2001, ch. 2001-299, � 3(17) true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. mills v. rule 1.15 is not unconstitutionally vague. consumers and travelers have a contest the government's power to regulate public transportation, we need consider and (2) whether there is a rational relationship between the government's objective burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative considerations, comparison with industry standards). in short, establishing a classifies persons in such a way that they receive different treatment under the law, he cites only our decision in eide v. sarasota county, 908 f.2d 716 (11th cir. commission was established to ensure the orderly and efficient "operation of "substantial hardship" as "a demonstrated economic, technological, legal, or other difficulty of establishing "class of one" equal protection claims where discretionary of the interior and exterior of the vehicle, amenities provided to the waivers will be consistent with the orderly regulation of public vehicles in some as noted previously, while leib's complaint alleges a violation of his right to earn a4 true, leib was unable to show that rule 1.15 and its luxury requirement lacked a hcptc was created -- gives substance to the "purpose of the underlying statute" florida's administrative procedure act, fla. stat. ann. � 120.68. having dismissed all of leib's each of his claims, he loses regardless of the merits of those claims as they might commission's discretion cannot be considered unbridled in light of the additional complaint. in short, as with his arbitrary-and-capricious due process claim, leib transportation are left with no alternative options whatsoever as a result of the doing business as tb limo.com, against this, leib again contends that the district court dismissed his or rule "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and the degree of scrutiny the court applies depends upon the basis for the state law claims is reviewed for abuse of discretion). of factual detail regarding the "similarly situated" requirement, leib's "class of cir. 2008); griffin, 496 f.3d at 1207. employing "[t]oo broad a definition of has been achieved by other means by the person and when application the foregoing line of analysis also applies to leib's police power claim in interstate commerce) are prohibited from utilizing the economical and indeed, as the commission points out, the rule has not been challenged by an out- iii. 9 moshe leib ("leib") appeals from the district court's dismissal of his suit, leib argues that rule 15.5's "purpose of the underlying statute" waiver the application of a single criterion to a single issue -- making out a "class of one was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that the marcus, circuit judge: failed to accept his allegations as true. specifically promotes safety, so long as it promotes the general welfare or some after his waiver request was denied, leib filed the instant suit seeking an cir. 2007)). to prove a "class of one" claim, the plaintiff must show (1) that he taximeter, with the capacity for 15 passengers or less, including the brought under 42 u.s.c. � 1983, against the hillsborough county public leib's substantive due process claims fare no better than his equal protection u.s. court of appeals proper showing," but gave no further guidance as to what might count as such a non-argument calendar either requirement. requirement, any old jalopy might be passed off as a limousine. the luxury wastes mgmt. ass'n v. alabama dep't of envtl. mgmt., 910 f.2d 713, 719-20 plaintiffs are not permitted simply to "rely on broad generalities in identifying a moreover, leib ignores the fact that the "purpose of the underlying statute" safety (say, on the theory that luxury vehicles are generally larger and that larger basis of his arbitrary and capricious due process claim is a sufficient ground for its leib's request on the ground that the prius did not qualify as a "luxury" vehicle, thereby constituting an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." but this 14 to consider whether the law or regulation in question represents an overt form of showing. the district court held that the "proper showing" standard was void for hcptc's complete prohibition of eco-friendly vehicles for use as limousines." ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with." id. at 1092 request to use the prius as a limousine (count iii), by exercising its police power vague and impermissibly burden interstate commerce. the district court dismissed that "principles of fairness" are violated "when the literal application of a rule out-of-state economic interests." s. waste sys, llc. v. city of delray beach, fla., 19 philadelphia v. new jersey, 437 u.s. 617, 624 (1978). however, where a statute by adding the "luxury" requirement to the definition of "limousine" in rule 1.15. we review de novo the district court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to count iv. leib argues that the commission unlawfully exercised its police power vagueness because it was not "set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising result, there is no rational relationship between the luxury requirement and public luxury vehicles by the manufacturer and vehicles that have been complaint. the commission's rules place any special burden on interstate commerce at all. a civil statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it is so indefinite as "really to be other rights invoked in his complaint are fundamental. on the contrary, all of his arguments on that "the purpose of the underlying statute" is too nebulous a standard to provide there, a zoning ordinance provided that a requirement could be waived "upon a february 19, 2009 consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." id. at 498-99. indeed, state borders, or from favoring in-state economic interests at the expense of 1990). otherwise, the law need only have a rational basis -- i.e., it need only be term "luxury" in rule 1.15 is unconstitutionally vague. to overcome a vagueness 7 vehicle's safety, the fact that the prius can operate on the highways of claims fare worse. in count iii, for example, leib asserts that the commission's engquist v. oregon dep't of agric., 128 s. ct. 2146, 2153 (2008) (noting the type of hardship to the person requesting the variance or waiver," and to explain of-state business. rather, leib purports to challenge the rule from within the state situated" requirement must be rigorously applied in the context of "class of one" injunction allowing him to use his prius as a limousine. the complaint alleges that claim. yet leib separately advances a void-for-vagueness claim in count v the another suspect classification, or if the law impinges on a fundamental right, it is services constitute a form of interstate commerce, the hcptc's regulations would decision is simple or one-dimensional -- for example, where the decision involves rational basis. 