Employee's Constitutional Claims Barred by Prior Title VII Lawsuit Dismissal

circuit judge not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, february 3, 2010 united states court of appeals county utah v. salazar, 562 f.3d 1077, 1085 (10th cir. 2009). in doing so, we record on appeal, the parties' appellate briefs, and the relevant case law in light of and this case is no exception. failure to allege sufficient facts"), cert. denied, ___ s. ct. ___, 2010 wl 154973 1565 (10th cir. 1991). mr. merswin, however, challenges the court's on appeal, mr. merswin argues that (1) res judicata does not bar his § 1981 moved to dismiss, asserting that the § 1981 claims were barred by the doctrine of biased because she entered judgment against him in the first lawsuit. an next, we address mr. merswin's assertion that the district court judge was state enough facts to suggest "that the defendant is liable for the misconduct filed a post-judgment motion in the first lawsuit. the court dismissed the raised in the first lawsuit; (2) his constructive discharge claim arose from the 605 f.2d 1169, 1172 (10th cir. 1979); see also q int'l courier, inc. v. smoak, consider whether the complaint "contain[ed] sufficient factual matter, accepted as summary judgment on all claims. we affirmed. merswin v. williams cos., inc., finally, we address mr. merswin's assertions that the district court erred in -6- res judicata and that the § 1985(2) claim did not set forth sufficient facts from for the tenth circuit granted. exercising jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, we affirm. * ground of res judicata, a court may take judicial notice of facts from a prior constructive discharge under § 1981 and conspiracy to obstruct justice with the accusation of bias based on prior rulings almost never demonstrates partiality a remedy under § 1981 for alleged incidents occurring during his deposition; and same reasons stated by the district court in the order dated june 10, 2009. correctly dismissed these claims. accordingly, we affirm for substantially the the judgment of the district court is affirmed. i. background moved to transfer the lawsuit to the northern district of oklahoma. the georgia 1264-65 n.24 (10th cir. 2006). r., vol. 1 at 202-12. a writ of certiorari. merswin v. williams cos., inc., 128 s. ct. 1884 (2008). tenth circuit without converting the rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a fed. r. civ. p. 56 motion for summary judgment so that he could present additional materials; mr. merswin's first lawsuit. the district court granted the motion to dismiss. 129 s. ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting bell atl. corp. v. twombly, 550 u.s. 544, mr. merswin's pro se pleadings. erickson, 551 u.s. at 94; see smith v. united we review the district court's rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. kane dismissing his § 1981 and § 1985(2) claims. upon careful consideration of the plaintiff-appellant, -2- same transaction and time period and is based on the same facts asserted in his rene sawanie merswin, who at all times has proceeded pro se, appeals 441 f.3d 214, 216 (4th cir. 2006) ("when entertaining a motion to dismiss on the alleged." iqbal, 129 s. ct. at 1949. additionally, we liberally construe -4- 244 f. app'x 897 (10th cir. 2007) (unpublished). and the supreme court denied court granted the motion. thereafter, in the northern district of oklahoma, twc therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. this order and judgment is consistent with fed. r. app. p. 32.1 and 10th cir. r. 32.1. (4) he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in his first lawsuit, defendant-appellee. the williams companies, inc., after examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined circuit judge. intent to injure him under § 1985(2). these claims arose out of his employment unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of (n.d. okla.) entered for the court the district court can take judicial notice of its own decision and records in a prior conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights does state a claim that is plausible on we first address mr. merswin's argument that the district court improperly order and judgment* no. 09-5096 v. first lawsuit, and therefore could have been raised in that suit; (3) he cannot seek mr. merswin's allegations of a conspiracy by twc's counsel during his clerk of court dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. see tal v. hogan, 453 f.3d 1244, considers matters outside the complaint, the court should treat a motion to dismiss by twc's counsel during his first lawsuit, challenged the admissibility of his requiring a judge's recusal. liteky v. united states, 510 u.s. 540, 555 (1994). this appeal. see fed. r. app. p. 34(a)(2); 10th cir. r. 34.1(g). the case is bell atlantic corp. to pro se action). to be facially plausible, the complaint must ii. analysis ended in 2004 when his job was outsourced. in 2005, he filed a lawsuit against 42 u.s.c. § 1985(2) claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be -3- united states court of appeals because he either could have raised his allegations of poisoning at his deposition claims; (2) the district court erred by considering matters outside the complaint, deposition were conclusory and unsupported by specific factual averments. true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" ashcroft v. iqbal, consideration of the court's own records from his first lawsuit. it is settled that construction, "[w]e have on several occasions dismissed pro se complaints for and collateral estoppel. it may be cited, however, for its persuasive value -5- on july 1, 2008, mr. merswin filed suit against twc in the united states states, 561 f.3d 1090, 1096 (10th cir. 2009) (noting that despite liberal 42 u.s.c. § 1981 claims as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and his (d.c. no. 4:09-cv-00051-cve-pjc) elisabeth a. shumaker (1) mr. merswin's current retaliation claim is identical to the retaliation claim he which it could be inferred that twc conspired to obstruct justice or interfere with judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of filed district court for the northern district of georgia, alleging retaliation and the court found that the § 1981 claims were barred by res judicata because iii. conclusion termination and the prior legal proceedings. twc made a special appearance and retaliation in violation of title vii of the civil rights act, 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e its face. fact."). thus, the district court did not err in failing to convert the motion to § 1985(2) claim for failure to state a claim that is plausible on its face, because 570 (2007)); see also erickson v. pardus, 551 u.s. 89, 93-94 (2007) (applying mr. merswin's employment with the williams companies, inc. (twc) twc in the united states district court for the northern district of oklahoma (3) the district court judge should have recused; and (4) his § 1985(2) claim for through 2000e-17, and § 1981. the district court granted twc's motion for dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. generally, when a district court before gorsuch and anderson, circuit judges, and brorby, senior stephen h. anderson 534 f.3d 1357, 1361-62 (10th cir. 2008); st. louis baptist temple, inc. v. fdic, the standards of review set forth above, we conclude that the district court deposition testimony in his response to twc's motion for summary judgment, or rene sawanie merswin, alleging race and national origin discrimination, a hostile work environment, and from the district court's order dismissing under fed. r. civ. p. 12(b)(6) his case involving the same parties. see amphibious partners, llc v. redman, considered matters outside his complaint without converting twc's motion to (u.s. jan. 19, 2010). as a motion for summary judgment. see, e.g., miller v. glanz, 948 f.2d 1562,