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Legal Group Seeks Permission to Interview Former Jurors


Clyma v. Sunoco, Case No. 08-5153 (C.A. 10, Feb. 3, 2010)

A civil jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff Clyma and against Defendant Sunoco in the employment discrimination dispute underlying this matter. With cross-appeals pending in this Court, Movant Oklahoma Employment Lawyers Association (OELA) submitted to the district court an “Application for Permission to Interview Jurors for Instructional Purposes” pursuant to N.D. Okla. L.R. 47.2.1 OELA is a group of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers providing continuing legal education to employment law litigators. OELA sought leave to contact the jurors “for the purpose of providing educational information to members of the bar regarding jury dynamics in employment law cases.” In support of its request, OELA asserted a First Amendment right to juror access. The district court denied OELA’s application in a minute order, and OELA sought review by way of direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Clyma and Sunoco subsequently settled their differences and filed a stipulation to dismiss their appeals. We entered an order dismissing those appeals without delay.

At the outset, we examine our appellate jurisdiction in terms of both OELA’s standing, and more generally, its direct appeal. OELA’s attempt to directly appeal the district court’s order raises a jurisdictional flag because, absent circumstances not present here, a non-party to a district court proceeding such as OELA may not directly appeal an adverse ruling. Such a ruling, however, may be reviewable by way of mandamus as our decision in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986), well illustrates. In Mechem, a publisher petitioned us pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to resolve its post-trial order prohibiting press interviews with jurors. We first held that the publisher had standing to challenge the order: “Journal Publishing alleged an injury in fact because the court’s order impeded its ability to gather news, and that impediment is within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 1235. We next held that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper means by which to seek review: “Because Journal Publishing was not a party and could not challenge the post-trial order on direct appeal, it has no other adequate means to obtain relief.” Id. at 1236. We recognize that unlike the situation before us in Mechem, OELA is not a media organization and has not petitioned us for a writ of mandamus. But as we shall see, neither distinction is in itself sufficient to defeat our jurisdiction over OELA’s case.

As to the standing inquiry, we first note that the media does not have a special right of access to information unavailable to the public. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001). But OELA’s alleged First Amendment right to juror access for the exclusive benefit of its members and the trial bar more generally, apparently raised within both a professional and commercial context, surely does not match the media’s right to access information for the purpose of informing the political thought and behavior of the general public. See Haeberle v. Texas Int’l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, OELA’s request for such access in order to prepare a program to educate a segment of the bar, despite countervailing concerns related to juror privacy and the administration of justice, may not be entirely devoid of First Amendment implications. See id. (describing as “not without First Amendment significance,” an attorney’s and his clients’ unsuccessful request for post-trial jury interviews “to satisfy their own curiosity and to improve their techniques of advocacy”). OELA has standing because it asserts an actual, particularized injury as a result of an alleged constitutional violation traceable to the district court’s order and redressable by a favorable ruling here. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009). OELA may pursue this matter on behalf of its members because (1) OELA’s members would have standing to sue in their own right under the same theory; (2) the interests OELA seeks to protect are related to its organizational purpose; and (3) neither the constitutional claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of OELA’s individual members. See Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1099 (10th Cir. 2006).



 

Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Related Categories: Constitutional-Law
 
Circuit Court Judge(s)Circuit Court Judge Jurisdiction(s)
Eugene E. SilerU.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Bobby Ray BaldockU.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Jerome A. HolmesU.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

 
Amicus Lawyer(s)Amicus Law Firm(s)
John D.W. PartridgeGibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
James Barker LebeckVinson & Elkins

 
Appellant Lawyer(s)Appellant Law Firm(s)
Mark Hammons, Sr.Hammons, Gowens & Assocaites

 
Appellee Lawyer(s)Appellee Law Firm(s)
N Kay Bridger-RileyBridger-Riley & Associates
Laura Lea EakensGibbs Armstrong Borochoff Mullican & Hart
Steven Anthony BroussardHall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C.
Michael Joseph LissauHall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C.

