Lawyer Sues Former Law Firm for $20 Million

efforts at distinguishing schrager and eskridge in the no. 07-cv-314--david r. herndon, chief judge. understanding: the complaint calls this extortion, finan- dismissed with prejudice in september 2006. the one- error is of no consequence. he had before him all he pertinent point that a dismissal can be without prejudice of identical case filed, the second such suit as the first case) against carr. he had filed a counterclaim; and in 1986). the issue was whether an illinois court should have suit on the alternative ground that the rico claim has no the fees to which it entitles him. it has never been explained how any of those acts could federal court. because the claims were different, and there merits. of course if a plaintiff keeps filing the same suit of that power. of suits in an illinois state court. the disputes wasn't much evidentiary overlap, the court held that the n.e.2d 51, 73-74 (ill. 1992); u.s.o. corp. v. mizuho holding co., 115 f.3d 208, 212-13 (3d cir. 1997); deutsch v. flannery, underwriters at lloyd's london, 826 n.e.2d 1089, 1097 (ill. that is called "claim splitting," and is barred by the for the most part the complaint simply renames breach control and his lawyers are neglecting their duties as from actions by the defendants of which he has com- lofy, 914 n.e.2d 248, 258-59 (ill. app. 2009); brzostowski v. missal to preclude relitigation of a claim, and the dismissal (7th cir. 1999); coors brewing co. v. m�ndez-torres, 562 the earlier litigation was pending on appeal, he filed into federal court, and under a statute that entitles a the illinois appellate court held in schrager v. grossman, (though barred by the one-refiling rule) are the allegations 1991). (hence our use of the term "utterly frivolous.") repeated charges in the 2004 suits, as a first refiling, so enforce rico), we must do likewise. cf. mcknight v. which a final judgment on the merits is entered will be relitigation in this suit only of claims arising from acts breach of contract, and a suit charging a conspiracy. motion. be sanctioned under section 1927 is an open question in and one in the trial court of another illinois county. but are him. future--would be allocated among the former partners. it appeals from the united states district court needed in order to be able to rule on the defense, and u.s.c. � 1367) that he brought in federal district court. see a wholesale migration of breach of contract suits common law principle, like its statutory counterpart, is courts. he filed the present suit three weeks after the before posner, ripple, and wood, circuit judges. between carr and the defendants, he will be entitled to remediless, and should not: a litigant can't be allowed to rather than res judicata, which as we explained would not just says that the defendants told the firm's bookkeeper the memorandum, he amended the counterclaim to add court of illinois in the timberlake case. counties were considered different jurisdictions, this just the kind of judicial burdens that inform the policy in issue in this case or any of the previous litigation 2004); williamson v. tucker, 645 f.2d 404, 415-16 (5th cir. had been taken in by the defendants' lies. dictions" for purposes of deciding whether the plaintiff the presumption, however, is that the dismissal of even the defendants also defend the dismissal of the present the same facts as the state-court suits that he filed and "carr does not seek to relitigate issues from the 2004 carr appeals. the defendants cross-appeal from the reply brief, the false statement in the opening brief that spreadsheets that he received showing the amount of fees otherwise courts would spend too much time distin- basis on which that claim can be retained in the district ment in the first case was with prejudice; indeed, it doesn't tions, which complement the award of monetary nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 13 refiling rule adds nothing to res judicata when the judg- such injunctions permit the person enjoined to ask the might require the parties to port issues or evidence from is a refiling is whether, had its predecessor been dismissed this court to sanction carr for misconduct. but we have held that section 1927 is inapplicable to a very weak case should be on the merits rather than missed. sanctions for vexatious litigation, are standard remedies provided that when fees came in to the partner telecommunications corp., 493 n.e.2d 1045, 1053-54 (ill. clear beyond any reasonable doubt that a case doesn't (7th cir. 2004) (per curiam); alexander v. united states, supra, 752 n.e.2d at 5, and as we noted in eskridge v. claim. the defendants did not pay carr the fees to which 582, 583 (7th cir. 2007); montgomery v. davis, 362 f.3d 956 allotted to him. one of these suits, as we'll see, led and this court dismissed carr's appeal as improper, merit. and they are right--so right that it creates doubt so, if carr tried to refile the supplemental claim in state defendants-appellees/cross-appellants. monetary sanction. (the defendants have not asked us to dants refuse to pay him his share on a ground not placed litigation, the first refiling the four 2007 state-court suits filing of the fourth state-law suit, and within days of jennings v. auto meter products, inc., 495 f.3d 466, 472-73 understanding" drafted by carr and agreed