16 appellant fails to make a minimally complete and comprehensible argument for basis. we agree with the district court that a multitude of rational bases might be similar to eide's," and we expressly refrained from offering any "opinion as to filed passenger, spaciousness and comparison to current industry standards public." id. � 5(1)(a). in adding the luxury requirement to the definition of 11 vehicles are generally safer). the rule survives rational basis review even if it adduced in support of the requirement. thus, for example, without the produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification." heller v. true, show that the challenged regulations are not substantially related to the public i. lastly, we reject leib's contention in count vii that the hcptc's rules equal protection rights, and that the commission's rules are unconstitutionally subject to strict scrutiny. eide v. sarasota county, 908 f.2d 716, 722 (11th cir. only the standards that would be applied to a claim which involves a grievance others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in affects other similarly situated persons who are subject to the rule." even commission, arguing that luxury vehicles are no safer than non-luxury vehicles, and that, as a hillsborough county public transportation rather asserts that the plaintiff "has been intentionally treated differently from nature of the enactment." vill. of hoffman estates v. flipside, hoffman estates, rule demonstrates that the purpose of the underlying statute will be or our holding that employment rights do "not enjoy substantive due process protection" because county, ga., 285 f.3d 1319, 1325 (11th cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks "underlying statute" to which rule 15.5 alludes -- the enabling act under which the transportation commission ("hcptc," or "the commission") for denying him municipalities." see act of may 25, 2001, ch. 2001-299, � 2(1). plainly, granting no. 08-14271 uniquely modified so as to provide "luxury" limousine service. the rule is substantially related to health, safety, or the general welfare; it is whether federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law circumstances but not in others. in this case, for example, granting leib a dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as constitutional, and the burden is on the one attacking the law to negate every living, he has abandoned that claim on appeal. the claim would have failed in any event given mckinney v. pate, 20 f.3d 1550, 1560 (11th cir. 1994). nor does leib claim that any of the transportation service. leib argues that the hcptc violated his due process and southwest airlines co., 385 f.3d 1324, 1330 (11th cir. 2004) (legal claims not briefed before will be or has been achieved by other means," or "when application of a rule would capricious due process claim fails. like equal protection claims, substantive due 13 ________________________ limousine in major metropolitan areas, assuming such allegations are accepted as doe by doe, 509 u.s. 312, 320 (1993). rather, a statute is presumed claim" as one of several closely related substantive due process claims, the dispute 12 challenge, statutes must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable test for evaluating equal protection claims."). since the commission's rules discretion" claim was not distinct from their equal protection and due process 15 bay area. seeking to offer customers an "environmentally-friendly" alternative to as explained above, leib is simply incorrect in asserting that the district court amendments) and we accordingly deem count i to have been waived. access now, inc. v. 733, 738 (11th cir. 2006) (district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "multi-dimensional, involving varied decisionmaking criteria applied in a series of hardship" or would "violate principles of fairness." notably, leib does not contest constitution does not require precision; all that is required is that the language unlawfully (count iv), and by granting "unbridled discretion" to administrative has not asserted his "unbridled discretion" claim clearly enough to permit our warner robins, ga., 311 f.3d 1334, 1337 (11th cir. 2002). "when legislation n.1 (11th cir. 2008) (quoting griffin indus. v. irvin, 496 f.3d 1189, 1202 (11th tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the at issue in that case involved a zoning ordinance. we specifically "consider[ed] by specifying additional criteria -- the vehicle's interior and exterior aesthetics, its because leib makes no allegation that he belongs to a suspect class or that thomas k. kahn hillsborough county under the `taxicab' label, and the emergence of the prius as a "class of one" equal protection claim can be an onerous task, and properly setting dismissal. see, e.g., tyler v. runyon, 70 f.3d 458, 465 (7th cir. 1995) ("[i]f an claims). in particular, it is difficult to distinguish leib's "unbridled discretion" this is simply false: an environmentally-friendly vehicle may qualify as a with respect to the first prong, we have frequently noted that the "similarly discretionary application of a variegated set of factors (e.g., aesthetic 17 authority is exercised "based on subjective, individualized determinations"). the local benefits." pike v. bruce church, inc., 397 u.s. 137, 142 (1970). rule purports merely to regulate travel in the tampa bay area. we doubt whether moshe leib, rules and decisions were "arbitrary and capricious." although leib appears to 2 10 rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 108 (1972)). the supreme court has explained that the of a rule would create a substantial hardship or would violate leib's "class of one" claim undeniably falls far short of the mark. indeed,