 





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unsuccessful request for post-trial jury interviews "to satisfy their own curiosity and 4 not present here, a non-party to a district court proceeding such as oela may not attorneys who did not participate in the underlying litigation be given access to match the media's right to access information for the purpose of informing the publish organizational purpose; and (3) neither the constitutional claim asserted nor the relief section 1651(a) provides that "all courts established by act of congress may oela's "application for permission to interview jurors for instructional purposes," proceeding. while nothing in the record suggests oela served the district judge direct appeal, where inevitably no court service occurs, as a petition for a writ of correctable on appeal; (3) the district court's order constitutes an abuse of discretion; may not be entirely devoid of first amendment implications. see id. (describing as so ordered. association (oela) submitted to the district court an "application for permission rule 47.2 to the facts of this case. (10th cir. 1986), well illustrates. in mechem, a publisher petitioned us pursuant to movant-appellant. jurors to assist them in the preparation of an educational program for the use and 3 by the petition; and accordingly, we grant oela's petition and issue a limited writ of mandamus (iv) the reasons why the writ should issue. amici curiae. sam clyma, an individual, the trial-court judge may request permission to address the petition but may not do applicable law. but unlike the fifth circuit in haeberle, we are unwilling to cross-appeals pending in this court, movant oklahoma employment lawyers (iii) the facts necessary to understand the issues presented ------------------------------------- directly appeal an adverse ruling. such a ruling, however, may be reviewable by way relevant facts, explains the substantive issue presented, analyzes the issue in some of mandamus as our decision in journal publishing co. v. mechem, 801 f.2d 1233 benefit of members of a professional organization. the closest case we have found, a civil jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff clyma and against defendant as to the standing inquiry, we first note that the media does not have a special (2)(a) the petition must be titled "in re [name of petitioner]." of counties v. bush, 455 f.3d 1094, 1099 (10th cir. 2006). court to resolve its post-trial order prohibiting press interviews with jurors.3 with a copy of its brief consistent with rule 21(a)(1), we do not believe this point filed united states court of appeals upon oela's application and therein lies the fundamental problem in this case. by (b) the petition must state: 9 do so." id. at 1186 (internal quotations omitted). "therefore, we will grant a writ our research suggests that the substantive question presented in this case may important problems of law or issues of first impression. id. at 1187. as we have omitted). in determining whether to issue a writ, we have identified five and that impediment is within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the first 6 "for the purpose of providing educational information to members of the bar the precepts governing our consideration of a petition for a writ of mandamus (d.c. no. 03-cv-809-tck-pjc) the trial-court judge to address the petition or may invite an amicus curiae to do so. involving a participating attorney's unsuccessful request to interview jurors post-trial conclusion" in denying the request under a local rule similar to n.d. okla. l.r. 47.2, at the outset, we examine our appellate jurisdiction in terms of both oela's to interview jurors represents an oft-repeated and manifest, persistent disregard of administration of justice, thereby allowing oela some form of access to the jurors, circuit judges.** v. flores, 129 s. ct. 2579, 2592 (2009). oela may pursue this matter on behalf of unanimously to grant the movant's request for a decision on the briefs without oral ii. for their thorough analysis of the issues raised. provide a copy to the trial-court judge. all parties to the proceeding in disregard of applicable law; and (5) the district court's order raises new and a. and filed a stipulation to dismiss their appeals. we entered an order dismissing those airlines, 739 f.2d 1019, 1022 (5th cir. 1984). nonetheless, oela's request for an instance such as this would allow us only upon the rarest occasion to construe a so unless invited or ordered to do so by the court of appeals." service of briefs on district judges. requiring prior service upon a district judge in the lack of any opposition to oela's application. the apparently novel issue (c) the petition must include a copy of any order or opinion or the media's claim that its appeal was proper under 1291 because the court's order to the district court's order and redressable by a favorable ruling here. see horne amendment." id. at 1235. we next held that a petition for a writ of mandamus the honorable eugene e. siler, united states court of appeals for the sixth james b. lebeck of vinson & elkins llp, houston, texas, and john