to in the rico claim is irrelevant. you cannot maintain a app. 2005); compare skipper marine electronics, inc. v. location of fees; these continued in force when the firm for the seventh circuit or ground of liability that was different from the theory or brought by the other partners (the defendants in this this litigation is groundless. the plaintiff is out of nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 15 state common-law cause of action available to remedy follow suit by merely asking us, without explanation, to commerce, mail fraud, wire fraud, and so on almost ad requires treating the four 2007 suits, insofar as they res judicata to a class of cases in which the decision plaintiff to refile the rico claim; a jurisdictional ruling district court. sassower v. field, 973 f.2d 75, 80 (2d cir. the rico suit was a new action because it was filed 2007 cases were filed in the illinois trial court of one county tions for misconduct in litigation, especially since the tion of this lawsuit; if not, the entire case must be dis- court he would be barred by the one-refiling rule under 1995) (illinois law). the supreme court of illinois. plaintiff indicates a motive to harass. the indication is which they set out at length in their briefs and to which nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 17 before the break up he has filed liens in an attempt to (7th cir. 2007) (per curiam). the complaint in the present the memorandum entitled him to. this omission the fourth--are barred by the one-refiling rule. the fact has inherent power, which is to say a common law power, the reply brief that had not been mentioned in the courts interpret this to mean that a plaintiff who volun- plaintiff to refile his case, albeit (as we noted) not on guishing degrees of weakness. and there is a certain dean, 270 f.3d 513, 518-19 (7th cir. 2001). barred by the one-refiling rule. res judicata and its cousin 1997); ko v. eljer industries, inc., 678 n.e.2d 641, 647-48 (ill. bar a claim that the defendants had violated the memoran- missal orders state that the dismissals are without preju- posner, circuit judge. rex carr, a successful class division of fees; a ninth is pending in missouri; and in at the gun in dismissing the case under rule 12(b)(6). but the impose sanctions for misconduct in the proceedings in second refiled suit isn't really "new." that is not correct, as suits; that creates just the kind of confusion and imposes collateral estoppel. e.g., hill v. potter, 352 f.3d 1142, 1146- (the frauds, extortion, etc.) to avoid honoring their obliga- argued december 4, 2009--decided january 12, 2010 tion. travelers casualty & surety co. of america, inc. v. combat with his former law partners, the defendants in the memorandum of understanding. more than two as well as by his son bruce carr of the rex carr law firm, of contract fraud or crime in an effort to satisfy the require- claim and entered final judgment, pursuant to the memo- him in. the district court is directed to assess a proper they are just the first refiling of a suit (the 2004 litigation) whether the federal courts have subject-matter jurisdic- plicable not only to lawyers who represent clients but litigating is so frivolous that his suits will be dismissed one of the nation's premier law firms, kirkland and ellis, belong in federal court, the parties cannot by agreeing to over and over again, a point will be reached at which his acts are barred by res judicata and all the allegations are this court.) what to pay carr and didn't tell her that it was less than least four other cases that were handled by the law firm the rico claim in this case is weak, indeed feeble. the bring a new suit. criminal. rico is not a proper vehicle for levering a one-refiling rule is thus the extension of the doctrine of yet have preclusive effect; another example, of course, is cases we cited (nowak, river park, etc.), his claim splitting 86 f.3d 1423, 1428 (7th cir. 1996). we once gave the amount merely to a breach of contract claim, which after the state-court suits. failing without excuse to make both suits to proceed until one goes to judgment may n.e.2d 471, 478-79 (ill. 2001); river park, inc. v. city of of carr's counterclaim was involuntary. and we're about different counties of the same state (and neighboring alexander v. united states, supra, 121 f.3d at 316. the that case to the other case. a. e. staley mfg. co. v. swift & arose from the same events that gave rise to carr's four as if this were not enough, those charges (and more, as example of a hypothetical dispute over bananas courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to compensatory damages alone. the district court dis- (ill. 1997); flesner v. youngs development co., 582 n.e.2d plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, we'll see) are also barred by illinois's "one refiling," or, as treated as one, and the third (and thus barred) refiling the pay carr his share of fees as they came in. the complaint corp., 63 f.3d 516, 522 (7th cir. 1995); midwest grinding co. securities law. crowley cutlery co. v. united states, 849 f.2d that the present suit, which carr acknowledges arises from missed with prejudice. law claims as a rico claim. defendants have violated it by not giving the plaintiff fees due after the memorandum of understanding was his lawyers have made no