Pre-Judgment Interest Squabble on Age Discrimination Judgment

prejudgment interest was simply a clerical error. motions to relief, the district court ordered reinstatement as well as back ii principally argues that the district court's failure to award winslow's motion as time-barred. winslow now appeals, prejudgment interest under the back pay act. that act him on the briefs was david h. shapiro. to winslow. winslow v. ferc, no. 84-1316 (j.a. 60-65). that his motion � which was filed two and a half years after the merits of his prejudgment interest argument. the the "correction of all agency records, including plaintiff's no. 08-5228 i mandatory prejudgment interest are governed by rule 59(e) different where prejudgment interest is available as a matter lawrence, assistant u.s. attorney. for rule 59(e) motions. 489 u.s. 169, 175 (1989) (emphasis states department of energy, whether under rule 60, rule 69, or rule 70, winslow asserts motions are not subject to time constraints, he asks us to reach of right." id. at 176 n.3. the court explained that courts and relief granted) (j.a. 62). it also included other relief such as 376, 378 (4th cir. 1994); pogor v. makita u.s.a., inc., 135 with interest." 5 u.s.c. � 5596(b)(2)(a). (no. 1:84-cv-1316-jmf) had unlawfully fired john winslow on the basis of age. as judiciary headed by "one supreme court." u.s. const. art. attorney at the federal energy regulatory commission, john we affirm the judgment of the district court. the entry of judgment and because winslow's motion was prejudgment interest on his back pay award, winslow the entry of judgment. therefore, the district court denied v. appeal from the united states district court osterneck on this question of mandatory prejudgment "payment of backpay in the gross amount of $179,126.34." amend the judgment. the problem for winslow was that kavanaugh, circuit judge: after losing his job as an compensation to prevailing plaintiffs." id. at 30. judgment." fed. r. civ. p. 60(a). winslow alternatively rule 59(e) motions must be filed no later than 10 days after (1989). we therefore affirm the judgment of the district for appellees. with her on the brief were jeffrey a. taylor, under rule 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake or a motion question have reached the same result. see crowe v. bolduc, (1989), the district court classified winslow's motion as a winslow contends that he is entitled under the back pay filed two and a half years after the entry of the judgment, the before: sentelle, chief judge, and griffith and treated winslow's claim as a rule 59(e) motion to alter or winslow's argument faces an insurmountable hurdle, however � namely the supreme court's decision in osterneck moved for prejudgment interest, which he claimed was letter and in spirit � is a critical aspect of our hierarchical supreme court has flatly stated, however, that motions for court's decision in osterneck. vertical stare decisis � both in 4 merits of the district court's judgment" and thus is governed by rule 59(e). id. at 177 n.3. respect to the components of the award. the stipulation so ordered. two and a half years later, winslow moved to obtain argued september 24, 2009 decided december 1, 2009 a different course" than the osterneck court and to allow 6 pay and other benefits. winslow v. ferc, no. 84-1316, at 2 (d.d.c.) (stipulation to 365 f.3d 86, 92 (1st cir. 2004); kosnoski v. howley, 33 f.3d federal energy regulatory commission and united interest: the five other courts of appeals to consider the suggests that his motion may be characterized as a motion after a bench trial, the district court found that ferc the district court awarded back pay; the court's order did not in accord with the supreme court's decision in included a precise calculation of the back pay due winslow: litigants are best served by a "bright-line rule" and that even a interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 69 or 70 to enforce the judgment. because those 2 language of the supreme court, even if technically dictum, f.3d 384, 387 (6th cir. 1998); mccalla v. royal maccabees prejudgment interest: "we do not believe the result should be arguing that the motion is better categorized as a motion legal question regarding interpretation of rule 59(e). winslow's. see brown v. secretary of the army, 918 f.2d court also addressed the related issue of mandatory official personnel folder" and "payment of an additional "a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment 214, 218 (d.c. cir. 1990). jane m. lyons, assistant u.s. attorney, argued the cause district court ruled that winslow's motion was untimely. correct clerical errors fall under rule 60(a); under that rule, a include prejudgment interest. several years later, winslow kavanaugh. united states court of appeals "comports with the congressional and judicial policies ferc paid winslow $179,126.34 � full back pay without the back pay act provides that back pay awards "shall be this appeal followed. we exercise de novo review of this and, therefore, by its 10-day filing requirement. see motion for mandatory prejudgment interest "implicates the generally must be treated as authoritative." united states v. clerical error may be corrected "whenever one is found in a dorcely, 454 f.3d 366, 375 (d.c. cir. 2006). we note, winslow sued and prevailed on an age discrimination claim. for the district of columbia circuit applies to employment discrimination suits such as court. v. bankers life & cas. co., 888 f.2d 678, 682 (10th cir. payable with interest," 5 u.s.c. � 5596(b)(2)(a), and the act for the district of columbia added). more to the point for present purposes, the osterneck act to receive prejudgment interest on his back pay award. we decline winslow's invitation to flout the supreme the district court's entry of judgment � was timely. $931.36 for health expenses." id. at 2-3 (j.a. 62-63). the district court accepted the parties' stipulation and 3 kavanaugh, circuit judges. v. ernst & whinney. in that case, the supreme court held that rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. because motions for mandatory prejudgment interest under rule 60(a). iii, � 1. and as we have said before, "carefully considered osterneck v. ernst & whinney, 489 u.s. 169, 176-77 n.3 moreover, that we are not alone in choosing to adhere to life ins. co., 369 f.3d 1128, 1132 (9th cir. 2004); mcnickle 1989). rule 59(e) motions must be filed no later than 10 days after winslow contends that osterneck's statement regarding interest. provides that certain awards of back pay "shall be payable favoring the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws via full in light of what he views as a clear legal entitlement to appellees u.s. attorney at the time the brief was filed, and r. craig 5 winslow br. at 29-30. he says that his position better john f. winslow, osterneck v. ernst & whinney, 489 u.s. 169, 176-77 n.3 opinion for the court filed by circuit judge appellant mandatory prejudgment interest is dicta. he urges us to "take richard l. swick argued the cause for appellant. with mandatory under the back pay act. the district court under rule 59(e)" and is subject to the strict 10-day time limit issued an order directing ferc to make the listed payments the parties entered into a stipulated agreement with under rule 69 or 70 to enforce the original judgment.