d.w. & supp. 2009) (discussing the propriety of attorneys' communication with jurors for only when the district court has acted wholly without jurisdiction or so clearly concerned that oela may have filed its notice of appeal out of time, we we in no way suggest that the district court's denial of oela's application (1) a party petitioning for a writ of mandamus . . . directed to a alleged an injury in fact because the court's order impeded its ability to gather news, (i) the relief sought; be one of first impression, namely whether the first amendment requires that mandamus, essentially limiting mcveigh to cases where opposing parties concede parts of the record that may be essential to understand the matters set fed. r. app. p. 21(a)(1) & (2). right under the same theory; (2) the interests oela seeks to protect are related to its alternative means to secure relief; (2) the petitioner will be damaged in a way not lawyers association, 1167, 1178 (10th cir. 2001). but oela's alleged first amendment right to juror corporation, "`nonconclusive guidelines'" under which we ask whether (1) the petitioner has is outcome determinative. federal rules governing direct appeals do not require amici curiae. entered an order to show cause regarding the timeliness of its appeal. but because to improve their techniques of advocacy"). oela has standing because it asserts an seen, oela's only means of relief is mandamus because direct appeal is unavailable its members because (1) oela's members would have standing to sue in their own portions of the district court record necessary to an understanding of its claim. the (4) the district court's order represents an oft-repeated error and manifest, persistent simply denying the application in a minute order without any substantive partridge of gibson dunn & crutcher llp, denver, colorado, as court-appointed so as to enable us to proceed, we observe that oela's appellate brief sets forth the denying its request for juror interviews, and, if so, (2) whether the district court's to interview jurors for instructional purposes" pursuant to n.d. okla. l.r. 47.2.1 tenth circuit ordered submitted without oral argument. political thought and behavior of the general public. see haeberle v. texas int'l accordingly, we conclude that oela has substantially complied with rule 21(a), such access in order to prepare a program to educate a segment of the bar, despite given oela's standing, the next question is whether we may construe its to the district court. the district court is directed to vacate its prior order denying 3 v. no. 08-5153 sunoco in the employment discrimination dispute underlying this matter. with regarding jury dynamics in employment law cases." in support of its request, oela for the northern district of oklahoma address (1) whether oela has standing to challenge the district court's order is a question we are uncomfortable deciding in the first instance, even more so given fell within the collateral order doctrine. we explained that we could justifiably treat the first amendment requires the district court in this case to craft a narrowly application in a minute order, and oela sought review by way of direct appeal for a writ of mandamus. but as we shall see, neither distinction is in itself sufficient are ably set forth in in re cooper tire & rubber co., 568 f.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th mandamus is used only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its ** james b. lebeck; john d.w. actual, particularized injury as a result of an alleged constitutional violation traceable was the proper means by which to seek review: "because journal publishing was not 8 and we have long held that a court's failure to exercise meaningful discretion 5 united states court of appeals compliance with rule 21(a). moreover, a district judge against whom a writ of such response, so that we may direct service at a later date if desirable.4 tailored order utilizing the least restrictive means to protect the jury and the 2 asserted a first amendment right to juror access. the district court denied oela's agreeable to the usages and principles of law." oela is a group of plaintiffs' employment lawyers providing continuing legal denial of that request violated the first amendment. in their joint brief, amici also all parties to the proceeding in the trial court. the party must also abused its discretion as to constitute a usurpation of power." id. (internal quotations exists where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard or the facts that the first amendment interests of the attorney were "plainly outweighed by the elisabeth a. shumaker self-education). 