reply. we see no obstacle co., 307 f.3d 1277, 1298-99 (11th cir. 2002). the unlikeli- co., 419 n.e.2d 23, 27 (ill. 1980); combined ins. co. v. certain scope but on the egregiousness of the plaintiff's conduct, judge denied the motion without explanation. they there are two ways of thinking about the application of (1982); allen v. mccurry, 449 u.s. 90, 96 (1980). so if note the failure of his lawyers in this court to cite the cial exploitation of an elderly person, theft in interstate 12 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 schrager case in their opening brief, the disingenuous (ill. 1988); schrager v. grossman, 752 n.e.2d 1, 4 (ill. app. device of charging that the breach was fraudulent, indeed the plaintiffs' lawyers may secretly agree, for they successful plaintiff to treble damages and attorneys' fees. judicata and the one-refiling rule) that its pursuit by the 14 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 1993). the new action is the action filed later; the date this circuit. alexander v. united states, 121 f.3d 312, 315-16 by the dismissal with prejudice of the 2004 suits. the which carr's suits were pending rejected the counter- timberlake v. illini hospital, 676 n.e.2d 634, 636-37 injunction, misconduct by lawyers appearing before it. noting his "refus[al] to accept adverse judicial decisions." the rule to this case. one, which is much the less plausible, may 2004, before the suit was dismissed as required by the second way of applying the one-refiling rule to this dum of understanding. the issue of sanctions as turning not on the statute's he might argue that the defendants' misconduct had a rico case (with a supplemental state-law claim, 28 4 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 be more economical than staying or dismissing one, which which carr may be entitled under the memorandum of declaratory judgment on the allocation of fees, a suit for the previous fee-allocation agreements, which the memo- like res judicata; and a federal court is required to 132 (1st cir. 2006); grantham & mann, inc. v. american cases can proceed, but the judgment in the first case in carr concedes that the one-refiling rule is applicable federal court's docket," or in other words to "improper although the suit is not frivolous, or at least not utterly understanding and that the defendants had violated before it broke up; carr is seeking some $20 million in into the federal courts, given the procedural advantages of so proceeding that we noted earlier. each of the four 2007 state-court suits presented a theory that were dismissed; at best (for him) the refiling of the lying a previous suit, simply by a change of legal theory. part of the st. louis metropolitan area) different "juris- 6 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 dismisses a suit "may commence a new action within later. his multiplication of suits all arising from the 1992). (whether a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer can action lawyer in southern illinois, is locked in mortal he does not protract any one of them unreasonably. a court on jurisdictional grounds. carr has not quite reached abuse of the patience of the courts. the rico claim is a complete nonstarter. but this is true 1-12-10 complaint contains fraud allegations that would create a that would have included all the claims in the five agreement terminating the law firm's practice provided the complaint in this present case is not (quite) just a as we noted in connection with his recasting his state- case, and we think the right way in light of both the illinois national bank, 513 n.e.2d 1041 (ill. app. 1987), held the violations of the memorandum of understanding and dants' motion for sanctions should not have been denied. that the defendants had received, to realize that he had a prima facie rico case, but they are barred by res judicata n.e.2d 1199, 1206-07 (ill. 1996); see also 735 ilcs 5/2-619, northwestern mutual life ins. co., 480 f.3d 499, 501 (7th cir. approach when parallel proceedings are pending in 1077-78 (10th cir. 2007); riccard v. prudential ins. ground that carr's claims are precluded by judgments in so the district court was right to dismiss the entire case by the one-refiling rule) as a violation of rico was an app. 1990). and even if the courts in the different illinois cybernet marine products, 558 n.e.2d 324, 327 (ill. app. the order denying their motion for sanctions is vacated by recharacterizing a breach of contract action (the only the ground on which the dismissal was based. "misconduct that occurs before the case appears on the the complaint in his present suit repeats many of the claim in this suit (insofar as the claim is based just on the standing. receipts with the text of the memorandum, and with the thing not barred by res judicata--yet even it was barred nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 5 alleged in the earlier ones as predicate acts in support of were dismissed is, as we said earlier, irrelevant. trine of res judicata bars, rein v. david a. noyes & co., 665 described by the parties as "securities" so that they could april 2004 by the other former partners. the memoran- res judicata (same transaction or occurrence, same parties this court for the limited interpretation of section 1927 opening brief. the failure to even attempt to rebut the or their privies, etc.) are satisfied. pfaff v. chrysler corp., 610 tions to carr under the memorandum of understanding. infinitum. if such renaming satisfies civil rico, we shall hole by squeezing garden-variety business disputes into enforceable, as the illinois state courts have held, the their abandonment upon the filing of a fifth lawsuit that application of the bar against claim splitting, is a common nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 19 anyway the plaintiff does not complain about the error. ceased to engage in the practice of law in 2003, though the four were a suit for an accounting, a suit seeking a would leave us with three of the four state-court suits filed court, carr filed five lawsuits in place of a single suit initiated by a different one of the adversaries. the parallel res judicata in the other suit if the other requirements for one of the "predicate acts" allegations that seems have prevented him from collecting the fees due him has split his claim between the two courts? the answer is that the illinois rule applies only when the first refiled suit res judicata is an affirmative defense, the defendant should contend are his abusive litigating tactics. this is carr's officers of the state and federal courts by failing to rein were voluntarily dismissed would have no significance; limitations of section 1927 do not apply to the exercise nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 9 the one-refiling rule. suit, arising from the same transaction or events under- safety products, inc., 831 f.2d 596, 606 (6th cir. 1987). rico claim not barred by res judicata is a claim that the jurisdiction or on lack of merit. but we do need to decide parties arising from the same facts was pending in a with prejudice, it would be barred by principles of res 10 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 to see that a plaintiff is not allowed to maintain duplicative the filing of four lawsuits in the illinois state courts and a claim that he had been fraudulently induced to sign one year or within the remaining period of limitation, behind the one-refiling rule. carr argues that despite cases like rein and the other curiam). we mention this because some of the fees to 8 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 filed the claim first in one of the four state-court suits a case, and the courts therefore have an independent v. will county sheriff, 580 f.3d 495, 502 (7th cir. 2009); cooper v. ibm personal pension plan, 240 fed. app'x 133, 135 a suit that is utterly frivolous does not engage the insurance corp. of ireland, ltd. v. compagnie des bauxites counties--madison county and st. clair county, both co., 547 f.3d 749, 750 (7th cir. 2008) (illinois law). allowing duty to refuse to entertain it. on which the previous action was dismissed is irrelevant. especially desperate is that the defendants had committed 1990). different jurisdictions, especially when each suit was excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably meritorious form the basis of a motion on the pleadings litigate it there authorize the federal courts to decide it. more costly. but as far as we can tell from the prolix stayed a case before it because a suit between the same tecting litigants from harassment. f.3d 882, 892 n. 2 (7th cir. 2006). the judge thus jumped litigation," and the improper attempt to raise issues in not barred by res judicata--the alleged nonpayment of laidlaw waste systems, inc., 49 f.3d 337, 338-39 (7th cir. error if the district court lacked jurisdiction. may be required by the court to satisfy personally the eighth suit against the defendants complaining about the claim; and he does not allege that the amount of the fees 1014, 1023 (5th cir. 1991). this interpretation does not pending when the firm ceased practice. a further agree- being overwhelmed by baseless litigation as with pro- breach of contract suit between citizens of the same state ment was also adopted then. disputes over the allocation the partners had several agreements concerning al- incurred because of such conduct." the statute is ap- the judgment was affirmed by the illinois appellate cannot be transmogrified into a rico claim by the facile (7th cir. 1997).) under rule 12(c), which is a motion for dismissal on the 2004); platten v. hg bermuda exempted ltd., 437 f.3d 118, barred from subsequent challenge by the doctrine of court in december 2007 and carr did not seek review by illinois courts would invoke the one-refiling rule to bar missed without prejudice. this would not permit the business deals gone sour"); western associates lp v. by carr in 2007 in one jurisdiction. the second of those suit--that borders on the frivolous, even though he is how much each of the other partners was entitled to. including--and this was the only new claim, the only one judicata. d'last corp. v. ugent, supra, 681 n.e.2d at 16. (the apply, because the rule is about using a voluntary dis- refiling; illinois law does not permit a second one. tion of fees earned but not yet paid by clients in cases raise it and then move for judgment on the pleadings defendants with repetitive litigation, including a suit--this 2007); johnson v. wattenbarger, 361 f.3d 991, 993-94 (7th cir. the parties are not of diverse jurisdiction, there is no 2001). four state-court suits that the plaintiff filed in 2007--that 16 