1531 (10th cir. 1997), we recognized a "clear example of an abuse of discretion a party and could not challenge the post-trial order on direct appeal, it has no other february 3, 2010 the all writs act, 28 u.s.c. 1651(a), for a writ of mandamus directing the district the trial court other than the petitioner are respondents for all purposes. right of access to information unavailable to the public. see smith v. plati, 258 f.3d standing, and more generally, its direct appeal.2 posture of oela's request for review, and consequent failure to proceed consistent 4 before us in mechem, oela is not a media organization and has not petitioned us explanation, we cannot say the district court exercised any meaningful discretion. mandamus governed by fed. r. app. p. 21, the time limits set forth in fed. r. app. (ii) the issues raised; cause is discharged. the sealing of district court documents as a petition for a writ of mandamus despite local rule 47.2 provides: "at no time, including after a case has been p. 4 relating to direct appeals have no application. accordingly, the order to show court must file a petition with the circuit clerk with proof of service on prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to juror's interest in privacy and the public's interest in well-administered justice." tenth circuit we conclude that oela's appeal is best construed as a petition for a writ of adequate means to obtain relief." id. at 1236. we recognize that unlike the situation baldock, circuit judge. to defeat our jurisdiction over oela's case. clerk of court conclude anything from the district court's terse denial of oela's request. whether * unimpressed with the inability of oela's counsel to discern the true procedural the district court's order raises a jurisdictional flag because, absent circumstances despite its apparent failure to provide the district judge with a copy of its brief, and now construe its direct appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus under 1651(a).5 mcveigh, 119 f.3d 806 (10th cir. 1997), we construed a press appeal challenging i. plaintiff-appellee, appeal from the united states district court b. 7 forth in the petition. for movant-appellant. had substantially complied with the requirements of fed. r. app. p. 21(a). id. at 10 defendant-appellee. with mechem. counsel's oversight has required the court to waste time and issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and cir. 2009), and we need not repeat them in detail here. importantly, "a writ of oklahoma employment partridge, in addressing whether oela's appeal substantially complies with rule 21(a) 1 argument. see fed. r. app. p. 34(f); 10th cir. r. 34.1(g). this case is therefore record further indicates that oela served its brief on the parties to the underlying is a case where such failure occurred. apparently raised within both a professional and commercial context, surely does not and reconsider the matter pursuant to a meaningful exercise of its discretion in oela's attempt to directly appeal appeals without delay. 809 n.4. before proceeding to the merits, we acknowledged the media's standing access for the exclusive benefit of its members and the trial bar more generally, about which we express no opinion, is the fifth circuit's decision in haeberle detail, and specifies the relief sought. oela's appendix to its brief includes those address our appellate jurisdiction generally. we express our indebtedness to amici provides in relevant part: direct appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus under 1651(a). we are 5 circuit, sitting by designation. under 28 u.s.c. 1291. clyma and sunoco subsequently settled their differences "not without first amendment significance," an attorney's and his clients' before holmes, baldock, and, siler,* haeberle, 739 f.2d at 1022. see generally dale r. agthe, annotation, propriety of -------------------------------------- constitutes an abuse of discretion. for example, in ohlander v. larson, 114 f.3d countervailing concerns related to juror privacy and the administration of justice, mark hammons of hammons, gowens & associates, oklahoma city, oklahoma, resources sorting out its jurisdiction. fortunately for oela, in united states v. education to employment law litigators. oela sought leave to contact the jurors 2 to it. therefore, our discussion focuses on the latter three factors. upon which the exercise of its discretionary judgment is based." id. at 1537. this presented certainly requires the district court to exercise some discretion in ruling mandamus is sought has no right to respond to a petition, unless we invite or order fed. r. app. p. 21(b)(4) provides: "the court of appeals may invite or order and noted that the opposing parties conceded compliance with rule 21(a), which sunoco, inc., a pennsylvania after examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined support of its ultimate determination. for self-education. the fifth circuit agreed with the district court's "implicit held that the publisher had standing to challenge the order: "journal publishing attorney's communication with jurors after trial, 19 a.l.r. 4th 1209, at 3 (1983 authorized by the court, upon written motion." oela assumes the applicability of we first completed, may attorneys approach or speak to jurors regarding the case unless the press appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus if the media had standing and requested requires the participation of oela's individual members. see utah ass'n because no respondent appears in this matter, we appointed amici curiae to


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