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 dismissed the filing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction up his mind whether he wanted to be in state or federal proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously mainly because the only plausible allegations of predicate leave victims of unreasonable and vexatious litigation because it was too weak even to engage federal jurisdic- rex carr, file repeated meritless suits with impunity just so long as ground in the other three suits, or sought different relief. in the district court. but neither has the plaintiff argued in because they relate to conduct that preceded the alleged chambers v. nasco, inc., 501 u.s. 32, 43-46 (1991); mach fact that the present suit redescribes the wrongful acts an immensely successful lawyer represented on appeal by 2000); d'last corp. v. ugent, 681 n.e.2d 12, 15-16 (ill. app. wanted the federal courts to waste their time with such and the case is remanded for reconsideration of that united states court of appeals "no." a. e. staley mfg. co. v. swift & co., supra, 419 n.e.2d so probably it makes no practical difference whether the an illinois state court, because it is a rule of preclusion, case law and the practicalities of the situation, is to treat made conclusive by the vitriolic tone of the complaint, make no attempt to counter the arguments for sanctions (7th cir. 2009) (illinois law). it is true that fanaro v. first charges in the 2004 suits, including the charge that he 18 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 in the with this observation, the other allegations on which the handled by the law firm (carr korein tillery, llc) complaint, that isn't the nature of his damages claim: he previous suits by him against the same defendants. since doing so voluntarily dismissed all four suits; the dis- that the defendants had received was misrepresented to smaller check than he claims to have been entitled to. the rehash of the 2004 litigation, for it also charges--as do the the plaintiff from bringing the present suit in an illinois for the southern district of illinois. section 1927 of the judicial code, on which the motion courts. both are affirmative defenses and when clearly litigate their dispute in the federal courts under federal doctrine of res judicata. nowak v. st. rita high school, 757 other monetary sanction, or to prevent for the future by an deemed to be res judicata is a dismissal without prejudice.) same dispute was classic claim splitting, which the doc- to the refiling in a federal court of a suit originally filed in years later, in september 2006, the illinois court in the basis on which the illinois courts decide whether a suit court if there is no jurisdiction over the federal claim. even was fraudulently induced to sign the memorandum of nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 3 under rule 12(c). forty one news, inc. v. county of lake, 491 the memorandum also required that the suits be dis- present suit, the fact that the four 2007 state-court suits plaintiffs persist in trying to fit a square peg in[to] a round kremer v. chemical construction corp., 456 u.s. 461, 466-67 april 2007, while the dismissal of carr's counterclaim in was based, provides that a lawyer "who so multiplies the f.3d 662, 664 (7th cir. 2007); mccready v. ebay, inc., 453 rico claim is based dissolve. remember that the only defendants, that he will accept defeat gracefully wants damages for breach of the memorandum of under- amount to the law firm (the shell) for determination of 20 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 supra, 121 f.3d at 315; andrews v. heaton, 483 f.3d 1070, defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity this case might seem similar because three of the four civil rico actions . . . . rico has not federalized every 720, 721 (ill. 1991); gendek v. jehangir, 518 n.e.2d 1051, 1053 f.3d 3, 8-9 (1st cir. 2009); bromwell v. michigan mutual ins. v. spitz, 976 f.2d 1016, 1025-26 (7th cir. 1992) ("civil rico but if the four state-court suits filed in 2007 are treated as 273, 277 (7th cir. 1988). congress would not have rule does any work. for if the first filing was the 2004 four lawsuits against the defendants in illinois state were resolved--or so it seemed--by a "memorandum of so, it is so lacking in merit (most clearly because of res which the plaintiff formed after the break-up of his old contrary, but it was explicitly rejected by the supreme 47 (7th cir. 2003); okoro v. bohman, 164 f.3d 1059, 1062-63 2 nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 for misconduct in litigation. in re anderson, 511 u.s. 364, case asserts wildly that we sanctioned carr because we dants had cut and mailed the check themselves. see corley therefore to invoking the common law ground for sanc- of his lawyers' briefs and oral argument in this court. we dice. illinois law provides that a plaintiff who voluntarily mutual ins. co. v. blaase, 615 n.e.2d 1333, 1335-36 (ill. app. after all, though on the basis of the one-refiling rule previous agreements) how all fees--past, present, and (7th cir. 2007); uniroyal goodrich tire co. v. mutual trading cross-appeal on sanctions is also telling. to punish by an award of reasonable attorneys' fees or tarily dismisses a suit may commence only one new action. ments in) state judicial proceedings. 28 u.s.c. � 1738; under the memorandum. he had only to compare his as much concerned with protecting the courts from the motion complained that carr is harassing the v. that point in this case. thus the suit was properly dis- affirm the denial. refiling, and the third and fourth suits--and, critically, the who had handled a case, he would pay over the entire 823 f.2d 1361, 1364 (9th cir. 1987). this illustrates the that the law firm (in its post-break-up shell form) would app. 1997); eskridge v. cook county, 577 f.3d 806, 808 filing a frivolous appeal--in a suit in which he was not a adopted in the bender case. the defendants have treated also to a lawyer who represents himself, as carr did in the but let's not forget the supplemental state-law claim; as present suit--as further refilings, thus barred by the rule. the judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed, but denial of the stay was proper. this, rather than strict two years ago we sanctioned carr under rule 38 for alleged violations of the memorandum of understanding, turning now to the cross-appeal, we think the defen- made in the defendants' brief even though the district of fees erupted the following year and led to a flurry on an issue that has been fully and fairly adjudicated is jurisdiction of the federal courts. hagans v. lavine, 415 u.s. grounds on which to base a conclusion that a suit is so at 28; tumminaro v. tumminaro, 556 n.e.2d 293, 297 (ill. perversity in a jurisdictional dismissal; it permits the adopted and after carr's counterclaim was filed a month plained in his voluminous filings to date. such injunc- even if the memorandum of understanding is valid and frivolous as not to engage the jurisdiction of the federal ment of establishing "predicate acts" required for a rico nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 due to his former partners. the district court correctly v. rosewood care center, inc., 388 f.3d 990, 1011 (7th cir. prior to carr's filing of the counterclaim in may 2004; for any view of the application of that rule to this case. he firm. fraud by misrepresenting to their bookkeeper what carr made his efforts to obtain damages for breach of contract separate suits. give "full faith and credit" to records of (including judg- de guinee, 456 u.s. 694, 702 (1982); eeoc v. chicago club, was owed, in consequence of which she mailed him a 365-66 (1994) (per curiam); in re city of chicago, 500 f.3d 2007). what that means as a practical matter is that if it is the only claim not barred by res judicata) is his first which it should be, as a simple affirmance would be e.g., in re davis, 878 f.2d 211, 212-13 (7th cir. 1989) (per suits was a first refiling, so the third case--and this case, the first refiling of the 2004 litigation, the illinois rule bars sought to circumvent the absence of diversity jurisdiction suggests that the remedy may be needed in this case. under rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), on the which was drafted by carr himself, and by the character is permitted by illinois law. he cites kellerman v. mci the district court should also consider whether to court's permission to lift the injunction for good cause. enjoin carr from conducting further litigation arising f.3d 747, 751 (7th cir. 2006); see also in re case, 937 f.2d the first of the four suits filed in 2007 as the first in a series whichever is greater." 735 ilcs 5/13-217. the illinois party but into which he had tried to inject himself by market square associates, 235 f.3d 629, 636-37 (d.c. cir. missed the entire case, supplemental claim and all, the defendants didn't invoke this common law power cir. 2008); jogi v. voges, 480 f.3d 822, 825-26 (7th cir. the one-refiling rule are not, in general, appropriate dismissal of the rico claim should be based on lack of that the fourth case was filed before the previous ones it is sometimes called, "single refiling," rule. in march and 528, 536-38 (1974); johnson v. orr, 551 f.3d 564, 570-71 (7th one of the suits was a declaratory judgment action stephen m. tillery et al., randum had superseded. all those charges are barred nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 11 could not have harmed him any more than if the defen- get a bigger share of the fees than the defendants had cook county, supra, 577 f.3d at 807-08. see also rockford of violations of the memorandum. but those allegations state court (as he could have done, because state promptly dismissed in 2007, is a second refiling. he argues nos. 09-1124, 09-1168 7 understanding have not yet been paid. should the defen- randum, dismissing with prejudice all the pending suits. 2007 state-court suits. what is not barred by res judicata conduct in the run up to litigation." bender v. freed, 436 the dispute is over the division of legal fees in cases hood, in view of the history of carr's litigation with the all four arose from the same events or transactions, filing a lien on fees that the district court had ruled were he contends he was entitled by the memorandum of highland park, 703 n.e.2d 883, 893 (ill. 1998); curtis v. denial of their motion for sanctions for what they dum specified (in part by adoption of the terms in the is dismissed before the second one is filed; otherwise the indeed, this is the only approach in which the one-refiling it continued a twilight existence to administer the alloca-